As foon as Euphraner had uttered thefe words, Alciphron ftopt fhort, and flood in a pofture of meditation, while the reft of us continued our walk, and took two or three turns, after which he joined us again with a fmiling countenance, like one who had made fome difcovery. I have found, faid he, what may clear up the point in difpute, and give Euphranor entire fatisfaftion; I would fay i6o MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IV.]
an argument, which will prove the exiftence of a freethinker, the like whereof cannot be applied to prove the exiftence of a God. You muft know then, that your notion of our perceiving the exiftence of God, as certainly and immediately as we do that of a human perfon, I could by no means digeft, though I muft own it puzzled me, till I had confidered the matter. At firft methought, a particular ftru&ure, ihape, or motion, was the mod certain proof of a thinking, reafonable foul. But a little attention fatisfied me, that thefe things have no necefiary connexion with reafon, knowledge, and wifdom. And that, allowing them to be certain proofs of a living foul, they cannot be fo of a thinking and reafonable one. Upon fecond thoughts, therefore, and a minute examination of this point, I have found, that nothing fo much convinces me of the exiftence of another perfon as his fpeaking to me. It is my hearing you talk, that, in Uriel: arid philofophical truth, is to me the beft argument for your being. And this is a peculiar argument, inapplicable to your purpofe: For you will not, I fuppofe, pretend that God fpeaks to man in the fame clear and fenfible manner, as one man doth to another.
VII. Euph. — How! is then the impreffion of found fo much more evident than that of other fenfes? Or, if it be, is the voice of man louder than that of thunder?
Alc. — Alas! You miftake the point. What I mean is not the found of fpeech, merely as fuch, but the arbitrary ufe of fenfible figns, which have no fimilitude or necefTary connexion with the things fignified j fo as by the oppofite management of them, to fuggeft and exhibit to my mind an endlefs variety of things, differing in nature, time, and place j thereby informing me, entertaining me, and directing me how to a£t, not only with regard to things near and prefent, but alfo, with regard to things diftant and future. No matter whether thefe figns arc pronounced or written, whether tVy enter by the eye or the ear: They have the fame ufe, and are equally proofs of an intelligent, thinking, defigning caufe.
Euph. — But what if it mould appear that God really fpeaks to man; mould this content you?
Alc.— I am for admitting no inward fpeech, no holy inftin&s, or fuggeftions of light or fpirit. All that, you muft know, pafTeth with men of fenfe for nothing. If you do not make it plain to me, that God fpeaks to men, by outward fenfible figns, of fuch fort, and in fuch manner, as I have defined, you do nothing.
Euph. — But if it fhall appear plainly, that God fpeaks to men by the intervention and ufe of arbitrary, outward, fenfible figns, having no refemblance or neceflary connexion with the things they (land for and fuggeft: If it fhall appear, that by innumerable combinations of thefe figns, an endlefs variety of things is difcovered, and made known to us; and that we are thereby i n fir u died, or informed, in their different natures; that we are taught and admonifhed what to fhun, and what to purfue; and are directed how to regulate our motions, and how to acl: with refpedt to things diftant from us, as well in time as place; will this content you?
Alc. — It is the very thing I would have you make out; for therein confifts the force, and ufe, and nature of language.
VIII. Euph. — Look, A!ciphron> do you not fee the caftie upon yonder hill?
Alc. — I do.
Euph. — Is it not at a great diftance from you?
Alc. — It is.
Euph. — Tell me, Jlciphroiiy is not diftance. 3 line turned end-wife to the eye?
Alc. — Doubtlefs.
W i6z MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IV.]
EupH. — And can a line, in that fituation, project more than one tingle point on the bottom of the eye?
Alc. — It cannot.
Euph. — Therefore the appearance of a long and of a fhort diftance, is of the fame magnitude, or rather of no magnitude at all, being, in all cafes, one fingle point.
Alc. — It feems fo.
Euph. — Should it not follow, from hence, that diftance is not immediately perceived by the eye?
Alc — It fhould.
Euph.— Muft it not then be perceived by the mediadon of fome other thing?
Alc. — It muft.
Euph.— To difcoverwhat this is, let us examine what alteration there may be in the appearance of the fame object, placed at different diftances from the eye. Now I find, by experience, that, when an object is removed ftill farther and farther off, in a direct line from the eye, its viiible appearance ftill grows lefier and fainter: And this change of appearance, being proportional and univerfal, feems to me to be, that by which we apprehend the various degrees of diftance.
Alc. — I have nothing to object to this.
Euph. — But littlenefs or faintnefs, in their own nature, feem to have no necefTary connexion with greater length of diftance.
Alc — I admit this to be true.
Euph. — Will it not follow then, that they could never fuggeft it but from experience?
Alc — It will.
Euph. — That is to fay, we perceive diftance, not immediately, but by mediation of a fign, which hath no likenefs to it, or necefTary connexion with it, but only fuggefts it from repeated experience, as words do things.
Alc — Hold, Euphranor: Now I think of it, the writers in optics tell us of an angle made by the two optic ax- [Dial. IV.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. j6?
cs, where they meet in the vifible point or object; which angle, the obtufer it is, the nearer it fhews the object to be, and by how much the acuter, by fo much the farther oft -, and this from a neceffary demonflrable connexion.
Euph. — The mind then finds out the diflance of things by geometry.
Alc It doth.
Euph. — Should it not follow, therefore, that nobody could fee, but thofe who had learned geometry, and knew fomething of lines and angles?
Alc. — There is a fort of natural geometry, which is got without learning.
Euph.— —Pray inform me, Alclphron^ in order to frame a proof of any kind, or deduce one point from another, is it not necefiary, that I perceive the connexion of the terms in the premifes, and the connexion of the premifes with the conclufion: And, in general, to know one thing by means of another, muft I not firft know that other thing? when I perceive your meaning by your v.*ords, muft I not firfl perceive the words themfelves? and mud I not know the premifes, before I infer the conclufion?
Alc — All this is true.
Euph. — Whoever, therefore, collects a nearer diflance from a wider angle, or a farther diflance from an acuter angle, muft firfl perceive the angles themfelves. And he who doth not perceive thofe angles, can infer nothing from them. Is it fo or not?
Alc — It is as you fay.
Euph. — Afk now the firfl man you meet, whether he perceives or knows any thing of thofe optic angles? or whether he ever thinks about them, or makes any inferences from them, either by natural or artificial geometry? What anfwer do you think he would make?
Alc — To fpeak the truth, I believe his anfwer would that! he knew nothing of thofe matters.
&*4 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial; IV.]
Euph. — It cannot therefore be, that men judge of distance by angles: Nor consequently can there be any force in the argument you drew from thence, to prove that diftance is perceived by means of fomething which hath a r.ecefTary connexion with it.
Alc. — I agree with you.
IX. Euph. — To me it feems, that a man may know whether he perceives a thing or no: and if he perceives it, whether it be immediately, or mediately: and if mediately, whether by means of fomething like, or unlike, neceffarily, or arbitrarily connected with it.
Alc. — It feems fo.
Euph.-— And is it not certain, that diftance is perceived only by experience, if it be neither perceived immediately by itfelf, nor by means of any image, nor of 2ny lines and angles, which are like it, or have a necefiary connexion with it?
Alc. — It is.
Euph. — Doth it not feem to follow, from what hath been' faid and allowed by you, that before all experience a man would not imagine, the things he faw were at any diflance from him?
Alc— —How! let me fee.
Euph. — The littlenefs or faintnefs of appearance, or any other idea or fenfation, not necelTarily connected with, or rcfembling diflance, can no more fuggeft different de-• grees of diftance, or any diflance at all, to the mind, which hath not experienced a connexion of the things fignifying and fignified, than words can fuggeft notions before a man hath learned the language.
Alc. — I allow this to be true.
Euph.— Will it not thence follow, that a man born blind, and made to fee, would, upon firfl: receiving his fight, take the things he faw, not to be at any diftance from him. but in his eve, or rather in his mind?
[Dial. IV.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. i6s Alc. — I mud own it fcem fo: And yet, on the other hand, I can hardly perfuade myfelf, that, if I were in fuch a ft ate, I mould think thofe objects, which I now fee at fo great a diftance, to be at no diftance at all.
Euph. — It feems then, that you now think the objects of fight are at a diftance from you.
Alc. — Doubtlefs I do. Can any one queftion but yonder caftle is at a great diftance?
Euph. — Tell me, Alciphron, can you difcern the doors, windows, and battlements of that fame caftle?
Alc. — I cannot. At this diftance it feems only' a fmall round tower.
Euph. — But I, who have been at it, know that it is no fmall round tower, but a large fquare building, with battlements and turrets, which it feems you do not fee.
Alc — What will you infer from thence?
Euph. — I would infer, that the very object, which you ftri&ly and properly perceive by fight, is not that thing which is feveral miles diftant.
Alc— Why fo?
Euph. — Becaufe a little round objetl is one thing, and a great fquare object is another., Is it not?
Alc — I cannot deny it.
Euph. — Tell me, is not the vifible appearance alone the proper objeel: of fight?
Alc — It is. What think you now (faid Euphranor, pointing towards the heavens) of the vifible appearance cf yonder planet? Is it not a round luminous flat, not bigger than a fixpence?
Alc — What then?
Euph. — Tell me then, what you think of the planet itfelf. Do you not conceive it to be a vaft opaque globe, with feveral unequal rifings and vallies?
Alc — I do.
Euph. — How can you, therefore conclude, that the proper objeel: of your fight exifts at a diftance?
Alc. — I confefs I know not.
Euph. — For your farther conviction, do but confider that crimfon cloud. Think you, that if you were in the very place where it is, you would perceive any thing like what you now fee?
Alc. — By no means. I mould perceive only a dark milt.
Euph. — Is it not plain, therefore, that neither the caftle, the planet, nor the cloud, which you fee here, are thofe real ones, which you fuppofe exift at a diftance?
X. Alc. — "What am I to think then? Do we fee any thing at all, or is it altogether fancy and illufion?
Euph.— Upon the whole, it feems the proper objects of fight are light and colours, with their feveral (hades and degrees; all which, being infinitely diverfified and combined, form a language wonderfully adapted to fuggeft and exhibit to us the diftances, figures, fituations, dimenfions, and various qualities of tangible objects: not by fimilitude,. nor yet by inference of neceiTary connexion, but by the arbitrary impofition of Providence: juft as words fuggeft the things fignified by them.
Alc. — How! Do we not, ftrictly fpeaking, perceive by fight fuch things as trees, houfes, men, rivers, and the like?
Euph. — We do, indeed, perceive or apprehend thofe things by the faculty of fight. But will it follow from thence, that they are the proper and immediate objects of fight, any more than that all thofe things are the proper and immediate objects of hearing, which are fignified by the help of words, or founds?
Alc — You would have us think then, that light, {hades, and colours, varioufly combined, anfwer to the feveral articulations of found in language; and that, by means thereof, all forts of objects are fuggefted to the mind through the eye, in the fame manner as they are fuggefted, by words or founds, through the ear: that is, neither from neceflary deduction to the judgment, nor from fimilitude to the fancy, but purely and folely from experience, cuftom, and habit.
Euph. — I would not have you think any thing, more than the nature of things obligeth you to think, nor fubmit in the leaft to my judgment, but only to the force of truth -, which is an impofition that I fuppofe the freeft thinkers will not pretend to be exempt from.
Alc. — You have led me, it feems, ftep by ftep, till I am got I know not where. But I fhall try to get out again, if not by the way I came, yet by fome other of my own finding. Here Alciphrcn> having made a (hort paufe, proceeded as follows: XI. Anfwer me, Euphranor, mould it not follow, from thefe principles, that a man, born blind, and made to fee, would at firft fight not only not perceive their diftance, but alfo not fo much as know the very things themfelves which he faw, for inftance, men or trees? which furely to fupport mult be abfurd.
Euph. — I grant, in confequence of thofe principles, which both you and I have admitted, that fuch a one would never think of men, trees, or any other objects that he had been accuftomed to perceive by touch, upon having his mind filled with new fenfations of light and colours, whofe various combinations he doth not yet underftand, or know the meaning of; no more than a Chi-Hefet upon firft hearing the words man and tree, would think of the things fignified by them. In both cafes, there mull be time and experience, by repeated a£ts, to acquire a habit of knowing the connexion between the figns and things fignified j that is to fay, of underftanding the lange, whether of the eyes or of the ears. And I conceive no abfurdity in this.
Alc. — I fee, therefore, in ftri£t philofophical truth, that rock only in the fame fenfe that I may be faid to hear it, when the word reck is pronounced.
1 63 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IV.]
Eu?H. — In the very fame.
Alc. — How comes it to pafs then, that every one (hall fay he fees, for inftance, a rock, or a houfe, when thofe things are before his eyes; but no body will fay, he hears a rock, or a houfe, but only the words or founds themfelves, by which thofe things are faid to be fignified or fuggefted, but not heard? Befides, if yifion be only a language, fpeaking to the eyes, it may be afked, When did men learn this language? To acquire the knowledge of fo many figns, as go to the making up a language, is a work of fome difficulty. But will any man fay, he hath fpent time, or been at pains, to learn this language of vifion?
Euph. — No wonder, we cannot affign a time beyond our remoteft memory. If we have been all pra&ifing this language, ever fince our firft entrance into the world; if the Author of nature conftantly fpeaks to the eyes of all mankind, even in their earlieft infancy, whenever the eyes are open in the light, whether alone or in company; It doth not feem to me at all ftrange, that men mould not be aware they had ever learned a language, begun fo early, and pra£Ufed fo conftantly, as this of vifion. And, if we alfo confider, that it is the fame throughout the whole world, and not, like other languages, differing in different places j it will not feem unaccountable, that men fhould miftake the connexion between the proper objects of fight, and the things fignified by them, to be founded in neceffary relation, or likenefs: Or, that they mould even take them for the fame things. Hence it feems eafy to conceive, why men, who do not think, fhould confound, in this language of vifion, the figns with the things fignified, othsrwife than they are wont to do, in the various particular lauguages, formed by the feveral nations of men.
XII. It may be alfo worth while to obferve, that figns being little confidered in themfelves, or for their own fake, [Dial. IVJ MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. i69 but only in their relative capacity, and for the fake of thofe things whereof they are figns, it comes topafs, that the mind often overlooks them, fo as to carry its attention immediately on to the things fignified. Thus, for example, in reading, we run over the characters with the flighteft regard, and pafs on to the meaning. Hence it is frequent for men to fay, they fee words, and notions, and things, in reading a book: whereas, in ftrictnefs, they fee only the characters, which fuggeft words, notions, and things. And, by parity of reafon, may we not fuppofe, that men, not refting in, but overlooking the immediate and proper objects of fight, as in their own nature of fmali moment, carry their attention onward to the very thing fignified, and talk as if they faw the fecondary objects? which, in truth and ftri£tnefs, are not feen, but only fuggefted and apprehended by means of the proper objects of fight, which alone are feen.
Alc. — To fpeak my mind freely, this differtation grows tedious, and runs into points too dry and minute for a gentleman's attention.
I thought, faid Crito, we had been told, the Minute Philofophers loved to confider things clofely and minutely.
Alc— That is true, but in fo polite an age, who would be a mere philofopher? There is a certain fcholaftic accuracy, which ill fuits the freedom and eafe of a well-bred man. But, to cut fhort this chicane, I propound it fairly to your own confidence, whether you really think that God himfelf fpeaks every day, and in every place, to the eyes of all men?
Euph. — That is really, and in truth, my opinion: and it mould be yours too, if you are confident with yourfelf, and abide by your own definition of language. Since you cannot deny, that the great mover and author of nature conftantly explaineth himfelf to the eyes of men, by the fenfible intervention of arbitrary figns, which have no fimilitude, or connexion, with the things fignified; fo as by X i7o MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IV.]
compounding and difpofing them, to fuggeft and exhibit an endlefs variety of obje&s, differing in nature, time, and place, thereby informing and directing men how to act with refpecl: to things diftant and future, as well as near and prefent. In confequence, I fay, of your own fentiments and conceflions, you have as much reafon to think, the Univerfal Agent, or God, fpeaks to your eyes, as you can have for thinking any particular perfon fpeaks to your ears.
Alc. — I cannot help thinking, that fome fallacy runs throughout this whole ratiocination, though perhaps I may not readily point it out. It feems to me, that every other fenfe may as well be deemed a language as that of vilion. Smells and tafte, for inftance, are figns that inform us of other qualities, to which they have neither likenefs nor neceffary connexion.
Euph. — That they are figns is certain, as alfo that language, and all other figns, agree in the general nature of fign, or fo far forth as figns. But it is as certain that all figns are not language; not even all fignificant founds, fuch as the natural cries of animals, or the inarticulate founds and interjections of men. It is the articulation, combination, variety, copioufnefs, extenfive and general ufe, and eafy application of figns (all which are commonly found in vifion) that conftitute the true nature of language. Other fenfes mayindeed furnifh figns; and yet thofe figns have no more right than inarticulate founds to be thought a language.
Alc- — Hold! let me fee! In language, the figns are arbitrary, are they not?* Eupk* — They are.
Alc — And confequently, they do not always fuggeft real matters of fa 61. Whereas, this natural language, as you call it, or thefe vifible figns, do always fuggeft things in the fame uniform way, and have the fame conftant regular connexion with matters of fact: whence it mould feern, the connexion was neceflary, and therefore, according to the definition premifed, it can be no language. How do you folve this objection?
Euph. — You may folve it yourfelf, by the help of a picture, or looking-glafs.
Alc. — You are in the right. I fee there is nothing in it. I know not what elfe to fay to this opinion more, than that it is fo odd and contrary to my way of thinking, that I (hall never affent to it.
XIII. Euph. — Be pleafed to recollecl: your own lectures upon prejudice, and apply them in the prefent cafe. Perhaps they may help you to follow where reafon leads, and to fufpe£t notions which are ftrongly riveted, without having been ever examined.
Alc. — I difdain the fufpicion of prejudice. And I do not fpeak only for myfelf. I know a club of mod ingenious men, the freed from prejudice of any men alive, who abhor the notion of a God, and I doubt not, would be very able to untie this knot. Upon which words of Alciphron, I, who had a£ted the part of an indifferent ftander-by, obferved to him, that it miibecame his character, and repeated profeflions, to own an attachment to the judgment, or build upon the prefumed abilities of other men, how ingenious foever: and that this proceeding might encourage his adverfaries to have recourfe to authority, in which, perhaps, they would find their account more than he.
Oh! faid CritOy I have often obferved the conduct of Minute Philofophers. "When one of them has got a ring of difciples round him, his method is to exclaim againft prejudice, and recommend thinking and reafoning, giving to underffcand that himfelf is a man of deep refearches and clofe argument, one who examines impartially, and corv cludes warily. The fame man, in other company, if he chance • 172 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IV.]
to' be pre fled with reafon, fhall laugh at logic, and afiume the lazy fupine airs of a fine gentleman, a wit, a railleur, to avoid the drincfs of a regular and exa£t inquiry. This double face of the Minute Philofopher is of no fmall ufe to propagate and maintain his notions. Though to me it feems a plain cafe, that if a fine gentleman will fhake off authority, and appeal from religion to reafon, unto reafon he mud go: And if he cannot go without leading-firings, furely he had better be led by the authority of the public, than by that of any knot of Minute Philosophers.
Alc. — Gentlemen, this difcourfe is very irkfome and needlefs. For my part, I am a friend to enquiry. I am willing reafon mould have its full and free fcope. I build on no man's authority. I have no intereft in denying a God. Any man may believe, or not believe, a God, as he pleafes, for me. But after all, Euphranor mult allow me to flare a little at his conclufions.
Euph. — The conclufions are yours as much as mine, for you were led to them by your own conceflions.
XIV. — You, it feems, flare to find, that God is not far from every one of us; and that in him we live and move and have our being. You, who, in the beginning of this morning's conference, thought it ftrange, that God fhould leave himfelf without a witnefs, do now think it ftrange the witnefs fhould be fo full and clear?
Alc- — I muft own I do. I was aware, indeed, of a certain metaphyficai hypothefis, of our feeing all things in God, by the union of the human foul with intelligible fubllance of the Deity, which neither I, nor any one elfe could make fenfe of. But I never imagined it could be pretended, that we faw God with our flefhly eyes, as plain as we fee any human perfon whatfoever, and that he daily fpeaks to our fenfes in a manifeft and clear diaJeel:.
Cri. — As for that metaphyficai hypothefis, I can make no more of it than you. But I think it plain, this optic language hath a neceffary connexion with knowledge, wifdom, and goodnefs. It is equivalent to a conftant creation, betokening an immediate act of power and providence. It cannot be accounted for by mechanical principles, by atoms, attractions, or effluvia. The inftantaneous production and reproduction of fo many figns combined, diflblved, tranfpofed, diverfified, and adapted to fuch an endlefs variety of purpofes, ever fhiftvng with the occafions, and fuited to them, being utterly inexplicable and unaccountable by the laws of motion, by chance, by fate, or the like blind principles, doth fet forth and teftify the immediate operation of a Spirit or thinking Being: and not merely of - a Spirit, which every motion or gravitation may pofEbly infer, but of one wife, good, and provident Spirit, who directs, and rules, and governs the world. Some philofophers, being convinced of the wifdom and power of the Creator, from the make and contrivance of organized bodies, and orderly fyftem of the world, did neverthelefs imagine, that he left this fyftem, with all its parts and contents, well adjufted and put in motion, as an artift leaves a clock, to go thenceforward, of itfelf, for a certain period.
But this vifual language proves, not a Creator merely, but a provident Governor, actually and intimately prefent, and attentive to all our interefts and motions, who watches over our conduct, and takes care of our minuteft actions and defigns, throughout the whole courfe of our lives, informing, admonifhing, and directing inceflantly, in a mod evident and fenfible manner. This is truly wonderful.
Euph. — And is it not fo, that men mould be encompaffed by fuch a wonder, without reflecting on it?
XV. Something there is of divine and admirable in this language, addrefied to our eyes, that may well awaken the mind, and deferves its utmoft attention: it is learned with fo little pains; it expretleth the differences of things fo clearly and aptly; it inftru&s with fuch facility and difpatch, by one glance of the eye conveying a greater variety of advices, and a more diftin£t knowledge of things, than could be got by a difcourfe of feveral hours. And, while it informs, it amufes and entertains the mind, with fuch fingular pleafure and delight. It is of fuch excellent ufe, in giving a liability and permanency to human difcourfe, in recording founds, and bellowing life on dead languages, enabling us to converfe with men of remote ages and countries. And it anfwers fo appofite to the ufes and neceffities of mankind, informing us more diftinctly of thofe objects, whofe riearnefs and magnitude qualify them to be of greateft detriment or benefit to our bodies, and lefs exactly, in proportion as their littlenefs, or diflance, make them of lefs concern to us.
Alc. — And yet thefe ftrange things affect men but little.
Euph. — But they are not ftrange, they are familiar, and that makes them to be overlooked. Things which rarely happen flrike j whereas frequency leffens the admiration of things, though in themfelves ever fo admirable. Hence a common man, who is not ufed to think and make reflexions, would probably be more convinced of the being of a God, by one fingle fentence heard once in his life from the fky, than by all the experience he has had of. this vifual language, contrived with fuch exquifite (kill, fo conftantly addreffed to his eyes, and fo plainly declaring the neamefs, wifdom, and providence of Him with whom we have to do.
Alc. — After all, I cannot fatisfy myfelf, how men fliould be fo little furprifed, or amazed, about this vifive faculty, if it was really of a nature fo furprifing and amazing.
Euph. — But let us fuppofe a nation of men blind from their infancy, among whom a ftranger arrives, the only man who can fee in all the country: Let us fuppofe this ftranger travelling with fome of the natives, and that one while he foretells to them, that, in cafe they walk ftrait forward, in half an hour they fhall meet men, or cattle, or come to a houfe; that, if they turn to the right, and proceed, they fhall, in a few minutes, be in danger of falling down a precipice *, that, fhaping their courfe to the left, they 'will, in fuch a time, arrive at a river, a wood, or a mountain. What think you? Muft they not be infinitely furprifed, that one, who had never been in their country before, fhould know it fo much better than themfelves? And would not thofe predictions feem to them as unaccountable and incredible, as prophefy to a Minute Philofopher?
A lc. — I cannot deny it.
Euph. — But it feems to require intenfe thought, to be able to unravel a prejudice that has been fo long forming, to get over the vulgar error of ideas common to both fenfes, and fo to diftinguifh between the objects of fight and touch, which have grown (if I may fo fay) blended together in our fancy, as to be able to fuppofe ourfelves exactly in the flate, that one of thofe men would be in, if he were made to fee. And yet this I believe is poffible, and might feem worth the pains of a little thinking, efpecially to thofe men whofe proper employment and profefiion it is to think, and unravel prejudices, and confute miftakes. I frankly own I cannot find my way out of this maze, and fhould gladly be fet right by thofe who fee better than myfelf.
Cri. — The purfuing this fubjecT: in their own thoughts would poflibly open a new fcene to thofe fpeculative gentlemen of the Minute Philofophy. It puts me in mind of a pafiage in the Pfalmift, where he reprefents God to be covered with light, as with a garment, and would, methinks, be no ill comment on that ancient notion of fome iy6 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IVj eaftern fages, That God had light for his body, and truth for his foul.
This converfation lafted till a fervant came to tell us the tea was ready: upon which we walked in, and found Lyficles at the tea-table.
XVI. As foon as we fat down, I am glad, faid Alciphrotiy that I have here found my fecond, a frefh man, to maintain our common caufe, which, I doubt, Lyficles will think hath fuffered by his abfence.
Lys.-~ Why fo?
Alc. — I have been drawn into fome concefiions you won't like, Lys. — Let me know what they are.
Alc. — Why, that there is fuch a thing as a God, and that his exiftence is very certain.
Lys. — Blefs me! How came you to entertain fo wild a notion?
Alc — You know we profefs to follow reafon wherever it leads. And, in ihort, I have been reafoned into it.
Lys. — Reafoned! You mould fay, amufed with words, bewildered with fophiftry.
Euph. — Have you a mind to hear the fame reafoning that led Alciphron and me, ftep by ftep, that we may examine whether it be fophiflry or no?
Lys — As to that, I am very eafy. I guefs all that can be faid on that head. It fhall be my bufinefs to help my friend out, whatever arguments drew him in.
Euph. — Will you admit the premifes, and deny the conclufions?
Lys. What if I admit the conclufion?
Euph.— -How! will you grant there is a God?
Lys. — Perhaps I may.
Euph. — Then we are agreed.
Lys. — Perhaps not.
{put. IV.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 177 Euph. — O Lyftcles! you are a fubtle adverfary. I know not what you would be at.