deftroying men and notions, that I queftion, whether the public gains as much by the latter, as it lofethby the former. For my own part, I had rather my wife and children all believed what they had no notion of, and daily pronounced words without a meaning, than that any one of them fhould cut his throat, or- leap out of a window. Errors and nonfenfe, as fuch, are of fmall concern in the eye of the public, which confidereth not the metaphyfical truth of notions, fo much as the tendency they have to produce good or evil. Truth itfelf is valued by the public, as it hath an influence, and is felt in the courfe of life. You may confute a whole fhelf of fchoolmen, and difcover many fpeculative truths, without any great merit towards your country. But, if I am not miftaken, the Minute Philofophers are not the men to whom we are mod beholden for difcoveries of that kind. This, I fay, mult be allowed; fuppofing, what I by no means grant, your notions to be true. For, to fay plainly what I think, the tendency of your opinions is fo bad, that no good man can endure them, and your arguments for them fo weak, that no wife man will admit them.
Lys. — Has it not been proved as clear as the meridian fun, that the politer fort of men lead much happier lives, and fwim in plcafures, fmce the fpreading of our principles? But, not to repeat or infill further on what has been fo amply deduced, I ihall only add, that the advantages flowing from them, extend to the tendered age, and the fofter fex. Our principles deliver children from terrors by night, and the ladies from fplenetic hours by day.
Cri. — Inftead of thofe old fafhioned things, prayers and the bible, the grateful amufements of drams, dice, and billet-doux have fucceeded. The fair fex have now nothing to do but drefs and paint, drink and game, adorn and divert themfelves, and enter into all the fweet fociety of life. But I thought, Lyftcles, the argument from pleafure had been exhaufted: however, fmce you have not done io8 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dufc II] with that point, let us once more, by Euphmnor's rule, call up the account of pleafure and pain, as credit and debt, under diftincT: articles. We will fet down in the life of your fine lady, rich clothes, dice, cordials, fcandal, late hours, againfl vapours, diftafte, remorfe, lofles at play, and the terrible diftrefs of ill fpent age, increafing every day: fuppofe no cruel accident of jealoufy, no madnefs or infamy of love; yet at the foot of the account, you fhall find that empty, giddy, gaudy, fluttering thing, not half fo happy as a butterfly, or a grafhopper, on a fummer's day. And for a rake, or man of pleafure, the reckoning will be much the fame, if you place liftleflhefs, ignorance, rottennefs, loathing, craving, quarrelling, and fuch qualities, or aecomplifhments, over-againft his little circle of fleeting amufements; long woe againfl momentary pleafure: And, if it be confidered, that when fenfe and appetite go off, though he feek refuge from his confcience in the Minute Philofophy, yet in this you will find, if you fift him to the bottom, that he affedls much, believes little, knows nothing.
Upon which Lyficles, turning to me, obferved, that Crits might difpute againfl fa£t if he pleafed, but that every one mud fee the nation was the merrier for their principles. True, anfwered Crito> we are a merry nation indeed: young men laugh at the old; children defpife their parents; and fubje&s make a jefl of the government: happy effects of the Minute Philofophy!
XXV. Lys.> — Infer what effects you pleafe, that will not make our principles lefs true.
Cri.— Their truth is not what I am now confidering. The point at prefent is the ufefulnefs of your principles: And, to decide this point, we need only take a fhort view of them, fairiy propofed, and laid together: that there is no God or providence; that man is as the beafts •that perifh \ that his happiaefs, as their's, confifts in obey- [Dial.IL] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 109 ing animal inftin&s, appetites, and paflions; that all flings of conscience, andfenfe of guilt, are prejudices and errors of education; that religion is a (late trick; that vice is beneficial to the public; that the foul of man is corporeal, and diflblveth like a flame or vapour; that man is a machine, actuated according to the laws of motion; that confequently he is no agent or fubjecl: of guilt; that a wife man will make his own particular individual intereft, in this prefent life, the rule and meafure of all his actions: thefe, and fuch opinions, are, it feems, the tenets of a Minute Philofopher, who is himfelf, according to his own principles, an organ played on by fenfible objects, a ball bandied about by appetites and paflions: fo fubtle is he, as to be able to maintain all this by artful reafonings; fo fharp-fighted and penetrating to the very bottom of things, as to find out, that the moll interefted occult cunning is the only true wifdom. To compleat his character, this curious piece of clock-work, having no principle of action within itfelf, and denying that it hath, or can have any one free thought or motion, fets up for the patron of liberty, and earneftly contends, for free-thinking.
Crito had no fooner made an end, but Lyficles addrefTed himfelf to Euphranor and me: Crito, faid he, has taken a world of pains, but convinced me only of one fingle point, to wit, that I mult defpair of convincing him. Never did I, in the whole courfe of my life, meet with a man fo deeply iminerfed in prejudice; let who will pull him out for me. But I entertain better hopes of you. I can anfwer, faid I, for myfelf, that my eyes and ears are always open to conviction: I am attentive to all that pafles, and, upon the whole, fliall form, whether right or wrong, a very impartial judgment. Crito, faid Euphranor, is a more entcrprifing man than I, thus to rate and lecture a philofopher. For my part, I always find it eafier to learn than to teach. I fliall therefore beg your afnitance to rid me of fome fcruples about the tendency of your no MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. II.]
opinions, which I find myfelf unable to mailer, though ever fo willing. This done, though we mould not tread exactly in the fame fteps, nor perhaps go the fame road; yet we fhall not run, in all points, diametrically oppofite one to another.
XXVI. Tell me now, Lyjcks, you who are a minute obferver of things, whether a fhade be more agreeable at morning or evening, or noon-day.
Lys. — Doubtlefs at noon-day.
Euph. — And what difpofeth men to reft?
Lys. — Exercife.
Euph. — When do men make the greateft fires?
Lys. — In the coldeft weather.
Euph. — And what creates a love for iced liquors?
Lys. — Exceffive heat.
Euph. — What if you raife a pendulum to a great height on one fide?
Lys. — It will, when left to itfelf, afcend fo much the higher on the other.
Euph. — It mould feem, therefore, that darknefs enfues from light, reft from motion, heat from cold, and, in general, that one extreme is the confequence of another.
Lys. — It fhould feem fo.
Euph. — And doth not this obfervation hold in the civil, as well as the natural world? Doth not power produce licence, and licence power? Do not whigs make tories, and tories whigs? Bigots make atheifts, and atheifts bigots?
Lys. — Granting this to be true.
Euph. — Will it not hence follow, that as we abhor flavifh principles, we fhould avoid running into licentious ones? I am, and always was, a fincere lover of liberty, legal Englijh liberty •, which I efteem a chief blefling, ornament, and comfort of life, and the great prerogative of in an Englifiman. But is it not to be feared, that, upon the nation's running into a licentioufnefs, which hath never been endured in any civilized country, men, feeling the intolerable evHs of one extreme, may naturally fall into the other? You muft allow, the bulk of mankind are not philofophers, like you and Alciphron, Lys. — This I readily acknowledge.
Euph. — I have another fcruple about the tendency of your opinions. Suppofe you mould prevail, and deftroy the proteftant church and clergy; how could you come at the popifh? I am credibly informed, there are a great number of emiflaries of the church of Rome difguifed, in England: Who can tell what harveft a clergy fo numerous, fo fubtle, and fo well furnifhed with arguments to work on vulgar and uneducated minds, may be able to make in a country defpoiled of all religion, and feeling the want of it? Who can tell whether the fpirit of free-thinking, ending with the oppofition, and the vanity with the diltin&ion, when the whole nation are alike infidels, who can tell, I fay, whether, in fuch a juncture, the men of genius themfelves may not affect a new diilincl:ion, and be the firfl converts to popery?
Lys. — And fuppofe they fhould. Between friends it would be no great matter. Thefe are Our maxims: In the firft place, we hold it would be beft to have no religion at all. Secondly, we hold that all religions are indifferent. If, therefore, upon trial, we find the country cannot do without a religion, why not popery as well as another? I know feveral ingenious men of our feci:, who, if we had a popifh prince on the throne, would turn papifts to-morrow. This is a paradox, but I fhall explain it. A prince whom we compliment with our religion, to be fure, mud be grateful.
Eupk.* — I underfland you. But what becomes of free-thinking all the while?
Lys. — Oh! we fhould have more than ever of that, ii2 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. II.]
for we fhould keep it all to ourfelvcs. As for the aniufement of retailing it, the want of this would be largely compenfated by folid advantages of another kind.
Euph. — It feems then, by. this account, the tendency, you obferved in the nation towards fomething great and new, proves a tendency towards popery and flavery.
Lys.— -Miftake us not, good Euphranor. The thing iirfi: in our intention is confummate liberty: But if this will not do, and there mult, after all, be fuch things tolerated as religion and government, we are wifely willing to make the beft of both.
Cri, — This puts me in mind of a thought I have often had, that Minute Philofophers are dupes of the jefuits. The two mod avowed, profefTed, bufy propagators of infidelity, in all companies, and upon all occafions, that I ever met with, were both bigoted papifts; and being both men of confiderable eftates, fuffered confiderably on that fcore; which it is wonderful their thinking difciples mould never reflecl: on. Hegemon, a moft diftinguiihed writer among the Minute Philofophers, and hero of ih.Q feci:, I am well allured, was once a papift, and never heard that he profeffed any other religion. I know that many of the church of Rome abroad, are pleafed with the growth of infidelity among us, as hoping it may make way for them. The emiifaries of Rome are known to have perfenated feveral other fetta, which, from time to time, have fprung up among us; and why not this of the Minute Philofophers, of all others, the beft calculated to tuin both church and ftate? I myfelf have known a jefuit abroad talk among Englijb gentlemen like a free-thinker. I am credibly informed, that jefuits, known to be fuch by the Minute Philofophers at home, are admitted into their clubs: and I have obferved them to approve, and fpeak better of the jefuits, than of any other clergy whatfoever. Thofe who are not acquainted with the fubtle fpirit, the refined politics, and wonderful economy of that renowned fociety, need only read the account given of them by the jefuit, Inchofer, in his book De Monarchia Solip forum •, and thofe who are, will not be furpriled that they fhould be able to make dupes of our Minute Philofophers. Dupes, I lay, for I can never think they lufpecl: that they are only tools to ferve the ends of cunninger men than themfelves. They feem to me drunk and giddy with a falfe notion of liberty, and fpurred on, by this principle, to make mad experiments on their country, they agree only in pulling down all that ftands in their way •, without any concerted fcheme, and without caring, or knowing, what to ere£r. in its (lead. To hear them, as I have often done, defcant on the moral virtues, refolve them into mame, then laugh at fhame as a weaknefs, admire the unconfined lives of favages, defpife all order and decency of education j one would think the intention of thefe philofophers was, when they had pruned and weeded the notions of their fellow-fubje£ts, and diverted them of their prejudices, to {trip them of their clothes, and fill the country with naked followers of nature, enjoying all the privileges of brutality.
Here Crito made a paufe, and fixed his eyes on Alciphrcn, who during this whole converfation had fat thoughtful and attentive, without faying a word; and with an air, one while diflatisfied at what Lyficles advanced, another, ferene and pleafed, feeming to approve fome better thought of his own. But the day being now far fpent, Alclphron propofed to adjourn the argument till the following; when, faid he, I {hall fet matters on a new foundation, and in fo full and clear a light, as, I doubt not, will give intire fatisfaction. So we changed the difcourfe, and, after a repaft upon cold provifions, took a walk on the ftrand, and in the cool of the evening returned to Crlto's.
P THE THIRD DIALOGUE.
J. Alciphron's Account of Honor. II. Character and Conduel of Men of Honor. III. Senfe of moral Beauty. IV. The Honejlum or to kalon of the Ancients. V. Ta/le for moral Beauty whether a fure Guide or Rule. VI. Minute Philofophers ravi/hed with the Abflracl Beauty of Virtue. VII. Their Virtue alone difinterejled and heroic.
VIII. Beauty offenfible Objecls, what, and how perceived.
IX. The Idea of Beauty explained by Painting and Architecture. X. Beauty of the moral Svjlem, wherein it confijls. XI. It Juppofeth a Providence. XII. Influence of to kalon and to prepon. XIII. Enthufwfm of Cratylus compared with the fentiments of Ariftotle. XIV. Com* pared with the Stoical Principles. XV. Minute Philofophers, their Talent for Railery and Ridicule. XVI. The Wifdom of thofe who make Virtue alone its own Reward.
HE following day, as we fat round the tea-table, in a fummer parlour, which looks into the garden, Alciphron, after the firft difh, turned down his cup, and, reclining back in his chair, proceeded as follows. Above all the fe£b upon earth, it is the peculiar privilege of ours, not to be tied down by any principles. While other philofophers profefs a fervile adherence to certain tenets, ours affert a noble freedom, differing not only one from another, but very often the fame man from himfelf. Which method of proceeding, befide other advantages, hath this annexed to it, that we are, of all men, the hardeft to confute. You may, perhaps, confute a particular tenet, but then this aftedts only him who maintains it, and fo long only as he maintains it. Some of our feci; dogmatize more than 1x6 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. III.]
others, and in fome, more than other points. The doctrine of the ufefulnefs of vice is a point wherein we are not all agreed. Some of us are great admirers of virtue. With others, the points of vice and virtue are problematical. For my own part, though I think the doctrine maintained yefterday, by Lyficles, an ingenious fpeculation; yet, upon the whole, there are divers reafons which incline me to depart from it, and rather to efpoufe the virtuous fide of the queftion; with the fmalleft, perhaps, but the moft contemplative and laudable part of our feet. It feemeth, I fay, after a nice inquiry, and balancing on both fides, that we ought to prefer virtue to vice; and thatTuch preference would contribute both to the public weal, and the reputation of our philofophers. You are to know then, we have among us feveral that, without one grain of religion, are men of the niceft honor, and, therefore, men of virtue, becaufe men of honor. Honor is a noble unpojluted fource of virtue, without the leaft mixture of fear, intereft or fuperflition. It hath all the advantages, without the evils, which attend religion. It is the mark of a great and fine' foul, and is to be found among perfons of rank and breeding. It affecls the court, the fenate, and the camp, and, in general, every rendezvous of people of fafhion.
Euph. — You fay then, that honor is the fource of virtue.
Alc. — I do.
Euph. — Can a thing be the fource of itfelf?
Alc. — It cannot.
Euph. — The fource, therefore, is diftinguifhed from that of which it is the fource.
Alc. — Doubtlefs.
Euph. — Honor then is one thing, and virtue another.
Alc.-— I grant it. Virtuous actions are the effe&, and honor is the fource or caufe of that efTecl:.
Euph. — Tell me. Is honor the will, producing thofe actions, or the final caufe for which they are produced, or right reafon, which is their rule and limit, or the object about which they are converfant? or do you by the word Honor, underftand a faculty, or appetite? all which are fuppofed, in one fenfe or other, to be the fource of human adtions.
Alc. — Nothing of all this.
Euph.— - Be pleafed then to give me fome notion or definition of it. Alciphron> having mufed a while, anfwered, that he defined honor to be a principle of virtuous actions. To which Ruphranor replied *, if I underftand it rightly, the word principle is varioufly taken. Sometimes, by principles, we mean the parts of which a whole is compofed, and into which it may be refolved. Thus the elements are faid to be principles of compound bodies. And thus words, fyliables, and letters are the principles of fpeech. Sometimes, by principle, we mean a fmall particular feed, the growth or gradual unfolding of which doth produce an organized body, animal or vegetable, in its proper fize and fhape. Principles, at other times, are fuppofed to be certain fundamental theorems in arts and fciences, in religion and politics. Let me know in which of thefe fenfes, or whether it be in fome other fenfe, that you underftand the word, when you fay, honor is a principle of virtue-. To this Alciphron replied, that, for his part, he meant it in none of thofe fenfes, but defined honor to be a certain ardor of enthufiafm that glowed in the bread of a gallant man. Upon this, Ruphranor obfervcd, it was always admitted to put the definition in place of the thing defined. Is this allowed, faid he, or not?
Alc. — It is.
Alc. — It is.
Euph. — May we not, therefore, fay, that a man of honor is a warm man, or an enthufiaft? Alciphron hearing this, declared, that fuch exac~tnefs was to no purpofe, that pedants, indeed, may difpute and define, but could never reach that high fenfe of honor, which diftinguiflicd the fine gentleman, and was a thing rather to be felt than explained.
n8 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER [Dial. III.]
II. Crito, perceiving that Alciphron could not bear being preffed any farther on that article, and willing to give fome fatisfa&ion to Euphranor, faid, That of himfelf, indeed, he mould not undertake to explain fo nice a point; but he would retail to them part of a converfation he once heard between Nicander, a Minute Philofopher, and Menecles, a chriftian, upon the fame fubje£t, which was, for fubftance, as follows: M. From what principle are you, gentlemen, virtuous?
N. From honor. We are men of honor.
M. May not a man of honor debauch another's wife, or get drunk, or fell a vote, or refufe to pay his debts, without leflening or tainting his honor?
N. He may have the vices and faults of a gentleman: but is obliged to pay debts of honor, that is, all fuch as are contracted by play.
M. Is your man of honor always ready to refent affronts, and engage in duels?
N. He is ready to demand and give a gentleman's fatisfa£tion, upon all proper occafions.
M. It fhould feem, by this account, that to ruin tradefmen, break faith to one's own wife, corrupt another man's, take bribes, cheat the public, cut a man's throat for a word, are all points confident with your principles of honor.
N. It cannot be denied that we are men of gallantry, men of fire, men who know the world, and all that.
M. It feems, therefore, that honor among infidels, is like honefty among pirates: fomething confined to themfelves, and which the fraternity may perhaps find their account in, but every one elfe fhould be on his guard againft.
By this dialogue, continued Crito, a man, who lives out of the grand mondc, may be enabled to form fome notion of what the world calls honor, and men of honor.
Euph.< — I muft in treat you not to put me off with iV7cander\ opinion, whom, I know nothing of \ but rather [Dial. III.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. n9 give me your own judgment, drawn from your own observation upon men of honor.
Cm. — If I mull pronounce, I can very fincerely affure you that, by all I have heard or feen, I could never find, that honor, confidered as a principle diftincl: from confcience, religion, reafon and virtue, was more than an empty name. And I do verily believe, that thofe who build upon that notion have lefs virtue than other men; and that what they have, or feem to have, is owing to faihion (being of the reputable kind) if not to a confcience early imbued with religious principles, and afterwards retaining a tincture from them, without knowing it. Thefe two principles feem to account for all that looks like virtue in thofe gentlemen. Your men of faihion, in whom animal life abounds, a fort of bullies in morality, who difdain to have it thought they are afraid of confcience; thefe defcant much upon honor, and affecl: to be called men of honor, rather than confcientious or honeft men. But, by all that I could ever obferve, this fpecious character, where there is nothing of confcience or religion underneath, to give it life and fubflance, is no better than a meteor or painted cloud.
Euph. — I had a confufed notion, that honor was fomething nearly connected with truth: and that men of honor were the greateft enemies to all hypocrify, fallacy, and difguife.
Cri. — So far from that, an infidel, who fets up for the nicefl: honor, mail, without the leaft grain of faith or religion, pretend himfelf a chriflian, take any teft, join in any acl: of worfliip, kneel, pray, receive the facrament, to ferve an intereft. The fame perfon, without any impeachment of his honor, (hall mod folemnly declare and promife, in the face of God and the world, that he will love his wife, and, forfaking all others, keep only to her, when at the fame time it is certain, he intends never to perform one tittle of his vow •, and convinceth the whole i2o MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. HI.]
world of this as foon as he gets her in his power, and her fortune, for the fake of which this man of untainted honor makes no fcruple to cheat and lie.
Euph. — We had a notion, here in the country, that it was of all things mod odious, and a matter of much rifk and peril, to give the lie to a man of honor.
Cri. — It is very true. He abhors to take the lie, but not to tell it.
III. Alciphron, having heard all this with great compofure of mind and countenance, fpake as follows. The word free-thinker, as it comprehends men of very different forts and fentiments, cannot, in a Uriel: fenfe, be faid to conftitute one particular feci:, holding a certain fyftem of pofitive and diflincl: opinions. Though it muft be owned, we do all agree in certain points of unbelief, or negative principles, which agreement, in fome fenfe, unites us under the common idea of one feet. But then thofe negative principles, as they happen to take root in men of different age, temper, and education, do produce various tendencies, opinions, and characters, widely differing onefrom another. You are not to think that our greateft ftrength lies in our greateft number, libertines, and mere men of honor. No, we have among us philofophers of a very different character, men of curious contemplation, not governed by fuch grofs things as fenfe and cuftom, but of an abftracted virtue and fublime morals; and the lefs religious, the more virtuous. For virtue of the high and difinterefted kind, no man is fo well qualified as an infidel, it being a mean and felfifh thing to be virtuous through fear or hope. The notion of a providence, and future ftate of rewards and punifhments, may indeed tempt or fcare men of abjeel: fpirit into practices contrary to the natural bent of their fouls, but will never produce a true and genuine virtue. To go to the bottom of things, to analyfe virtue into its firit principles, and fix a fcheme of morals on its true bans, you muft understand, that there is an idea of [Dial. III.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. W beauty natural to the mind of man. This all men defire, this they are pleafed and delighted with, for its own fake, purely from an inftincl: of nature. A man needs no arguments to make him difcern and approve what is beautiful: it ftrikes at firft fight, and attracts without a reafon. And as this beauty is found in the friape and form of corporeal things; fo alfo is there analogous to it, a beauty of another kind, an order, a fymmetry, and comelinefs, in the moral world. And, as the eye perceiveth the one, fo the mind doth, by a certain interior fenfe, perceive the other; which fenfe, talent, or faculty, is ever quickeft and pureft in the nobleft minds. Thus, as by fight, I difcern the beauty of a plant, or an animal, even fo the mind apprehends the moral excellence, the beauty and decorum of juftice and temperance. And, as we readily pronounce a drefs becoming, or an attitude graceful, we can, with the fame free untutored judgment, at once declare, whether this or that conduct:, or action, be comely and beautiful. To rclim.this kind of beauty, there muft be a delicate and fine tafte: But where there is this natural tafte, nothing further is wanting, cither as a principle to convince, or as a motive to induce men to the love of virtue. And more or lefs there is of this tafte or fenfe, in every creature that hath reafon. All rational beings are by nature facial. They are drawn one towards another, by natural affections. They unite and incorporate into families, clubs, parties, and commonwealths, by mutual fympathy. As by means of the fenfitive foul, our feveral diftinct. parts and members do confent towards the animal functions, and are connected in one whole; even fo, the feveral parts of theie rational fyftems, or bodies politic, by virtue of this moral or interior fenfe, are held together, have • a fellow-feeling, do fuccour and protect each other, and jointly cooperate towards the fame end. Hence that joy in fociety, that prot»enfion towards doing good to our kind, that gratulatioa and delight in beholding the virtuous deeds of other men, or in reflecting on our own. By contemplation of the fitnefs and order of the parts of a moral fyftem, regularly operating, and knit together by benevolent affe&ions, the mind of man attaineth to the higheft notion of beauty, excellence, and perfection. Seized and wrapt with this fublime idea, our philofophers do infinitely defpife and pity whoever fhall propofe or accept any other motive to virtue. Intereft is a mean ungenerous thing, deftroying the merit of virtue: and falfhood, of every kind, is inconfiftent with the genuine fpirit of philofophy.
Cri. — The love, therefore, that you bear to moral beauty, and your pafHon for abflra&ed truth, will not fuffer you to think with patience of thofe fnpidulent impositions upon mankind, Providence, the immortality of the foul, and a future retribution of rewards and punifhmeiits; which, under the notion of promoting, do, it feems, deftroy all true virtue, and, at the fame time, contradict and difparage your noble theories, manifeftly tending to the perturbation and difquiet of men's minds, and filling them with fruitlefs hopes, and vain terrors.
Alc. — Men's flrft thoughts, and natural notions, are the beft in moral matters. And there is no need that mankind mould be preached, or reafoned, or frightened into virtue, a thing fo natural and congenial to every human foul. Now if this be the cafe, as it certainly is, it follows, that all the ends of fociety are fecured without religion, and that an infidel bids fair to be the mofl virtuous man, in a true, fublime, and heroic fenie.
IV. Euph. — O Alciphron i while you talk, I feel an affection in my foul, like the trembling of one lute upon (Inking the unilon firings of another. Doubtlefs, there is a beauty of the mind, a charm in virtue, a fymmetry and proportion in the moral world. This moral beauty was known to the ancients by the name of homfium^ or to ka- Jon. And, in order to know its force and influence, it may not be amifs to inquire, what it was underitood to be, and what light it was placed in, by thofe who firfl confidered it, and gave it a name. To kalon> according to Ariflotle, is the epoineton, or laudable: according to Plato, it is the ediiy or ophetimon, pleafant, or profitable, which is meant with refpedv. to a reafonable mind, and its true intereft. Now I would fain know, whether a mind, which confiders an action as laudable, be not carried beyond the bare action itfelf, to regard the opinion of others concerning it?
Alc. — It is.
Alc. — It is.
Euph. — And whether this be a fufficient ground or principle of virtue, for a man to act upon, when he thinks himfelf removed from the eye and obfervation of every other intelligent being r Alc. — It feems not.
Euph. — Again, I afk whether a man, who doth a thing pleafant or profitable as fuch, muft not be fuppofed to forbear doing it, or even to do the contrary, upon the profpect of greater pleafure or profit?
Alc-*— He muft.
Euph. — Doth it not follow from hence, that the beauty of virtue, or to kalon, in either Artjlotles or Plato's fenfe, is not a fufficient principle, or ground, to engage fenfual and worldly-minded men in the practice of it?
Alc— What then?
Euph. — Why, then it will follow, that hope of reward, and fear of punifhment, are highly expedient to caft the balance of pleafant and profitable on the fide of virtue, and thereby very much conduce to the benefit of human fociety. Alciphron, upon this, appealed: Gentlemen, faid he, you are witnefies of this unfair proceeding of Euphranor, who argues againft us, from explications given by Plato and Ari/Iotle, of the beauty of virtue, which are things we have nothing to fay to \ the philoh4 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. HI.]
fophers of our feci: abftra&ing from all praife, pleafure, and intereft, -when they are enamoured and tranfported with that fublime idea. I beg pardon, replied Euphranor, for fuppofing the Minute Philofophers, of Our days, think like thofe ancient fages. But you muft tell me, Alciphrotiy fince you do not think fit to adopt the fenfe of Plato or Arificile, what fenfe is it in which you underftand ihe beauty of virtue? Define it, explain it, make me to underftand your meaning, that fo we may argue about the fame thing, without which we can never come to a conclufion.
V. Alc. — Some things are better underftood by definitions and defcriptions; but I have always obferved, that thofe, who would define, explain, and difpute about this point, make the lead of it. Moral beauty is of fo peculiar and abftra£ted a nature, fomething fo fubtile, fine, and fugacious, that it will not bear being handled and infpe&ed, like every grofs and common fubjecl:. You will, therefore, pardon me, if I (land upon my philofophic liberty; and choofe rather to intrench myfelf, within the general and indefinite fenfe, rather than, by entering into a precife and particular explication of this beauty, perchance lofe fight of it •, or give you fome hold whereon to cavil, and infer, and raife doubts, queries, and difficulties, about a point as clear as the fun, when nobody reafons upon it.
Euph. — How fay you, A/ciphron, is that notion cleareft when it is not confidered?
Alc. — I fay, it is rather to be felt than underftood, a certain je ne Jcai quoi. An object, not of the difcurfive faculty, but of a peculiar fenfe, which is properly called the moral fenfe, being adapted to the perception of moral beauty, as the eye to colours, or the ear to founds.
Euph. — That men have certain inftint~tive fenfations, or paflions, from nature, which make them amiable and ufeful to each other, I am clearly convinced. Such are fellow-feeling with the diftreffed, a tendernefs for our offspring, an affection towards our friends, our neighbors, and our country, an indignation againft things bafe, cruel, or unjuft. Thefe paflions are implanted in the human foul, with feveral other fears and appetites, averfions and defires, fome of which are ftrongeft and uppermoft in one mind, others in another. Should it not, therefore, feem a very uncertain guide in morals, for a man to follow his paffion or inward feeling? And would not this rule infallibly lead different men different ways, according to the prevalency of this or that appetite, or paffion?
Alc. — I do not deny it.