Lys. — You muft know then, that, at bottom, the being of God is a point, in itfelf, of fmall confequence, and a man may make this conceflion without yielding much. The great point is, what fenfe the word God is to be taken in. The very Epicureans allowed the being of gods, but then they were indolent gods, unconcerned with human affairs. Hobbes allowed a corporeal god; and Spino* fa held the univerfe to be god. And yet nobody doubts they were ftanch free-thinkers. I could wifh, indeed, the word god were quite omitted, becaufe, in molt minds, it is coupled with a fort of fuperftitious awe, the very root of all religion. I (hall not, neverthelefs, be much difturbed, though the name be retained, and the being of God allowed in any fenfe, but in that of a Mind, which knows all things, and beholds human actions, like fome judge, or magiftrate, with infinite obfervation and intelligence. The belief of a God, in this fenfe, fills a man's mind with fcruples, lays him under conftraints, and imbitters his very being: But, in another fenfe, it may be attended with no great ill confequence. This, I know, was the opinion of our great Diagoras, who told me he would never have been at the pains to find out a demonstration that there was no God, if the received notion of God had been the fame with that of fome fathers and fchoolmen.
Euph. — Pray what was that?
XVII. Lys. — You muft know, Diagoras, a man of much reading and inquiry, had difcovered, that once upon a time the mod profound and fpeculative divines, finding it impoflible to reconcile the attributes of God, taken in the common fenfe, or in any known fenfe, with human reafon, and the appearances of things, taught, that the Y words knowledge, wifdom, goodnefs, and fuch like, when fpoken of the Deity, muft be under flood in a quite different fenfe from what they fignify in the vulgar acceptation, or from any thing that we can form a notion of, or conceive. Hence, whatever objections might be made againfl the attributes of God, they eafily folved, by denying thofe attributes belonged to God, in this or that, or any known particular fenfe or notion; which was the fame thing as to deny they belonged to him at all. And thus denying the attributes of God, they, in effe£t., denied his being, though perhaps they were not aware of it. Suppofe, for inftance, a man fhould object that future contingencies were inconfiftent with the fore-knowledge of God, becaufe it is repugnant, that certain knowledge mould be of an uncertain thing: it was a ready and eafy anfwer to fay, that this may be true, with refpeft to knowledge, taken in the common fenfe, or in any fenfe that we can pofhbly form any notion of: but that there would not appear the fame inconfiftency, between the contingent nature of things, and divine fore knowledge, taken to fignify fomewhat that we know nothing of, which, in God, fupplies the place of what we underftand by knowledge; from which it differs not in quantity or degree of perfection, but altogether, and in kind, as light doth from found; and even more, fmce thefe agree in that they are both fenfations: whereas knowledge in God hath no fort of refemblance, or agreement, with any notion that man can frame of knowledge.
The like may be faid of all the other attributes, which indeed may, by this means, be equally reconciled with every thing, or with nothing. But all men, who think, muft needs fee, this is cutting knots, and not untying them. For how are things reconciled with the divine attributes, when thefe attributes themfelves are, in every intelligible fenfe, denied } and confequently the very notion of God taken away, and nothing left but the name, without any meaning annexed to it? In fhort, the belief that there is an unknown fubje£fc of attributes, abfolutely unknown, is a very innocent doctrine: which the acute Diagoras well faw, and was, therefore, wonderfully delighted with this fyftem.
•XVIII. For, faid he, if this could once make its way, and obtain in the world, there would be au end of ail natural or rational religion, which is the bafis both of the Jewifh and the chriftian: for he who comes to God, or enters himfeif in the church of God, mull firft believe that there is a God, in fome intelligible fenfe: and not only that there is fomething in general without any proper notion, though never fo inadequate, of any of its qualities or attributes: for this may be fate, or chaos, or piaftic nature, cr any thing elfe, as well as God. Nor will it avail to fay, there is fomething in this unknown Being analogous to knowledge and goodnefs: that is to fay, which produceth thofe effe&s, which we could not conceive to be produced by men in any degree, without knowledge and goodnefs. For this is, in fa£fc, to give up the point in difpute between theifts and atheifts, the queftion having always been, not whether there was a principle (which point was allowed by all philofophers, as well before as fince Anaxagoras) but whether this principle was a nous, a thinking, intelligent Being: that is to fay, whether that order, and beauty, and ufe, vifible in natural effects, could be produced by any thing but a mind or intelligence, in the proper fenfe of the word? and whether there mud not be true, real, and proper knowledge in the firft caufe? we will therefore acknowledge, that all thofe natural effects, which are vulgarly afcribed to knowledge and wifdom, proceed from a Being, in which there is, properly fpeaking, no knowledge, or wifdom at all, but only fomething elfe, which, in reality, U the caufe of thofe things which men, for want of knowi8o MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IV.]
ing better, afcribe to what they call knowledge, and wifdom, and underftanding. You wonder, perhaps, to hear a man of pleafure, who diverts himfelf as I do, philofophize at this rate. But you fhould confider, that much is to be got by converfing with ingenious men, which is a fhort way to knowledge, that faves a man the drudgery of reading and thinking. And now we have granted to you tnat there is a God in this indifinite fenfe, I would fain fee what ufe you can make of this concefhon. You cannot argue from unknown attributes, or which is the fame thing, from attributes in an unknown fenfe. You cannot prove, that God is to be loved for his goodnefs, or feared for his juftice, or refpe&ed for his knowledge: all which confequences, we own, would follow from thofe attributes admitted in an intelligible fenfe. But we deny, that thofe, or any other confequences, can be drawn from attributes admitted in no particular fenfe, or in a fenfe which none of us underftand. Since, therefore, nothing can be inferred from fuch an account of God, about confcience, or worship, or religion, you may even make the beft of it: and, not to be lingular, we will ufe the name too, and fo at once there is an end of atheifm.
Euph.— - This account of a Deity is new to me. I do not like it, and therefore Ihall leave it to be maintained by thofe who do.
XIX. Cri.— It is not new to me. I remember, not long fince, to have heard a Minute Philofopher triumph Upon this very point; which put me on enquring what foundation there was for it, in the fathers, or fchoolmen. And, for ought that I can find, it owes it original to thofe writings, which have been publifhed under the name of Dionyfius the Arecpagite. The author of which, it muft be owned, hath written upon the Divine Attributes in a very lingular ftile. In his treat ife of the Celeftial Hierarchy, * he faith, that God is feme thing above all eflence * De Kierarch CeeleiL c. a.
[Dial. IV.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER...;gi and life, uper pafan oufian kai zocn: and again, in his treatife of the Divine Names, f that he is above all wifdom, and underftanding, uper pafan fophian kaifune/in, ineffable and innominable, arretos kai dnonumos; the wifdom of God he terms an unreafonable, unintelligent, and foolifh wifdom; ton a/ogon kai anoun kai mor an fophian. But the reafon he gives, for expreffing himfelf in this ftrange manner, is, that the Divine Wifdom is the caufe of -all reafon, wifdom, and underftanding, and therein are contained the treafures of all wifdom and knowledge. He calls God uperfophos and uperzos: As if wifdom and life were words not worthy to exprefs the Divine Perfections: And he adds, that the attributes, unintelligent and unperceiving, mud be afcribed to the Divinity, not lot elleipfin by way of defect, but kath uperochen, by way of eminency: which he explains, by our giving the name of darknefs to light inacceflible. And, notwithftanding the harfhnefs of his exprefhons in fome places, he affirms, over and over, in others, that God knows all things; not that he is beholden to the creatures for his knowledge, but by knowing himfelf, from whom they all derive their being, and in whom they are contained as in their caufe.
It was late before thefe writings appear to have been known in the world: And, although they obtained credit, during the age of the fchoolmen, yet fince critical learning hath been cultivated, they have loft that credit, and are at this day given up for fpurious, as containing feveral evident marks of a much later date than the age of Dionyfius. Upon the whole, although this method of growing in expreffion, and dwindling in notion, of clearing up doubts by nonfenfe, and avoiding difficulties by running into affected contradictions, may perhaps proceed from a wellmeant zeal; yet it appears not to be according to knowledge, and, inftead of reconciling atheifts to truth, hath, f De Norn. Div. c. 7.
iS* MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IV.]
I doubt, a tendency to confirm them in their own perfuafion. It mould feem, therefore, very weak and rafli in a chriftian to adopt this harm language of an apocryphal writer, preferably to that of the holy fcriptures. I remember, indeed, to have read of a certain philofopher, who lived fome centuries ago, that ufed to fay, if thefe fuppofed works of Dionyfms had been known to the primitive fathers, they would have furnifhed them admirable weapons againft the heretics, and would have faved a world of pains. But the event, fince this difcovery, hath by no means confirmed this opinion. It mull be owned, the celebrated Picus of Mirandula, among his nine hundred conclufions (which that prince, being very young, propofed to maintain by public difputation at Rome) hath this for one •, to wit, that it is more impoper to fay of God, he is an intellect, or intelligent Being, than to fay of a reafonable foul, that it is an angel: which doctrine, it feems, was not relifhed. And Picusy when he comes to defend it, fupports himfelf altogether by the example and authority of Dionyjius, and in effect explains it away into a mere verbal defence, affirming, that neither Dionyfius> nor himfelf, ever meant to deprive God of knowledge, or to deny that he knows all things: But that, as reafon is of kind peculiar to man, fo, by intellection, he underftands a kind of manner of knowing peculiar to angels: And that the knowledge, which is in God, is more above the intellection of angels, than angel is above man.
He adds that, as his tenet confifts with admitting the mod perfect knowledge in God, fo he would by no means be underftood to exclude from the Deity intellection itfelf, taken in the common or general fenfe, but only that peculiar fort of intellection proper to angels, which he thinks ought not to be attributed to God, any more than human reafon. * Picus, therefore, though he fpeaks * Pic. Mirand, in Apolog. p. 155- Ed. Baf.
as the apocryphnl Dionyftus> yet, when he explains himfelf, it is evident he fpeaks like other men. And although the foremen tioned books of the Celeftial Hierarchy, and of the Divine Names, being attributed to a faint and martyr of the apoftolical age, were refpected by the fchoolmen \ yet it is certain they rejected, or foftened, his harfli expreffions, and explained away, or reduced, his doctrine to the received notions taken from Holy Scripture, and the light of nature.
XX. Thomas Aquinas expreffeth his fenfe of this point in the following manner. All perfections, faith he, derived from God to the creatures, are in a certain higher fenfe, or (as the fchoolmen term it) eminently in God. Whenever, therefore, a name, borrowed from any perfection in the creature, is attributed to God, we muft exclude from its fignification every thing that belongs to the imperfect manner, wherein that attribute is found in the creature. Whence he concludes, that knowledge in God is not an habit, but a pure act.* And again, the fame doctor obferves, that our intellect gets its notions of all forts of perfections from the creatures, and that as it apprehends thofe perfections, fo it fignifies them by names. Therefore, faith he, in attributing thefe names to God, we are to confider two things j firft, the perfections themfelves, as goodnefs, life, and the like, which are properly in God; and, fecondly, the manner which is peculiar to the creature, and cannot, ftrictly and properly fpcaking, be faid to agree to the Creator.f And although Suarez, with other fchoolmen, teacheth, that the mind of man conceiveth knowledge and will to be in God, as faculties or operations, by analogy only to created beings •, yet he gives it plainly as his opinion, that, when knowledge is faid not to be properly in God, it mad be underftood in a fenfe including imperfection, fuch as difcurfive knowledge, or the like imperfect kind, found in the creatures: and that, none of thofe imperfections in" the knowledge of men or angels, belonging to knowledge as fuch, it will not thence follow, that knowledge, in its proper fenfe, may not be attributed to God: And of knowledge, taken in general, for the clear evident underftanding of all truth, he exprefsly affirms, that it is in God, and that this was never denied by any philofopher, who believed a God.* It was indeed a current opinion in the fchools, that even being itfelf mould be attributed analogically to God arid the creatures. That is, they held that God, the fupreme, independent, felf-originate caufe and fource of all beings, muft not be fupofed to exift in the fame fenfe with created beings, not that he exifts lefs truly or properly than they, but only becaufe he exifts in a more eminent and perfedt manner.
XXI. But to prevent any man's being led, by miftaking the fcholaftic ufe of the terms analogy and analogical^ into an opinion that we cannot frame, in any degree, a true and proper notion of attributes, applied by analogy, or, in the fchool phrafe, predicated analogically, it may not be amifs to inquire into the true fenfe and meaning of thofe words. Every one knows, that analogy is a Greek word, ufed by mathematicians, to fignify a fimilitude of proportions. For inftance, when we obferve that two is to fix, as three is to nine, this fimilitude, or equality of proportion, is termed analogy. And although proportion ftricUy fignifies the habitude, or relation, of one quantity to another, yet in a loofer and tranflated fenfe, it hath been applied to figriify every other habitude: And confequently the term, analogy, comes to fignify all fimilitude of relations, ©r habitudes whatfoever. Hence, the Schoolmen telf us, there is analogy between intellect and * Suarez Difp. Me'taph. Tom. 2. Difp. 30.' Se<5t 15.
[Dial. IV.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. ig5 fight: forafmuch as intellect is to the mind, what fight is to the body? and that he who governs the ftate, is analogous to him who (tears- a (hip. Hence a prince is analogically (tiled a pilot, being to the flate as a pilot is to his vefiel.* For the farther clearing of this point, it is to be obferved, that a two-fold analogy is diftinguifhed by the fchoolmen, metaphorical and proper. Of the firft kind there are frequent inftances in holy fcripture, attributing human parts and paflions to God. When he is reprefented as having a finger, an eye, or an ear: when he is faid to repent, to be angry, or grieved: every cne fees the analogy is merely metaphorical. Becaufe thofe parts and paflions, taken in the proper (ignification, mult in every degree necefTarily, and from the formal nature of the thing, include imperfection. When, therefore, it is faid, the finger of God appears in this or that event, men of common fenfe mean no more, but that it is as truly afcribed to God, as the works wrought by human fingers are to man: and fo of the reft. But the cafe is different, when wifdom and knowledge are attributed to God. Paflions and fenfes, as fuch, imply defect: but in knowledge Amply, or as fuch, there is no defeat. Knowledge, therefore, in the proper formal meaning of the word, may be attributed to God proportionably, that is, preferving a proportion to the infinite nature of God. We may fay, therefore, that as God is infinitely above man, fo is the knowledge of God infinitely above the knowledge of man, and this iswhat Cajetan calls Analogia proprie faEla. And after this fame analogy, we rnuft underitand all thofe attributes to belong to the Deity, which, inthemfelvesfimply, and as fuch, denote perfection.
We may, therefore, confidently with what hath been premifed, affirm, that all forts of perfection, which we can conceive in a finite fpirit, are in God, but without any of that allay which is found in the creatures. This doctrine, • Vide Cajetau. dc Nona. Analog, c. 3.
z therefore, of analogical perfections in God, or our knowing God by analogy, feems very much mifunderftood, and mifapplied, by thofe who would infer from thence, that we cannot frame any direct or proper notion, though never fo inadequate, of knowledge or wifdom, as there are in the Deity; or underfland any more of them, than one born blind can of light and colours.
XXII. And now, gentlemen, it may be expected I mould afk your pardon, for having dwelt fo long on a point of metaphyfics, and introduced fuch unpoliflied and unfaftiionable writers, as the fchoolmen^ into good company: but as Lyficles gave the occafion, I leave him to anfwer for it., Lys.— I never dreamed of this dry diflertation. Buf^ if I have been the occafion of difcufling thefe fcholaftic points, by my unlucky mentioning the fchoolmen, it was my firft fault of the kind, and I promife it (hall be the laft. The meddling with crabbed authors of any fort, is none of my tafte. I grant, one meets, now and then, with a good notion in what we call dry writers, fuch an one, for example, as this I was {peaking of, which I muft own (truck my fancy. But then, for thefe, we have fuch as Prodicus, or Diagorasy who look into obfolete books, and fave the reft of us that trouble.
Cri. — So you pin your faith upon them.
Lys. — It is only for fome odd opinions, and matters of fa£t, and critical points. Befides, we know the men to whom we give credit: they are judicious and honeft, and have no end to ferve but truth. And I am confident fome author or other has maintained the forementioned notion in the fame fenfe as Diagoras related it* Cri. — That may be. But it never was a received notion, and never will, fo long as men believe a God: the fame arguments that prove a firft caufe, proving an intelli- [Dial. IV.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. i«7 gent caufe: intelligent, I fay, in the proper fenfe: wife and good, in the true and formal acceptation of the words. Otherwife it is evident, that every fyllogifm brought to prove thofe attributes, or (which is the fame thing) to prove the Being of a God, will be found to confift of four terms, and confequently can conclude nothing. But, for your part, Alciphron, you have been fully convinced, that God is a thinking intelligent Being, in the fame fenfe with other fpirits, though not in the fame imperfect manner or degree.
XXIII. Alc — And yet I am not without my fcruples: for, with knowledge you infer wifdom, and with wifdom goodnefs. Though I cannot fee that it is either wife, or good, to enact fuch laws as can never be obeyed.
Cm. — Doth any one find fault with the exa&nefs of geometrical rules, becaufe no one in practice can attain to it? the perfection of a rule is ufeful, even though it is not reached. Many may approach what all may fall fhort of.
Alc— But how is it poflible to conceive God fo good, and man fo wicked? It may, perhaps, with fome colour be alledged, that a little foft (hadowing of evils fets off the bright and luminous parts of the creation, and fo contributes to the beauty of the whole piece i but, for blots fo large and fo black, it is impoffible to account by that principle. That there mould be fo much vice, and fo little virtue upon earth, and that the laws of God's kingdom (hould be fo ill obferved by his fubje&s, is what can never be reconciled with that furpafTmg wifdom and goodnefs of the Supreme Monarch.
Euph. — Tell me, Alciphrony would you argue that a flate was ill adminftred, or judge of the manners of its citizens, by the difordcrs committed in the goal or dungeon?
Alc— I would not.
iS8 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IVJ Eupk. — And, for ought we know, this fpot with the few finners on it, bears no greater proportion to the univerfe of intelligences, than a dungeon doth to a kingdom. It feems, we are led not only by revelation, but by common fenfe, obferving and inferring from the analogy of vifible tilings, to conclude there are innumerable orders of intelligent beings, more happy and more perfect than man: whofe life is but a fpan, and whofe place, this earthly globe, is but a point, in refpect of the whole fyftem of God's Creation. We are dazzled indeed with the glory and grandeur of things here below, becaufe we know no better. But I am apt to think, if we knew what it was to be an angel for one hour, we mould return to this world, though it were to fit on the brighteft throne in it, with vaftly more loathing and reluctance, than we would now defcend into a loathfome dungeon or fepulchre.
XXIV. Cri. — To me it feems natural, that fuch a weak, paffionate, and fhort-fight creature as man, mould be ever liable to fcrupies of one kind or other. But, as this fame creature is apt to be over-pofitive in judging, and over-hafty in concluding, it falls out, that thefe difficulties and fcrupies about God's conduct are made objections to his Being. And fo men come to argue from their own defects, againft the divine perfections. And, as the views and humours of men are different, and often oppofite, you may fometimes fee them deduce the fame atheiftical conclufion from contrary premifes. I knew an inftance of this in two Minute Phiicfophersof my acquaintance, who ufed to argue each from his own temper againft a Providence. One of them, a man of a choleric and vindictive fpirit, faid he cGuld not believe a Providence:.becruife London w&s not f wallowed up or confumed by fire- from heaven: the flreets being, as he faid, full of people, who fhew no other belief or worfhip of God, but perpetually [Dial. IV.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. **9 praying that he would damn, rot, fink, and confound them. The other, being of an indolent and eafy temper, concluded there could be no fuch thing as a Providence: for that a Being of consummate wifdom muil needs employ himfelf better, than in minding the prayers, and actions, and little interefts of mankind.
Alc — After all, if God have no paflions, how can it be true that vengeance is his? or how can he be faid to be jealous of his glory?
Cri. — We believe that God executes vengeance without revenge, and is jealous without weaknefs, juft as the mind of man fees without eyes, and apprehends without hands.
XXV. Alc. — To put a period to this difcourfe, we will grant, there is a God in this difpaffionate fenfe: but what then? What hath this to do with religion or divine worfhip? To what purpofe are all thefe prayers and praifes, and thankfgivings, and finging of pfalms, which the foolifh vulgar call ferving God? What fenfe, or ufe, or end is there in all thefe things?
Cri. — We worfhip God, we praife and pray to him, not becaufe we think that he is proud of our worfhip, or fond of our praife or prayers, and affected with them as mankind are: or that all our fervice can contribute in the leaft degree to his happinefs or good: but becaufe it is good for us, to be fo difpofed towards God: becaufe it is juft and right, and fuitable to the nature of things, and becoming the relation we ftand in to our Supreme Lord and Governor.
Alc. — If it be good for us to worfhip God, it mould feem that the chriftian religion, which pretends to teach men the knowledge and worfhip of God, was of fome ufe and benefit to mankind. ' Cri, — Doubtlefs.
ioe> MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IV.]
Alc. — If this can be made appear, I fliall own myfelf very much miftaken.
Cri.— It is now near dinner-time. Wherefore, if you pleafe, we will put an end to this converfation for the prefent, and to-morrow morning refume our fubje&s THE FIFTH DIALOGUE.
I. Minute Philofophers join in the Cry, and follow the Scent of others. II. Worjhip prefcribed by the Chriflian Religion fuitable to God and Man. III. Power and Influence of the Druids. IV. Excellency and Ufefulnefs of the Chriflian Religion. V. It ennobles Mankind, and makes them happy. VI. Religion neither Bigotry nor Superflition. VII. Phyficians and Phyfic for the Soul. VIII. Characler of the Clergy. IX. Natural Religion and Human Reafon not to be difparaged. X. Tendency and Ufe of the Gentile Religion. XL Good Effecls of Chriflianity, XII. Englifhmen compared with ancient Greeks and Romans. XIII. The modem Practice of Duelling.
XIV. Characler of the old Romans, how to be formed.