SigPhi · Cicero

On Divination and On the Laws (Yonge Treatises of Cicero)

English · translated by C. D. Yonge

Page 30 of 38

** Imperfect, therefore, as this Treatise of Cicero on the Laws may seem, 1 am persuaded that it is still a very important work, which may give rise to the most seasonable reflections.

*¢'T he First Book, which is full of the sublimest religion and morality, treats of the crigin and essence of law, its causes, its objects, and its operations. It demonstrates the obligation which is imposed on every individual to obey its injunctions, and to contribute his appropriate part to the general good of the society of which he is a member. Cicero tells him that the respect he owes to law is not a mere human decency, but that the Author of nature has invested just laws with so much of his divine authority, that we cannot neglect or violate them without injuring and insulting the Deity, nor without contradicting our moral conscience, which no good man can fail to consult, and which no bad man can oppose without feeling remorse and compunction. He shows us that all the virtues which we ought to cultivate always tend to our own happiness, and that the best means of promoting them consists in living with men in 394 A REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF.

that perfect union and charity which are cemented by mutual benefits. Lastly, he informs us that penal laws have been invented only to restrain those whose love of justice is not suffic.ent to keep them within reasonable bounds. And he concludes by depicting the character of the wise man, who illustrates these propositions in his life and conduct. rf “Tn the Second Book, which treats of religious worship, he discovers an infinity of facts, which serve to undeceive us on the false ideas which are entertained respecting the religion of the ancients. Cicero proves that they also believed and worshipped one true God, in all his wonderful Theophanies and developments, and that the astonishing multiplicity of divinities which they venerated was originally the product of a pious fear, but angmented and often corrupted by the interest of certain parties. The religion, therefore, of the ancient philosophers and sages was only one form of the true theology; and it excites our marsha by showing us how fre-‘quently the grand doctrines of revelation are confirmed by the mythology of the heathens. Thus the great chain of divine truth was preserved entire, even in the midst of that confusion of gods, sacrifices, festivals, and religious ceremonials, so generally idle, ridiculous, or profane.

“The translation of the Third Book is rather a disappointing task, owing to the great lacune which has deprived us of the explanations of a part of the laws which relate to public order. on “ Notwithstanding these defects, we conceive that Cicero’s Treatise on Laws may be advantageously placed in the hands of young students. Those who conduct the education of young people have often been censured for not more extensively instructing them in those practical sciences which hold the closest connexion with real life and business. For want of this, as Petronius Arbiter justly observes, “our students think themselves transported in‘o another planet, when they draw their first breath in the world we live in..

We shall add to this preface of Morabin’s the critical notice of this work on Laws contained in the ‘‘ Cyclopedia Metropolitana:”— “TnCicero’s ‘Treatise de Legibus,” say the editors, “which was written two years later than his Commonwealth. and shortly after the murder of Clodius, he represents himself as explaining to his brother Quintus and Atticus, in their walks through the woods of Arpinum, the nature and origin of the laws, and their actual state in Rome and other countries. Law, he pronounces to be the perfection of reason, the eternal mind, the divine energy, which, while it pervades and unites the whole universe, associates gods and men by the most intimate resemblance of reason and virtue; and still more closely men with men, by the participation of common faculties and affections. He then proves, at length, that justice is not, merely created by civil institutions from the power of conscience, the imperfections of human — Jaw, the moral sense, and the disinteresteduess of virtue. He next CICERO’S TREATISE ON THE LAWS. 395 proceeds to unfold the principles, first, of religious law, under the heads of divine worship, the observance of festivals and games, the office of priests, augurs, and heralds, the punishment of sacrilege and perjury, the consecration of lands, and the rights of sepulchres; secondly, he proceeds to the inyestigation of the civil law, which gives him an opportunity of noticing the respective relations of magistrates and citizens.”

The splendid panegyries which Cicero has here pronounced on divine law and universal justice have given rise to many eulogies, searcely less eloquent, with which the greatest divines, philosophers, and lawyers have adorned their works. A few of these are worth quoting, as theyemay serve to elevate our ideas of the importance of the subject, and induce us to study the topics of jurisprudence with more ardour and perseverance. | Thus, from one brilliant passage in this Book of Laws, has Hooker derived that well-known exordium in his Ecclesiastical Polity, which is indisputably the finest specimen of his eloquence:—“ Of Law no less can be said, than that her seat is the bosom of God, and her voice the harmony of the universe. All things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as feeling her care, and the greatest, as not exempted from her power. Both angels and men, and creatures of what creation soever, though each in different sort and manner, yet all with uniform consent, admiring her as the mother of their common peace and joy.’ Similar panegyrics on Law are found in Cumberland’s Law of Nature and Nations, Cudworth’s Treatise on Eternal aud Immutable Morality, and in the imperishable works of the immortal Seiden.

“This subject,” says Williams, “has been treated with much dignity by a writer who is admired by all mankind for his eloquence, but who is, if possible, still more admired by all competent judges for his philosophy. I allude to Burke, of whom I may justly say that he was ‘gravissimus et dicendi et imtelligendi auctor et magister;’ and I cannot refuse myself the gratification of quoting his words:-—‘ The science of jurisprudence,’ says he, ‘is the pride of the human intellect; for, with all its defects, redundancies, and errors, it is the collected reason of ages, combining the principles. of original justice with the infinite variety of human concerns.’ Dr. Johnsou’s reply to a person who was foolishly abusing the profession of the law, was, ‘ Do you presume, sir, to find fault with that study which is the last effort. of human intelligence acting upon human experience?’ ” * Law,” says Sir W. Blackstone, * is a science which distinguishes the criterions of right and wrong; which teaches us to establish the one, and prevent, punish, and redress the other; which employs in its theory the noblest faculties of the soul, and exerts in its practice the cardinal virtues of the heart. A science which is universal in its use and extent, accommodated to each individual, yet comprehending the whole community.” ¢; Sir), EE LS a 396 A REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF ** The science of jurisprudence,” says Sir James Mackintosh, in his discourse on the Study of the Law of Nature and Nations, “is certainly the most honourable occupation of the understanding, because it is most immediately subservient to the general safety and comfort. There is not, in my opinion, in the whole compass of human affairs, so noble a spectacle as that which is displayed in the progress of jurisprudence; where we contemplate the cautious and unwearied exertions of a succession of wise men through a long course of ages, withdrawing every case as it arises from the dangerous power of discretion, and subjecting it to inflexible rules; extending the dominion — of justice and reason, and gradually contracting, within the narrowest possible limits, the domain of brutal force and arbitrary will.” Granting the justice of these remarks, we cannot help lamenting that the science of jurisprudence or universal law, properly so called, should be so little studied in our British state at present. When we look into the history of literature, we find the times have been, in which men of the most consummate genius devoted that genius with the most ardent perseverance and the most mathematical precision, to the study of jurisprudence in its very loftiest and widest bearings. They hesitated not, through many years of incessant labour, like Grotius abroad and Selden at home, to study the vast system of moral obligations. In order to make themselves jurisconsults worthy of the name, they studied the divine laws handed down in Scripture, and developed in the ecclesiastical policy, ancient and modern. They studied the law of nature and nations, as explained by its oriental - and classical commentators. They studied the civil laws of all states and commonwealths, and, by a kind of comparative analysis, elicited the spirit of laws among all peoples, and confirmed just regulations by examples derived from the catholic experience of men in all ages and countries, and defeated the blunders of legislation, by showing their pernicious consequences under every variety of circumstance. Such men still appear occasionally in Kurope and America. A few such may still grace the colleges, and the inns of court, or the open walks of literature; but their number has certainly become deplorably limited. We scarcely ever can find the man, now-a-days, who has studied jurisprudence in its loftier and broader relations,—a man who, like Grotius, Selden, Montesquieu, or Sir W. Jones, can establish the doctrines of a sage and philosophical legislation by an overwhelming accumulation of testimonies and facts calculated to inspire confidence and ensure success. In consequence, we meet with few who rise to those syncretic and universal maxims of equity and law, which throw a moral radiance through the long current of decisions, simplify the legal economy in its most important branches, and disperse the technical abuses that profane the sanctuary of Themis. Such men are valuable in proportion to their rarity. be deserve the best patronage and promotion that the state can give them; for they are the true prophets and oracles of jurisprudence,—and they Pavia ii |: Pavia ii |: . CICERO’S TREATISE ON THE LAWS. 397 can speak with the force and precision of science, while others are eeerecing through the perilous by-paths of, quackery, pretence, and ap-hazard.

But such men are not encouraged, and consequently their number is insignificant. Legal philosophy is slighted and unrewarded; while legal practice, however erroneous, is profusely paid for. The consequence is so plain and palpable that it has struck most of the Italian, German, and French writers on the subject. They say, “ Britain has no jurists, but she has lawyers in abundance.” (See Filangieri, Savigny, Pastoret, Constant, Guizot, Sismondi, Chateaubriand, &c.)

This dangerous tendency of the age to sacrifice the higher doctrines of political and legal philosophy,—such as most tend to develop the national mind and national resources,—to a merely secular practice, which will take any form and impression for the sake of interest and emolument, is too much noted. ‘‘ These lower studies,” says the author of the Natural History of Enthusiasm, “fall in marvellously well with the frigid timidity of the times, and the love of practical utility. But that kind of discretion which can sacrifice truth for the sake of lucre, is always short-sighted and fraught with peril.” ' We do sincerely believe that a sound knowledge of jurisprudence is quite as necessary as a familiarity with the practice of our courts, for all those who would truly deserve the name of legal reformers. And we more strenuously insist on this indispensable combination of theory and practice in relation to legal reforms, because it affords us the only hope of those ameliorations which have become of the utmost importance to the welfare of the British empire. 5 BOOK I.

INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST BOOK.

Marcus Triurvs Cicero has composed this treatise in the form of a dialogue, in which himself, his brother Quintus, and Atticus, are the interlocutors. Cicero supposes this dialogue to take place near his villa at Arpinum, on the banks of the river Liris, and beneath the Shade of a grove, in the midst of which grew an ancient oak. The - sight of this tree reminds Atticus of the oak which Cicero had described in a poem which he once composed in honour of Marius. From this circumstance he takes occasion to compliment Cicero on his poetry. The conversation then turns upon history; and Quintus observes, that he knew no one better able than his brother to write the history of his country,and presses him to undertake it. This Cicero declines, and turns the discourse to the subject of universal justice, and the law of nature and nations.

I. Atticus.—I recognise this as the very grove, and this oak, too, as the oak of Arpinum, the description of which I have often read in your poem on Marius. If that oak still exists, this must certainly be it: and, indeed, it appears extremely old.

Quintus Cicero.—Yes, my Atticus, it does exist, and always will exist, for it is a nursling of genius. No such long-lived stock can be planted by the care of the agriculturist as may be sown by the verse of the poet.

Atticus.—How can that happen, my Quintus? And what sort of seed is that which poets can sow? For you seem to me, in eulogizing your brother, to be putting in a word for yourself, Quintus.—You may say that if you please, but as long as the Latin language is spoken, an oak which will be called Marius’s oak will never be wanting in this place; and as Sceevola said of my brother’s poem on Marius, it will Extend its hoary age through countless years. Unless, indeed, you believe that your Athenians have been able really to preserve the olive in their citadel free from ON THE LAWS) * 399 death, or that tall and slender palm-tree which the people of Delos show to this day, is the same which Homer’s Ulysses says that he had beheld at Delos; and there are many other things, in many places, the memorial of which endures beyond the term of any possible natural existence: this eeprsnionessis, 3 oak, then, out of which there once did fly Jove’s golden eagle, dazzling as the sun, is at present the genuine tree. But when storms and the lapse of ages shall have wasted it, there will still be found an oak on this sacred spot, which will be called the Oak -Marius.

_ Aitticus.—I do not doubt it; but there is one qiieation which I would ask, not of you, but of the poet Marcus himself; whether the tree is indebted for its celebrity to his verses alone, or whether the circumstance which they record really happened in the history of Marius?

Marcus Cicero.—I will answer you frankly; but not till you have first informed me what you think of the tradition which asserts, that not far from your house at Rome, Proculus Julius beheld our first king Romulus walking after his decease, and that Romulus told him that he had become a god, and that his name was Quirinus; and he ordered a temple to be dedicated to him on that spot. Tell me also what you think of the tradition of the Athenians, who maintain that not far from your Athenian villa, Boreas made a stolen match with Orithya, for so runs the story.

Atticus.—For what purpose do you ask me such gs “18 as these?

Marcus.—For no purpose at all, unless it be to convince you that we had better not inquire too critically into those remarkable accounts which have been thus handed down by tradition.

Atticus —But there are many statements in your Marius which are the subjects of inquiry as to whether they are true or false; and some people expect the strictest accuracy from you, because the events of which you speak are fresh in men’s memory, and because you are speaking of one who, like yourself, was a native of Arpinum.

Mareus.—I myself, also, should be unwilling to gain the reputation of a liar, But ‘yet some of these inquisitors, my 400 * ON THE LAWS.

Atticus, show great ignorance of the subject, who expect an exact statement of matters of fact in a work of this nature, as | if the author were not a poet, but a witness. And yet, I doubt not that these critics really believe that Numa did converse with Egeria, and that the Eagle did really replace his cap on the head of the first Tarquin.

Quintus.—I understand you, my brother; you think that the laws which ought to bind a historian are quite different from those which require to be observed in a poem.

Marcus.—Certainly; inasmuch as the main object of the former is truth in all its relations, while that of the latter is amusement; although in Herodotus,’ the father of Greek history, and in Theopompus, we find fables in great numbers.

Il, Atticus.—I have now found the opportunity which I wanted, and I shall not let it slip.

, Marcus.—What opportunity, Atticus?

_ Atticus—Men have long ago asked, or rather implored ‘you, to write a history; for they conceive that if you undertook this literary enterprise, the result would be that, even in the historical department, we should be nowise inferior to Greece, And if you will listen to my opinion, it seems to me that you owe this gift, not only to the affection of those who are delighted with literature, but to your country too, in order that, since you have saved her, you should endeavour likewise to adorn her. For a good history is a desideratum in our national literature, as I know by my own experience, and.as I have often heard you declare. Now, there is no man more likely than yourself to give general satisfaction in a work of this kind, since by your own avowal, it is of all the 1 There is nothing more unjust and false, than the charges made by the Romans against the truthfulness of Herodotus and the Greek historians in general. As for Herodotus, in particular, there is no historian in any language more scrupulous to relate nothing which he does not believe to be true. He also considered it not inconsistent with the province of a historian, to record such reports as were communicated to him by the priests and other natives of the countries of which he was speaking. But he not only gives his authorities, so as to enable us to judge for ourselves how much trust may be reposed in them, but he often even states expressly that he does not believe the story which has been told him. In fact, the Greck historians were as a body very scrupulous lovers of truth, And the first author who ever undertook to write a history utterly regardless of the truth of his statements, and too careless to make the slightest inquiry, was Livy.: Se eee eee eh forms of composition that which most demands the eloquence of the orator.

Wherefore, I entreat you, undertake this work, and devote your time to this employment, which has been hitherto unknown to our fellow-citizens, or at least neglected by them. For after the annals of the chief Pontiffs, than which nothing can be more interesting,’ we come to the ‘book of Fabius, or of Cato, whom you are always eulogizing, or to the treatises of Piso, Fannius, and Venonius; though perhaps one of them may be more vigorous than another, still are they not all extremely defective? The contemporary of Fannius, Ccelius Antipater, adopted a bolder style of expression. He had, indeed, some energy, was rude and rough, without much polish or skill, but he served as a sort of warning to his successors, to write with more accuracy and eloquence.. But unfortunately he had for his successors a Gellius, a Claudius, an Asellio, who, far from improving on him, relapsed into the dulness and insipidity of earlier writers.

I scarcely need to mention Attius. His garrulity is not without neatness, though he has derived it not so much from the learned Grecian authors, as from the petty Latin scrib-— blers. In his style he is prolix, and full of conceits, which he indulges in the most shameless manner. His friend Sisenna far surpasses all our historical writers, unless there be any whose compositions have not yet been published, and of whom we cannot judge. He, however, has never gained a name as an orator among those of your rank; and in his history he betrays a sort of puerility. He seems to have read no Greek author but Clitarchus, and he is content to * imitate him; but even if he were to succeed in his imitation, he would still be far enough from the best style. Therefore the task of historian of right belongs to you, and we shall expect you to accomplish it, unless Quintus can bring forward any reasonable objections.

IIL. Quintus.—I have nothing to say against it. Indeed we have often talked over the subject together, and I have made the same request as yourself; but there is a slight disagreement between us on the subject.

1 The reading of MSS. is jwcundius. But many critics propose to read jujunius, more scanty; which would certainly make better sense.

DE NAT. ETC. DD ali.

A tticus.—How so!

Quintus.—Why, respecting the a from whence he should eommence his history. For, in my opinion, he ought to go back to the most distant ages, since the accounts that have hitherto been published respecting those times are so written as never to be read. But he himself, on the other hand, wishes to confine himself to the events that have hap- ‘pened within the recollection of his own age, so as only to describe those public affairs in which he himself bore a part. Atticus.—In this respect I rather agree with him. For the grandest events in Roman history are probably those that have taken place within our own recollection. And then, too, he will be able to illustrate the praises of our noble friend Pompey, and describe the memorable year of his own consulship, which I would much rather have related by him than anything about Romulus and Remus, as the saying is.

Marcus.—\1 know, my Atticus, that you and other friends have long urged me to this undertaking, nor should I be at all unwilling to attempt it, if I could find any free and leisure time. But. it is vain to enter on so extensive a work while my mind is harassed with cares, and my hands are full of business. Such an undertaking requires a perfect freedom from care and political business.

Atticus,—What can you mean? What leisure time did you ever find for those other works of which you have. written more than any other of our Roman authors?

. Marcus. —Why, certain spare times occur to every man, and these I make a rule not to lose. For instance, if I spend a few days in rusticating at my country seat, I employ them in composing a part of those essays which I may have determined to write. But an historical work cannot be begun at all unless one has leisure time prepared beforehand, nor can it be completed in a short time. And my mind is thrown into a miserable state of suspense when, after having fairly com- ‘macneéd some work, I am drawn away in some other direction; nor do I find it as easy to recover the train of ideas in works.80 interrupted, as to bring works when begun at once 10 a conclusion.

Attiews.—Your argument, then, would. show that you re- _ quire an appointment as ambassador, or some similar free and unoccupied holiday, for -_ Pee) Marcus.—\ would rather trust to the holiday to which I am entitled by my age, especially asI do not refuse, after the method of our ancestors, to continue the custom of giving magisterial advice to my clients, and thus to discharge the offices of old age gracefully and honourably. And in such a situation, I should be able to give as much time as I might choose, not only to the work which you require, but to others still more extensive and important.. ti IV. Attiews—I fear that few will accept such an apology for your retirement, and that you will be obliged to speak in public as long as you live. And I regret this the more, as you have already changed your manner of delivery, and have instituted another style of eloquence. So that as your friend Roscius the actor, in his old age, was forced to give up his most brilliant modulations, and to adapt the instrumental accompaniments to a slower measure; so you also, my Cicero, find | it necessary daily to relax from those lofty conflicts of oratory | to which you have been accustomed, so that your eloquence ‘is already not much removed from the gentle conversation of — philosophers...Aud since the extremest old age is still capable of undergoing that amount of exertion, I see that your retirement will never be allowed to excuse you from pleading causes. | Quintus.—But I indeed think that the citizens of Rome might be induced to sanction your retirement from public life, if you still consented to plead in legal matters..So, whenever you please, I think you ought to try.

Marcus.—Your advice, my Quintus, would be excellent if there were no danger in taking stich a step. But I fear that in thus. seeking to diminish my labours, I should rather increase them; and that I might find that I had united to the toil of public causes and prosecutions (which I never attempt to plead without full preparation and meditation) the addition of this professional interpretation of the laws, which would not distress me so much by its labour, as by its tendency to deprive me of that time for deliberation as to what I should speak, without which I never ventured to enter on any considerable: pleadings. jee te. Atticus.—Why should you not then, in this spare time, as you callit, at present, explain these very points to us, and write usa treatise on the civil law with more accuracy than others have DD2 hitherto employed. For even from your earliest youth, I remember that you used to study the laws, when I used to go, like yourself, to hear the lectures of Sczvola; nor did I ever find you so addicted to oratorical pursuits as to neglect your legal studies.

Marcus.—You seek to engage me in a long discussion, my Atticus. However, I will not hesitate to undertake it, unless Quintus prefers some other subject.. If not, I will tell you all I know about it, since at present we seem to be at leisure.

Quintus.—I shall listen to you with the greatest pleasure, for what better subject can be discussed, or how can the day be spent more profitably?

Marcus.—Let us go, then, to our accustomed promenade, and to the benches, where, after we have had walking enough, we may lie down. Nor shall we want for entertainment while asking different questions of one another.: Atticus.—Let us go, then, and enter on our investigations, as we walk along the bank of the river under the shadow of its foliage. And now begin, I beg of you, to explain to us your opinion respecting the nature of Civil Law.

Marcus.—My opinion? Why, that we have had many great men in Rome, who have made it their profession to expound it to the people, and explain its doctrines and practice. But though they professed to be acquainted with its great principles, they were in reality familiar rather with its minuter technicalities. For what can be grander or nobler than the jurisprudence of a state? or what can be so insignificant ag the office of those men who are consulted as advocates, necessary as it is for the people? Not that 1 think that those who adopt this profession have been altogether ignorant of the principles of universal legislation, but they have united their _ practice of this civil law, as they call it, to just so much as | gives them a hold on the interests of the people. But the great principles of jurisprudence are unknown, and less necessary in practice. What, then, is it that you invite me to? or what.are you exhorting me to? to write treatises on the rights of common sewers and partition walls? or to compose formulas of stipulations and judgments? These have been already most diligently prepared by many persons, and are _ lower than the topics which, I suppose, you expect me to — discuss,: a V. Alticus.—But, if you ask what I expect, I should reply, that after having given us a treatise on the Commonwealth, it appears a natural consequence that you should also write one on the Laws. Yor this is what I see was done by your illustrious favourite Plato, the philosopher whom you admire and prefer to all others, and love with an especial affection, Marcus.—Do you wish, then, that, as he conversed at Crete with Clinias, and Megillus of Lacedzemon, on that summer’s day, as he describes it, in the cypress groves and sylvan avenues of Cnossus, often objecting to, and at times approving of, the established laws and customs of commonwealths, and discussed what were the best laws; so we also, walking beneath these lofty poplars, along these green and umbrageous banks, and sometimes sitting down, should investigate the same subjects somewhat more copiously than is required by the practice of the courts of law?; Atticus.—I should like to hear sucha discussion.

Marcus.—But what says Quintus?

- Quintus.—There is no subject which I would rather hear argued..., Marcus.—And you are quite right. For, take my word for it, in no kind of discussion can it be more advantageously displayed how much has been bestowed upon man by nature, and how great a capacity for the noblest enterprises is implanted in the mind of man, for the sake of cultivating and perfecting which we were born and sent into the world, and what beautiful association, what natural fellowship, binds men together by reciprocal charities: and when we have explained these grand and universal principles of morals, then the true fountain of laws and rights can be discovered.

Atticus.—In your opinion, then, it is not in the edict of: the magistrate, as the majority of our modern lawyers pretend, nor in the Twelve Tables, as the ancients maintained, but in the sublimest doctrines of philosophy, that we must seek for the true source and obligation of jurisprudence, | Marcus.—For in this discussion of ours, my Atticus, we are not inquiring how we may take proper caution in law, or what we are to answer in each consultation,—that may indeed be an important affair, as in truth it is; and at one time it was supported by many great men, and is at present ex+ 406 ON THE LAWS: pounded by one most eminent lawyer with admirable ability and skill.

But the whole subject of universal law at jurispr udence must be comprehended in’ this discussion, in order that this which we call civil law, may be confined in some one small and narrow space of nature. For we shall have to explain the true nature of moral justice, which must be traced back from the nature of man. And laws will have to be considered by which all political states should be governed. And last of all, shall we have to speak of those laws and customs of_ nations, which are framed for the use and convenience of par= ticular countries, (in which even our own people will not be omitted,) which are known by the title of civil laws.

VI. Quintus.—You take a noble view of the subject, my brother, and go to the fountain-head, in order to throw light: on the subject of our consideration; and those who treat. civil law in any other manner, are not so much pointing out the paths of justice as those of litigation.

Marcus.—That is not quite the case, my Quintus. It is not.so much the science of law that. produces litigation, as the ignorance of it. But more of this by-and-by. At pre= sent: let us examine the first principles of Right. _ Now, many learned men have maintained that it springs from law. I hardly know if their opinion be not correct, at least according to their own definition; for “ law,” say they,: “is the highest reason implanted in nature, which prescribes those things which ought to be done, and forbids the contrary.” And when this same reason is confirmed and estax blished in men’s minds, it is then law.

They therefore conceive that prudence is a law, hens | operation is to urge us to good actions, and restrain us from: evil ones. And they think, too, that the Greek name for law (vdj0s), which is derived from: véno, to distribute, implies the very nature of the thing, that is, to give every man his due. The Latin name, lex, conveys the idea of selection, a legendo. According to the Greeks, therefore, the name: of law implies an’ equitable distribution: according to the Romans, an — equitable selection. And, indeed, both characteristics mene 4 pearly to law..

_And if this be a correct statement, which it seems to me for the most part to be, then the origin of right is to be — ON THE LAWS. 407.