Euph. — You imagine, Alciphron, if I rightly underftand you, that man is a fort of organ played on by outward objects, which according to the different fnape and texture of the nerves, produce different motions and effects therein.
Alc. — Man may, indeed, be fitly compared to an organ: but a puppet is the very thing. You muft know, that certain particles iffuing forth in right lines from all fenfible objects, compofe fo many rays, or filaments, which drive, draw, and actuate every part of the foul and body of man, juft as threads or wires do the joints of that little wooden machine vulgarly called a Puppet: With this only difference, that the latter are grofs and vifible to common eyes, whereas, the former are too fine and fubtle to be difcerned by any but a fagacious free-thinker. This admirably accounts for all thofe operations, which we have been taught to afcribe to a thinking principle within us.
Euph. — -This is an ingenious thought, and muft be of great ufe in freeing men from all anxiety about moral notions, as it transfers the principle of action from the human foul to things outward and foreign. But I have my fcruples about it. For you fuppofe the mind, in a literal fenfe, to be moved, and its volitions to be mere motions. Now, if another mould affirm, as it is not impofiible fome or other may, that the foul is incorporeal, and that motion is one thing, and volition another, I would fain know how you could make your point clear to fuch a one. It muft be owned very clear to thofe, who admit the foul to be corporeal, and all her a&s to be but fo many motions. Upon this fuppofition, indeed, the light wherein you place human nature is no lefs true, than it is fine and new. But let any one deny this fuppofition, which is eafily done, and the whole fuperftruc~ture falls to the ground. If we grant the abovementioned points, I will not deny a fatal neceftity muft enfue. But I fee no reafon for granting them. On the contrary, it feems plain, that motion and thought are two things, as really and as manifeftly diftincl: as a triangle, and a found. It feems, therefore, that in order to prove the neceffity of human actions, you fuppofe what wants proof as much as the very point to be proved.
XVII. Alc. — But fuppofing the mind incorporeal, I {hall, neverthelefs, be able to prove my point. Not- to amufe you with far-fetched arguments, I mail only defire you to look into your own breaft, and obferve how things pafs there, when an object offers itfelf to the mind. Firft the underilanding confiders it: in the next place, the judgment decrees about it, as a thing to be chofen or rejected, to be omitted or done, in this or that manner: And this decree of the judgment doth neceffarily determine the will, whofe office is merely to execute what is ordained by another faculty: Confequently there is no fuch thing as freedom of the will. For that which is neceffary, cannot be free. In freedom, there fhould be. an indifference to either fide of the queftion, a power to aft or not to act, without prefcription or control: and without this indifference and this power, it is evident, the will cannot be free. But it is no Iefs evident, that the will is not indifferent in its actions, being abfolutely determined and governed by the judgment. Now whatever moves the judgment, whether the greateft prefent uneafinefs, or the greateft apparent good, or whatever elfe it be, it is all one to the point in hand. The will being ever concluded and controlled by the judgment, is in all cafes alike under neceffity. There is indeed, throughout the whole of human nature, nothing like a principle of freedom, every faculty being determined in all its a£ts - by fomething foreign to it. The underftanding, for inftance, cannot alter its idea, but muft neceffarily fee it fuch as it prefents itfelf. The appetites, by a natural neceffity, are carried towards their refpec~tive objects. Reafcn cannot infer indifferently any thing from any thing, but is limitted by the nature and connexion of things, and the eternal rules of reafoning. And as this is confeffedly the cafe of all other faculties, (o it equally holds with refpect to the will itfelf, as hath been already fhewn. And if we may credit the divine characlerizer of our times, this, above all others, muft be allowed the moll flavifh faculty. " Appetite (faith that noble writer) which is elder brother to reafon, being the lad of ftronger growth, is fure on every conteft to take the advantage of drawing all to his own fide: and will, fo highly boafted, is but at beft a foot-ball, or top, between thofe youngfters who prove very unfortunately matched, till the youngeft, inftead of now and then a kick or lafh, bellowed to little purpofe, forfakes the ball or top itfelf, and begins to lay about his elder brother."
Cri. — This beautiful parable, for ftile and manner, might equal thofe of a known EngUJh writer, in low life, renowned for allegory, were it not a little incorrect, making the weaker lad find his account in laying about the ftronger.
Alc. — This is helped by fuppofing the ftronger lad the greater coward. But, be that as it will, fo far as it relates to the point in hand, this is a clear ftate of the cafe. The fame point may be alfo proved from the prefcience of God. That which is certainly foreknown, will certainly be. And what is certain, is neceffary. And neceffary actions cannot be the effecl: of free-will. Thus you have this fundamental point of our free-thinking philofophy demonftrated different ways.
Euph. — Tell me, Alciphron, do you think it implies a contradiction, that God mould make a creature free?
Alc— -I do not.
Euph. — It is then poffible there may be fuch a thing.
Alc. — This I do not deny.
Euph.— You can, therefore, conceive and fuppofe fuch a free agent.
Alc— Admitting that I can j what then?
[Dial. VII.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 36*7 Euph. — Would not fuch an one think that he acted?
Alc— He would.
Euph.— And condemn himfelf for fome actions, and approve himfelf for others?
Alc— This too I grant.
Euph.— Would he not think he deferved reward or punifhment?
Alc. — He would.
Euph. — And are not all thefe characters actually found in man?
Alc. — They are.
Euph. — Tell me now, what other character of your fuppofed free agent may not actually be found in man? For if there is none fuch, we mult conclude, that man hath all the marks of a free agent.
Alc — Let me fee! I was certainly overfeen in granting it poflible, even for Almighty Power, to make fuch a thing as a free-agent. I wonder how I came to make fuch an abfurd conceflion, after what had been, as I obferved before, demonftrated fo many different ways.
Euph. — Certainly whatever is poflible may be fuppofed: And whatever doth not imply a contradiction is poffible to an infinite power: Therefore if a rational agent implieth no contradiction, fuch a being may be fuppofed. Perhaps from this fuppofition I might infer man to be free: But I will not fuppofe him that free agent *, fince, it feems, you pretend to have demonftrated the contrary. O Alciphrotiy it is vulgarly obferved, that men judge of others by themfelves. But in judging of me by this rule, you may be miftaken. Many things are plain to one of your fagacity, which are not fo to me, who am often puzzled rather than enlightened by thofe very proofs, that, with you, pafs for clear and evident. And, indeed, be the inference never fo juft, yet fo long as the premifes are not clear, I cannot be thoroughly convinced.
You muft give me leave, therefore, to propofe fome questions, the folution of which, may perhaps, fhew what at prefent I am not able to difcern.
Alc— I fhall leave what hath been faid with you, to coniider and ruminate upon. It is now time to fet out on our journey: there is, therefore, no room for a long firing of queflion and anfwer.
XVIII. Euph. — I fhall then only beg leave in a fummary manner, to make a remark or two on what you have advanced. In the firfl place, I obferve, you take that for granted which I cannot grant, when you aflert whatever is certain, the fame to be necefTary. To me, certain and necefTary feem very different; there being nothing in the former notion that implies conftraint, nor confequently which may not confifl with a man's being accountable for his ad\ions. If it is forefeen that fuch an action fhall be done: may it not alfo be forefeen that it fhall be an effect of human choice and liberty? In the next place, I obferve, that you very nicely abflract and diflinguifh the actions of the mind, judgment, and will: That you make ufe of fuch terms as power, faculty, a£l, determination, indifference, freedom, neceflity, and the like, as if they flood for diflincl: abftracT; ideas: And that this fuppofition feems to infnare the mind into the fame perplexities and errors, which, in all other inflances, are cbferved to attend the doctrine of abflraclion. It is felf-evident, that there is fuch a thing as motion: And yet there have. been found, philofophers, who, by refined reafoning, would undertake to prove there was no fuch thing.
Walking before them was thought the proper way to confute thofe ingenious men. It is no lefs evident, that man is a free agent: And though by abftra£led reafonings you fhould puzzle me, and feem to prove the contrary, yet fo long as I am confcious of my own actions, this inward evidence of plain facl, will bear me up againft all your reafonings, however fubtle and refined. The confuting plain points by obfeure ones, may perhaps convince me of the ability of your philofophers, but never of their tenets.
I cannot conceive why the acute Cratylus fhould fuppofe a power of acting in the appetite and reafon, and none at all in the will. Allowing, I fay, the diftinction of three fuch beings in the mind, I do not fee how this could be true. But if I cannot abftract and diftinguifh fo many beings in the foul of man fo accurately as you do, I do not find it neceflary, Gnce it is evident to me in the grofs and concrete that I am a free agent. Nor will it avail to fay, the will is governed by the jtfdgment, or determined by the object, while, in every fudden common caufe, I cannot difcern nor abftract the decree of the judgment from the command of the will; while I know the fenfible object to be abfolutely inert: And laftly, while I am confcious that I am an active being, who can and do determine myfelf. If I fhould fuppofe things fpiritual to be corporeal, or refine things actual and real into general abftracted notions, or by metaphyfical ikill fplit things fimple and individual into manifold parts, I do not^know what may follow: But if I take things as they are, and afk any plain untutored man, whether he acts or is free in this or that particular action, he readily affents, and I as readily believe him from what I find within. And thus, by an induction of particulars, I may conclude man to be a free agent, although I may be puzzled to define or conceive a notion of freedom in general and abftract.
And if man be free, he is plainly accountable. But if you fhall define, abftract, fuppofe, and it fhall follow that according to your definitions, abftractions, and fuppofitions, there can be no freedom in man, and you fhall thence infer that he is not accountable, I fhall make bold to depart from your metaphyfical abftracted fenfe, and appeal to the common fenfe of mankind.
Y y 3)o MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.]
XIX. If we confider the notions that obtain in the world, of guilt and merit, praife and blame, accountable and unaccountable, we (hall find the common queftion in order to applaud or cenfure, acquit or condemn a man, is, whether he did fuch an action? and whether he was himfelf when he did it? Which comes to the fame thing. It mould feem, therefore, that in the ordinary commerce of mankind, any perfon is efteemed accountable fimply as he is an agent. And though you mould tell me that man is inactive, and that the fenfible objects a£fc upon him, yet my own experience afTures me of the contrary. I know I a£t, and what I a£t, I am accountable for. And if this be true, the foundation of religion and morality remains unfhaken. Religion, I fay, is concerned no farther than that man mould be accountable: And this he is according to my fenfe, and the common fenfe of the world, if he acts: And that he doth a£t is felf-evident. The grounds, therefore, and ends of religion are fecured: whether your philofophic notion of liberty agrees with man's actions or no; And whether his actions are certain or contingent; the queftion being not whether he did it with a free will, or what determined his will; not whether it was certain or foreknown that he would do it, but only whether he did it wilfully: As what muft intitle him to the guilt or merit of it.
Alc. — But ftill the queftion recurs, whether man be free?
Euph.— To determine this queftion, ought we not firft to determine what is meant by the word free?
Alc — We ought.
Euph. — In my opinion, a man is faid to be free, fo far forth as he can do what he will. Is this fo, or is it not?
Alc. — It feems fo.
Euph. — Man, therefore, acting according to his will, is to be accounted free.
Alc. — This I admit to be true, in the vulgar fenfe. But a philofopher goes higher, and inquires whether man be free to will?
Euph. — That is, whether he can will as he wills? I know not how philofophical it may be to afk this queftion, but it feems very idle. The notions of guilt, and merit, juftice, and reward, are in the minds of men, antecedent to all metaphyfical difquifitions: And according to thofe received natural notions, it is not doubted that man is accountable, that he acts, and is felt-determined.
XX. But a Minute Philofopher (hall, in virtue of wrong fuppofitions, confound things moft evidently diftincl:; body, for inftance, with fpirit, motion with volition, certainty with necefiity; and an abftra&er, or refiner, fhall fo analyfe the moft fimple inftantaneous act: of the mind, as to diftinguifh therein divers faculties and tendencies, principles and operations, caufes and effects; and having abftracted, fuppofed, and reafoned upon principles gratuitous and obfcure, he will conclude it is no act at all, and man no agent, but a puppet, or an organ, played on by outward objects, and his will a top or a foot-ball. And this paffeth for philofophy and free-thinking. Perhaps this may be what it paffeth for, but it by no means feems a natural or juft way of thinking. To me it feems, that if we begin from things particular and concrete, and thence proceed to general notions and conclufions, there will be no difficulty in this matter. But if we begin with generalities, and lay our foundation in abftracl: ideas, we mall find ourfelves intangled and loft in a labyrinth of our own making. I need not obferve, what every one muft fee, the ridicule of proving man no agent, and yet pleading for free thought and action, of fetting up at once for advocates of liberty and necefiity. I have haftily thrown together thefe hints or remarks, on what you call a funda- 372 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.j mental article of the Minute Philofopby, and your meth^ od of proving it, which feems to furntui an admirable fpecimen of the fophiftry of abftract ideas. If in this fummary way, I have been more dogmatical than became me, you mufl excufe what you occafioned, by declining a joint and leifurely examination of the truth.
Alc — I think we have examined matters fufficiently.
Cri. — To all you have faid againft human liberty, it is a fufneient anfwer to obferve, that your arguments proceed upon an erroneous fuppofition either of the foul's being corporeal, or of abflracl: ideas: not to mention other grofs miftakes and gratuitous principles. You might as well fuppofe, that the foul is red or blue, as that it is folid. You might as well make the will any thing eUa as motion. And whatever you infer from fuch premifes, which (to fpeak in the fofteft manner) are neither proved nor probable, 1 make no difficulty to reject. You difcinguifh in all human actions between the lail decree of the judgment and the acl: of the will. You confound certainty with neceffity. You inquire, and your inquiry amounts to an abfurd queftion: Whether man can will as he wills? As evidently true as is this identical proposition, fo evidently falfe mud that way of thinking be, which led you to make a queftion of it. You fay, the appetites have by neceffityof nature a tendency towards their refpe&ive objects.
This we grant, and withal that appetite, if you pleafe, is not free. But you go farther, and tell us the underftanding cannot alter its idea, nor infer indifferently any thing from any thing. m What then! Can we not acl; at all if we cannot alter the nature of objects, and mayx we not be free in other things if we are not at liberty to make abfurd inferences? You take for granted, that the mind is Inactive, but that its ideas acl upon it: As if the contrary were not evident to every man of common fenfe, who cannot but know, that it is the mind which confiders its ideas, choofes, rejects, examines, deliberates, decrees, in one word, acts about them, and not they about it. Upon the whole, your premifes being obfcure and falfe, the fundamental point, which you pretend to demonftrate fo many different ways, proves neither fenfe nor truth in any. And, on the other hand, there is not need of much inquiry to be convinced of two points, than which none are more evident, more obvious, and more univerfally admitted by men of all forts, learned or unlearned, in all times and places, to wit, that man acts and is accountable for his actions. Whatever abftracters, refiners, or men prejudiced to a falfe hypothecs may pretend, it is, if I miftake not, evident to every thinking man of common fenfe, that human minds are fo far from being engines, or foot-balls, acted upon and bandied about by corporeal objects, without any inward principle of freedom or action, that the only original true notions that we have of freedom, agent* or action, are obtained by reflecting on ourfelves, and the operations of our own minds. The finguiarity and credulity of Minute Philofophers, who fuller themfelves to be abufed by the paralogifms of three or four eminent patriarchs of infidelity in the laft age, is, I think, not to be matched; there being no inftance of bigotted fuperftition, the ringleaders whereof have been able to fcduce their followers, more openly and more widely from the plain dictates of nature and common fenfe.
XXI. Alc. — It has been always an objection againft the difcoverers of truth, that they depart from received opinions. The character of finguiarity is a tax on {i\zc,~ king: And as fuch we mod willingly bear it, and glory in it. A genuine philofopher.is never modefc in a falfe fenfe, to the preferring authority before reafon, or an old and common opinion before a true one. Which falfe mod-?:ty>.ourages men from treading in untroden paths.
or ftriking out new light, is above all other qualities the greateft enemy to free-thinking.
Cri. — Authority in difputable points will have its weight with a judicious mind, which yet will follow evidence wherever it leads. Without preferring, we may allow it a good fecond to reafon. Your gentlemen, therefore, of the Minute Philofophy, may fpare a world of common place upon reafon, and light, and difcoveries. We are not attached to authority againft reafon, nor afraid of untroden paths that lead to truth, and are ready to follow a nem light, when we are fure it is no ignis fatuus. Reafon may oblige a man to believe againft his inclinations: But why fhould a man quit falutary notions, for others not lefs unreafonable than pernicious? Your fchemes, and principles, and boafted demonftrations have been at large propofed and examined. You have fhifted your notions, fucceffively retreated from one fcheme to another, and in the end renounced them all. Your objections have been treated in the fame manner, and with the fame event. If we except all that relates to the errors and faults of particular perfons, and difficulties which, from the nature of things, we are not obliged to explain; it is furprifing to fee, after fuch magnificent threats, how little remains, that can amount to a pertinent objection againft the chriftian religion. What you have produced has been tried by the fair tefl of reafon: AncJ though you mould hope to prevail by ridicule when you cannot by reafon, yet in the upfhot I apprehend you will find it impracticable to deftroy all fenfe of religion.
Make your countrymen ever fo vicious, ignorant, and profane, men will ftill be difpofed to look up to a Supreme Being. Religion, right or wrong, will fubfift in fome fhape or other, and fome worfhip there will furely be, either of God or the creature. As for your ridicule, can any thing be more ridiculous, than to fee the moft unmeaning men of the age fct up for free-thinkers, men fo ftrong in aflertion, and yet fo weak in argument, advocates for freedom introducing a fatality, patriots trampling on the laws of their country, and pretenders to virtue deftroying the motives of it? Let any impartial man but caft an eye on the opinions of the Minute Philofophers, and then fay if any thing can be more ridiculous, than to believe fuch things, and at the fame time laugh at credulity.
XXII. Lys. — Say what you will, we have the laughers on our fide: And as for your reafoning, I take it to be another name for fophiftry.
Cri.— And I fuppofe, by the fame rule, you take your own fophifms for arguments. To fpeak plainly, I know no fort of fophifm that is not employed by Minute Philofophers againft religion. They are guilty of a Petit 10 Principle in taking for granted that we believe contradictions; of non Caufa pr& Caufa, in affirming that uncharitable feuds and difcords are the effects of chriftianity; of Ignoratio elenchi) in expecting demonftration where we pretend only to faith. If I was not afraid to offend the delicacy of polite ears, nothing were eafier than to aflign inftances of every kind of fophifm, which would fhew how fkilful your own philofophers are in the practice of that fophiftry you impute to others.
Euph. — For my own part, if fophiftry be the art or faculty of deceiving other men, I muft acquit thefe gentlemen of it. They feem to have led me a progrefs through atheifm, libertinifm, enthufiafm, fatalifm, not to convince me of the truth of any of them, fo much as to confirm me in my own way of thinking. They have expofed their fairy ware not to cheat but divert us. As I know them to be profefTed mailers of ridicule, fo in a ferious fenfe I know not what to make of them.
376 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.3 Alc-— You do not know what to make of us! I mould be fony you did. He mutt be a fuperficial philofopher that is foon fathomed.
XXIII. Cri. — The ambiguous character is, it feems, the fure way to fame and efteem in the learned world, as it {lands conftituted at prefent. When the ingenious reader is at a lofs to determine whether his author be atheift or deift, or polytheift, ftoic or epicurean, fceptic or dogmatift, infidel or enthufiaft, in jeft or in earned, he concludes him, without hefitation, to be enigmatical and profound. In fad!:, it is true of the moft admired writers of the age* that no man alive can tell what to make of them, or what they would be at.
Alc. — We have among us, moles that dig deep under ground, and eagles that foar out of fight. We can a£fc all parts, and become all opinions, putting them on or off with great freedom cf wit and humor.
Euph.- — It feems then, you are a pair of infcru table, unfathomable, falhionable philofophers.
Alc— It cannot be denied.
Euph. — But, I remember, you fet out with an open dogmatical air, and talked cf plain principles, and evident reafoning, promifed to make things as clear as noon-day, to extirpate wrong notions, and plant right in their ftead. Soon after, you began to recede from your firft notions and adopt others ■: you advanced one while, and retreated another, yielded and retracted, faid and unfaid: And after having followed you through fo many untroden paths and intricate mazes, I find myfelf never the nearer.
Alc— Did we not tell you, the gentlemen of our feci; are great proficients in raillery?
Euph. — But, methinks, it is a vain attempt, for a plain man of any fettled belief or principles to engage with fuch flippery, fugitive, changeable philofophers. It feems as if a man fhould (land ftill in the fame place, while his adverfary choofes and changes his fituation, lias full range and liberty to traverfe the field, and attack him on all fides, and in all fhapes, from a nearer or farther diftance, on horfeback or on foot, in light or heavy armour, in clofe fight or with miffive weapons.
Alc. — It muft be owned, a gentlemen hath great advantage over a ftrait-laced pedant, or bigot.
Euph. — But after all, what am I the better for the converfation of two fuch knowing gentlemen? I hoped to have unlearned my errors, and to have learned truths from you, but, to my great difappointment, I do not find that I am either untaught or taught.
Alc.—- To unteach men their prejudices, is a difficult talk: And this muft firft be done, before we can pretend to teach them the truth. Befides, we have at prefent no time to prove and argue.
Euph. — But fuppofe my mind white paper, and without being at any pains to extirpate my opinions, or prove your own, only fay what you would write thereon, or what you would teach me in cafe I were teachable. Be for once in earned, and let me know fome one conclufion of yours before we part: Or I (hall intreat Crito to violate the laws of hofpitality, towards thofe, who have violated the laws of philofophy, by hanging out falfe lights to one benighted in ignorance and error. I appeal to you (faid he, turning to Crito) whether thefe philosophical knight-errants fhould not be confined in this caftle of yours, till they make reparation. Euphranor has reafon, faid Critoy and my fentence is that you remain here in durance, till you have done fomething towards fatisfying the engagement I am under, having promifed, he fhould know your opin» ions from yourfelves, which you alfo agreed to.
Z z Z z XXIV. Alc. — Since it mud be fo, I will now reveal what I take to be the fum and fubftance, the grand arcanum and ultimate conclufion of our feci;, and that in two words, PANTA UPOLEEPSIS.
Cri.— You are then a downright fceptic. But, fceptic as you are, you own it probable there is a God, certain that the chriftian religion is ufeful, poflible it may be true, certain that if it be, the Minute Philofophers are in a bad way. This being the cafe, how can it be queilioned what courfe a wife man mould take? "Whether the principles of chriftians or infidels are trued, may be made a queftion, but which are fafeft can be none. Certainly if you doubt of all opinions, you mud doubt of your own: And then for ought' you know, the chriftian may be true. The more doubt, the more room there is for faith, a fceptic, of all men, having the leaft right to demand evidence. But, whatever uncertainty there may be in other points, thus much is certain: Either there is, or is not a God: There is, or is not a revelation: Man either is, or is not an agent: The foul is, or is not immortal. If the negatives are not fure, the affirmatives are poflible. If the negatives are improbable, the affirmatives are probable. In proportion, as any of your ingenious men, finds himfelf unable to prove any one of thefe negatives, he hath grounds to fufpecl: he may be miftaken. A Minute Philofopher, therefore, that would acl: a confident part, mould have the diffidence, the modefty, and the timidity, as well as the doubts, of a fceptic; not pretend to an ocean of light, and then lead us to an abyfs of darknefs. If I have any notion of ridicule, this is mod ridiculous. But your ridiculing what, for ought you know, may be true, I can <nake no fenfe of. It is neither acting as a wife man, with regard to your own intereft, nor as a good man, with regard to that of your country.
XXV. Tully faith fome where, aut undique religtonem tolle aut ufquequaque conferva: Either let us have no religion at all, or let it be refpe£ted. If any fingle inftance can be (hewn of a people, that ever profpered without fome religion, or if there be any religion, better than the chriftian, propofe it in the grand aflembly of the nation to change our conftitution, and either live without relgioin, or introduce that new religion. A fceptic, as well as other men, is member of a community, and can diftinguifh between good and evil, natural or political. Be this then his guide as a patriot, though he be no chriftian. Or, if he doth not pretend even to this difcernment, let him not pretend to correct or alter, what he knows nothing of: