Euph. — And will it not follow from hence, that duty and virtue are in a fairer way of being pra&ifed, if men are led by reafon and judgment; balancing low and fenfual pleafures with thofe of a higher kind, comparing prefent loffes with future gains, and the uneafinefs and difguft of every vice, with the delightful practice of the oppofite virtue, and the pleafing reflexions and hopes which attend it? Or, can there be a ftronger motive to virtue, than the fhewing that, confidered in all lights, it is every man's true intereft?
VI. Alc. — I tell you, Euphranor, we contemn the virtue of that man, who computes and deliberates, and muft have a reafon for being virtuous. The refined moralifts of our feci: are ravifhed and tranfported with the abftraft beauty of virtue. They difdain all forenfical motives to it; and love virtue only for virtue's fake. Oh rapture! Oh enthufiafm! Oh the quinteflence of beauty! Methinks I could dwell for ever on this contemplation. But rather than entertain myfelf, I muft endeavor to convince you. Make an experiment on the firft man you meet. Propofe a villainous or unjuft action. Take his firft fenfe of the matter, and you (hall find he detefts it. He may indeed 126 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. III.]
be afterwards mifled by arguments, or overpowered by temptation; but his original, unpremeditated, and genuine thoughts, are juft and orthodox. How can we account for this, but by a moral fenfe, which, left to itfelf, hath as quick and true a perception of the beauty and deformity of human actions, as the eye hath of colors.
Euph. — May not this be fufficiently accounted for, by conscience, affection, paffion, education, reafon, cuftom, religion, which principles and habits, for aught I know, may be what you metaphorically call a moral fenfe?
Alc — What I call a moral fenfe, is ftri&ly, properly, and truly fuch, and, in kind, different from all thofe things you enumerate. It is what all men have, though all may not obferve it. Upon this, Euphranor fmiled, and faid, Alciphron has made difcoveries where I leaft expected it. For, faid he, in regard to every other point, I mould hope to learn from him j but for the knowledge of myfelf, or the faculties and powers of my own mind, I mould have looked at home. And there I might have looked long enough, without finding this new talent, which even now, after being tutored, I cannot comprehend. For Alciphron, I mult needs fay, is too fublime and enigmatical upon a point, which, of all others, ought to be moft clearly underftood. I have often heard that your deepeft adepts and oldeft profeflbrs in fcience are the obfcureft. Lyftdes is young, and fpeaks plain. Would he but favor us with his fenfe of this point, it might, perhaps, prove more upon a level with my apprehenfion.
VII. Lyftdes fhook his head, and in a grave and earneft manner addrefled the company. Gentlemen, faid he, Alciphron ftands upon his own legs. I have no part in thefe refined notions he is at prefent engaged to defend. If I muft fubdue my pafiions, abftracl:, contemplate, be enamoured of virtue; in a word, if I muft be an enthufiaft, I owe fo much deference to the laws of my country, as to choofe being an enthufiaft in their way. Befides, it is better being fo for fome end, than for none. This doctrine hath all the folid inconveniencies, without the amufing hopes and profpecls of the chriftian.
Alc. — I never counted on Lyficles for my fecond in this point; which, after all, doth not need his afliftance or explication. All fubjeds ought not to be treated in the fame manner. The way of definition and divificn is dry and pedantic. Befides, the fubjecl; is fometimes too obfcure, fometimes too fimple, for this method. One while we know too little of a point, another too much, to make it plainer by difcourfe.
Cri. — To hear Alciphron talk, puts me in mind of that ingenious Greek, who having wrapt a man's brother up in a cloak, afked him whether he knew that perfon? being ready, either by keeping on, or pulling off the cloak, to confute his anfwer, whatever it fhould be. For my part, I believe, if matters were fairly ftated, that rational fatiffa&ion, that peace of mind, that inward comfort, and confcientious joy, which a good chriftian finds in good actions, would not be found to fall fhort of all the ecftafy, rapture, and enthufiafm fuppofed to bk the effecl: of that high and undefcribed principle. In earned, can any ecftafy be higher, any rapture more affecting, than that which fprings from the love of God and man, from a confeience void of offence, and an inward difcharge of duty, with the fecret delight, truft, and hope that attend it?
Alc. — O Euphratwr, we votaries of truth do not envy, but pity, the groundlefs joys and miftaken hopes of a chriftian. And, as for confeience and rational pleafure, how can we allow a confeience, without allowing a vindictive Providence? or how can we fuppofe, the charm of virtue confifts in any pleafure, or benefit attending virtuous actions,* without giving great advantages to the chriftian * There can never be lefs felf-enjoyment than in thefe fuppofed wife characters, thefe felfifh computers of happinels and private good. Characterises, Vol. 3. p. 301.
xa8 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial, in.]
religion, which, it feems, excites its believers to virtue by the higheft interefts and pleafures in reversion. Alas! mould we grant this, there would be a door opened to all thofe rufty declaimers upon the neceffity and ufefulnefs of the great points of faith, the immortality of the foul, a future ftate, rewards and punifhments, and the like exploded conceits; which, according to our fyftem and principles, may perhaps produce a low, popular, interefted kind of virtue, but mull abfoluteiy deitroy and extinguifh it in the fublime and heroic fenfe.
VIII. Euph.1 — What you now fay is very intelligible: I wim I underftood your main principle as well.
Alc. — And are you then in earned at a lofs? Is it poffible you mould have no notion of beauty, or that, having it, you fhould not know it to be amiable, amiable I fay, in itfelf, and for itfelf?
Euph. — Pray tell me, Alciphron> are all mankind agreed, in the notion of a beauteous face?
Alc. — Beauty in human kind feems to be of a more mixt and various nature: forafmuch as the paflions, fentiments, and qualities of the foul being feen through! and blending with the features, work differently on different minds, as the fympathy is more or lefs. But, with regard to other things, is there no fteady principle of beauty? Is there upon earth, a human mind, without the idea of order, harmony, and proportion?
Euph. — O Alciphron^ it is my weaknefs, that I am apt to be loft in abftracHons and generalities, but a particular thing is better fuited to my faculties. I find it cafy to confider and keep in view the objects of fenfe; let us therefore try to difcover what their beauty is, or wherein it confifts j and fo, by the help of thefe fenfible things, as a fcale or ladder, afcend to moral and intellectual beauty. Be pleafed then to inform me, what it is we call beauty in the objects of fenfe?
[Dial. III.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. I2j Alc — Every one knows beauty is that which pleafes.
Eupk. — There is then beauty in the fmeli of a rofe, or the tafte of an apple.
Alc. — By no means. Beauty is, to fpeak properly, perceived only by the eye.
Euph. — It cannot, therefore, be defined, in general, that which pieafeth.
Alc — I grant it cannot.
Euph. — How then fhall we limit or define it? Aidphroriy after a fhort paufe, faid, that beauty confided in a certain fymmetry, or proportion, pleafing to the eye.
Euph. — Is this proportion one and the fame in all things, or is it different in different kinds of things?
Alc — Different, doubtlefs. The proportions of an ox would not be beautiful in an horfe. And we obferve, alfo in things inanimate, that the beauty of a table, a chair, a door, confilts in different proportions.
Euph. — Doth not this proportion imply the relation of one thing to another?
Alc — It doth.
Euph. — And are not thefe relations founded in fize and fhape?
Alc — They are.
Euph. — And, to make the proportions juft, muft not thefe mutual relations of fize and fhape, in the parts, be fuch, as fhall make the whole complete and perfect in its kind?
Alc — -I grant they muft.
Euph. — Is not a thing faid to be perfect in its kind, when it anfwers the end for which it was made?
Alc — It is.
Euph. — The parts, therefore, in true proportions, muft be fo related, and adjufted to one another, as that they may beft confpire to the ufe and operation of the whole.
Alc — It feems fo.
R i3o MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. III.]
Euph. — But the comparing parts one with another, the confidering them as belonging to one whole, and the refering this whole to its ufe and end, mould feem the work of reafon: mould it not?
Alc — It mould.
Euph. — Proportions, therefore, are not, ftriclly fpeaking, perceived by the fenfe of fight, but only by reafon, through the medium of fight.
Alc. — This I grant.
Euph.-— Confequently beauty, in your fenfe of it, is an obje£t, not of the eye, but of the mind.
Alc. — It is.
Euph. — The eye, therefore, alone, cannot fee that a chair is handfome, or a door well proportioned.
Alc — It feems to follow *, but I am not clear as to this point.
Euph.— -Let us fee, if there be any difficulty in it. — Could the chair you fit on, think you, be reckoned well proportioned, or handfome, if it had not fuch a height, breadth, widenefs, and was not {o far reclined, as to afford a convenient feat?
Alc. — It could not.
Euph. — The beauty, therefore, or fymmetry of a chair, cannot be apprehended, but by knowing its ufe, and comparing its figure with that ufe, which cannot be done by the eye alone, but is the effecl: of judgment. It is, therefore, one thing to fee an object, and another to difcern its beauty.
Alc. — I admit this to be true.
IX. Euph. — The architects judge a door to be of a beautiful proportion, when its height is double of the breadth. But if you mould invert a well proportioned door, making its breadth become the height, and its height the breadth, the figure would ftill be the fame, but without that beauty in one fituation, which it had in another.
What can be the caufe of this, but that in the forementioned fuppofkron, the door would not yield a convenient entrance to creatures of a human figure? But, if in anyother part of the univerfe, there mould be fuppofed rational animals of an inverted ftature, they muft be fuppofed to invert the rule for proportion of doors: and to them that would appear beautiful, which, to us, was difagreeable.
Alc- — Againft this, I have no objection.
Euro. — Tell me, Alciphron, is there not fomething truly decent and beautiful in drefs?
Alc. — Doubtlefs, there is.
Euph. — Are any likelier to give us an idea of this beauty in drefs, than painters and fculptors, whofe proper bufinefs and ftudy it is, to aim at graceful representations?
Alc. — I believe not.
Euph. — Let us then examine the draperies of the great mailers m thefe arts: How, for inftance, they ufe to clothe a matron, or a man of rank. Call an eye on thofe figures (faid he, pointing to fome prints after Raphael and Guidoy that hung upon the wall) what appearance, do you think, an Englijh courtier, or magillrate, with his Gothic, fuccin£l, plaited garment, and his fullbottomed wig; or one of our ladies in her unnatural drefs, pinched, and ftiffened, and enlarged with hoops, and whale-bone, and buckram, mull make; among thole figures fo decently clad in draperies, that fall into fuch a variety of natural, eafy, and ample folds \ that cover the body without incumbering it, and adorn without altering the fhape?
Alc. — Truly, I think they mull make a very ridiculous appearance.
Euph. — And what do you think this proceeds from? Whence is it, that the eaflern nations, the Greeks and the Romans, naturally run into the moll becoming drefles; while our Gothic gentry, after fo many centuries racking their inventions, mending, and altering, and improving, and whirling about in perpetual rotation of faftiions, have never yet had the |uck to (tumble on any that was not abfurd and ridiculous? Is it not from hence, that inflead of confulting ufe, reafon, and convenience, they abandon themfelves to fancy, the unnatural parent of monfters? Whereas the ancients, confidering the ufe and end of drefs, made it fubfervient to the freedom, eafe, and convenience of the body, and, having no notion of mending or changing the natural ihape, they aimed only at fhewing it with decency and advantage. And, if this be fo, are we not to conclude, that the beauty of drefs depends on its fubferviency to certain ends and ufes?
Alc. — This appears to be true.
Euph. This fubordinate, relative nature of beauty, perhaps will be yet plainer, if we examine the refpective beauties of a hoife and a pillar. VirgW$ defcription of the former is, — — llli ardna cervix, Argutumque caput, brevis alvus, obefaque terga, Luxuriatque toris animofum pectus.
Now I would fain know, whether the perfections and ufe s of a horfe may not be reduced to thefe three points, courage, ffcrength, and fpeed? and whether each of the beauties enumerated, doth not occafion, or betoken, one of thefe perfections? After the fame manner, if we inquire into the parts and proportions of a beautiful pillar, we mail perhaps find them anfwer to this fame idea. Thofe who have confidered the theory of architecture, tell us, * the proportions of the three Grecian Orders were taken from the human body, as the moft beautiful and perfect * See the learned patri?rch of Aquileia's Commentary on Vitruvius, I production of nature. Hence were derived thofe graceful ideas of columns, which had a character of ftrength without clumfinefs, or of delicacy without weaknefs. — Thofe beautiful proportions were, I fay, taken originally from nature, which, in her creatures, as hath been already obferved, referreth them tofome end, ufe, or defign. The Gonfiezza alfo, or fwelling, and the diminution of a pillar, is it not in fuch proportion, as to make it appear ltrong and light at the fame time? In the fame manner, muft not the whole entablature, with its projections, be fo proportioned, as to feem great, but not heavy, light, but not little: inafmuch as a deviation into either extreme would thwart that reafon and ufe of things, wherein their beauty is founded, and to which it is fubordinate? The entablature, and all its parts and ornaments, architrave, freeze, cornice, triglyphs, metopes, modiglions, and the reft, have each an ufe, or appearance of ufe, in giving firmnefs and union to the building, in protecting it from the weather, and calling off the rain, in reprefenting the ends of beams with their intervals, the production of rafters, and fo forth. And, if we confider the graceful angels in frontispieces, the fpaces between the columns, or the ornaments of their capitals; mail we not find, that their beauty rifeth from the appearance of ufe, or the imitation of natural things, whofe beauty is originally founded on the fame principle?
which is, indeed, the grand diftinclion between Grecian and Gothic architecture; the latter being fantaftical, and, for the mod part, founded neither in nature, nor in reafon, in neceffity nor ufe, the appearance of which, accounts for all the beauty, grace and ornament, of the other.
Cri. — What Euphra7ior\\i\S\ faid, confirms the opinion, I always entertained, that the rules of architecture were founded, (as all other arts which flourifhed among the Greeks) in truth, and nature, and good fenfe. But the ancients, who, from a thorough confideration of the grounds and principles of art, formed their idea of beauty, did not always confine themfelves ftri£tly to the fame rules and proportions: But, whenever the particular diftance, polition, elevation, or dimenfion of the fabric, or its parts, feemed to require it, made no fcruple to depart from them, without deferting the original principles of beauty, which governed whatever deviations they made. This latitude, or licence, might not, perhaps, be fafely trufted with moll ' modern architects, who, in their bold fallies, feem to acl: without aim Or defign; and to be governed by no idea, no reafon, or principle of art, but pure caprice, joined with a thorough contempt of that noble fimplicity of the ancients, without which there can be no unity, gracefulnefs, or grandeur in their works; which, of confequence, mull ferve only to disfigure and dilhonor the nation, being fo many monuments to future ages of the opulence and ill tafte of the prefent; which, it is to be feared, would fucceed as wretchedly, and make as mad work in other affairs, were men to follow, inftead of rules, precepts, and models, their own tafte and firft thoughts of beauty.
Alc. — I mould now, methinks, be glad to fee a little more diftin&Iy, the ufe and. tendency of this digreflion upon architecture.
Euph.—- Was not beauty the very thing we inquired after?
Alc. — It was.
Euph. — What think you, Alciphron, can the appearance of a thing pleafe at this time, and in this place, which pleafed two thoufand years ago, and two thoufand miles off, without fome real principle of beauty?
Alc. — It cannot.
Euph. — And is not this the cafe with refpecl: to a jufl piece of architecture?
Alc — No body denies it.
Euph. — Architecture, the noble offspring of judgment and fancy, was gradually formed in the molt polite and [Dial. HI.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. i35 knowing countries of Afta> Egypt, Greece and Italy. It was cherifhed and edeemed by the moft flourifhing dates, and mod renowned princes, who, with vad expenfe, improved and brought it to perfection. It feems, above all other arts, peculiarly converfant about order, proportion, and fymmetry. May it not, therefore, be fuppofed, on all accounts, mod likely to help us to fome rational notion of theyV nefcai quoi in beauty? And, in effect, have we not learned from this digreffion, that, as there is no beauty without proportion, fo proportions are to be edeemed juft and true, only as they are relative to fome certain ufe or end, their aptitude and fubordination to which end is, at bottom, that which makes them pleafe and charm? Alc — I admit all this to be true.
X. Euph. — According to this doctrine, I would fain know what beauty can be found in a moral fydem, formed, connecled, and governed by chance, fate, or any other blind unthinking principle? forafmuchas, without thought, there can be no end or defign; and, without an end, there can be no ufe; and, without ufe, there is no aptitude or fitnefs of proportion, from whence beauty fprings.
Alc. — May we not fuppofe a certain vital principle of beauty, order, and harmony, diffufed throughout the world, without fuppofing a Providence, infpecting, punifhing, and rewarding the moral actions of men? without fuppofmg the immortality of the foul, or a life to come; in a word, without admitting any part of what is commonly called faith, worfhip, and religion?
Cri. — Either you fuppofe this principle intelligent, or not intelligent: If the latter, it is all one with chance, or fate, which was jud now agreed againd: If the former, let me intreat Alciphron to explain to me, wherein confids the beauty of a moral fydem, with a Supreme Intelligence at the head of it, which neither protects the innocent, puniflies the wicked, nor rewards the virtuous? To fuppofe, indeed, a Society of rational agents, acting under the eye of Providence, concurring in one dtfign to promote the common benefit of the whole, and conforming their actions to the eftabliihed laws and order of the Divine Paternal Wifdoin: Wherein each particular agent fhall not. confider himfelf apart, but as the member of a great city, whofe author and founder is God: In which the civil laws are no other, than the rules of virtue, and the duties of religion: And where every one's true interefl is combined with his duty: to fuppofe this, would be delightful: On this fuppofition, a man need be no ftoic or knight-errant, to account for his virtue. In fuch a fyftem, vice is madnef&, cunning is folly, wifdom and virtue are the fame thing, where, notwithstanding all the crooked paths and by-roads, the wayward appetites and inclinations of men, Sovereign reafon is fure to reform whatever feems amifs, to reduce that which is devious, make ftraight that which is crooked, and, in the laft act, wind up the whole plot, according to the exacted rules of wifdom and juftice* In fuch a fyftem, or fociety, governed by the wifeft precepts, enforced by the higheft rewards and difcouragements, it is delightful to confider, howT the regulation of laws, the distribution of good and evil, the aim of moral agents, do all confpire, in due Subordination, to promote the noble ft end, to wit, the complete happinefs, or well-being, of the whole. In contemplating the beauty of fuch a moral fyftem, we may cry out, with the pfalmift, Very excellent things are fpohen of thee, though City of God.
XL In a fyftem of fpirits, Subordinate to the will, and under the direction, of the Father of fpirits, governing them by laws, and conducting them by methods, Suitable to wife and good ends, there will.be great beauty. But in an incoherent fortuitous fyftem, governed by chance, or in a blind fyftem, govetned by fate, or in any fyftem where Providence doth not prefide, how can beauty be, which cannot be without order, which cannot be without defign? when a man is confcious that his will is inwardly conformed to the divine will, producing order and harmony in the univerfe, and conducting the whole by the jufteft methods to the beft end: This gives a beautiful idea. But on the other hand, a confcioufnefs of virtue overlooked, neglected, diftrefied by men, and not regarded or rewarded by God, ill-ufed in this world, without hope or profpecl: of being better ufed in another, I would fain know, where is the pleafure of this reflexion, whej-e is the beauty of this fcene?
or, how could any man, in his fenfes, think the fpreading fuch notions the way to fpread or propagate virtue in the world? Is it not, I befeech you, an ugly fyftem, in which you can fuppofe no law, and prove no duty, wherein men thrive by wickednefs, and fuffer by virtue? Would it not be a difagreeable fight to fee an honeft man peeled by (harpers, to fee virtuous men injured and defpifed, while vice triumphed? An enthufiaft may entertain himfelf with vifions, and fine talk, about fuch a fyftem; but when it comes to be confidered by men of cool heads, and clofe reafon, I believe they will find no beauty nor perfection in it; nor will it appear, that fuch a moral fyftem can poflibly come from the fame hand, or be of a piece with the natural, throughout which there fhines fo much order, harmony, and proportion.
Alc. — Your difcourfe ferves to confirm me in my opinion. You may remember, I declared, that touching this beauty of morality in the high fenfe, a man's firft thoughts arc beft; and that, if we pretend to examine, and infpe£t, and reafon, we are in danger to lofe fight of it.* That, in fact, there is fuch a thing cannot be doubted, when we confider that, in thefe days, fome of our philosophers have a high fenfe of virtue, without the lead notion of religion, * Men's firft thoughts on moral matters are generally better than th«ir fecond: their natural notions better than thofe refined by ftudv Chara&criftics, Vol. 1. p. 13.
s a clear proof of the ufefulnefs and efficacy of our principles!
XII. Cri. — Not to difpute the virtue of Minute Philosophers, we may venture to call its caufe in queftion, and make a doubt, whether it be an inexplicable enthufiaftic notion of moral beauty, or rather, as to me it feems, what was already affigned by Euphranor > complexion, cuftom, and religious education? but, allowing what beauty you pleafe, to virtue in an irreligious fyftem, it cannot be lefs in a religious, unlefs you will fuppofe that her charms diminifti, as her dowry increafeth. The truth is, a believer hath all the motives from the beauty of virtue, in any fenfe whatfoever, that an unbeliever can poffibly have, befides other motives, which an unbeliever hath not. Hence it is plain, that thofe of your fe&, who have moral virtue, owe it not to their peculiar tenets, which ferve only to leflen the motives to virtue. Thofe, therefore, who are good, are lefs good, and thofe who are bad, are more bad, than they would have been, were they believers.
Euph. — To me it feems, thofe heroic infidel inamoratos of abftra&ed beauty, are much to be pitied, and much to be admired. Lyficlesy hearing this, faid, with fome impatience, gentlemen, you mail have my whole thoughts upon this point, plain and frank. All that is faid about a moral fenfe, or moral beauty, in any fignification, either of Alciphron or Euphranor^ or any other, I take to be at bottom mere bubble and pretence. The kalon and the prepon, the beautiful and the decent, are things outward, relative, and fuperficial, which have no eflfecl; in the dark, but are fpecious topics to difcourfe and expatiate upon, as fome formal pretenders of our feci:, though in other points very orthodox* are ufed to do. But mould one of them get into power, you would find him no fuch fool as Euphranor imagines. He would foon fhew he had found out, that the love of one's country is a prejudice: That mankind are [Dial. HI.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. i39 rogues and hypocrites, and that it were folly to facrifice one's felf for the fake of fuch: That all regards center in this life, and that, as this life is to every man his own life, it clearly follows that charity begins at home. Benevolence to mankind is perhaps pretended, but benevolence to himfelf is praclifed by the wife. The livelier fort of our philofophers do not fcruple to own thefe maxims; and as for the graver, if they are true to their principles, one may guefs what they muft think at bottom.
Cri.—- Whatever may be the effecl: of pure theory upon certain felecl: fpirits, of a peculiar make, or in fome other parts of the world; I do verily think that, in this country, of ours, reafon, religion, law, are all together little enough to fubdue the outward to the inward man; and that it muft argue a wrong head, and weak judgment, to fuppofe, that, without them, men would be enamoured of the golden mean. To which my countrymen, perhaps, are lefs inclined thanf others, there being in the make of an Englifh mind a certain gloom and eagernefs, which carries to the fad extreme; religion to fanaticifm; free-thinking to atheifm; liberty to rebellion: Nor fhould we venture to be governed by tafte, even in matters of lefs confequence. The beautiful in drefs, furniture, and building, is, as Euphranor hath obferved, fomething real and well grounded: And yet our Englijh do not find it out ©f themfelves. What wretched work do they and other northern people make, when they follow their own tafte of beauty, in any of thefe particulars, inftead of acquiring the true, which is to be got from ancient models and the principles of art, as in the cafe of virtue, from great models and meditation, fo far as natural means can go? But in no cafe is it to be hoped, that to kalon will be the leading idea of the many, who have quick fenfes, ftrong paflions, and grofs intellects.
XIII. Alc. — The fewer they are, the more ought we to efteem, and admire fuch philofophers, whofe fouls arc touched, and tranfported, with this fublime idea.
i4o MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial, in.]
Cri.— -But then one might expect, from fuch philofophers, fo much good fenfe, and philanthrophy, as to keep their tenets to themfelves, and confider their weak brethren, who are more ftrongly afFe£ted by certain fenfes and notions of another kind, than that of the beauty of pure difinterefled virtue. Craiylus, a man prejudiced againft the chriftian religion, of a crazy conftitution, of a rank above mod men's ambition, and a fortune equal to his rank, had little capacity for fenfual vices, or temptation to diihoneft ones. Cratylus having talked himfelf, or imagined that he had talked himfelf, into a ftoical enthufiafm about the beauty of virtue, did, under the pretence of making men heroically virtuous, endeavor to deftroy the means of making them reafonably and humanly fo. A clear inftance, that neither birth, nor books, norconverfation, can introduce a knowledge of the world into a conceited mind, which will ever be its own object, and contemplate mankind in its own mirror! <- Alc. — Cratylus was a lover of liberty, and of his country, and had a mind to make men incorrupt and virtuous, upon the pureft and molt difinterefted principles.
Cri.— It is true, the main fcope of all his writings (as he himfelf tells us) was to aflert the reality of a beauty and charm in moral, as well as in natural fubjec~ts: to demonftrate a tafte, which he thinks more effectual than principle: to recommend morals on the fame foot with manners; and fo to advance philofophy on the very foundation of what is called agreeable and polite. As for religious qualms, the belief of a future ftate of rewards and punifhments, and fuch matters, this great man (ticks not to declare, that the liberal, polifhed, and refined part of mankind, muft needs confider them only as children's tales, and amufements of the vulgar. For the fake, therefore, of the better fort, he hath, in great goodnefs and wifdom, thought of fomething elfe, to wit, a tafte or relifh: this, he azures us, is, at la®, what will influence: fince, [Dial. HI.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. i4r according to him, whoever has any impreffion of gentility (as he calls it) or politenefs, is fo acquainted with the decorum and grace of things, as to be really tranfported with the comtemplation thereof.* His conduct feems jufl: as wife, as if a monarch fhould give out, that there was neither jail nor executioner in his kingdom, to enforce the laws, but that it would be beautiful to obferve them, and that, in fo doing, men would tafte the pure delight which refults from order and decorum.
Alc. — After all, is it not true, that certain ancient philofophers, of great note, held the fame opinion with Cratylusy declaring that he did not come up to the character, or deferve the title of a good man, who pra£tifed virtue for the fake of any thing but its own beauty?
Cri. — I believe, indeed, that fome of the ancients faid fuch things as gave occafion for this opinion. Ariftotle\ diftinguimeth between two characters of a good man, the one he calleth agathos, or fimply good, the other kalos kagathos, from whence the compound term kalokagathiciy which cannot, perhaps, be rendered by any one word in our language. But his fenfe is plainly this: agathos he defineth to be, that man to whom the good things of nature are good: For, according to him, thofe things, which are vulgarly efteemed the greateft goods, as riches, honors, power, and bodily perfections, are indeed good by nature; but they happen, neverthelefs, to be hurtful and bad to fome perfons, Upon the account of evil habits: inafmuch as neither a fool, nor an unjufl man, nor an intemperate, can be at all the better for the ufe of them, any more than a fick man for ufmg the nourifliment proper for thofe who are in health. But kales hagathos is that man, in whom are to be found all things worthy, and decent, and laudable, purely as fuch, and * See Chara&eriflics, Vol. III. Mifcel- 5. cap. 3. and Mifcel- 3. cap af Ethic ad Eudemum, lib, 7. cap. ult.
x42 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. III.]