sought in the law. For this is the true energy of nature,—~ this is the very soul and reason of a wise man, and the test. of virtue and vice. But since all this discussion of ours relates to a subject, the terms of which are of frequent occur-) rence in the popular language of the citizens, we shall be sometimes obliged to use the same terms as the vulgar, and to call that law, which in its written enactments sanctions what it thinks fit by special commands or prohibitions.
- Let us begin, then, to establish the principles of justice on that supreme law, which has existed from all ages before any legislative enactments were drawn up in ba li or any political governments constituted.
Quintus.—That will be more convenient, and more sensible with reference to the subject of the discussion which we have. determined on.
Marcus.—Shall we, then, seek for the origin of justice at: its fountain-head? when we have discovered. which, we shall be in no doubt to what these questions which we are examin-~ ing ought to be referred.
Quintus. —Such is the course I would advise.
Atticus,—I also subscribe to your brother’s opinion.
Marcus.— Since, then, we wish to maintain and preserve the constitution of that republic which Scipio, in those six books which I have written under that title, has proved to be: the best, and since all our laws are to be accommodated to the kind of political government there described, we must also treat of the general principles of morals and manners, and not limit ourselves on all occasions to written laws; but I purpose to trace back the origin of right from nature itself, who will be our best guide in conducting the whole discussion.
Atticus.—You will do right, and when she is our guide it is absolutely impossible for us to err. — VII. Marcus.—Do you then grant, my Atticus, (for I know my brother’s opinion already,) that the entire universe is regu~ lated by the power of the immortal Gods, that by their nature; reason, energy, mind, divinity, or some other word of clearer. signification, if there be such, all things are governed and directed’? for if you will not grant me this, that is what L ot begin by establishing., : Atticus—I grant you all you can desire. But owing te this singing of birds and babbling of waters, I fear my fellowlearners can scarcely hear me. | Marcus.—You are quite right to be on your guard; for even the best men occasionally fall into a passion, and they will be very indignant if they hear you denying the first article of that notable book, entitled “The Chief Doctrines of Epicurus,” in which he says “that God takes care of nothing, — neither of himself nor of any other being!” | Atticus.—Pray proceed, for I am waiting to know what advantage you mean to take of the concession I have made ou.
Marcus.—I will not detain you long. This is the bearing which they have on our subject. This animal—prescient, sagacious, complex, acute, full of memory, reason, and counsel, which we call man—has been generated by the supreme God in a most transcendent condition. for he is the only creature among all the races and descriptions of animated beings who is endued with superior reason and thought, in which the rest are deficient. And what is there, I do not say in man alone, but in all heaven and earth, more divine than reason, which, when it becomes right and perfect, is justly termed wisdom?
There exists, therefore, since nothing is better than reason, and since this is the common property of God and man, a eertain aboriginal rational intercourse between divine and human natures. But where reason is common, there right reason must also be common to the same parties; and since this right reason is what we call law, God and men must be considered as associated by law. Again, there must also be a communion of right where there is a communion of law. And those who have law and right thus in common, must be considered members of the same commonwealth.
And if they are obedient to the same rule and the same authority, they are even much more so to this one celestial regency, this divine mind and omnipotent deity. So that the entire universe may be looked upon as forming one vast commonwealth of gods and men. And, as in earthly states certain ranks are distinguished with reference to the relationships of families, according to a certain principle which will be discussed in its proper place, that principle, in the nature ef things, is far more magnificent and splendid by which men ON THE LAWS. 409° are connected with the Gods, as belonging to their kindred and nation.
VIII. For when we are reasoning on “universal nature, we are accustomed to argue (and indeed the truth is just as it is stated in that argument) that in the long course of ages, and the uninterrupted succession of celestial revolutions, there arrived a certain ripe time for the sowing of the human race; and when it was sown and scattered over the earth, it was animated by the divine gift of souls. And as men retained from their terrestrial origin those other particulars by which they cohere together, which are frail and perishable, their immortal spirits were ingenerated by the Deity. From which circumstance it may be truly said, that we possess a certain consanguinity, and kindred, and fellowship with the heavenly powers, And among all the varieties of animals, there is not one except man which retains any idea of the Divinity. And among men themselves, there is no nation so savage and ferocious as not to admit the necessity of believing in a God, however ignorant they may be what sort of God they ought to believe in. From whence we conclude that every man must recognise a Deity, who has any recollection and knowledge of his own origin.
Now, the law of virtue is the same in God and man, and in no other disposition besides them. This virtue is nothing else than a nature perfect in itself, and wrought up to the _~™most consummate excellence. There exists, therefore, a. similitude between God and man. And as this is the case, what connexion can there be which concerns us more nearly, and is more certain?- | _ Therefore, nature has supplied such an abundance of supplies suited to the convenience and use of men, that the things which are thus produced appear to be designedly -bestowed on us, and not fortuitous productions. Nor does this observation apply only to the fruits and vegetables which gush from the bosom of the earth, but likewise to cattle and the beasts of the field, some of which, it is clear, were intended for the use of mankind, others for propagation, and. others for the food of man, Innumerable arts have likewise been discovered by the teaching of nature, whom reason has imitated, and thus skilfully discovered all things necessary to the happiness of life, ok” A A IX. With respect to man, this same bountiful nature hath: not merely allotted him a subtle and active spirit, but also. physical senses, liké so many servants and messengers. And’she has laid bare before’him the obscure but necessary » explanation of many things, which are, as it were, the foun-, dation of practical knowledge; and in all respects she has given him a convenient figure of body, suited to the bent of. the human character. For while she has kept down the countenances of other animals, and fixed their eyes on their. food, she has bestowed on man alone an erect stature,' and prompted him to the contemplation of heaven, the ancient. home of his kindred immortals. So exquisitely, too, has she fashioned the features of the human face, as to make them indicate the most recondite thoughts and sentiments. For our eloquent eyes speak forth every impulse and passion of owr souls; and that which we call expression, which cannot exist in any other animal but man, betrays all our feelings, the power of which was well known to the Greeks, though they have no name for it.
I will not enlarge on the wonderful faculties and qualities of the rest of. the body, the modulation of the voice, and the. power of oratory, which is the greatest instrument of influence upon human society. For these matters do not all belong to the present occasion or the present subject, and_ I think that Scipio has already sufficiently explained them in. those books of mine which you have read.
_ Since, then, the Deity has been pleased to create and adorn: man to be the chief and president of all terrestrial creatures, so it is evident, without further argument, that human nature: has also made very great advances by its own intrinsic energy; that nature, which without any other instruction than her own, has developed the first rude principles of the 1 Oyid has versified this idea: Pronaque cum spectent animalia csetera terram, Os homini sublime dedit; ecelumque tueri -Jussit et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus, —Met. i. 86.
Which may be translated— And while all other creatures from their birth With downeast eyes gaze on their kindred earth; -. He bids man walk erect, and scan the heaven ‘ From whence his soul has sprung, to which his hopes are given. - ON THE LAWS. 41} understanding, and strengthened and perfected reason to all the appliances of science and art.
X. Atiicus.—Oh ye immortal Gods! to what a distance back are you tracing the principles of justice! However, you are discoursing in such a style that I will not show any impatience to hear what I expect you to say on the Civil Law. But I will listen patiently, even if you spend the whole day in this kind of discourse; for assuredly these, which perhaps you are embracing in your argument for the sake of others, are grander topies than even the subject itself for which they prepare the way.
Marcus.—You may well describe these topics as grand, which we are now briefly discussing. But.of all the questions which are ever the subject of discussion among learned men, there is none which it is more important thoroughly to understand than this, that. man is born for justice, and that law and equity have not been established by opinion, but by nature. ‘This truth will become still more apparent if we investigate the nature of human association and society.
For there is no one thing so like or so equal. to another, as in every instance man is to man. And if the corruption of customs, and the variation of opinions, did not - induce an imbecility of minds, and turn them aside from the course of nature, no one would more nearly resemble himself than all men would resemble all men. Therefore, whatever definition we give of man, will be applicable to the whole human race. And this is a good argument that there is no dissimilarity of kind among men; because if this were the case, one definition could not inblintte all men.
In fact, reason, which alone gives us so many advantages over beasts, by means of which we conjecture, argue, refute, discourse, and accomplish and conclude our designs, is assuredly common to all.men; for the faculty of acquiring knowledge is similar in all human minds, though the knowledge itself may be endlessly diversified. By the same senses we all perceive the same objects, and those things which move the senses at all, do move in the same way the senses of all men. And those first rude elements of intelligence which, as I before observed, are the earliest developments of thought, are similarly impressed upon all men; and that faculty of speech which is the interpreter of the mind, agrees in the ideas which it conveys, though it may differ in the words by which it expresses them. And therefore there exists not a man in any nation, who, if he adopts nature for his guide, may not arrive at virtue.
XI. Nor is this resemblance which all men bear to each other remarkable in those things only which are in accordance with right reason, but also in errors. For all men alike are captivated by pleasure, which, although it is a temptation to what is disgraceful, nevertheless bears some resemblance to natural good; for, as by its delicacy and.sweetness it is delightful, it is through a mistake of the intellect adopted as something salutary. . And by an error scarcely less universal, we shun death as if it were a dissolution of nature, and cling to life because it keeps us in that existence in which we were born. Thus, likewise, we consider pain as one of the greatest evils, not only on account of its present asperity, but also because it seems the precursor of mortality. Again, on account of the apparent resemblance between renown with honour, those men appear to us happy who are honoured, and miserable who happen to be inglorious. In like manner our minds are all similarly susceptible of inquietudes, joys, desires, and fears; nor if different men have different opinions, does it follow that those who deify dogs and cats, do not labour under superstition equally with other nations, though they may differ from them in the forms of its manifestation.
Again, what nation is there which has not a regard for kindness, benignity, gratitude, and mindfulness of benefits? What nation is there in which arrogance, malice, cruelty, and unthankfulness, are not reprobated and detested? And while this uniformity of opinions proves that the whole race of mankind is united together, the last point is that a system of living properly makes men better. If what I have said meets your approbation, I will proceed; or if any doubts occur to you, we had better clear them up first.
Atticus.—There is nothing which strikes us, if I may reply for both of us.
_ XII. Marcus.—It follows, then, that nature made us just that we might share our goods with each other, and supply each other’s wants, You observe in this discussion, whenever I speak of nature, I mean nature in its genuine purity, but that there is, in fact, such corruption engendered by evil customs, that the sparks, as it were, of virtue which have been given by nature are extinguished, and that antagonist vices arise around it and become strengthened.
But if, as nature prompts them to, men would with deliberate judgment, in the words of the poet, “being men, think nothing that concerns mankind indifferent to them,” then would justice be cultivated equally by all. For to those to whom nature has given reason, she has also given right reason, and therefore also law, which is nothing else than right reason enjoining what is good, and forbidding what is evil. And if nature has given us law, she hath also given us right. But she has bestowed reason on all, therefore right has been bestowed on all. And therefore did Socrates deservedly execrate the man who first drew a distinction between utility and nature, for he used to complain that this error was the source of all human vices, to which this sentence of Pythagoras refers—“ The things belonging to friends are common”—and that other, “Friendly equality.” From whence it appears, that when a wise man has displayed this benevolence which is so extensively and widely diffused towards one who is endowed with equal virtue, then that phenonemon takes place which is altogether incredible to some people, but which is a necessary consequence, that he loves himself not more dearly than he loves his friend. For how can a difference of interests arise where all interests are similar? If there could be ever so minute a difference of interests, then there would be an end of even the nature of friendship, the real meaning of which is such, that there is no friendship at all the moment that a person ‘prefers anything happening to himself rather than to his friend.
Now, these preliminary remarks have been put forward as a preparation for the rest of our discourse and argument, in order that you may more easily understand that nature herself is the foundation of justice. And when I have explained this a little more at large, then I will proceed to the consideration of that civil law from which all these arguments of mine are derived.
XIII. Quintus.—Then you have not much to add, my ‘brother, for the. arguments you have already used have suf- ‘A414 ON THE LAWS.
ficiently proved to Atticus, or at all events to me, that nature is the fountain of justice.
Atticus ——How could I maintain any other opinion, since -you have now established these points —first, that we have been provided as we are and adorned by the gifts of the Gods; -secondly, that all mankind have but one similar and common principle of living together; and, lastly, that all men are bound together by a certain natural indulgence and affection, as well as social rights? And as we have, rightly as I think, admitted the truth of these principles, how can we, with any consistency, separate from nature that law and justice which are her moral developments?
Marcus.—You are quite right, and that is the proper view of the case. But in conformity with the method of philoso-‘phers, (1 do not mean the older sages of philosophy, but those modern ones, who have erected a magazine, as it were, of wisdom,) those questions which were formerly discussed loosely and unconstrainedly, are now examined with strictness and distinctness. Nor will these men allow that we have done justice to the subject which we have now before us, unless we demonstrate in a distinct discussion that right is ‘a part of nature.
Atticus.—You seem to have renowned your liberty in debate, my Cicero; or are you become a man who, in dis-‘cussion, rather follows the authority of others, than develops his individual sentiments?
Marcus.—N ot always, Atticus. But you see what the line of this present conversation is, and how the main object of this whole discussion is to strengthen the foundation of com-‘monwealths, to establish their forces, and to benefit their ‘population. I am, therefore, particularly anxious to avoid arguments which have not been thoroughly examined and carefully considered. Not that I expect to demonstrate my doctrine to the satisfaction of all men, for that is impossible; -but I hope to do so to that of those who think that all just and honourable things deserve to be cultivated even for their own sake, and that nothing whatever can be properly called a good which is not. intrinsically praiseworthy, or at least that there can exist no great good whatever which is truly laudable on its own account.
All the philosophers who flourished in the. old academy ON THE LAWS, ALD ‘with Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemon, or those that followed Aristotle and Theophrastus, agréeing with them in doctrine, though they might differ in their method of explaining it—whether, like Zeno, they preserved the same principles, while they changed the terms of exposition,—or whether, like Ariston, they supported that difficult and ‘arduous sect now generally scattered and confuted, which supposed that, with the exception of virtue and vice, all other things were completely equal and indifferent: all these have ‘adopted the principles which I have been explaining.
But those who indulge their appetites and pamper their ‘passions, and who estimate all the objects of their pursuit or avoidance in life by pleasure and pain, even if they speak truth, (for there is no need of raising the question here,) we may ‘still desire to be content with talking in their own gardens, and entreat them to retire for a while from all connexion with the state, of which they know nothing, and have never wished to know anything. <As to that new academy, of which Arcesilas and Carneades are the leaders, rand who. attack all sects and parties, we will implore them not to interrupt us in our present discussion; for if they enter upon these subjects, which to us appear to be settled and arranged with sufficient accuracy and learning, they will do great mischief. But I would rather pacify them, and dp not dare to order them off.’
XIV. For in questions of this nature, we uns po expiation without such fumigations as theirs.
But there is no expiation for the crimes and icapiotieg of men. The guilty therefore must pay the penalty, and bear the punishment; not so much those punishments inflicted by courts of justice, which were not always in being, do not exist at present in many places, and even where established are frequently biassed and partial, but those of conscience; while the furies pursue and torment them, not with burning torches, as the poets feign, but with remorse of COnRAASIADR, and the tortures arising from guilt.
But were it the fear of punishment, and not the nature of the thing itself, that ought to restrain mankind from wickedness, what, I would ask, could give villains the least uneasiness, abstracting from all fears of this kind? And yet none 1 There is a hiatus here. bie?
of them was ever so audaciously impudent, but what he either denied that the action in question had been committed by him, or pretended some cause or other for his just indignation, or sought a defence of his deed in some right of nature. And if the wicked dare to appeal to this principle, with what respect ought not good men to treat them?
But if either direct punishment, or the fear of it, be what ‘deters men from a vicious and criminal course of life, and not the turpitude of the thing itself, then none can be guilty of injustice, and the greatest offenders ought rather to be called imprudent than wicked.
On the other hand, those among us who are determined to the practice of goodness, not by its own intrinsic excellence, but for the sake of some private advantage, are cunning rather than good men. For what will not that man do in the dark who fears nothing but a witness and a judge? Should he meet a solitary individual in a desert place, whom he can rob of a large sum of money, and altogether unable to defend himself from being robbed, how will he behave? In such a case our man, who is just and honourable from principle and the nature of the thing itself, will converse with the stranger, assist him, and show him the way. But he who does nothing for the sake of another, and measures everything by the advantage it brings to itself, it is obvious, I suppose, how such a one will act; and should he deny that he would kill the man, or rob him of his treasure, his reason for.this cannot be that he apprehends there is any moral turpitude in such actions, but only because he is afraid of a discovery, that is to say, that bad consequences will thence ensue—a sentiment this at which not only learned men but even clowns must blush. — XY. It is therefore an absurd extravagance in some philosophers to assert, that all things are necessarily just which are established by the civil laws and the institutions of nations. Are then the laws of tyrants just, simply because they are laws? Suppose the thirty tyrants of Athens had imposed certain laws on the Athenians? or, suppose again that these Athenians were delighted with these tyrannical Jaws, would these laws on that account have been considered just? For my own part, I do not think such laws deserve any greater estimation than that passed during our own interregnum, which ordained that the dictator should be empowered to put to death with impunity whatever citizens he pleased, without hearing them in their own defence.
For there is but one essential justice which cements society, and one law which establishes this justice. This law is right reason, which is the true rule of all commandments and prohibitions. Whoever neglects this law, whether written or unwritten, is necessarily unjust and wicked.
But if justice consists in submission to written laws and national customs, and if, as the same school affirms, everything must be measured by utility alone, he who thinks that such conduct will be advantageous to him will neglect the laws, and break them if it is in his power. And the consequence is, that real justice has really no existence if it have not one by nature, and if that which is established as such on account of utility is overturned by some other utility.
But if nature does not ratify law, then all the virtues may — lose their sway. For what becomes of generosity, patriotism, or friendship? Where will the desire of benefitting our neighbours, or the gratitude that acknowledges kindness, be able to exist at all? For all these virtues proceed from our natural inclination to love mankind. ‘And this is the true basis of justice, and without this not only the mutual charities of men, but the religious services of the Gods, would be at an end; for these are preserved, as I imagine, rather by the natural sympathy which subsists between divine and human beings, than by mere fear and timidity.
XVI. But if the will of the people, the decrees of the senate, the adjudications of magistrates, were sufficient to establish rights, then it might become right to rob, right to commit adultery, right to substitute forged wills, if such conduct were sanctioned by the votes or decrees of the multitude. But if the opinions and suffrages of foolish men had sufficient weight to outbalance the nature of things, then why should they not determine among them, that what is essentially bad and pernicious should henceforth pass for good and beneficial? Or why, since law can make right out of injustice, should it not also be able to change evil into good?
_ But we have no other rule by which we may be capable of distinguishing between a good or a bad law than that of DE NAT. ETC. EE ) nature. Nor is it only right and wrong which are discriminated by nature, but generally all that is honourable is by this means distinguished from all that is shameful; for common sense has ‘impressed i in our minds the first principles of things, and has given us a general acquaintance with them, by which we connect with virtue every honourable quality, and with vice all.that is disgraceful.; 3 But to think that these differences exist only i in opinion,’ and not in nature, is the part of an idiot. For even the virtue of a tree or a horse, in which expression there is an’ abuse of terms, does not exist in our opinion only, but in nature; and if that is the case, then what is honourable and disgraceful, must also be discriminated by nature.
For if opinion could determine respecting the character of universal virtue, it might also decide respecting particular or _ partial virtues. But who will dare to determine that a man: is prudent and cautious, not from his general conduct, but from some external appearances? For virtue. evidently consists in perfect reason, and this certainly resides in nature. Therefore so does all honour and honesty in the same way.
XVIT. For as what is true and false, creditable and dis. creditable, is judged of rather by their essential qualities than their external relations; so the consistent and perpetual. course of life, which is virtue, and the inconsistency of life, which is vice, are judged of according to their own nature, —and that inconstancy must necessarily be vicious.
We form an estimate of the opinions of youths, but not by their opinions. Those virtues and vices which reside in their moral ‘natures must not be measured by opinions. And so of all moral qualities, we must discriminate between honourable and. dishonowrable by reference to the essential nature of the things themselves.
The good we commend, must needs contain in itself something commendable; for as I before stated, goodness is not ‘a mode of opinion, but of nature. For if it were otherwise, ‘opinion alone might constitute virtue and happiness, which is the most absurd of suppositions. And since we judge of good and evil by their nature, and since good and evil are the first principles of nature, certainly we should judge in the same manner of all honourable and all shameful things, referring them all to the law of nature, De: ON TEE LAWS.’ 419.
ON TEE LAWS.’ 419.
- But we are often too much disturbed by the dissensions of men and the variation of opinions: And because the same thing does not happen with reference to our senses, we look upon them as certain by nature. Those objects, indeed, which sometimes present to us one appearance, sometimes another, and which do not always appear to the same people in the same way, we term fictions of the senses; but it is far otherwise. For neither parent, nor nurse, nor master, nor poet, nor drama, deceive our senses; nor do popular prejudices seduce them from the truth. But all kinds of snares are laid for the mind, either by those errors which I have just enumerated, which, taking possession of the young and. uneducated, imbue them deeply, and bend them any way they please; or by that pleasure which is the imitator of goodness, being thoroughly and closely implicated with all our senses—the prolific mother of all evils. For she so corrupts us by her blandishments, that we no longer perceive some things which are essentially excellent, because they have none of this deliciousness and pruriency.
XVIII. It follows that I may now sum up the whole of this argument by asserting, as is plain to every one from these positions which have been already laid down, that all right and all that is honourable is to be sought for its own sake. In truth, all virtuous men love justice and equity for what they are in themselves; nor is it like a good man to make a mistake, and love that which does not deserve their affection. Right, therefore, is desirable and deserving to be cultivated for its own sake; and if this be true of right, it must be true also of justice. What then shall we say of liberality? Ts it exercised gratuitously, or does it covet some reward and recompense? If a man does good without expecting any recompense for his kindness, then it is gratuitous: if he does expect compensation, it is a mere matter of traffic. Nor is there any doubt that he who truly deserves the reputation of a generous and kind-hearted man, is thinking of his duty, not of his interest. In the same way the virtue of justice demands neither emolument nor salary, and therefore we desire it for its own sake. And the case of all the moral virtues is the same, and so is the opinion formed of them.
Besides this, if we weigh virtue by the mere utility and profit that attend it, and not by its own merit, the one virtue EE2 which results from such an estimate will be in fact a species of vice. For the more a man refers all his actions especially to his own advantage, the further he recedes from probity; so that they who measure virtue by profit, acknowledge no other virtue than this, which is a kind of vice. For who can be called benevolent, if no one ever acts kindly for the sake of another? And where are we to find a grateful person, if those who are disposed to be so can find no benefactor to whom they can show gratitude? What will become of sacred friendship, if we are-not to love our friend for his own sake with all our heart and soul, as people say? if we are even to desert and discard him, as soon as we despair of deriving any further assistance or advantage from him. What can be imagined more inhuman than this conduct? But if friendship ought rather to be cultivated on its own account, so also for the same reason are society, equality, and justice, desirable for their own sakes. If this be not so, then there can be no such thing as justice at all; for the most unjust thing of all is to seek a reward for one’s just conduct.
XIX. What then shall we say of temperance, sobriety, continence, modesty, bashfulness, and chastity? Is it the fear of infamy, or the dread of judgments and penalties, which prevent men from being intemperate and dissolute? Do men then live in innocence and moderation, only to be well spoken of, and to acquire a certain fair reputation? Modest men blush even to speak of indelicacy. And I am ereatly ashamed of those philosophers, who assert that there are no vices to be avoided but those which the laws have branded with infamy. For what shall I say? Can we call those persons truly chaste, who abstain from adultery merely for the fear of public exposure, and that disgrace which is only one of its many evil consequences? For what can be either praised or blamed with reason, if you depart from that great law and rule of nature, which makes the difference between right and wrong? Shall corporal defects, if they are remarkable, shock our sensibilities, and shall those of the soul make no impression on us?!—of the soul, I say, whose turpitude is so evidently proved by its vices. For what is there more hideous than avarice, more brutal than lust, more contemptible than cowardice, more base than stupidity and