or difagrecment of the ideas may not be fo evident, as in the cafe of knowledge. I fay, all degrees of aflent whether founded on reafon or authority, more or lefs cogent, are internal acts of the mind, which alike terminate in ideas as their proper object: Without which there can be really no fuch thing as knowledge, faith, or opinion.
We may perhaps raife a duft and difpute about tenets purely verbal: But what is this at bottom, more than mere trifling? All which will be eafily admitted with refpect to human learning and fcience; wherein it is an allowed method to expofe any doctrine or tenet, by {tripping them of the words, and examining what ideas are underneath, or whether any ideas at all? This is often found the fhortaft way to end difputes, which might othervvife grow, and multiply without end, the litigants neither underflanding one another nor themfelves. It were needlefs to illuftrate what mines by its own light, and is admitted by all thinking men. My endeavor fhall be only to apply it in the prefent cafe. I fuppofe I need not be at any pains to prove, that the fame rules of reafon and good fcnk, which obtain in all other fubjects, ought to take place in religion. As for thofe, who confider faith and reafon as two diftinct provinces, and would have us think good fenfe has nothing to do where it is moll concerned, I am refoived never to argue with fuch men, but leave them in quiet pofTeiTion of their prejudices. And now, for the particular application of what I have faid, I lliall not fingle out any nice difputed points of fchool divinity, -or thofe that relate to the nature and eflence of God, which being allowed infinite you might pretend to fcreen them, under the general notion of difficulties attending the nature of infinity.
IV. Grace is the main point in the chriftian difpenfais cftner mentioned or more confidered throughout the New Teftament; wherein it is reprefented as fomewhat of a very particular kind, diftin£t, from any thing revealed to the Jews, or known by the light of nature. This fame grace is fpoken of, as the gift of God, as coming by Jefus Chrifty as reigning, as abounding, as operating. Men are faid to fpeak through grace, to believe through grace. Mention is made of the glory of grace, the riches of grace, the Rewards of grace. Christians are faid to be heirs of grace, to receive grace, grow in grace, be ftrong in grace, to (land in grace, and to fall from grace. And laftiy, grace is faid to juftify, and to fave them. Hence chriitianity is Puled the covenant or difpenfation of grace. And it is well known, that no point hath created more controverfy in the church, than this doctrine of grace. "What difputes about its nature, extent, and effects, about univerfal, efficacious, fufEcient, preventing, irrefiflible grace, have employed the pens of proteftant as well as popim divines, of Janfemjls and Molin'ijisy of Lutherans^ Calvinifls, and Arminians, as I have not the lead curiofity to know, fo I need not fay. It fufficeth to obferve, that there have been, and are (till fubfifting great contefls upon thefe points. Only one thing I fnould defire to be informed of, to wit, what is the clear and diftincl: idea marked by the word grace? I prefume a man may know the bare meaning of a term, without going into the depth of all thofe learned inquiries.
This furcly is an eafy matter, provided there is an idea annexed to fuch term. And if there is not, it can be neither the fubject of a rational difpute, nor the object of real faith. Men may indeed impofe upon themfelves or others, and pretend to argue and believe, when at bottom there is no argument or belief, farther than mere verbal trifling. Grace taken in the vulgar fenfe, either for beauty, or favor, I can eafily underftand. But when it de- 34o MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.)
notes an active, vital, ruling principle, influencing and operating on the mind of man, diftimtl from every natural power or motive, I profefs myfelf altogether unable to underftand it, or frame any diftincl: idea of it: And, therefore, I cannot aflent to any propofition concerning it, nor confequently have any faith about it: And it is a felf-evident truth, that God obligeth no man to impoffibilities. At the requeit of a philofophical friend, I did caft an eye on the writings he (hewed* me of fome divines, and talked with others, on this fubje£t, but after all I had read or heard, could make nothing of it, having always found,- whenever I laid afide the word gracey and looked into my own mind, a perfect vacuity or privation of all ideas. And, as I am apt to think men's minds and faculties are made much alike, I fufpecl: that other men, if they examined what they call grace, with the fame exactnefs and indifference, would agree with me, that there was nothing in it but an empty name. This is not the only inftance, where a word often heard and pronounced, is believed intelligible, for no other reafon but becaufe it is familiar. Of the fame kind are many other points reputed neceiTary articles of faith. That which in the prefent cafe impofeth upon mankind, I take to be partly this.
Men fpeak of this holy principle, as of fomething that a&s, moves, and determines, taking their ideas from corporeal things, from motion, and the force or Momentum of bodies, which being of an obvious and fenfible nature they fubftitute in place of a thing fpiritual, and incomprehenfible, which is a manifeft delufion. For though, the idea of corporeal force be ever fo clear and intelligible, it will not, therefore, follow, that the idea of grace, a thing perfectly incorporeal, miift be fo too. And though, we may reafon diftin&ly, perceive,' aflent, and form opinions about the one, it will by no means, follow that, we can do fo of the other. Thus it comes to pafs, that a clear fenfible idea of what is real, produceth, or rather, is made a pretence for an imaginary, fpiritual faith, that terminates in no object; a thing impoffible! For there can be no afient, where there are no ideas: And where there is no aflent, there can be no faith: And what cannot be, that no man is obliged to. This is as clear as any thing in Euclid.
V. Euph. — Be the ufe of v/ords or names, what it will, I can never think it is to do things impoffible. Let us then inquire what it is? And fee if we can make fenfe of our daily practice. Words, it is agreed, are figns: It may not, therefore, be amifs to examine the ufe of other figns, in order to know that of words. Counters, for inftance, at a card-table are ufed, not for their own fake, but only as figns fubftituted for money, as words are for ideas. Say now, Alciphron, is it neceflary every time thefe counters are ufed, throughout the whole progrefs of a game, to frame an idea of the diitinct, fum or value, that each reprefents?
Alc. — By no means: It is fufiicient, the players at firft agree on their refpedtive values, and at laft fubftitute thofe values in their ftead.
Euph. — And in calling up a fum, where the figures (land for pounds, millings, and pence, do you think it necefiary, throughout the whole progrefs of the operation, in each ftep, to form ideas of pounds, millings, and pence?
Alc. — I do not, it will fuffice, if in the conclufion, thofe figures direct our actions with refpecl: to things.
Euph. — From hence, it feems to follow, that words may not be infignificant, although they fhould not every time they are ufed, excite the ideas they fignify in our minds, it being fufiicient, that we have it in our power to fubftitute things or ideas for their figns when there is occafion. It feems alfo to follow, that there may be another ufe of words, befides that of marking and fuggefting diftinct ideas, to wit, the influencing our conduct and actions; which may be done, either by forming rules for us to act by, or by railing certain paflions, difpofitions, and emotions in our minds. A difcourfe, therefore, that directs how to acl:, or excite to the doing or forbearance of an action may, it feems, be ufeful and fignificant, although the words whereof it is compofed, mould not bring each a diftinfr, idea into our minds.
Alc. — It feems fo.
Euph. — Pray tell me, Alciphron, is not an idea altogether inactive?
Alc. — It is.
Euph. — An agent, therefore, an active mind, or fpirit, cannot be an idea, or like an idea. Whence it mould feem to follow, that thofe words, which denote an active principle, foul, or fpirit, do not, in a ftrict, and proper fenfe, ftand for ideas: And yet they are not infignificant neither: Since I underftand what is fignified by the term /, or myfelf, or know what it means, although it be no idea, nor like an idea, but that which thinks and wills, and apprehends ideas and operates about them. Certainly it muft be allowed that we have fome notion, that we underftand, or know what is meant by the terms myfelf, will, memory, love, hate, and fo forth, although, to fpeak exactly, thefe words do not fuggeft fo many diftict ideas.
Alc. — What would you infer from this?
Euph. — What hath been inferred already, that words may be fignificant, although they do not ftand for ideas.* The contrary whereof having been prefumed, feems to have produced the doctrine of abftract ideas.
Alc — Will you not allow then, that the mind can abftract?.
* See the Principles of Human Knowledge. Sect, 135. and the Introduction. Sect. 20.
Euph. — I do not deny it may abftracl: in a certain fenfe; inafmuch as thofe things that can really exift, or be really perceived afunder, may be conceived afunder, or abftracled one from the other; for inftance, a man's head from his body, colour from motion, figure from weight. But it will not thence follow, that the mind can frame, abftracl: general ideas, which appear to be impoffible.
Alc. — And yet it is a current opinion, that every fubftantive name marks out, and exhibits to the mind, one diftincl: idea feparate from all others.
Euph. — Pray, Alciphrony is not the word number, fuch a fubftantive name?
Alc. — It is.
Euph. — Do but try now, whether you can frame an idea of number, in abftract exclufive of all figns, words, and things numbered. I profefs, for my own part, I cannot.
Alc. — Can it be fo hard a matter to form a fimple idea of number, the object of a mod evident demonftrable fcience? Hold, let me fee, if I cannot abftracl: the idea of number, from the numeral names and characters, and all particular numerable things. Upon which, Alciphron paufed a while, and then faid: To confefs the truth, I do not find that I can.
Euph. — But though, it feems, neither you nor I can form diftincl:, fimple ideas of number, we can neverthe-Iefs, make a very proper and fignificant ufe of numeral names. They direct us in the difpofition, and management of our affairs, and are of fuch necefTary ufe, that we (liould not know how to do without them. And yet, if other men's faculties may be judged of by mine, to attain a precife, fimple abftracl: idea of number, is as difficult as to comprehend any myftery in religion.
" VI. But to come to your own inftance, let us examine what idea we can frame of force abftra&ed from body, motion, and outward fenfible efFe£ts. For myfelf, I do not find that I have or can have any fuch idea.
Alc. — Surely every one knows what is meant by force.
Euph. — And yet I queftion whether every one can form a diftin6t idea of force. Let me intreat you, Alciphron, be not amufed by terms, lay afide the word force, and exclude every other thing from your thoughts, and then fee what precife idea you have of force.
Alc— Force is that in bodies, which produceth motion and other fenfible effe&s.
Euph. — It is then fomething diftindt from thofe effects.
Alc. — It is.
Euph. — Be pleafed now to exclude the confederation of its fubje£t and effects, and contemplate force itfelf in its own precife idea.
Alc — I profefs I find it no fuch eafy matter.
Euph. — Take your own advice, and fhutT your eyes to affift your meditation. Upon this, Alciphron having clofed his eyes, and mufed a few minutes, declared he could make nothing of it. And that, replied Euphranor, which it feems neither you nor I can»frame an idea of, by your own remark of men's minds and faculties being made much alike, we may fuppofe others have no more an idea of than we.
Alc — We may.
Euph. — But, notwithftanding all this, it is certain there are many fpeculations, reafonings, and difputes, refined fubtilities, and nice difiin&ions, about this fame force. And to explain its nature, and diftinguifh the feveral notions or kinds of it, the terms, gravity, reaclion, vis inertia, vis inftta, vis imprejfa, vis mortua, vis viva, impetus, momentum, folicitatio, conatus, and divers other fuch like expreflions, have been ufed by learned men: and no fmall controverfies have arifen about the notions or definitions of thefe terms. It has puzzled men to know whether force is fpiritual or corporeal, whether it remains after action, how it is transferred from one body to another. Strange paradoxes have been framed about its nature, properties, and proportions: For inftance, that contrary forces may at once fubfift in the fame quiefcent body: That the force of percuffion in a fmall particle is infinite: For which, and other curiofities of the fame fort, you may confult Borellus de vi perciffionis, the Lezioni Academiche of Torricelli, the exercitations of Hermanus% and other writers. It is well known to the learned world, what a controverfy hath been carried on, between mathematicians, particularly Monfieur Leibnitz and Monfieur Papin in the Leipfic Acta Eruditorum, about the proportion of forces: Whether they be each to other in a proportion compounded of the fimple proportion of the bodies and the celerities, or in one compounded of the fimple proportion of the bodies, and the duplicate proportions of the celerities? A point, it feems, not yet agreed: As indeed the reality of the thing itfelf is made a queftion.
Leibnitz diftinguifhed between the nifus elementaris, and the impetus, which is formed by a repetition of the nifus elementarisy and feems to think they do not exift in nature, but are made only by an abftraction of the mind. The fame author, treating of original, active force, to illuftrate his fubject hath recourfe to the fubftantial forms and Entelechtia of Ariflotle. And the ingenious Torricelli faith of force and Impetus, that they are fubtile ab (tracts and fpiritual quintefiences: And concerning the momentum and the velocity of heavy bodies falling, he faith they are tin certo che and un non Jo che, that is plain Englifh, he knows not what to make of them. Upon the whole, therefore, may we not pronounce, that excluding body, time, fpace, motion, and all its fenfible meafures, and effects, we U u (hall find it as difficult to form an idea of force, as of grace?
Alc.— I do not know what to think of it.
VII. Euph.— And yet, I prefume, you allow there are very evident proportions or theorems, relating to force, which contain ufeful truths: for inftance, that a body with conjunct forces, defcribes the diagonal of a parallelogram, in the fame time that it would the fides with feparate. Is not this a principle of very extenfive ufe? Doth not the doctrine of the compofition and refolution of forces depend upon it, and in confequence thereof, numberlefs rules and theorems, directing men how to act, and explaining Phenomena, throughout the mechanics and mathematical philofophy? And if, by confidering this doctrine of force, men arrive at the knowledge of many inventions in mechanics, and are taught to frame engines, by means of which things difficult, and otherwife impoffible may be performed; and if the fame doctrine, which is fo beneficial here below, ferveth alfo as a key to discover the nature of the celeltial motions; (hall we deny that it is of ufe, either in practice or fpeculation, becaufe we have no diftinct idea of force? Or that which we admit with regard to forcey upon what pretence can we deny, concerning grace? If there are queries, difputes, perplexities, diversity of notions and opinions about the one, fo there are about the other alfo: If we can form no precife diftinct idea of the one, fo neither can we of the other. Ought we not, therefore, by a parity of reafon, to conclude, there may be poflibly divers true and ufeful propofitions concerning the one, as well as the other?
And that grace may, for ought you know, be an object: of our faith, and influence our life and actions, as a principle, deftructive of evil habits, and productive of good ones, although we cannot attain a diftinct idea of it, feparate, or abftracted from God, the Author, from man, the fubject, and from virtue and piety, its effects?
VIII. Shall we not admit the fame method of arguing, the fame rules of logic, reafon, and good fenfe to obtain in things fpiritual, and things corporeal, in faith and fcience? And (hall we not ufe the fame candor, and make the fame allowances in examining the ravelations of God, and the inventions of men? For ought I fee, that philofopher cannot be free from bias, and prejudice, or be faid to weigh things in an equal balance, who mall maintain the doctrine of force, and reject that of grace, who (hall admit the abftract idea of a triangle, and at the fame time ridicule the holy trinity. But, however partial or prejudiced other Minute Philosophers might be, you have laid it down for a maxim, that the fame logic, which obtains in other matters, muft be admitted in religion.
Lys. — I think, Alciphron^ it would be more prudent to abide by the way of wit and humor, than thus to try religion by the dry teft of reafon and logic.
Alc— Fear not: By all the rules of right reafon, it is absolutely impoflible that any myftery, and leaft of all the trinity, mould really be the object of man's faith.
Euph. — I do not wonder you thought fo, as long as you maintained that no man could affent to a propofition without perceiving or framing in his mind, diftinct ideas marked by the terms of it. But although terms are figns, yet having granted, that thofe figns may be fignificant, though they fhould not fuggeft ideas reprefented by them, provided they ferve to regulate and influence our wills, paflions, or conduct, you have confequently granted, that the mind of man may affent to propofitions containing fuch terms, when it is fo directed or affected by them, notwithftanding it mould not perceive diftinct ideas marked by thofe terms. Whence it feems to follow, that a man may believe the do&rine of the trinity, if he finds it revealed in Holy Scripture, that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghoft are God, and that there is but one God? Although he doth not frame in his mind, any abftract, or diftinct ideas of trinity, fubftance, or perfonality, provided, that this doctrine of a Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier makes proper impreffions on his mind, producing therein, love, hope, gratitude, and obedience, and thereby becomes a lively operative principle, influencing his life and actions, agreeably to that notion of faving faith which is required in a chriftian. This, I fay, whether right or wrong, feems to follow from your own principles, and conceffions. But, for further fatisfa&ion, it may not be amifs to inquire, whether there be any thing parrallel to this chriftian faith, in the Minute Philofophy. Suppofe a fine gentleman or lady of fafhion, who are too much employed to think for themfelves, and are only freethinkers at fecond hand, have the advantage of being betimes initiated in the principles of your feci;, by converting with men of depth and genius, who have often declared it to be their opinion, the world is governed either by fate, or by chance, it matters not which: Will you deny it poflible for fuch perfons to yield their aflent to either of thefe propositions?
Alc. — I will not.
Euph. — And may not fuch their aflent, be properly called faith } Alc. — It may.
Euph. — And yet it is pcflible, thofe difciples of the Minute Philofophy may not dive fo deep, as to be able to frame any ahftracl:, or precife, or any determinate idea whatfoever, either of fate, or of chance.
Alc. — This too, I grant.
Euph. — So that according to you, this fame gentleman or lady, may be faid to believe, or have faith, where they have not ideas.
Alc— They may.
Euph.— And may not this faith, or perfuafion produce real effe&s, and fhew itfelf in the conduct, and tenor of their lives, freeing them from the fears of fuperftition, 'and giving them a true relifh of the world, with a noble indolence, or indifference about what comes after.
Alc— It may.
Euph.' — And may not chriftians, with equal reafon, be allowed to believe the dignity of our Saviour, or that in him, God and man, make one perfon, and be verily perfuaded thereof, fo far as for fuch faith or belief, to become a real principle of life and conduct? inafmuch as by virtue of fuch perfuafion, they fubmit to his government, believe his doctrine, and pra&ife his precepts, although they frame no abftracl: idea of the union between the divine and human nature; nor may be able to clear up the notion of perfon to the contentment of a Minute Philofopher. To me, it feems evident, that if none but thofe who had nicely examined, and could themfelves explain the principle of individuation in man, or untie the knots and anfwer the objections, which may be raifed even about human perfonal identity, would require of us to explain the divine myfteries, we mould not be often called upon, for a clear and diftindt. idea of perfon in relation to the trinity, nor would the difficulties on that head, be often objected to our faith.
Alc. — Methinks, there is no fuch myflery in perfonal identity.
Euph. — Pray, in what do you take it to confift?
Alc— In confcioufnefs.
Euph.-— Whatever is poflible, may be fuppofed.
Alc — It may.
Euph. — We will fuppofe now (which is poflible in the nature of things, and reported to be facl) that a perfon, through fome violent accident or diftemper, mould fall ii>- to fuch a total oblivion, as to lofe all confcioufnefs of his pad life, and former ideas. I afk, is he not ftill the fame perfon?
Alc— -He is the fame man, but not the fame perfon. Indeed, you ought not to fuppofe that a perfon lofeth its former confcioufnefs; for this is impoffible, though a man perhaps may; but then he becomes another perfon. In the fame perfon, it muft be owned, fome old ideas may be loft, and fome new ones got: But a total change is inconfiftent with identity of perfon.
Euph.— Let us then fuppofe that a perfon hath ideas, and is confcious during a certain fpace of time, which we will divide into three equal parts, whereof the later terms are marked by the letters, A, B, C. In the firfl part of time, the perfon gets a certain number of ideas, which are retained in A: during the fecond part of time, he retains one half of his old ideas, and lofeth the other half, in place of which he acquires as many new ones: So that in B, his ideas are half old and half new. And in the third part, we fuppofe him to lofe the remainder of the ideas acquired in the firft, and to get new ones in their ftead, which are retained in C, together with thofe acquired in the fecond part of time. Is this a poffible fair fuppofition?
Alc— It is.
Euph, — Upon thefe premifes, I am tempted to think, one may demenftrate, that perfonal identity doth not confift in confcioufnefs.
Alc. — As how?
Euph You mall judge; but thus it feems to me. — The perfons in A and B are the fame, being confcious of common ideas by fuppofition. The perfon in B is (for the fame reafon) one and the fame with the perfon in C. Therefore the perfon in A, is the fame with the perfon in C, by that undoubted axiom, £$ua conveniunt uni tertio conveniunt inter fe. But the perfon in C hath no idea in common with the perfon in A. Therefore, perfonal identity doth not confift in confcioufnefs. What do you think, Alcipkrotiy is not this a plain inference?
Alc. — I tell you what I think: You will never affift my faith by puzzling my knowledge.
IX. Euph. — There is, if I miftake not, a practical faith, or afTent, which fheweth itfelf in the will and actions of a man, although his underftanding may not be furnifhed with thofe abftracl:, precife, diftinct, ideas, which, whatever a philofopher may pretend, are acknowledged to be above the talents of common men; among whom, neverthelefs, may be found, even according to your own conceflion, many inftances of fuch practical faith, in other matters which do not concern religion. What fhould hinder, therefore, but that doctrines relating to heavenly myfteries, might be taught in this faving fenfe to vulgar minds, which you may well think incapable of all teaching and faith in the fenfe you fuppofe. Which miftaken fenfe, faid Crito, has given occafion to much profane and mifapplied raillery. But all this may very juftly be retorted on the Minute Philofophers themfelves, who confound fcholafticifm with chriftianity, and impute to other men thofe perplexities, chimeras, and inconfiftent ideas, which are often the workmanfhip of their own brains, and proceed from their own wrong way of thinking. Who doth not fee that fuch an ideal abftra<£ted faith is never thought of by the bulk of chriftians, hufbandmen, for inftance, artifans, or fervants? Or what footfteps are there in the Holy Scripture to make us think, that the wiredrawing of abftracl; ideas was a talk injoined either Jews or chriftians? Is there any thing in the law or the prophets, the evangelifts or apoftles, that looks like it? Every' one, whofe underftanding is not perverted by fcience, falfely fo called, may fee the faving faith