or did not believe what he did hear; and on the other hand I say that for invincible ignorance it is enough that the man bestowed human diligence in trying to learn, even if in other respects he is in mortal sin. And so on this point our judgment is the same concerning one in sin and one in grace, both now and immediately after Christ’s coming or after His passion.
Adrian could not deny that after our Lord’s passion the Jews in India or in Spain were invincibly ignorant of His passion, however much they were in mortal sin; nay, he himself has expressly conceded this in his first quaestio, fourth point, on the topic de observantia legalium. And it is certain that the Jews who were away from Judaea, whether they were in sin or not, had invincible ignorance about baptism and about the faith of Christ. Just as 368 there could at that time be a case of invincible ignorance on this matter, so there may also be nowadays among those who have not had baptism declared to them. But the mistake which the doctors in question make is in thinking that when we postulate invincible ignorance on the subject of baptism or of the Christian faith it follows at once that a person can be saved without baptism or the Christian faith, which, however, does not follow. For the aborigines to whom no preaching of the faith or Christian religion has come will be damned for mortal sins or for idolatry, but not for the sin of unbelief, as St. Thomas ( Secunda Secundae, as above) says, namely, that if they do what in them lies, accompanied by a good life according to the law of nature, it is consistent with God’s providence and He will illuminate them regarding the name of Christ, but it does not therefore follow that if their life be bad, ignorance or unbelief in baptism and the Christian faith may be imputed to them as a sin.
10. Second proposition: The Indians in question are not bound, directly the Chriscian faith is announced to them, to believe it, in such a On the Indians, Sect. II.
way that they commit mortal sin by not believing it, merely because it has been declared and announced to them that Christianity is the true religion and that Christ is the Saviour and Redeemer of the world, without miracle or any other proof or persuasion. This proposition is proved by the first: For if before hearing anything of the Christain religion they were excused, they are put under no fresh obligation by a simple declaration and announcement of this kind, for such announcement is no proof or incentive to belief. Nay, as Cajetan says (on Secunda Secundae, qu. 1, art. 4), it would be rash 369 and imprudent for any one to believe anything, especially in matters which concern salvation, unless he knows that this is asserted by a man worthy of credence, a thing which the aboriginal Indians do not know, seeing that they do not know who or what manner of men they are who are announcing the new religion to them. And this is confirmed by what St. Thomas says {Secunda Secundae, qu. 1, art. 4, on obj. 2, and art. 5, on obj. 1), namely, that matters of faith are seen and become evident by reason of their credibility. For a believer would not believe unless he saw that the things were worthy of belief either because of the evidence of signs or for some other reason of this kind. Therefore, where there are no such signs nor anything else of persuasive force, the aborigines are not bound to believe. And this is confirmed by the consideration that if the Saracens were at the same time to set their creed before them in the same way and without anything more, like the Christians, they would not be bound to believe them, as is certain.
Therefore they are not bound to believe the Christians either, when without any moving or persuasive accompaniments they set the faith before them, for they are unable, and are not bound, to guess which of the two is the truer religion, unless a greater weight of probability be apparent on one side. For this would be to believe hastily, which is a mark of levity of heart, as Ecclesiasticus, ch. 19, says. Further confirmation is furnished by the passage in St. John, ch. 15: “If I had not wrought signs,” etc., “they would not have had sin.” Therefore, where there are no signs, and nothing to induce belief, there will be no sin.
370 11. From this proposition it follows that, if the faith be presented to the Indians in the way named only and they do not receive it, the Spaniards can not make this a reason for waging war on them or for proceeding against them under the law of war. This is manifest, because they are innocent in this respect and have done no wrong to the Spaniards. And this corollary receives confirmation from the fact that, as St. Thomas lays it down {Secunda Secundae, qu. 40, art. 1), for a just war “there must be a just cause, namely, they who are attacked for some fault must deserve the attack.” Accordingly, St. Augustine says {Liber 83 Quaestionum ): “It is involved in the definition of a just war that some wrong is being avenged, as where a people or state is to be punished for neglect to exact amends from its citizens for their wrongdoing or to restore what has been wrongfully taken away.” Where, then, no wrong has previously been committed by the Indians, there is no cause of just war. This is the received opinion of all the doctors, not only of the theologians, but also of the jurists, such as Proof.
Confirma¬ tion 3.
Corollary.
Proposition proved from the common opinion of the doctors.
Franciscus de Victoria Proposition III.
Proof i.
Proof 2.
Proposi¬ tiori IV.
Proposi¬ tiori V.
Proposi¬ tiori VI.
Proof i.
Hostiensis, Innocent, and others. Cajetan ( Secunda Secundae, qu. 66, art. 8) lays it down clearly and I know of no doctor whose opinion is to the contrary. Therefore this would not be a legitimate title to seize the lands of the aborigines or to despoil the former owners.
12. Third proposition: If the Indians, after being asked and admonished 371 to hear the peaceful preachers of religion, refused, they would not be excused of mortal sin. The proof lies in the supposition that they have very grave errors for which they have no probable or demonstrable reasons. There¬ fore, if any one admonishes them to hear and deliberate upon religious matters, they are bound at least to hear and to enter into consultation. Further, it is needful for their salvation that they believe in Christ and be baptized (St. Mark, last ch.), “Whoso believeth,” etc. But they can not believe unless they hear ( Romans, ch. io). Therefore they are bound to hear, otherwise if they are not bound to hear, they would, without their own fault, be outside the pale of salvation.
13. Fourth proposition: If the Christian faith be put before the aborigines with demonstration, that is, with demonstrable and reasonable arguments, and this be accompanied by an upright life, well-ordered according to the law of nature (an argument which weighs much in confirmation of the truth), and this be done not once only and perfunctorily, but diligently and zealously, the aborigines are bound to receive the faith of Christ under penalty of mortal sin. This is proved by our third proposition, for, if they are bound to hear, they are in consequence bound also to acquiesce in what they hear, if it be reasonable. This is abundantly ciear from the passage (St. Mark, last ch.): “Go ye out into all the world, preach the Gospel to every creature; whoso believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but whoso 372 believeth not shall be damned”; and by the passage (Acts, ch. 4): “No other name is given unto man whereby we can be saved.”
14. Fifth proposition: It is not sufficiently ciear to me that the Christian faith has yet been so put before the aborigines and announced to them that they are bound to believe it or commit fresh sin. I say this because (as appears from my second proposition) they are not bound to believe unless the faith be put before them with persuasive demonstration. Now, I hear of no miracles or signs or religious patterns of life; nay, on the the other hand, I hear of many scandals and cruel crimes and acts of impiety. Hence it does not appear that the Christian religion has been preached to them with such sufficient propriety and piety that they are bound to acquiesce in it, although many religious and other ecclesiastics seem both by their lives and example and their diligent preaching to have bestowed sufficient pains and industry in this business, had they not been hindered therein by others who had other matters in their charge.
15. Sixth proposition: Although the Christian faith may have been announced to the Indians with adequate demonstration and they have refused to receive it, yet this is not a reason which justifies making war on them and depriving them of their property. This conclusion is definitely stated by St. Thomas (Secunda Secundae, qu. 10, art. 8), where he says that On the Indians, Sect. II.
373 unbelievers who have never received the faith, like Gentiles and Jews, are in no wise to be compelled to do so. This is the received conclusion of the Proof 2doctors alike in the canon law and the civil law. The proof lies in the fact that belief is an operation of the will. Now, fear detracts greatly from the voluntary ( Ethics, bk. 3), and it is a sacrilege to approach under the influence of servile fear as far as the mysteries and sacraments of Christ. proof Our conclusion is also proved by the canon de Judaeis (can. 5, Dist. 45), which says: “The holy synod also enjoins concerning the Jews that thenceforth force be not applied to any of them to make him believe; ‘for God has compassion on whom He wills, and whom He wills He hardens.’”1 There is no doubt about the doctrine of the Council of Toledo, that threats and fears should not be employed against the Jews in order to make them receive the faith. And Gregory expressly says the same in the canon qui sincera (can. 3, Dist. 45): “Who with sincerity of purpose,” says he, “desires to bring into the perfect faith those who are outside the Christian religion should labor in a manner that will attract and not with severity;...for whosoever does otherwise and under cover of the latter would turn them from their accustomed worship and ritual is demonstrably furthering his own end thereby and not God’s end.”
Our proposition receives further proof from the use and custom of the Proof 4-Church. For never have Christian Emperors, who had as advisors the most holy and wise Pontiffs, made war on unbelievers for their refusal 374 to accept the Christian religion. Further, war is no argument for the truth p™°f 5. of the Christian faith. Therefore the Indians can not be induced by war to believe, but rather to feign belief and reception of the Christian faith, which is monstrous and a sacrilege. And although Scotus (Bk. \, dist. The opinion last qu.) calls it a religious act for princes to compel unbelievers by threats °fersec0°ntusset and fears to receive the faith, yet he seems to mean this to apply only to f0rth. unbelievers who in other respects are subjects of Christian princes (with whom we will deal later on). Now, the Indians are not such subjects.
Hence, I think that Scotus does not make this assertion applicable to their case. It is ciear, then, that the title which we are now discussing is not adequate and lawful for the seizure of the lands of the aborigines.
Another, and a fifth, title is seriously put forward, namely, the sins of ^*ufisfs^dUtle these Indian aborigines. For it is alleged that, though their unbelief or their rejection of the Christian faith is not a good reason for making war on them, yet they may be attacked for other mortal sins which (so it is said) they have in numbers, and those very heinous. A distinction is here drawn with regard to mortal sins, it being asserted that there are some sins, which are not against the law of nature, but only against positive divine law, and 375 for these the aborigines can not be attacked in war, while there are other sins against nature, such as cannibalism, and promiscuous intercourse with mother or sisters and with males, and for these they can be attacked in war and so compelled to desist therefrom. The principle in each case is that, in the case of sins which are against positive law, it can not be clearly Franciscus de Victoria Statement and explanation of the opinion of the Archbishop, Augustinus of Ancona, Sylvester and Innocent that this is a lawful title.
The author’s answer.
Proof 1.
Proof 2.
shown to the Indians that they are doing wrong, whereas in the case of the sins which are against the law of nature, it can be shown to them that they are offending God, and they may consequently be prevented from continuing to offend Him. Further they can be compelled to keep the law which they themselves profess. Now, this law is the law of nature. Therefore. This is the opinion of the Archbishop of Florence (pt. 3, tit. 22, ch. 5, § 8), following Augustinus Anconitanus, and of Sylvester (under the word Papa, § 7); and it is the opinion of Innocent in X, 3, 34, 8, where he expressly says: “I hold that if the Gentiles who have no other law than the law of nature break that law, they can be punished by the Pope. This is shown by the case of the men of Sodom, who were punished by God ( Genesis, ch. 19). Now, the judgments of God are examples unto us, and so I do not see why the Pope, who is the vicar of Christ, can not do this.” This is what Innocent said. And on the same principle the Indians can be punished by Christian princes under the authority of the Pope.
16. I, however, assert the following proposition: Christian princes can not, even by the authorization of the Pope, restrain the Indians from sins against the law of nature or punish them because of those sins. My 376 first proof is that the writers in question build on a false hypothesis, namely, that the Pope has jurisdiction over the Indian aborigines, as said above.
My second proof is as follows: They mean to justify such coercion either universally for sins against the law of nature, such as theft, fornication, and adultery, or particularly for sins against nature, such as those which St. Thomas deals with ( Secunda Secundae, qu. 154, arts. 11, 12), the phrase “sin against nature” being employed not only of what is contrary to the law of nature, but also of what is against the natural order and is called uncleanness in II Corinthians, ch. 12, according to the commentators, such as intercourse with boys and with animals or intercourse of woman with woman, whereon see Romans, ch. 1. Now, if they limit themselves to the second meaning, they are open to the argument that homicide is just as grave a sin, and even a graver sin, and, therefore, it is ciear that, if it is lawful in the case of the sins of the kind named, therefore it is lawful also in the case of homicide. Similarly, blasphemy is a sin as grave and so the same is ciear; therefore. If, however, they are to be understood in the first sense, that is, as speaking of all sin against the law of nature, the argument against them is that the coercion in question is not lawful for fornication; therefore not for the other sins which are contrary to the law of nature.
The antecedent is ciear from I Corinthians, ch. 5: “I wrote to you in an epistle not to company with fornicators,” and besides “If any brother among you is called a fornicator or an idolater,” etc.; and lower down: “For what have I to do to judge them also that are without?” Whereon 377 St. Thomas says: “The prelates have received power over those only who have submitted themselves to the faith.” Hence it clearly appears that St. Paul declares it not his business to pronounce judgment on unbelievers and fornicators and idolaters. So also it is not every sin against the law of nature that can be clearly shown to be such, at any rate to every one.
On the Indians, Sect. II.
Further, this is as much as to say that the aborigines may be warred into subjection because of their unbelief, for they are ali idolaters. Further, the Pope can not make war on Christians on the ground of their being fornicators or thieves or, indeed, because they are sodomites; nor can he on that ground confiscate their land and give it to other princes; were that so, there would be daily changes of kingdoms, seeing that there are many sinners in every realm. And this is confirmed by the consideration that these sins confirmation. are more heinous in Christians, who are aware that they are sins, than in barbarians, who have not that knowledge. Further, it would be a strange Proof 3thing that the Pope, who can not make laws for unbelievers, can yet sit in judgment and visit punishment upon them.
A further and convincing proof is the following: The aborigines in Proof 4. question are either bound to submit to the punishment awarded to the sins in question or they are not. If they are not bound, then the Pope can not award such punishment. If they are bound, then they are bound to recognize the Pope as lord and lawgiver. Therefore, if they refuse such recogni- 378 tion, this in itself furnishes a ground for making war on them, which, however, the writers in question deny, as said above. And it would indeed be strange that the barbarians could with impunity deny the authority and jurisdiction of the Pope, and yet that they should be bound to submit to his award. Further, they who are not Christians can not be subjected to the Proof 5. judgment of the Pope, for the Pope has no other right to condemn or punish them than as vicar of Christ. But, the writers in question admit — both Innocent and Augustinus of Ancona, and the Archbishop and Sylvester, too — that they can not be punished because they do not receive Christ.
Therefore not because they do not receive the judgment of the Pope, for the latter presupposes the former.
The insufficiency alike of this present title and of the preceding one, Refutation is shown by the fact that, even in the Old Testament, where much was done th”“nd the by force of arms, the people of Israel never seized the land of unbelievers just^precedeither because they were unbelievers or idolaters or because they were guilty of other sins against nature (and there were people guilty of many such sins, in that they were idolaters and committed many other sins against nature, as by sacrificing their sons and daughters to deviis), but because of either a special gift from God or because their enemies had hindered their passage or had attacked them. Further, what is it that the writers in 2. question call a profession of the law of nature? If it is mere knowledge, 379 they do not know it ali; if it is a mere willingness to observe the law of nature, then the retort is that they are also willing to observe the whole divine law; for, if they knew that the law of Christ was divine, they would be willing to observe it. Therefore, they make no more a profession of the law of nature than they make of the law of Christ. Further, we certainly 3. possess clearer proofs whereby to demonstrate that the law of Christ is from God and is true than to demonstrate that fornication is wrong or that other things which are also forbidden by natural law are to be shunned.* *Otherwise to be blamed.
Franciscus de Victoria Sixth title set out.
The author’s answer. Proof 1.
Proof 2.
Proof 3.
Seventh title.
The author’8 refutation.
1.
2.
3- 4- Therefore, if the Indians can be compelled to observe the law of nature because it admits of proof, they can therefore, be compelled to observe the Gospel law.
There remains another, a sixth title, which is put forward, namely, by voluntary choice. For on the arrival of the Spaniards we find them declaring to the aborigines how the King of Spain has sent them for their good and admonishing them to receive and accept him as lord and king; and the aborigines replied that they were content to do so. Now, “there is nothing so natural as that the intent of an owner to transfer his property to another should have effect given to it” ( Inst., 2, 1, 40). I, however, assert the proposition that this title, too, is insufficient. This appears, in the first place, because fear and ignorance, which vitiate every choice, ought to be absent. But they were markedly operative in the cases of choice and acceptance under consideration, for the Indians did not know what they were doing; nay, they may not have understood what the 380 Spaniards were seeking. Further, we find the Spaniards seeking it in armed array from an unwarlike and timid crowd. Further, inasmuch as the aborigines, as said above, had real lords and princes, the populace could not procure new lords without other reasonable cause, this being to the hurt of their former lords. Further, on the other hand, these lords themselves could not appoint a new prince without the assent of the populace. Seeing, then, that in such cases of choice and acceptance as these there are not present ali the requisite elements of a valid choice, the title under review is utterly inadequate and unlawful for seizing and retaining the provinces in question.
There is a seventh title which can be set up, namely, by special grant from God. For some (I know not who) assert that the Lord by His especial judgment condemned all the barbarians in question to perdition because of their abominations and delivered them into the hands of the Spaniards, just as of old He delivered the Canaanites into the hands of the Jews. I am loath to dispute hereon at any length, for it would be hazardous to give credence to one who asserts a prophecy against the common law and against the rules of Scripture, unless his doctrine were confirmed by miracles. Now, no such are adduced by prophets of this type. Further, even assuming that it is true that the Lord had determined to bring the barbarians to 381 perdition, it would not follow, therefore, that he who wrought their ruin would be blameless, any more than the Kings of Babylon who led their army against Jerusalem and carried away the children of Israel into captivity were blameless, although in actual fact all of this was by the especial providence of God, as had often been foretold to them. Nor was Jeroboam right in drawing Israel away from Rehoboam, although this was done by God’s design, as the Lord had also threatened by his prophet. And, would that, apart from the sin of unbelief, there might be no greater sins in morals among certain Christians than there are among those barbarians! It is also written (I St. John, ch. 4): “Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they be of God;” and as St. Thomas says ( Prima Secundae, qu. 68), On the Indians, Sect. II.
“Gifts are given by the Holy Spirit for the perfecting of virtues.” Accordingly, where faith or authority or providence shows what ought to be done, recourse should not be had to gifts.
Let this suffice about false and inadequate tities to seize the lands of the Indians. But it is to be noted that I have seen nothing written on The author this question and have never been present at any discussion or council on j^mseif. this matter. Hence it may be that others may found a title and base the 382 justice of this business and overlordship on some of the passages cited and not lack reason in so doing. I, however, have up to now been unable to form any other opinion than what I have written. And so, if there be no other tities than those which I have discussed, it would certainly be of ill omen for the safety of our princes, or rather of those who are charged with the disco very of these matters; for princes follow ad vice given by others, being unable to examine into these matters for themselves. “What is a man advantaged” so saith the Lord, “if he gain the wholeworld and lose himself, or becast away?” (St. Matthew, ch. 16; St. Mark, ch. 8; St. Luke, ch.9.)
SUMMARY OF THE THIRD SECTION.
On the laivful tities zvhereby the aborigines of America could have come into the poiver of Spain.
1. How the aborigines might have come into the power of the Spaniards on the ground of natural society and fellowship.
2. The Spaniards have a right to travel to the lands of the Indians and to sojourn there so long as they do no harm, and they can not be prevented by the 383 Indians.
3. The Spaniards may carry on trade among the Indian aborigines, so long as they do no harm to their own country, by importing the goods which the aborigines lack, etc., and taking away gold and silver and other articles in which the Indians abound; and the princes of the Indians can not prevent their subjects from trading with the Spaniards, etc.
4. The Indians can not prevent the Spaniards from a communication and participation in those things which they treat as common alike to natives and to strangers.
5. Any children born to Spanish parents domiciled in those parts who wish to become citizens thereof can not be excluded from citizenship or from the advantages enjoyed by other citizens.
6. Whatcourse ought to beadopted if the aborigines desire to prevent the Spaniards trading with them, etc.
7. If the Spaniards, after resort to ali moderate measures, can not attain security among the aborigines or Indians save by seizing their cities and reducing them to subjection,^whether they can lawfully do this.
8. When and in what case the Spaniards can resort to severe measures against the 384 Indians, treating them as faithless foes, and employ ali the rights of war against them and take away their property and even reduce them to captivity, aye, and depose their former lords also and set up new lords.
9. Whether the Indians could have come under the sway of the Spaniards, in the interest of the spread of Christianity. Christians have a right to preach and publish the Gospel in the lands of barbarians.
10. The Pope could entrust to the Spaniards alone the task of converting the Indian aborigines and could forbid to all others not only preaching, but trade too, if the propagation of Christianity would thus be furthered.
1 1. The Indians are not to be warred into subjection or despoiled of their property, if they give the Spaniards unhindered freedom to preach the Gospel, and this whether they accept the faith or not.
12. How the aborigines who hinder the spread of the Gospel, whether it be their lords or the populace, may be coerced by the Spaniards, so long as no scandal is caused. And what is to be said of those who, while admitting preaching, prevent conversion, either by killing or punishing or terrorizing 385 those who have been converted to Christianity?
13. How the Indians might have come under the sway of the Spaniards by the fact that, when they had been converted and become Christians, their princes desired to bring them back to idolatry by force or by fear, and so they were taken into the protection and guardianship of the Spaniards.
14. The Indians might have come under the sway of the Spaniards by the fact that, after the conversion of a large part of them to Christianity, the Pope, either with or without a request on their part, might on reasonable grounds have given them a Christian prince, such as the King of Spain, and driven out their infidel lords.
On the Indians, Sect. III.
I5i 15. Whether the Indians could have come under the sway of the Spaniards because of the tyranny of their lords or because of tyrannical laws which injured innocent folk.
16. The Indian aborigines could have come under the sway of the Spaniards through true and voluntary choice.
17. The Indians might have come under the sway of the Spaniards by a title of alliance and friendship.
18. Whether the Spaniards could have reduced the Indians into their power, if it were certainly ciear that they were of defective intelligence.
386 I will now speak of the lawful and adequate tities whereby the Indians might have come under the sway of the Spaniards. (1) The first title to be JuUit\e! law' named is that of natural society and fellowship. And hereon let my first Proposition 1.
conclusion be: (2) The Spaniards have a right to travel into the lands in question and to sojourn there, provided they do no harm to the natives, and the natives may not prevent them. Proof of this may in the first place Proof Ibe derived from the law of nations (Jus gentium), which either is natural law or is derived from natural law ( Inst., 1, 2, 1): “What natural reason has established among all nations is called the jus gentium For, congruently herewith,it is reckoned among all nations inhumane to treat Visitors and foreigners badly without some special cause, while, on the other hand, it is humane and correct to treat visitors well; but the case would be different, if the foreigners were to misbehave when visiting other nations.
Secondly, it was permissible from the beginning of the world (when Proof 2. everything was in common) for any one to set forth and travel wheresoever he would. Now this was not taken away by the division of property, for it was never the intention of peoples to destroy by that division the reciprocity and common user which prevailed among men, and indeed in the days of Noah it would have been inhumane to do so.
Thirdly, everything is lawful which is not prohibited or which is not Proof 3.
387 injurious or hurtful to others in some other way. But (so we suppose) the travel of the Spaniards does no injury or harm to the natives. Therefore it is lawful.
Fourthly, it would not be lawful for the French to prevent the Spanish Proof 4from traveling or even from living in France, or vice versa, provided this in no way enured to their hurt and the visitors did no injury. Therefore it is not lawful for the Indians.
Further, fifthly, banishment is one of the capital forms of punishment.
Therefore it is unlawful to banish strangers who have committed no fault.
Further, sixthly, to keep certain people out of the city or province as being enemies, or to expel them when already there, are acts of war.
Inasmuch, then, as the Indians are not making a just war on the Spaniards (it being assumed that the Spaniards are doing no harm), it is not lawful for them to keep the Spaniards away from their territory.
Further, seventhly, there is the Poet’s verse, Proof 7- Proof 5.
Proof 6.
Quod genus hoc hominum? quaeve hunc tam barbara morem Permittit patria? hospitio prohibemur arenae.
[What race of men is this? or what country is barbarous enough to allow this usage? We are driven off from the hospitality of its shore.]
Franciscus de Victoria Proof 8.
Proof 9.
Proof 10.
Proof 11.
Proof 12.
Proof 13.
Proof 14.
Proposi¬ tiori II.
Proof 1.
Proof 2.
Proof 3.
Also, eighthly, “Every animal loveth its kind” ( Ecclesiasticus, ch. 15). Therefore, it appears that friendship among men exists by natural law and it is against nature to shun the society of harmless folk.
Also, ninthly, there is the passage (St. Matthezv, ch. 25): “I was a stranger and ye took me not in.” Hence, as the reception of strangers seems to be by natural law, that judgment of Christ will be pronounced with universal application. 388