2. Second conclusion: Granted that the Emperor were the lord of the 349 world, stili that would not entitle him to seize the provinces of the Indian aborigines and erect new lords there and put down the former ones or take taxes. The proof is herein, namely, that even those who attribute lordship over the world to the Emperor do not claim that he is lord in ownership, but onlyin jurisdiction, and this latter right does not goso far as towarrant him in converting provinces to his own use or in giving towns or even estates away at his pleasure. This, then, shows that the Spaniards can not justify on this ground their seizure of the provinces in question.
A second alleged title to the lawful possession of these lands, and one which is vehemently asserted, is traced through the Supreme Pontiff. For it is claimed that the Pope is temporal monarch, too, over ali the world and that he could consequently make the Kings of Spain sovereign over the aborigines in question, and that so it has been done.
In this matter there are some jurists, who hold that the Pope has full jurisdiction in temporal matters over the whole earth, and they even add that the power of ali secular princes comes to them from the Pope. This is the tenet of Hostiensis on X, 3, 34, 8; also of the Archbishop (pt. 3, tit. 22, ch. 5, § 8); and also of Augustinus Anconitanus. Sylvester holds the same 350 doctrine, making a much more ample and liberal concession of this power to the Pope, under the word infidelitas (§ 7) and under the word Papa (§§ 7j io, ii and 14), and under the word legitimus (§ 4). He has some singular remarks on this topic in the passages mentioned, as, for example, that “the power of the Emperor and ali other princes is sub-delegated as regards the Pope, being derived from God through the medium of the Pope,” and that “all their power is dependent on the Pope,” and that “Constantine gave lands to the Pope in recognition of his temporal power,” and on the other hand that “the Pope gave the Empire to Constantine to his use and profit,” nay, that “Constantine’s act was really not a gift, but merely the retura of what had previously been taken away,” and that, “if the Pope does not exercise jurisdiction in temporal matters outside the patrimony of the Church, this is not for want of authority, but in order to avoid the scandal of the Jews and in order to promote peace”; and many other things even more empty and absurd than these. The sole proof that he gives herefor is in the passages “The earth is the Lord’s and the fulness thereof,”1 and “All power is given unto me, both in heaven and in earth,”2 and the Pope On the Indians, Sect. II.
is the vicar of God and of Christ, and ( Philippians, ch. 2) Christ “for our sake became obedient even unto death,” etc. Bartolus, too, seems to be of this opinion in his comment onthe Extravagans, Ad reprimendum, and 351 St. Thomas seems to favor it at the end of the second book of the Sententiae, the closing words of which are by way of solution of the fourth argument, which is the last of the whole book, namely, that the Pope holds the summit of both kinds of power, both secular and spiritual, and Herveus is of the same opinion in his De potestate Ecclesiae.
This, then, being laid as a basis, the authors of this opinion say as follows: In the first place, that the Pope has free power, on the footing of supreme temporal lord, to make the Kings of Spain rulers over the Indian aborigines. Secondly, they say that, even if it be assumed that he could not do this, at any rate if these aborigines refused to recognize the temporal power of the Pope over them, this would warrant him in making war on them and in putting rulers over them. Now, each of these things has been done. For, first, the Supreme Pontiff granted the provinces in question to the Kings of Spain. Secondly, the aborigines were notified that the Pope is the vicar of God and His vicegerent on earth and it was claimed that they should, therefore, recognize him as their superior, and their refusal furnishes a good ground for making war on them and seizing their lands, etc. Hostiensis, place cited, expressly makes this point, so does Angelus in his Summa.
Now, inasmuch as I have fully discussed the temporal power of the Pope in my Relectio de Potestate Ecclesiastica, I will put my answer to the 352 above into a few brief propositions: 3. First: The Pope is not civil or temporal lord of the whole world in the proper sense of the words “lordship” and “civil power.” This is the conclusion arrived at by Torquemada (bk. 2, ch. 1 1 3), and by Joannes Andreae and by Hugo, on can. 6, Dist. 96. And the most learned Innocent admits, in the above cited X, 1, 6, 34, that he has not temporal power over the Kingdom of France. And it seems the definite opinion of St. Bernard in the second book of his De consideratione, addressed to Pope Eugenius III.
The opposite opinion seems contrary to the precept of our Lord who, {St. Matthew, ch. 20, and St. Luke, ch, 22), says, “ Ye know that the princes of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them,” etc. “But it shall not be so among you.” And contrary also to the precept of the Apostle Peter, “neither as being lords over [God’s] heritage but being ensamples to the flock.”1 And if Christ the Lord had not temporal power, as has been shown in the foregoing discussion to be more probable and as is also the opinion of St. Thomas, much less has the Pope it, he being Christ’s vicar. The above-mentioned thinkers attribute to the Pope that which he has never claimed for himself; nay, he admits the contrary in many passages, as I have shown in the Relectio referred to. And the proof is sufficient, like that given above concerning the Emperor, for no lordship can come to him save either by natural law or by divine law or by human law. Now, it is certain that none comes to him by natural or by human law, and none is Summary of the opinion of the aforementioned.
The author replies in a few proposi¬ tions.
Proposition I.
Franciscus de Victoria The author refutes the arguments of the opposite side.
Proposition II.
Proposisition III.
shown to come to him by divine law. Therefore the assertion is ungrounded and arbitrary.
Further, our Lord’s injunction to Peter, “Feed my sheep,”1 clearly 353 shows that power in spiritual and not in temporal matters is meant. It is, moreover, demonstrable that the Pope has not the whole world for his sphere. For our Lord said (St. John, ch. 10) that there should be “one flock and one shepherd ” at the end of the age. This is sufficient proof that at the present day all are not sheep of this flock. Again, assuming that Christ had this power, it is manifest that it has not been entrusted to the Pope.
This appears from the fact that the Pope is no less vicar of Christ in spiritual than in temporal matters. But the Pope has no spiritual jurisdiction over unbelievers, as even our opponents admit, and, as seems (I Corinthians, ch. 5) to have been the express teaching of the Apostle: “For what have I to do to judge them also that are without?” Therefore he has it not also in temporal matters. And of a truth there is nothing in the argument that, as Christ had temporal power over the world, therefore the Pope also has it. For Christ undoubtedly had spiritual power over the whole world, not less over believers than over unbelievers and could make laws which bound the whole world, as he did with regard to baptism and the articles of faith. And yet the Pope has not that power over unbelievers and may not excommunicate them or forbid their marriage within the degrees permitted by the divine law. Therefore. Also, the fact that, according to the doctors, Christ did not entrust supremacy in power even to the Apostles 354 shows that there is no force in the consequence: Christ had temporal power over the world; therefore the Pope has it too.
4. Second proposition: Even assuming that the Supreme Pontiff had this secular power over the whole world, he could not give it to secular princes. This is obvious, because it would be annexed to the Papacy. Nor can any Pope sever it from the office of Supreme PontifF or deprive his successor of that power, for the succeeding Supreme Pontiff can not be less than his predecessor; and, if some one Pontiff had made a gift of this power, either the grant would be null or the succeeding Pontiff could cancel it.
5. Third proposition: The Pope has temporal power only so far as it is in subservience to matters spiritual, that is, as far as is necessary for the administration of spiritual affairs. This is also the view of Torquemada (as above, ch. 114), and of all the doctors. And the proof of it lies in the fact that an art to which a higher end pertains is imperative and preceptive as regards the arts to which lower ends pertain (Ethics, bk. 1). But the end of spiritual power is ultimate felicity, while the end of civil power is political felicity. Therefore, temporal power is subject to spiritual power. This is the reasoning adopted by Innocent in X, 1, 33, 6; and it receives 355 confirmation from the consideration that, whenever anybody is entrusted with the charge of any office, he is impliedly granted everything without which the duties of the office can not rightly be discharged (X, 1, 29, 1). Inasmuch, then, as the Pope is a spiritual pastor by Christ’s commission On the Indians, Sect. II.
and the discharge of the duties of this office can not be hindered by the civil power (there being no lack in the provision of things necessary either by God or by Nature), it is beyond doubt that power over things temporal has also been left to him so far as is necessary for the government of things spiritual. And on this principle the Pope can infringe civil laws which tend to breed sinners, just as he has infringed the laws with regard to prescription by a party acting in bad faith, as is ciear from X, 2, 26, 20. And on this principle also, when princes are at variance with one another about some right of sovereignty and are rushing into war, he can act as judge and inquire into the claims of the parties and deliver judgment, a judgment which the princes are bound to respect, lest those numerous spiritual evils should befall which are the inevitable results of a war between Christian princes. And although the Pope does not do this or does not do it often, it is not because he can not, as Master Durandus says, but because, for fear of scandal, he wishes to prevent the princes from thinking his motive is ambition or because he is afraid of a revolt from the Apostohc See on the part of 356 the princes. And on this principle the Pope can sometimes depose kings and even set up new kings, as at times has been done. And certainly no one rightly calling himself Christian should deny this power to the Pope. This is the viewheld by Paludanus and Durandus {De jurisdictione ecclesiastica ), and by Henricus Gandavensis (1 Quodlibeta, 6, art. 23). It is in this sense, also, that those numerous rules are to be interpreted which say that the Pope has both swords. The earlier doctors make the same assertion, as also does St. Thomas in the second book of the Sententiae, as above quoted.
Aye, and there is no doubt that in this way bishops have temporal authority within their bishoprics on the same principle that the Pope has iay princes authority in the world. And so they err in speech and in deed, whether note th,sprinces or magistrates, who stnve to prevent bishops from deternng laymen from sin by fines or exile or other temporal punishments. For this is not in excess of their power, provided they do not do it from greed or for gain, but of necessity and for profit in things spiritual. And herein we find a further argument in support of our first conclusion; for if the Pope were lord of the world, a bishop would also be temporal lord in his bishopric, seeing that within his bishopric he also is a vicar of Chnst, but this oui opponents deny.
357 6. Fourth conclusion: The Pope has no temporal power over the Propoji- Indian aborigines or over other unbehevers. This is cleai from proposi- proof 1# tions I and III. For he has no temporal power save such as subserves spiritual matters. But he has no spiritual power over them (I Corinth., ch. c v. 12). Therefore he has no temporal power either.
7. The corollary follows that even if the barbarians refuse to recogmze Coroiiary. any lordship of the Pope, that furnishes no ground for making war on them and seizing their property. This is ciear, because he has no such lordship.
And it receives manifest confirmation from the fact (as will be asserted below and as our opponents admit) that, even if the barbarians refuse to accept Christ as their lord, this does not justify making war on them or Absurdity of the opposite opinion.
Confirmation 2.
Proof 2, and with authority.
Proof 3. Proof 4.
Third Title.
138 Franciscus de Victoria doing them any hurt. Now, it is utterly absurd for our opponents to say that, while the barbarians go scatheless for rejecting Christ, they should be bound to accept His vicar under penalty of war and confiscation of their property, aye, and penal chastisement. And a second confirmation is furnished by the fact that the ground, according to the persons in question, for disallowing compulsion, even if they refuse to accept Christ or His faith, is that it can not be evidently proved to them by natural reasoning. But the lordship of the Pope admits of this proof stili less. Therefore they can not be compelled to recognize this lordship.
Again, although Sylvester discourses at great length on the power of the Pope, yet, under the word infideles (§ 7), he expressly maintains against 358 Hostiensis that unbelievers can not be compelled by arms to recognize this lordship and can not be deprived of their property on this pretext. And Innocent maintains the same in X, 3, 34, 8. There is also no doubt that this was the opinion of St. Thomas too ( Secunda Secundae, qu. 66, art. 8, on obj. 2); Cajetan is express thereon, in his comment on the passage where St. Thomas says that unbelievers cannot be deprived of their property, save only that the subjects of temporal princes can be deprived for reasons known to the law and rendering their subjects in general liable to deprivation. Of a truth, Saracens dwelling among Christians have never been deprived of their property on any such pretext or made to suffer any harm. Why, if this pretext be enough to justify making war on them, it is as much as to say that they can be deprived by reason of their unbelief. For it is certain that none of the unbelievers recognize this lordship. But there is no doctor even among our opponents who would allow that they can be deprived on the mere ground of unbelief. Therefore the allegation of the doctors in question is utterly sophistical, namely, that if the unbelievers recognize the lordship of the Roman Pontiff, war can not be made on them, but that it may if they do not recognize it; for none of them does recognize it.
This shows that the title under discussion can not be set up against 359 the barbarians and that Christians have no just cause of war against them either on the ground that the Pope has made a gift of their lands on the footing of absolute lord or that they do not recognize the lordship of the Pope. This is the opinion maintained by Cajetan at considerable length, on Secunda Secundae, qu. 66, art. 8, on obj. 2. And the authority of the canonists to the contrary ought not to weigh much, because, as said above, these matters are to be discussed with reference to the divine law, and the majority in numbers and weight hold the contrary view, and among the latter is Joannes Andreae. Our opponents have no text in their favor. And even the weighty authority of the Archbishop of Florence is not to be admitted here, for he followed Augustinus Anconitanus, just as in other places he usually follows the canonists. What has been said demonstrates, then, that at the time of the Spaniards’ first voyages to America they took with them no right to occupy the lands of the indigenous population.
Accordingly, there is another title which can be set up, namely, by right of discovery; and no other title was originally set up, and it was in On the Indians, Sect. II.
virtue of this title alone that Columbus the Genoan first set sail. And this seems to be an adequate title because those regions which are deserted become, by the law of nations and the natural law, the property of the first 360 occupant (Inst., 2, 1, 12). Therefore, as the Spaniards were the first to discover and occupy the provinces in question, they are in lawful possession thereof, just as if they had discovered some lonely and thitherto uninhabited region.
Not much, however, need be said about this third title of ours, because, as proved above, the barbarians were true owners, both from the public and from the private standpoint. Now the rule of the law of nations is that what belongs to nobody is granted to the first occupant, as is expressly laid down in the aforementioned passage of the Institutes. And so, as the object in question was not without an owner, it does not fall under the title which we are discussing. Although, then, this title, when conjoined with another, can produce some effect here (as will be said below), yet in and by itself it gives no support to a seizure of the aborigines any more than if it had been they who had discovered us.
Accordingly, a fourth title is set up, namely, that they refuse to accept the faith of Christ, although it is set before them and although they iscusse ' have been adjured and advised to accept it. This title might seem to be K;J^fulneB8 a lawful one for occupying the lands of the barbarians, firstly, on the ground Argument i. that the obligation of the aborigines to receive the faith of Christ results from the passage: “Whoso believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he who believeth not shall be damned.”1 But damnation is not visited on any one except for a mortal sin, and “There is no other name given among men whereby we must be saved” (Acts, ch. 4). Therefore, as the Pope is the 361 minister of Christ, at least in things spiritual, it would appear that at any rate by the authority of the Pope they can be compelled to receive the faith of Christ, and if they reject the demand to receive it they may be proceeded against under the law of war. Nay, it would seem that pnnces may do this on their own authority also, seeing that they are God’s ministers ( Romans, ch. 13), and “revengers [to execute] wrath upon them that do evil.” But those, indeed, do evil who do not accept the faith of Christ.
Therefore they can be coerced by princes.
A second argument is: If the French refused to obey their King, the Argumenta.
King of Spain could compel them to obedience. Therefore, if the Indian aborigines refuse to obey God, who is their true and supreme Lord, Christian princes can compel them to obedience; for the cause of God ought not to be in worse condition than the cause of men. And this is confirmed, as Scotus (bk. 4, dist. 4, qu. 9) argues about the baptism of the children of unbelievers, by the fact that persons ought to be compelled to obey a superior lord rather than an inferior lord. If, then, compulsion may be employed to make these aborigines obey their chiefs, much more may it be employed to make them obey Christ and God.
Franciscus de Victoria Argument 3. St. Thomas, Secunda Se¬ cundae, Confirmation.
Certain propositions in reply. Proposition I.
The contrary opinion of Altissiodorensis, and William of Paris, and Gerson, sc, that unbelief is always a sin, quoted.
I4O A third argument is: If the barbarians publicly blasphemed Christ, they could be compelled by war to cease from such blasphemies, as the doctors admit and as is true. For we could take measures of war against them, if they made a mock of the crucifix or in any other way abused Christian practices by way of insuit, as by jesting imitation of the Sacra- 362 ments of the Church or the like conduct. This is obvious; for if they outraged a Christian sovereign, even one now dead, we could avenge the outrage; much more, then, if they outrage Christ, who is the living King of Christians. This is indubitable; for if Christ were alive in the flesh and pagans wrought an outrage on Him, there is no doubt that we could avenge the outrage by war. So, therefore, in this case. But unbelief is a greater sin than blasphemy, for, as St. Thomas asserts and proves (, Secunda Seciindae, qu. 10, art. 3), unbelief is the gravest of the sins which lie in moral perversity, because it is directly opposed to faith, while blas¬ phemy is not directly opposed to faith, but to the confession of faith.
Unbelief cuts at the root of turning to God, that is, at faith, while blas¬ phemy does not. Therefore, seeing that Christians can proceed by war against unbelievers for their blasphemy of Christ, so they can for their unbelief itself. And the contention that blasphemy is not so great a sin as unbelief is confirmed by the fact that unbelief, is, in a Christian, a capital crime by the civil laws, while blasphemy is not.
8. By way of answer let my first proposition be: Before the barbarians heard anything about Christianity, they did not commit the sin of unbelief 363 by not believing in Christ. This proposition is precisely that of St. Thomas in Secunda Secundae, qu. 10, art. 1, where he says that in those who have not heard of Christ unbelief does not wear the guise of sin, but rather of punishment, such ignorance of things divine being a consequence of the sin of our first parent. “Such unbelievers as these,” says he, “are indeed open to condemnation for other sins,...but not for the sin of unbelief.” Accordingly our Lord says (St. John, ch. 15): “If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin.” St. Augustine, in his exposition of this passage, says it refers to the sin of unbelief in Christ. St. Thomas says the same ( Secunda Secundae, qu. 10, art. 6, and qu. 34, art. 2, on obj. 2).
This proposition is opposed to the teaching of many doctors and especially to that of Altissiodorensis, 3 p.,1 on the question, Utrum fidei possit suhesse falsum, where he says that ignorance not only of Christ, but of any article of faith is not invincible ignorance in any one, for if a man does what in him lies, God will illuminate him either through the doctor that is within him or through a doctor outside, and so it is always a mortal sin to believe anything contrary to articles of faith. He takes an illustration from an old woman to whom a bishop might preach something contrary to an article of faith. And he lays down the general proposition that 364 ignorance of divine law excuseth none. William of Paris was of the same opinion and supported it by the same kind of argument. For either, says he, such an one does what in him lies and therefore will receive illumina- 1 Summa aurea sententiarum: Paris edition (1500), fol. cxxxv, coi. 4 at end.
On the Indians, Sect. II.
tion, or if he does not this, he is without excuse. And Gerson ( De spirituali vita animae, lect. 4) appears to be of the same view. “Doctors are unanimous,” says he, “that in matters of the divine law there is no room for invincible ignorance, seeing that God will always help him who does what in him lies, and He is ready to enlighten the mind as far as will be necessary for salvation and the avoidance of error.” And Hugo de Sancto Victore (xbk. 2, pt. 6, ch. 5) says that none is excused by ignorance for breach of the command to receive baptism, for he could have heard and known, had it not been for his own fault, as was the case with Cornelius ( Acts, ch. 10).
Adrian gives precision to this doctrine, in his Quodlibeta, qu. 4. “There is,” says he, “a two-fold distinction in matters of the divine law. There are some matters to the knowledge of which God does not oblige every one universally, such as the nice problems of the divine law and difficulties with regard to this law and with regard to Holy Scripture and the Commandments; in these matters there may well be a case of invincible ignorance, even if a man does all that in him lies. There are other matters to the knowledge of which God obliges all men generally, such as the articles of faith and the universal commandments of the law; of these it is true, as 365 the doctors assert, that ignorance thereof is not excused. For if any one does what in him lies, he will be illuminated of God through either the doctor that is within him or a doctor from without.”
Nevertheless, the conclusion above stated is entirely in accord with St. Thomas’s doctrine. The proof of it is as follows: Such as have never heard anything, however much they may be sinners in other respects, are under an invincible ignorance; therefore, their ignorance is not sin. The antecedent is evident from the passage ( Romans, ch. 10): “How shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard, and how shall they hear with¬ out a preacher?” Therefore, if the faith has not been preached to them, their ignorance is invincible, for it was impossible for them to know. And what Paul condemns in unbelievers is not that they have not done what in them lies in order to receive illumination from God, but that they do not believe after they have heard. “Have they not heard?” says he, “Yes, verily, their sound went into all the earth.” That is the ground of his condemnation, inasmuch as the Gospel has been preached over all the earth; he would not otherwise condemn them, whatever other sins they Hugo de S. Victore, of the same opinion.
So also in part Adrian.
Rejecting the views of these persons, the author prores his own proposition.
might have.
This shows that Adrian was also mistaken in another point,with regard ^srj®£fabout to the subject-matter of their ignorance; for in the same note he says, with JJJjjJctl0 °Ut regard to the subject-matter of morals, that if a man bestows all industry matter of and diligence in getting to know that which behoves him, this is not enough lgnoranceto procure him an excuse for his ignorance, unless by repentance of his sins 366 he specially prepares himself to be illuminated by God. Suppose, then, a man is in doubt about a certain business arrangement and makes inquiry of learned men and tries in other ways to find out the truth and thinks that the thing is lawful; if it really is not lawful and he does it, he is without 1De Sacramentis Christianae fidei.
Franciscus de Victoria The author’s reasoning against Adrian.
The author’s opinion what ignorance is sin, what is not. The author again confirms his proposition.
The mistake of the afore* named authors explained.
Proposi¬ tion II.
excuse, if in another respect he is in sin, because he does not do all that in him lies to conquer his ignorance, and although it be admitted that were he to render himself amenable to grace he would not receive illumination, stili he is without excuse so long as he does not remove the hindrance in question, that is, his sin. Accordingly, if Peter and John are in doubt in the same case and business matter and bestow equal human diligence, and each thinks the thing is lawful, but Peter is in grace, while John is in sin, Peter’s igno¬ rance is invincible, but John’s is vincible, and if they both embark on the business, Peter is excused and John is not. Adrian, I say, makes a mistake here, as I have shown at length in my discussion on Prima Secundae on the topic of ignorance. For it would be strange to say that there is no topic of the divine law on which an unbeliever, aye, any one who is in mortal sin, can be invincibly ignorant. Nay, it would follow in the case of the abovenamed Peter, who was in grace and whose ignorance on some point about usury or simony was invincible, that his ignorance would become vincible merely by his falling into mortal sin, which is absurd.
9. I say accordingly on this point that negligence with regard to the 367 subject-matter is requisite for ignorance, even though it be vincible, to be imputed as, and to be, a sin, as, for example, that the man refused to hear