35a MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.]
of chriftians is quite of another kind, a vital operative principle, productive of charity and obedience.
Alc— What are we to think then of the difputes and decifions of the famous council of Nice, and fo many fubfequent councils? What was the intention of thofe venerable fathers, the Homooufians and the Homoiouftans? Why did they difturb themfelves and the world with hard words and fubtle controversies?
Cri.—— Whatever their intention was, it could not be to beget nice abftra&ed ideas of myfteries in the minds of common chriftians, this being evidently impoffible: Nor doth it appear that the bulk of chriftian men did, in thofe days, think it any part of their duty, to lay a fide the words, fhut their eyes, and frame thofe abftracl: ideas; any more than men now do of force, time, number, or feveral other things, about which they neverthelefs believe, know, argue, and difpute. To me it feems, that whatever was the fource of thofe controversies, and howfoever they were managed, wherein human infirmity muft be fuppofed to have had its (hare, the main end was not, on either fide, to convey precife pofitive ideas to the minds of men, by the ufe of thofe contefted terms, but rather a negative fenfe, tending to exclude polytheifm on the one hand, and fabellianifm on the other.* Alc. — But what fhall we fay to fo many learned and ingenious divines, who, from time to time, have obliged the- world with new explications of myfteries, who having themfelves profefledly labored to acquire accurate ideas, would recommend their difcoveries and fpeculations to others for articles of faith?
Cri. — To all fuch innovators in religion, I would fay with Jerome, (i Why, after fo many centuries, do you pretend to teach us what v/as untaught before? Why explain what neither Peter nor Paul thought neceflary to be explained? f" And it muft be owned, that the explication of myfteries in divinity, allowing the attempt as fruitlefs as the purfuit of the philosopher's Hone in chymiftry, or the perpetual motion in mechanics, is no more than they, chargeable on the profeffion itfelf, but only on the wrongheaded profeflbrs of it.
X. It feems, that whit hath been now faid, may be applied to other myfteries of our religion. Original fin, for inftance, a man may find it impofiible to form an idea of an abftract, or of the manner of its tranfmiflion, and yet the belief thereof may produce in his mind a falutary fenfe of his own unworthinefs, and the goodnefs of his Redeemer: From whence may follow good habits, and from them good actions, the genuine effects of faith: which confidered in its true light, is a thing neither repugnant nor incomprehenfible, as fome men would perfuade us, but fuited even to vulgar capacities, placed in the will and affections rather than in the underftanding, and producing holy lives, rather than fubtile theories. Faith, I fay, is not an indolent perception, but an operative perfuafion of mind, which ever worketh fome fuitable action, difpofition, or emotion in thofe who have it: As it were eafy to prove and illuftrate by innumerable inftances taken from human affairs. And, indeed, while the chriftian religion is confidered as an inftitution fitted to ordinary minds, rather than' to the nicer taknt, whether improved or puzzled, of fpeculative men; and our notions about faith are accordingly taken from the commerce of the world, and practice of mankind, rather than from the peculiar fyftems of refiners; it will, I think, be no difficult matter to conceive and juftify the meaning and ufe of our belief of myfteries, again ft the mod confident aflertions and objections of the Minute Phil ofophers, who are eafily to be 354 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.j caught in thofe very fnares, which they have fpun and fpread for others. And that humor of controverfy, the mother and nurfe of herefies, would doubtlefs very much abate, if it was confidered that things are to be rated, not by the colour, fhape, or ftamp, fo truly as by the weight.
If the moment of opinions had been by fome litigious divines made the meafure of their zeal, it might have fpared much trouble both to themfelves and others. Certainly one that takes his notions of faith, opinion, and afTent from common fenfe, and common ufe, and has maturely weighed the nature of figns and language, will not be fo apt to controvert the wording of a my fiery, or to break the peace of the church, for the fake of retaining or rejecting a term. But, to convince you, by a plain inftance, of the efficacious neceffary ufe of faith without ideas: We will fuppofe a man of the world, a Minute Philofopher, prodigal and rapacious, one of large appetites and narrow circumftances, who fhall have it in his power at once to feize upon a great fortune by one villanous act, a fingle breach of truft, which he can commit with impunity and fecrecy: Is it not natural to fuppofe him arguing in this manner? All mankind in their fenfes purfue their intereft. The interefts of this prefent life are either of mind, body, or fortune. If I commit this fact, my mind will be eafy (having nought to fear here or hereafter) my bodily pleafures will be multiplied, and my fortune enlarged. Suppofe now, one of your refined theorifls talks to him about the harmony of mind and affections, inward worth, truth of character, in one word, the beauty of virtue; which is the only intereft he can propofe, to turn the fcale againft all other fecular interefts and fenfual pleafures •, would it not, think you, be a vain attempt? I fay, in fuch a juncture what can the moft plaufible and refined philofophy of your feet offer, to diffuade fuch a man from his purpofe, more than alluring him that the abftra£ted delight of the mind, the enjoyments of an interior moral fenfe, the to kalon are what conftitute his true intereft? And what efFecl: can this have on a mind callous to all thofe things, and at the fame time ftrongly afFedted with a fenfe of corporeal pleafures, and the outward intereft, ornaments, and conveniencies of life? Whereas that very man, do but produce in him a iincere belief of a future (late, although it be a myftery, although it be what eye hath not feen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive, he fhall neverthelefs, by virtue of fuch belief, be withheld from executing his wicked project: And that for reafons which all men can comprehend, though no body can the object of them. I will allow the points infilled on by your refined moralifts to be as lovely and excellent as you pleafe to a reafonable, reflecting, philofophical mind. But I will venture to fay, that, as the world goes, few, very few, would be influenced by them. We fee, therefore, the neceflary ufe as well as the powerful effects of faith, even where we have not ideas.
XI. Alc — It feems, Euphranor and you, would perfuade me into an opinion, that there is nothing fo Angularly abfurd as we are apt to think, in the belief of myfteries: And that a man need not renounce his reafon to maintain his religion. But if this were true, how comes it to pafs, that, in proportion as men abound in knowledge, they dwindle in faith?
Euph. — O Alciphrorij I have learned from you, that there is nothing like going to the bottom of things, and anaiyfing them into their firft principles. I (hall therefore make an eflay of this method, for clearing up the nature of faith: With what fuccefs I fhall leave you to determine: For I dare not pronounce myfelf on my own judgment, whether it be right or wrong: But thus k fcems to me. The objections made to faith are by no means an effecT: of knowledge, but proceed rather from an ignorance of what knowledge is: Which ignorance may poflibly be found even in thofe who pafs for mailers of this or that particular branch of knowledge. Science and faith agree in this, that they both imply an affent of the mind: And, as the nature of the fir.ft is moft clear and evident, it fnould be firit confidercd in order to caft a light on the other. To trace things from their original, it feems that the human mind, naturally furnifhed with the ideas of things particular and concrete, and being defigned, not for the bare intuition of ideas, but for action or operation about them, and purfuing her ov/n happinefs therein, ftands in need of certain general rules or theorems to direcl: her operations in this purfuit: The fupplying which want is the true, original, reafonable end of itudying the arts and fciences. Now thefe rules being general, it follows, that they are not to be obtained by the mere consideration of the original ideas, or particular things, but by the means of marks or figns, which, being fo far forth univerfal, become the immediate inftruments and materials of fcience. It is not, therefore, by mere contemplation of particular things, and much lefs of their abftracl: general ideas, that the mind makes her progrefs, but by an appofite choice and fkilful management of figns: For inftance, force and number, taken in concrete with their adjuncts, fubjecls, and figns, are what every one knows: And confidered in abftra£t, fo as making precife ideas of themfelves, they are what no body can comprehend. That their abftracl: nature, therefore, is not the foundation of fcience, is plain: And that barely confidering their ideas in concrete, is not the method to advance in the refpe&ive fcience, is what every one that reflects may fee; nothing being more evident, than that one, who can neither write nor read; in common life, underftands [Dial. VII.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 3^7 the meaning of numeral words, as well as the bed philofopher or mathematician.
XII. But here lies the difference: the one who understands the notation of numbers, by means thereof is able to exprefs briefly and diftin&ly all the variety and degrees of number, and to perform with eafe and difpatch feverai arithmetical operations, by the help of general rules. Of all which operations, as the ufe in human life is very evident, fo it is no lefs evident, that the performing them depends on the aptnefs of the notation. If we fuppofe rude mankind, without the ufe of language, it may be prefumed, they would be ignorant of arithmetic: But the ufe of names, by the repetition whereof in a certain order they might exprefs endlefs degrees of number, would be the firft ftep towards that fcience. The next ftep would be, to devife proper marks of a permanent nature, and vifible to the eye, the kind and order whereof mult be chofe with judgment, and accommodated to the names. Which marking or notation would, in proportion as it was apt and regular, facilitate the invention and application of general rules, to aflift the mind in reafoning and judging, in extending, recording, and communicating its knowledge about numbers: in which theory and operations, the mind is immediately occupied about the flgns or notes, by mediation of which it is directed to a£fc about things, or number in concrete (as the logicians call it) without ever confidering the fimple, abftracl:, intellectual, general idea of number. The figns, indeed, do in their ufe imply relations or proportions of things: but thefe relations are not abftracl general ideas, being founded in particular things, and not making of themfelves diftincl: ideas to the mind, exclufive of the particular ideas and the figns. I imagine one need not think much to be convinced, that the fcience of arithmetic, in its rife> 353 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VIL] operations, rules and theorems, is altogether converfant about the artificial ufe of figns, names, and characters. Thefe names and characters are univerfal, inafmuch as they are figns. The names are referred to things, the characters to names, and both to operation. The names being few, and proceeding by a certain analogy, the characters will be more ufeful, the fimpler they are, and the more aptly they exprefs this analogy. Hence the old notation by letters was more ufeful than words written at length: And the modern notation by figures, expreffing the progreffion or analogy of the names by their fimple places, is much preferable to that, for eafe and expedition, as the invention of algebraical fymbols is to this for extenfive and general ufe. As arithmetic and algebra are fciences of great clearnefs, certainty, and extent, which are immediately converfant about figns, upon the fkillful ufe and management whereof they intirely depend, fo a little attention to them may poflibly help us to judge of the progrefs of the mind in other fciences; which, though differing in nature, defign, and object, may yet agree in the general methods of proof and inquiry.
XIII. — If I miftake not, all fciences, fo far as they are univerfal and demonflrable by human reafon, will be found converfant about figns as their immediate object, though thefe in the application are referred to things: The reafon whereof is not difficult to conceive. For as the mind is better acquainted with fome fort of objects, which are earlier offered to it, ftrike it more fenfibly, or are more eafily comprehended than others, it feems naturally led to fubftitute thefe objects for fuch as are more fubtile, fleeting, or difficult to conceive. Nothing, I fay, is more natural, than to make the things we know, a ftep towards thofe we do not know: and to explain and reprefent things lefs familiar by others which are more fo.— - Now, it is certain we imagine before we reflect; and we perceive by fenfe before we imagine: and of all our fenfes the fight is the mod clear, diftin£t, various, agreeable, and comprehensive. Hence it is natural to aflift intellect by imagination, imraagination by fenfe, and other fenfes by fight. Hence figures, metaphors, and types. We illuftrate fpiritual things by corporeal: we fubftitute founds for thoughts, and written letters for founds; emblems, fymbols, and hieroglyphics for things too obfcure to itrike, and too various or too fleeting to be retained. We fubftitute things imaginable for things intelligible, fenfible things for imaginable, fmaller things for thofe that are too great to comprehend eafily, and greater things for fuch as are too fmall to be difcerned diftinc"Hy, prefent things for abfent, permanent for perifhing, and vifible for invifible. Hence the ufe of models and diagrams.
Hence lines are fubflituted for time, velocity, and other things of very different natures. Hence we fpeak of fpirits in a figurative ftyle, exprefling the operations of the mind by allufions and terms, borrowed from fenfible things, fuch as apprehend^ conceive^ refleff> difcourfe, and fuch like: And hence thofe allegories which illuftrate things intellectual by vifions exhibited to the fancy. Plato^ for inftance, reprefents the mind prefiding in her vehicle by the driver of a winged chariot, which fometimes moults and droops and is drawn by two horfes, the one good, and of a good race, the other of a contrary kind; fymbblically exprefling the tendency of the mind towards the divinity, as (he foars or is borne aloft by two inftincts like wings, the one in the intellect towards truth, the other in the will towards excellence, which inftin£ts moult or are weakened by fenfual inclinations: exprefling alfo her alternate elevations and depreflions, the ftruggks between reafon and appetite, like horfes that go an unequal pace, or draw different ways, embarrafling the foul 36o MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.]
in her progrefs to perfection. I am inclined to think the doctrine of figns a point of great importance, and general extent, which if duly confidered, would caft no fmall light upon things, and afford a juft and genuine folution of many difficulties.
XIV. Thus much, upon the whole, may be faid of all figns: That they do not always fuggeft ideas fignified to the mind: That when they fuggeft ideas, they are not general abftracl: ideas: That they have other ufes befides barely {landing for and exhibiting ideas, fuch as railing proper emotions, producing certain difpofitions or habits of mind, and directing our actions in purfuit of that happinefs, which is the ultimate end and defign, the primary fpring and motive, that fets rational agents at wrork: That figns may imply or fuggeft the relations of things; which relations, habitudes, or proportions, as they cannot be by us underftood but by the help of figns, fo being thereby expreffed and confuted they, direct and enable us to acl: with regard to things: That the true end of fpeech, reafon, fcience, faith, affent, in all its different degrees, is not merely, or principally, or always the imparting or acquiring of ideas, but rather fome thing of an active, operative nature,, tending to a conceived good; which may fometimes be obtained, not only although the ideas marked are not offered to the mind, but even although there fhould be no poflibility of offering or exhibiting any fuch idea to the mind: For inftance, the algebraic mark, which denotes the root of a negative fquare, hath its ufe in logiftic operations, although it be impoffible to form an idea of any fuch quantity. And what is true of algebraic figns, is alfo true of words or language, modern algebra being in fa£t a more fhort, appofite, and artificial fort of language, and it being pcfiible to exprefs by words at length, though lefs conveniently, all the fteps of an algebraical procefs. And it muft be confefled, that even the mathematical fciences themfelves, which above all others are reckoned the mod clear and certain, if they are confidered, not as inftruments to direct our practice, but as fpeculations to employ our curiofity, will be found to fall fhort in many instances of thofe clear and diftin£t ideas, which, it feems, the Minute Philofophers of this age, whether knowingly or ignorantly, expect and iniift upon in the myfteries of religion.
XV. Be the fcience or fubjecl: what it will, whenfoever men quit particulars for generalities, things concrete for abftrattions, when they forfake practical views, and the ufeful purpofes of knowledge for barren fpeculation, confidering means and inftruments as ultimate ends, and loboring to obtain precife ideas, which they fuppofe indifcriminately annexed to all terms, they will be fure to embarrafs themfelves with difficulties and difputes. Such are thofe which have fprung up in geometry about the nature of the angle of contact, the doctrine of proportions, of indivifibles, infinitelimals, and divers other points j notwithstanding all which, that fcience is^very rightly efteemed an excellent and ufeful one, and is really found to be fo in many occafions of human life 5 wherein it governs and directs the actions of men, fo that by the aid or influence thereof, thofe operations become juft and accurate, which would otherwife be faulty and uncertain. And from a parity of reafon, we mould not conclude any other doctrines which govern, influence, or direcl: the mind of man to be, any more than that, the lefs true or excellent, becaufe they afford matter of controverfy and ufelefs fpeculation to curious and licentious wits: Particularly thofe articles of our chriftian faith, which, in proportion as they are believed, perfuade, and, as they perfuade, influence the lives and actions cf men. As to the X x X x perplexity of contradictions and abftrafted notions, in all parts, whether of human fcience or divine faith, cavillers may equally object, and unwary perfons incur, while the judicious avoid it. There is no need to depart from the received rules of reafoning to juitify the belief of chriftians. And if any pious men think otherwife, it may be fuppofed an efFecl:, not of religion or of reafon, but only of human weaknefs. If this age be fingularly productive of infidels, I (hall not, therefore, conclude it to be more knowing, but only more prefuming, than former ages: And their conceit, I doubt, is not the efFecl: of consideration. -To me it feems, that the more thoroughly and extensively any man fhall confider and fcan the principles, objects, and methods of proceeding in arts and fciences, the more he will be convinced, there is no weight in thofe plaufible objections that are made againft the myfteries of faith, which it will be no difficult matter for him to maintain or juftify in the received method of arguing, on the common principles of logic, and by numberlefs avowed parrallel cafes, throughout the feveral branches of human knowledge, in all which the fuppofition of abftracl ideas creates the fame difficulties.
Alc — According to this doctrine, all points may be alike maintained. There will be nothing abfurd in popery, not even tranfubftantiation.
Euph. — Pardon me. This doctrine juftifies no article of faith, which is not contained in fcripture, or which is repugnant to human reafon, which implies a contradiction, or which leads to idolatry or wickednefs of any kind: All which is very different from our not having a diilincl or an abftracl: idea of a point.
. XVI. Alc— I will allow, Euphramr> this reafoning of yours to have all the force you meant it fhould have. I freely own there may be myfteries: That we may believe, where we do not under ft and: And that faith may be of ufe, although its object is not diftinctly apprehended.
In a word, I grant there may be faith and myfteries in other things, but not in religion: And that for this plain reafon: becaufe it is abfurd to fuppofe, there fhould be any fuch thing as religion: And if there be no religion, it follows there cannot be religious faith or myfteries. Religion, it is evident, implies the worfhip of a God, which worftiip, fuppofeth rewards and punifhments, which fuppofe merits and demerits, actions good and evil, and thefe fuppofe human liberty, a thing impoffible: and confequently religion a thing built thereon, muft be an unreafonable abfurd thing. There can be no rational fears where there is no guilt, nor any guilt where there is nothing done, but what unavoidably follows from the ftructure of the world and the laws of motion. Corporeal objects ftrike on the organs of fenfe, whence enfues a vibration in the nerves, which being communicated to the foul, or animal fpirit in the brain or root of the nerves, produceth therein that motion called volition: And this produceth a new determination in the fpirits, caufing them to flow into fuch nerves as muft neceffarily by the laws of mechanifm produce fuch certain actions. This being the cafe, it follows, that thofe things, which vulgarly pafs for human actions, are to be efteemed mechanical, and that they are faifly afcribed to a free principle. There is, therefore, no foundation for praife or blame, fear or hope, reward or punifhment, nor confequently for religion, which, as I obferved before, is built upon and fuppofeth thofe things.