queftion in thofe, or the like cafes. This or that tenet of a feci:, this or that controverted notion is not what we contend for at prefent, but the general faith, taught by Chrift and his apoftles, and preferved by univerfal and perpetual tradition, in all the churches down to our own times. To tax or ftrike at this divine doctrine, on account of things foreign and adventitious, the fpeculations and difputes of curious men, is in my mind, an abfurdity of the fame kind, as it would be to cut down a fine tree, yielding fruit and (hade, becaufe its leaves afforded nourishment to caterpiliers, or becaufe fpiders may now and then weave cobwebs among the branches.
Alc. — To divide and diftinguifh would take time. We have feveral gentlemen very capable of judging in the grofs, but that want attention for irkfome and dry ftudies or minute inquiries. To which, as it would be very hard to oblige men againft their will, fo it mull be a great wrong to the world, as well as themfelves, to debar them from the right of deciding according to their natural fenfe of things.
Cri. — It were to- be wiflied thofe capable men would employ their judgment and attention on the fame objects. If theological inquires are unpalatable, the field of nature is wide. How many difcoveries to be made! How many errors to be corrected in arts and fciences! How many vices to be reformed in life and manners! Why do men fingle out fuch points as are innocent and ufeful, when there are fo many pernicious miftakes to be amended? Why fet themfelves to deftroy the hopes of human kind and encouragements to virtue? Why delight to judge where they difdain to inquire 2 Why not employ their noble talents on the longitude or perpetual motion?
Alc. — I wonder you would not fee the difference between points of curiofity and religion. Thofe employ only men of a genius or humor fuited to them: But all mankind have a right to cenfure, and are concerned to judge of thefe, except they will blindly fubmit to be governed, by the dale wifdom of their anceftors and the eftablifhed laws of their country.
Cri. — It mould feem, if they are concerned to judge, they are not lefs concerned to examine before they judge.
Alc — But after all the examination, and inquiry, that mortal man can make about revealed religion, it is impoflible to come at any rational fure footing. Strange things are told us, and in proof thereof, it is faid, that men have laid down their lives. But it may be eafily conceived, and hath been often known, that men have died for the fake of opinions, the belief of which, whether right or wrong, had once pofTefTed their minds.
Cri. — I grant you may find inftances of men dying for falfe opinions which they believed. But can you aflign an inftance of a man's dying for the fake of an opinion, which he did not believe. This cafe is inconceivable: And yet this muft have been the cafe, if the witnefles of ChrifrVs miracles and refurre&ion are fuppofed impoftors.
XXX. There is, indeed, a deal of fpecious talk about faith, founded upon miracles: But when I examine this matter thoroughly, and trace chriftian faith up to its original, I find it refts upon much darknefs, and fcruple, and uncertainty. Inftead of points evident or agreeable to human reafon, I find a wonderful narrative of the Son of God tempted in the wildernefs by the devil, a thing utterly unaccountable, without any end, or ufe, or reafon whatfoever. I meet with ftrange hiftories of apparitions of angels and voices from heaven, with furprifing accountsof demoniacs, things quite out of the road of common fenfe or obfervation, with feveral incredible feats, faid to have been done by divine power, but more probably the inventions of men: Nor the lefs likely to be fo, bccaufe I cannot pretend to fay with what view, they were invented. Defigns deeply laid are dark, and the lefs we know, the more we fufpecl: But, admitting them for true, I fhall not allow them to be miraculous, until I thoroughly know the power of what are called fecond caufes and the force of magic.
Cri.— You feem, Alciphron, to analyfe not faith, but infidelity, and trace it to its principles; which, from your own account, I collecl: to be dark and doubtful fcruples and furmifes, haftinefs in judging, and narrownefs in thinking, grounded on a fanciful notion, which over-rates the little fcantling of your own experience, and on real ignorance of the views of Providence, and of the qualities, operations, and mutual refpe£ts of the feveral kinds of beings, which are, or may be, for ought you know, in the univerfe. Thus obfcure, uncertain, conceited, and conjectural are the principles of infidelity. Whereas, on the other hand, the principles of faith feem to me, points plain and clear. It is a clear point, that this faith in Chrift was fpread abroad throughout the world foon after his death. It is a clear point, that this was not effected by human learning, politics, or power. It is a clear point, that in the early times of the church, there were feveral men of knowledge and integrity, who embraced this faith, not from any, but againft all temporal motives. It is a clear point, that, the nearer they were to the fountainhead, the more opportunity they had to fatisfy themfelves as to the truth of thofe fa£ts, which they believed. It is a clear point, that the lefs intereft there was to perfuade, the more need there was of evidence to convince them.
It is a clear point, that they relied on the authority of thofe, who declared themfelves eye-witneiTes of the miracles and refurreclion of Chrift. It is a clear point, that thofe profefied eye-witnefies fuffered much for this, their atteftation, and finally feded it with their blood. It is a [Dial. VI.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. • 325 clear point, that thefe witnefTes, weak and contemptible as they were, overcame the world, fpread more light, preached purer morals, and did more benefit to mankind, than all the philofophers and fages put together. Thefe points appear to me clear and fure, and, being allowed fuch, they are plain, juft, and reafonable motives of affent: They ftand upon no fallacious ground, they contain nothing beyond our fphere, neither fuppofmg more knowledge, nor other faculties, than we are really mafters of: And if they mould not be admitted for morally certain, as I believe they will, by fair and unprejudiced inquirers, yet the allowing them to be only probable, is fufficient to flop tlie mouth of an infidel. Thefe plain points, I fay, are the pillars of our faith, and not thofe obfeure ones, by you fuppt>fed, which are in truth, the unfound, uncertain principles of infidelity, to a rafh, prejudiced, and affuming fpirit. To raife an argument, or anfwer an objection, from hidden powers of nature or magic, is groping in the dark: But by the evident light of fenfe, men might be fufficiently certified of fenfible effects, and matters of fa£t, fuch as the miracles and refurre&ion of Chrift: And the teftimony of fuch men might be transmitted to afterages, with the fame moral certainty, as other hiftorical narrations: And thofe fame miraculous fads, compared by reafon with the doctrines they were brought to prove, may afford to an unbiafled mind, flrong indications of their coming from God, or a fuperior principle, whofe goodnefs retrieved the moral world, whofe power commanded the natural, and whofe Povidence extended over both. — Give me leave to fay, that nothing dark, nothing incomprehenfible, or myfterious, or unaccountable, is the ground or motive, the principle or foundation, the proof or reafon of our faith, although it may be the object of it. For it muft be owned, that, if by clear and fure principles, we are rationally led to believe a point lefs clear; wc do not, therefore, reject fuch point, becaufe it is myfterious to conceive, or difficult to account for; nor would it be right fo to do. As for Jews and Gentiles, anciently attributing our Saviour's miracles to magic, this is fo far from being a proof againft them, that to me it feems, rather a proof of the facts, without difproving the caufe to which we afcribe them. As we do not pretend to know the nature and operations of demons, the hiftory, laws, and fyftem of rational beings, and the fchemes or views of Providence, fo far as to account for every action and appearance, recorded in the gofpel: So neither do you know enough of thofe things, to be able from that knowledge of yours, to object againfl accounts fo well attefted. It is an eafy matter to raife fcruples upon many authentic parts of civil hiftory, which, requiring a more perfect knowledge of facts, circumftances, and councils, than we can come at to explain them, muft be to us inexplicable. And this is ftill more eafy, with refpect to the hiftory of nature; in which, if furmifes were admitted for proofs againft things odd, ftrange, and unaccountable; if our fcanty experience were made the rule and meafure of truth, and all thofe phenomena rejected, that we, through ignorance of the principles, and laws, and fyftem of nature, could not explain; we mould indeed make difcoveries, but it would be only of our own blindnefs and prefumption. And why, that men are fo eafily and fo often gravelled in common points, in things natural and vifible, mould yet be fo fharp-fighted and dogmatical about the invifible world, and its myfteries, is to me a point utterly unaccountable by all the rules of logic and good fenfe. Upon the whole, therefore, I cannot help thinking that there are points, fufficiently plain, and clear, and full, whereon a man may ground a reafonable faith in Chrift: But that the attacks of Minute Philosophers, againft this faith, are grounded upon darknefs, ignorance and prefumption.
Alc. — I doubt I fhall (till remain in the dark, as to the proofs of the chriftian religion, and always prefume there is nothing in them.
XXXI. For how is it poflible, at this remote diftance, to arrive at any knowledge, or frame any demonftration about it?
Cri. — What then? Knowledge, I grant, in a ftri& fenfe, cannot be had without evidence, or demonftration: but probable arguments are a fufficient ground of faith. Who ever fuppofed that fcientifical proofs are neceffary to make a chriftian? Faith alone is required, and, provided that, in the main, and upon the whole, men are perfuaded, this faving faith may confift with fome degrees of obfcurity, fcruple, and error. For, although the light of truth be unchangeable, and the fame in its eternal fource, the father of lights: Yet, with refpect to us, it is varioufly weakened and obfcured, by palling through a long diftance, or grofs medium, where it is intercepted, diftorted, or tin&ured by the prejudices and paflions of men. But, all this, notwithstanding, he that will ufe his eyes, may fee enough for the purpofes, either of nature or of grace; though by a light dimmer indeed, or clearer, according to the place, or the diftance, or the hour, or the medium. And it will be fufHcient, if fuch analogy appears between the difpenfations of grace and nature, as may make it probable (although much fhould be unaccountable in both) to fuppofe them derived from the fame author, and the workmanfhip of one, and the fame hand.
Alc— Thofe who faw, and touched, and handled Jefus Chrift after his refurre&ion, if there were any fuch, may be faid to have feen by a clear light: But to us, the light is very dim, and yet it is expected we (hould believe this point as well as they. For my part, I believe with Spinofiy that Chrift's death was literal, but his rcfurrection allegorical. * Cri. — And for my part, I can fee nothing in this celebrated infidel, that fhculd make me defert matters of fac~r, and moral evidence, to adopt his notions. Though I muft needs own, I admit an allegorical refurrre£fcion, that proves the real: to wit, a refurre&ion of ChrifVs difciples from weaknefs to refolution, from fear to courage, from defpair to hope: of which, for ought I can fee, no rational account can be given, but the fenfible evidence, that our Lord was truly, really, and literally rifen from the dead: But as it cannot be denied, that his difciples, who were eye-witnefTes of his miracles and refurre&ion, had flronger evidence than we can have of thefe points: So it cannot be denied, that fuch evidence was then more necefTary, to induce men to embrace a new inftitution, contrary to the whole fyftem of their education, their prejudices, their paflions, their interefts, and every human motive. Though to me it feems, the moral evidence and probable arguments within our reach, are abundantly fufficient to make prudent, thinking men, adhere to the faith, handed down to us from our anceftors, eftablifhed by the laws of our country, requiring fubmiflion in points above our knowledge, and for the reft, recommending doctrines, the moft agreeable to our intcreft, and our reafon. And, however ftrong the light might have been at the fountain-head, yet its long continuance and propagation, by fuch unpromifing inftruments throughout the world, have been very wonderful. We may now take a more comprehenfive view of the connexion, order, and progrefs of the divine difpenfations, and by a retrofpe£fc on a long feries of part ages, perceive a unity of defign, running throughout the whole, a gradual difclofing, and fufilling the purpofes of Providence, a regular progrefs * Vid- Spinofae EpLft. ad Oldenburgium.
from types to anti-types, from things carnal to things fpiritual, from earth to heaven. We may behold Chrifi crucified, that ftumbling-block to the Jews, and fooliihnefs to the Greeks, putting a final period to the temple worfhip of the one, and idolatry of the other, and that ftone, which was cut out of the mountain without hands, and brake in pieces all other kingdoms, become itfelf a great mountain.
XXXII. If a due reflexion on thefe things be not fufficient to beget a reverence for the chriftian faith in the minds of men, I fhould rather impute it to any other caufe, than a wife and cautious incredulity: "When I fee their eafinefs of faith in the common concerns of life, where there is no prejudice or appetite to bias or difturb their natural judgment: When I fee thofe very men that, in religion, will not ftir a ftep without evidence, and at every turn expect demonftration, truft their health to a phyfician, and their lives to a failor, with an implicit faith, I cannot think they deferve the honor of being thought more incredulous than other men: Or that they are more accuftomed to know, and for this reafon lefs inched to believe. On the contrary, one is tempted to fufpecl:, that ignorance hath a greater fhare than fcience in our modern infidelity: And that it proceeds more from a wrong head, or an irregular will, than from deep refearches.
Lys. — We do not, it muft be owned, think that learning, or deep refearches, are neceflary to pafs a right judgment upon things. I fometimes fufpecl: that learning is apt to produce and juftify whims, and fmcerciy believe we fhould do better without it. Our feci: are divided on this point, but much the greater part think with me. I have heard more than once, very obferving men remark, that learning was the true human means which prefervcd religion in the world: And that, if we had it in our power to prefer blockheads in the church, all would foon be right, S s 33o MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial* VI] Cri. — Men mu(t be ftrangely in love with their opinions, to put out their eyes rather than part with them. But it has been often remarked by obferving men, that there are no greater bigots than infidels.
Lys. — What! A free-thinker, and a bigot, impoffible!
Cri. — Not fo impoffible neither, that an infidel mould be bigoted to his infidelity. Methinks I fee a bigot, wherever I fee a man over-bearing, and pofitive without knowing why, laying the greateft ftrefs on points of fmallcft moment, hafty to judge of the confcience, thoughts, and inward views of other men, impatient of reafoning againft his own opinions, and choofing them with inclination rather than judgment, an enemy to learning, and attached to mean authorities. How far our modern infidels agree with this description, I leave to be confidered by thofe who really confider and think for themfelves.
Lys. — We are no bigots, we are men that difcover difficulties in religion, that tie knots and raife fcruples, which difturb the repofe, and interrupt the golden dreams of bigots, who therefore cannot endure us.
Cri.— —They who caft about for difficulties, will be fure to find, or make them upon every fubjecl:: But he that would, upon the foot of reafon, erecl: himfelf into a judge, in order to make a wife judgment on a fubjecl: of that nature, will not only confider the doubtful and difficult parts of it, but take a comprehenfive view of the whole, confider it in all its parts and relations, trace it to its original, examine its principles, effects, and tendencies, its proofs internal and external: he will diftinguifh between the clear points and the obfcure, the certain and uncertain, the efiential and the circumftantial, between what is genuine and what foreign. He will confider the different forts of proof, that belong to different things: where evidence is to be expected: Where probability may iuffice: And where it is reafonable to fuppofe there fhould be doubts and fcruples. He will proportion his pains and exa&nefs to the importance of the inquiry, and check that difpofition of his mind to conclude all thofe notions, groundlefs prejudices, with which it was imbued before it knew the reafon of them. He will filence his paflions, and liften to truth. He will endeavor to untie knots as well as to tie them, and dwell rather on the light parts of things, than the obfcure. He will balance the force of his underftanding with the difficulty of the fubje£t, and to render his judgment impartial, hear evidence on all fides, and fo far as he is led by authority, choofe to follow that of the honefteft and wifeft men. Now it is my fincere opinion, the chriftian religion may well ftand the teft of fuch an inquiry.
Lys.— — But fuch an inquiry would coft too much pains and time. We have thought of another method, the bringing religion to the teft of wit and humour: This we find a much fhorter, eafier, and more effectual way. And, as all enemies are at liberty to choofe their weapons, we make choice of thofe we are moft expert at: And we are the better pleafed with this choice, having obferved that of all things, a folid divine hates a jell.
Euph. — To confider the whole of the fubjecl:, to read and think on all fides, to objecT: plainly, and anfwer directly, upon the foot of dry reafon and argument, would be a very tedious and troublefome affair. Befides it is attacking pedants at their own weapons. How much more delicate and artful is it, to give a hint to cover one's felf, with an senigma, to drop a double entendre, to keep it in one's power to recover, and flip afide, and leave his antagonift beating the air?
Lys.— This hath been pra&ifed with great fuccefs, and I believe it the top method to gain profelytes, and confound pedants.
Cri. — I have feen feveral things written in this, way, which, I fuppofe, were copied from the behavior of a fly fort of fcorners, one may fometimes meet with. Suppofe a conceited man that would pafs for witty, tipping the wink upon one, thrufting out his tongue at another; one while waggifhly fmiling, another with a grave mouth and ludicrous eyes; often affe&ing the countenance of one who fmothered a jeft, and fometimes bursting out in a horfe-laugh: What a figure would this be, I will not fay in the fenate or council, but in a private vifit among well-bred men? And yet this is the figure that certain great authors, who in this age, would pafs for models, and do pafs for models, make in their polite and elaborate writings on the moft weighty points.
Alc. — I, who profefs myfelf an admirer, an adorer of reafon, am neverthelefs obliged to own, that in fome cafes, the fharpnefs of ridicule can do more than the ftrength of argument. But if we exert ourfelves in the ufe of mirth and humor, it is not for want of other weapons. It mail never be faid, that a free-thinker was afraid of reafoning. No Crito, we have reafons in ftore: The beft are yet to come: And if we can find an hour for another conference before we fet out to-morrow morning, I'll undertake you (hall be plied with reafons, as clear, and home, and clofe to the point as you could wifh.
THE SEVENTH DIALOGUE.
I. Chriftian Faith impofftble. II. Words Jiand for Ideas. : III. No Knowledge or Faith without Ideas. IV. Grace, no Idea of it. V. Suggefling Ideas not the only life of Wards. VI. Force as difficult to form an Idea of as Grace. VII. Notwithstanding which, ufeful Proportions may be formed concerning it. VIII. Belief of the Trinity and other Myfleries not abfurd. IX. Mi/lakes about Faith an Occafion of profane Raillery. X. Faith, its true Nature and Efecls. XI. Illuf rated by Science. XII. By Arithmetic in particular. XIII. Sciences converfant about Signs. XIV. The true End of Speech, Reafon, Science, and Faith. XV. Metaphyseal Objections as Jlrong again/} Human Sciences as Articles of Faith. XVI. No Religion, becau/e no Human Liberty. >XVII. Farther Proof againfl Human Liberty. XVIIL Fatalifm a Confequence of erroneous Suppofitions. XIX. Man an accountable Agent. XX. Inconftflency, Singularity, and Credulity of Minute Philofophers. XXI. Untroden Paths and new Light of the Minute Philofophers. XXII. Sophiflry of the Minute Philofophers. XXIII. Minute Philofophers ambiguous, enigmatical, unfathomable. XXIV. Scepticifm of the Minute Philofophers. XXV. How a. Sceptic ought to behave. XXVI. Minute Philofophers, why difficult to convince. XXVII. Thinking, not the epidemical Evil of thefe times. XXVIII. Infidelity, not an Effecl of Reafon or Thought, its true Motives affigned.
XXIX. Variety of Opinions about Religion, Effects thereof* XXX. Method for proceeding with Minute Philofophers. XXXI. Want of Thought, and want of Education Defects of the prefent Age.
HE philofophers having refolved to fct out for London next morning, we aflembled at break of day in the library. Atciphron began witli a declaration of his fincerity, alluring us, he had very maturely and with a mod unbiased mind confidered all that had been faid, the day before. He added that, upon the whole, he could not deny feveral probable reafons were produced for embracing the chriftian faith. But, faid he, thofe reafons being only probable can never prevail againft abfolute certainty and demonftration. If therefore, I can demonftrate your religion to be a thing altogether abfurd and inconfiftent, your probable arguments in its defence do, from that moment, lofe their force, and with it, all right to be anfwered or confidered. The concurring teftimony of fincere and able witneffes hath, without queftion, great weight in human affairs. I will even grant, that things odd and unaccountable to human judgment or experience, may fometimes claim our afTent on that fole motive.- — And I will alfo grant it poflible, for a tradition to be conveyed with moral evidence through many centuries. But at the fame time, you will grant to me, that a thing demonstrably and palpably falfe, is not to be admitted on any teftimony whatever, which at bed can never amount to demonftration. To be plain, no teftimony can make nonfenfe fenfe: No moral evidence can make contradictions confident. Know then, that as the ftrength of our caufe doth not depend upon, fo neither is it to be decided by any critical points of hiftory, chronology, or languages. You are not to wonder, if the fame fort of tradition and moral proof, which governs our afient with refpecl: to fa£ts in civil or natural hiftory is not admitted as a fuflicient voucher for metaphyfical abfurdities and abfolute impoflibilities. Things obfcure and unaccountable in human affairs, or the operations of nature, may yet 336 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VIL] be poflible, and, if well attefted, may be aflented unto: But religious aflent, or faith, can be evidently fhewn in its own nature to be impracticable, impofiible, and abfurd. This is the primary motive to infidelity. This is our citadel and fortrefs, which may, indeed, be graced with outworks of various erudition, but, if thofc are demolished, remains in itfelf, and of its own proper ftrength impregnable.
Euph. — This, it muft be owned, reduceth our inquiry within a narrow compafs: Do but make out this, and I (hall have nothing more to fay.
Alc. — Know then, that the fhallow mind of the vuU gar, as it dwells only on the outward furface of things, and confiders them in the grofs, may be eafily impofed on. Hence a blind reverence for religious faith and myftery. But when an acute philofopher comes to difle£t and analyfe thefe points, the import ure plainly appears: And as he has no blindnefs, fo he has no reverence for empty notions, or, to fpeak more properly, for mere forms of fpeech, which mean nothing, and are of no ufe to mankind.
II. Words are figns: They do or fhould ftand for ideas; which fo far as they fuggeft they are fignificant. But words that fuggeft no ideas are infignificant. He who annexeth a clear idea to every word he makes ufe of, fpeaks fenfe: But where fuch ideas are wanting, the fpeaker utters nonfenfe. In order, therefore, to know whether any man's fpeech be fenfelefs and infignificant, we have nothing to do but lay afide the words and confider the ideas fuggefted by them. Men, not being able immediately to communicate their ideas one to another, are obliged to make ufe of fenfible figns, or words; the ufe of which is to raife thofe ideas in the hearer, which are in the mind of the fpeaker: And if they fail of this end, they ferve to no purpofe. He, who really thinks hath a train of ideas fucceeding each other and connected in his mind: And when he exprefleth himfelf by difcourfe, each word fuggefts a diftinft idea to the hearer or reader; who by that means hath the fame train of ideas in his, which was in the mind of the fpeaker or writer. As far as this effect is produced, fo far the difcourfe is intelligible, hath fenfe and meaning. Hence it follows, that whoever can be fuppofed to underftand what he reads or hears, muft have a train of ideas raifed in his mind, correfpondent to the train of words read or heard. Thefe plain truths, to which men readily aflent in theory, are but little attended to in practice, and therefore deferve to be enlarged on, and inculcated however obvious and undeniable. Mankind are generally averfe from thinking, though apt enough to entertain difcourfe either in themfelves or others: The effecl: whereof is, that their minds are rather ftored with names than ideas, the hulk of fcience rather than the thing. And yet thefe words without meaning do often make diftinttions of parties, the fubjecl: matter of their difputes, and the object of their zeal. This is the moft general caufe of error, which doth not influence ordinary minds alone, but even thofe who pafs for acute and learned philofophers, are often employed about names inftead of things or ideas, and are fuppofed to know when they only pronounce hard words, without a meaning.
III. Though it is evident that, as knowledge is the perception of the connexion or difagreement between ideas, he who doth not diltinclly perceive the ideas marked by the terms, fo as to form a mental propofition anfwering to the verbal, cannot poflibly have knowledge: No more can he be faid to have opinion or faith which imply a weaker aflent, but ftill it muft be to a propofition, the terms of which, are underftood as clearly, although the agreement T t 338 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII]