quantity of motion) and partly as the degree of Intellect (which has a general relation to the complexity of the motion). And thus interpreting the facts, supposed anomalies disappear* CHAPTER ILL THE RELATIVITY OF FEELINGS.
§ 77. Mind being composed of Feelings and the Relations between Feelings, and the aptitudes of Feelings for entering into Relations varying with their- kinds, the..Relativity of Feelings is an expression applicable, in one sense,, to certain, of the purely subjective phenomena described in the last chapter. But it is" 'here, to be understood in quite a different sense. Having "contemplated Feelings in their relations to one another as components of consciousness, we have now to contemplate them inr their relations to th.e lathings beyond consciousness by which they are produced. ' "" Moreover, the things beyond consciousness here to be considered, are not the nerve- disturbances which are the physical sides of what we call feelings on their psychical sides: already, in the chapter on.2Estho -Physiology,, the relations between the subjective and objective faces of nervous changes have been described. Our present inquiryf is into the nature of the connexions between feelings, and( forces existing outside the organism. To treat of thesef without going over any ground before traversed is difficult; since an external action being related to a feeling only through an intermediate nervous change, the intermediation cannot well be left out of sight. Occasional brief repetitions must therefore be excused.
It should be further premised that we are here concerned o mainly with peripherally-initiated feelings •which Lave external origins; or rather,, with those primary or vivid forms of them, which we call real, in contradistinction, to the secondary or faint forms we call ideal.
§ 78. The general truth,, familiar to all students of Psychology^ which it is the object of this chapter to present under its many aspects, is that though internal feeling habitually depends on external agent, yet there is no likeness I bet ween them either in kind or degree. The connexion ] bet ween objective cause and subjective effect is conditioned jin ways extremely complex and variable — ways which we |will proceed to consider seriatim.
We shall find that each set of conditions so modifies the connexion between objective cause and subjective effect as to determine the qualitative character of the effect. In • other words, the^ saine agent produces feelings of quite i unlike natures according to the circumstances under which •:it_acts, j \ We shall further see that, besides this qualitative unlikeness, there. is a quantitative unlikeness. Between the outer force and the inner fe'eling it excites, there is no such correlation as that which the physicist calls equivalence — nay, the two do not even maintain an unvarying proportion. Equal amounts of the same force arouse different amounts of the same feeling, if the circumstances differ. Only.while all the conditions remain constant is there something like a constant ratio between the physical antecedent and the psychical consequent.
§ 79. Were I not bound to enumerate all aspects of this relativity, it would be needless to say that the connexion between the outer agent and the inner feeling generated by it, depends on the structjire^ ObviousIyTEe forms o? sensation that can be roused in the consciousness of a creature, are primarily determined by THE RELATIVITY OF FEELINGS.
the peripheral organs with wMcli its type is endowed. This is so even with the most general of the sensations — that of Touch. A Crustacean, everywhere enclosed in a hard exoskeleton, can have no such tactual impressions as those which are possible to a soft-skinned animal. The impressions received from the ends of its limbs and claws when they come in contact with external objects, may be compared to those which a man receives from poking objects with the end of his walking-stick. Still more manifestly are the special sensations dependent for their qualities on the presence of special sense-organs. Take the auditory sensations. Various aquatic creatures that have no developed organs of Hearing, are nevertheless affected by those vibrations which to creatures better endowed are sonorous. When such vibrations are propagated through their medium, they contract themselves, or they withdraw into their shells if they have them. We may reasonably assume that what they feel is a jar somewhat resembling the jar received by the hand from a vibrating musical instrument. But in any case, the quality of the feeling excited in these lower animals by sonorous waves, is wholly unlike the quality of the feeling which such waves excite in higher animals.
That, qualities being alike, the quantities of the feelings produced by given agents vary with the specific structures, is an equally familiar truth. In a bird or mammal having eyes that fit it for nocturnal habits, the sensation aroused by a faint light, is much greater than is aroused by it in a diurnal bird or mammal; and the light which gives to a diurnal creature a moderate amount of sensation suffices to dazzle the nocturnal creature by its excess. Similarly \vith the olfactory feelings. An odour which has no appreciable efect on the consciousness of a man, has a very marked effect on the consciousness of a dog. Even varieties of dogs, as the greyhound and the beagle, yield us evidence of decided quantitative differences between the mental changes caused by the same odour. • These few instances warrant us In suspecting that; in.no |two species does a given amount of a given outer agent (excite exactly the same kind and quantity of feeling.
§ SO. This apparently hasty generalization is justified by the generalization to which we come next; namely., that within the same species the relation bet ween objective cause and subjective effect varies both qualitatively and quantitatively with the constitution — varies, that is, with the individual structure.
I That peculiarity of vision discovered in himself by Dalton, and sometimes named after him,, yields an instance of {qualitative difference. To those organized as he was,, the 'visible world does not present all the various feelings of colour that it does to mankind in general. Sensations which to others seem strongly contrasted, as red and green, seem to them the same. Whence we must conclude that certain etherial undulations produce in such persons feelings unlike those they produce in other persons. From sentient states excited through the ears, inav be drawn another illustration. Aerial pulses recurring at the rate of sixteen per second are perceived by some as separate pulses; but by some they are perceived as a tone of very low pitch. Similarly at the other extreme. Vibrations exceeding thirty thousand per second, are inaudible through certain ears; while through ears that are, as we may suppose, of somewhat unlike structures, these rapid vibrations are known as an excessively acute sound.
> Quantitative differences of sensation that are caused by differences of individual organization, every one observes. All orders of sensations exemplify them. Here are instances from each. Thick-skinned persons are insensible to tactual impressions which thin-skinned persons clearly feel; and there are persons by whom minute unlikenesses of surface are so distinctly perceived that they are employed to judge of commodities, such as raw silk, by handling THE RELATIVITY OF FEELINGS. 19?
them. How amounts of Savour qnite inappreciable by some are readily appreciable by others, the dinner-table constantly reminds ns. And that there are professional tasters, shows that the gustatory feeling produced by a given quantity of sapid substance, is, in exceptional organizations, much greater than usual. With smells it is the same. There are those to whom quite delicate perfumes seem of overpowering strength. And there are those to whom odours usually felt to be disgusting in the extreme, are scarcely perceptible. Constitutional differences in quickness of hearing, sometimes marked between persons of the same race, are more marked between persons of different races. By putting his ear to the ground a savage hears sounds inaudible by a civilized man. The; like holds with visual sensitiveness. The Bushman is impressible by changes in the field of view which do not impress the European. And such tests as occur in the telescopic search for minute stars, show that, in the same race, the amount of light which excites a distinct feeling in one person, excites no feeling in another.
Thus we may make wider the startling inference drawn in the last section. Besides concluding that in no two species are the subjective effects produced by given objective actions absolutely alike, qualitatively and quantitatively; we may conclude that they are absolutely alike in no two, individuals of the same species.
, § 81. Whatever there may seem of excess in this state-j rnent will disappear when we remember that even^jin. the| same individual the quantity, if not the quality, of the feel| "ing excited by an external agent constant in kind and del gree, varies according to the constitutional staie/<>v '•>• - '< T Of qualitative variations we have but vague and indirect evidence. Still the experiences of invalids yield reason to suspect that they occur. There are abnormal states of the nervous system during which illusive sedations trouble the patient. The consciousness of a disagreeable smell which is one of the premonitory symptoms of an epileptic fit, may be named as an instance. And if feelings of purely subjective origin, so strong as to "be mistaken for feelings of objective origin, may arise from extreme nervous derangements, it is reasonably inferable that smaller nervous derangements will often arouse vague subjective states which may mingle with, and qualify, the feelings objectively originated.
The quantitative variations which variations of constitutional state entail among the feelings produced by equal external agents, are very familiar. As before, some are consequent on derangements of health and some on advancing years. In certain conditions of nervous irritability, sounds of ordinary strength seem intolerably loudj daylight becomes unbearable from the excess of visual feeling it causes; and even the skin becomes unduly sensitive: there is what is called hyper-sesthesia. Contrariwise, there are deviations from health characterized by an anaesthesia allied to that artificially caused — a state of comparative indifference to amounts of external stimuli which commonly arouse much feeling. ', How along with decline of vigour in old age there goes an increasing anaesthesia of one or more kinds, we.have daily proof. There is dimness of sight; there is dulness of hearing; there is often obtuseness of taste.
Thus, besides seeing that the subjective effect produced by each objective cause varies with the structure of the species, and varies with the structure of the individual of the species, we see that it varies with the constitutional state of the individual— often in a marked degree. Very ^possibly the ratio is never twice the same; but always differs infinitesimaliy, if not appreciably.
§ 82. The kind and degree of effect which an external; physical stimulus produces on the psychical state, djepends; also on the part of the organism subject to it. Equal quan- . THE EELATIVITY OF PEEL&NGS. 199 titles of tlie same force excite feelings widely unlike, qualitatively and quantitatively, according to the structures of the peripheral organs on which they fall.
The qualitative differences we recognize so much as matters of course that we forget their! significance. Here, however, they must not be passed over. Many kinds of matter which, when applied i'o the skin at large, cause only sensations of touch, cause, -when applied to the tongue, sensations of touch and taste; ^or, if they are kinds of matter having the tastes we call pu:agent, they arouse in the skin sensations of heat or tingling.! Similarly with volatile substances. A whiff.of;, ammonia coming in contact with the eyes^ produces a sma-:rt; getting into the nostrils, excites the consciousness we describe as an intolerably strong odour; being condensed on the tongue, generates an acrid taste; while ammonia applied iln solution to a tender part of the skin, makes it burn, as we say. The - feeling caused by sonorous undulations;, already adverted to as varying with the structure of the species, must be named here also as varying with the structure of the part affected. A vibrating tuning-fork touched T^ith the fingers, gives them a sense of jar; held between t'h'e teeth, it gives this same sense to the parts in which they are imbedded, while by communication through the bones of the skull, its vibrations so affect the auditory apparatus^ as to awaken a consciousness of sound — a consciousness which alone results if the tuning-fork does not touch tHe body. The different sensations excited by etherial undulations on the unmodified integument and on those modified portions of it which constitute eyes (Principles of Biology, § 295) yield further illustrations. The Sun's rays falling on the hand T cause a sensation of heat but no sensation of light; and/ falling on the retina cause a sensation of light but no sensation of heat. As Professor Tyndall has proved by experiment on himself, the jretina is msensible tqjkeat-rays of considerable concentration.
That the relation between an outer force and the feeling it arouses, varies quantitatively according to the of the body acted upon., there are many proofs, of whicla or two will suffice. The arched under-surfaoe o the foot experiences an intense sensation of tickling from.. gentle touch which generates a much feebler sensation o this kind elsewhere. Conversely,, the thick skin of the tee bears with comparatively little pain the long-continue < pressure of a hard prominence which would be intolerabl to the back of the hand. The feelings caused, "b; exposing different parts of the skin to the same heat, are not i] most cases conspicuously unlike in degree; but there is ou case in which they are. When drinking a liquid the heat c which is quite bearable by that part of the upper lip us~u.aUimmersed, it may be observed that if the lip is accidental! dipped deeper, so as to immerse a little of the outer slsim, sensation of scalding results.
We find, then, that the same external agent acting- o different peripheral organs, generates states of consciousneg which have in many cases no likenesses of kind whateve: and have in other cases immense unlikenesses of degree.
§ 83. The state of the part affected, as well as its structure has a share in determining the relation between outer and inner feeling. Already in the chapter on Physiology, it has been shown that the ratio borne by tt change set up in a nerve-termination to the feeling ellcitec varies with the local conditions. Obviously this involves concomitant variation in the ratio between the amoTixit < external force which initiates the nervous change, and. tl amount of feeling that eventually results. It will suffice 1 recall the several causes of the variation.
The temperature of the part is one of them. Betwee the state of local insensibility produced by excessive coland the state of sensibility accompanying natural warmt! there arc states showing all gradations in the proportic THE RELATIVITY OF FEEJLmGS. £01 which the incident force bears toi the feeling called forth.
Local anemia affects this proportioia by diminishing the quantity of sensation which a given amount of outer action generates; and local hyperasrnia, by i increasing it — often extremely. Hypersemia, however, in; certain cases (possibly by putting an obstacle between: the outer agent and the nerves to be affected) decreases the amount of feeling generated; as in the partial or complete loss of taste and smell caused by a bad cold.; The conation of the structures concerned as modified by previous discharge of their functions,! is a further cause of variation in the ratio between the objective actions and the subjective effects due to them. Sensory organs worn by strong excitements recently undergone, require greater external forces to arouse the same amounts of internal feelina-s.
This is so with touches, tastes, smells,! as well as visual and auditory impressions. j One more cause of variation, occurring in a special class of cases, must be added. The sensatio^i that follows contact with matter hotter or colder than the body, depends less on s the temperature of the matter than ojn. the contrast between; its temperature and that: of.the bodyj On going into a warm;• bath or into cold water, the heat or /the cold seems greater than it does after a short interval, d-pring which the thermal state of the skin has approximate^, to that of the water. More striking still is the evidence yielded by cases in which the same tepid water feels either wirm or cold according to the temperature of the hand put into it; nay, in which it feels both warm and cold to thel two hands, if one has been much heated and the other mttch cooled.
§ 84. Yet another general fact remains. The relative motions of subject and object, modify, both qualitatively and quantitatively, the relations between incident forces and evoked feelings.
The instance of qualitative modification most easily observed,, is that produced in the pitch of a sound by the movement of the soiunding body towards, or away from,, the auditor. If, as an e:sgress train passes through a railwaystation, the whistle liappens to be going, the tone heard by each person in the station, changes from a higher to a lower at the moment the engine goes by him. A still more marked change is perceivable if the auditor, seated in a train travelling with • considerable speed in one direction, is passed by a whisthing engine travelling rapidly in the opposite direction. jUnder such circumstances I have observed, at the moniep-t of passing, a fall in the pitch of the note amounting to a major third or even a fourth. How this is due to an alteration in the number of aerial pulses reaching the ear in a i given time, need not here be explained at length. It concerns us only to note that the quality of -the feeling produced by a sounding body is not the same when the body is approaching or receding as when, stationary; and that ithe quality of the feeling changes i'with every change in the rate of approach or recession. A remarkable illustration of analogous nature, has been disclosed by inquiries respecting the qualities of the lights radiated by different stars. Some years since it was' suggested that possibly the apparent colours of the stars iare.determined by their motions towards, or away from, 'the Earth at various velocities; and though this supposition^ has not turned out to be true, yet a truth akin to it has beei discovered. Though to the naked eye, the quality of the light emanating from each star is not appreciably affected by the star's velocity of approach to, or recession from, us; yet,j as examined through the spectroscope, its quality proves i to be thus affected. Mr. Huggins has recently shown that the spectrum of Sirius differs from the spectrum he would yield were he stationary relatively to us; and differs in such w;ay as to show that he is moving away from us at a rate of more than two millions of miles THE RELATIVITY OF FEELINGS. 203 per day. Hence, in a degree appreciably under certain con-.ditions, the nature of the feeling excited by luminiferous undulations, varies according to the relative motion of the observer and the body emitting them. /. Of quantitative variations arising fronk relative motion, we have "Unfamiliar instance in the different feelings of heat or of cold produced in us by surrounding media, when we are at rest and when we move. In;a bath above 100°,.the water seems hotter to a limb that stirs than to one that is stationary; and every bather knows how much colder running water of a given temperature feels than still water of the same temperature — a contrast that becomes very great when the velocity of the water is much raised, as in a douche. Similarly with the air. A greater chill is felt by those who, instead of standing still, are exposed in a carriage to "the wind of their own speed." Though the explanation of these differences is, that the medium in contact with the skin is ^continually changed in the one set of cases and not in the other, yet it remains true that the sensation varies in intensity as the relative motion of the medium varies.
I § 85. Thus far we have limited onr attention to the feel- \ ings excited by external things acting; on the organism. We \ { must not, however, pass over the feelings i which accompany Iji actions. of the organism on external things. Though ' •' here the relation between subjective and objective changes does noti obviously vary qualitatively, it varies very much quantitatively.
If, in muscular action, there took place a transformation of the feeling of muscular effort into an equivalent of mechanical effect; then a given amount of such feeling would always generate the same amount of such effect, through whatever muscles expended. But the fact is quite otherwise. The. conscious exercise of force required when a stone weight is lifted by the little finger, far exceeds that re- 2*4 THE ilXDlTCTJGXS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
faired when the £tone weight is grasped in the hand, ancl lifted by the linn. Or again, the gymnastic feat of raising the body ujp a ladder hand over hand, implies a T ^A \io-lier decree? of the subjective state we call exertion tli:-i is implied by Climbing up the ladder in the usual way. CIc-criv, therefore", k given amount of feeling gives rise to an 'amount of racblar motion which is large or small according to the muscles used. This relation is also dependent on age.; The sense of effort which a child experiences in raising a ^weight, greatly exceeds in intensity the sense of effort it will experience in raising the same weight by the same muscles twenty years afterwards. At maturity, a like amount of sensation is the correlate of an increased amount of produced motion. Similarly, this relation varies quantitatively as the constitutional state varies. After a prostrating illness, the feeling of strain that accompanies the raising of a limb, is as great- as that which in health accompanies a considerable feat of strength.
§ 86. Were it not that already as much space as can be afforded has been occupied, it would be well here to illustrate the ways in which both the peripherally - initiated feelings that arise in internal organs and the centrallyinitiated feelings or emotions, have also their several forms of relativity. But it must suffice just to indicate these extensions of the general truth that has been set forth.
For present purposes we may fitly limit ourselves to the relativity of those peripherally - initiated feelingis directly traceable to environing agencies. Their relativities we find to be of manifold kinds. The quality and the quantity of the sensation produced by a given amount of a given external force, vary not only with the structure of the organism, specific and individual, as well as the structure of the part affected, but also with the age, the constitutional state, the state of the part as modified by temperature, circulation, and previous use, and even with the TTTE RELATIVITY OF FEELINGS. 205 relative motion of subject and object. l^Thus we may count up nine different causes which affect qualitatively or quantitatively or both, the relation between t lie exciting physical agent and the produced psychical modification. These different causes co-operate in ever-changing proportions. And when we remember that any change in any one of them results in some alteration in the kind- or degree of feeling,^ aroused, we become strongly impressed? with the trath_ t subjective consciousness, determined as it is wholly b; subjective nature, state,, and circumstances, is no measur of objective existence.
Indeed, the primitive belief that redness exists as such out of the mind, and that sound possesses apart from ourselves that quality which it has to ou* perception, is thus rendered as hard for the psychologist to entertain as its opposite is hard to entertain for the 'uncultivated. After learning that when a tumbler is strubk the blow causes in it a change of form, instantly followed by an opposite change of form, after which thfere recurs the first form, and so on — after perceiving thati each of these rhythmical changes of form gives an impact to substances in contact with the tumbler, generating! visible waves on the surface of its contained liquid, and wayes having like periods in the surrounding air — when it has jbeen proved to us that the feeling of tone results only when jSuch mechanical oscillations of adjacent matter recur with a certain speed, and varies in quality according to the speed — when, further, we find that these mechanical oscillations produce this feeling only when they fall on a particular structure, and that, when they fall on other structures, they produce feelings of totally unlike kinds; we become filly convinced that tj^ef form of objective action we call sound, has not the slightest i kinship in nature jo jhj^sensatio^ ' injis^ Sipailarly withjin^latipns ' of.±lie.,.etherial^ medium, Now that we know heatj^and light tctb$ nearly-allied forms i. of insensible motion, which may arise by transformation of \ sensible motion ands mar be re-transformed into it, we are convinced that amo£ng the outer actions which arouse in us the feelings of light,? heat, and sensible motion, there can be no such intrinsic differences as among the feelings we know by these names; an-.<d that hence these feelings cannot be like them. There.^follows irresistibly the conclusion that the same holds of t;}istes and smells — that a bitter flavour implies in the substance yielding it nothing like what we call bitterness, and t:hat there is no intrinsic sweetness in the exhaled matter yiVhich we distinguish as a sweet odour; but that, in these cashes as in the others, the.objective action which sets up the s^'ubjective state, no more resembles it Ithan the pressure wl^iich mores the trigger of a gun resemjSles the explosion wFiich follows.
; Finally, the induction extends itself to the sensations of i tension and pressure l which we ascribe to mechanical force, ordinarily so-called. The same weight produces one kind of feeling when it re^sts on a passive portion of the body, and another kind of: feeling when supported at the end of the outstretched arm.- Or, to take a better case — if, one hand being opened oui; on the table, a knuckle of the other hand is thrust down ]with some force on the back of it, there results a sensation of pain in the back of the hand, a sensation of pressure in* the knuckle, and a sensation of muscular tension in the active arm. Which of these sensations does the mechanical force in action resemble, qualitatively or quantitatively? Clet'irly, it cannot be assimilated to one more than another of them; and hence must in itself be something alien from, or unrepresentable by, any feeling. $ t Thus we are brought,to the conclusion that what we are • Iconscious of as properties of matter, even down to its •weight and resistance, are but subjective affections produced by objective agencies that are unknown and UIL-! Sowable. All the sensations produced in us by environ^! ling things are but symbols of actions out of ourselves, the | Inatures of which we cannot even conceive. • • - THE EELATIVITY OF FEELIXG3. 207 § 87. Tliis conclusion fully harmonizes with; and is indeed an obvious corollary from, those icruths which Physiology supplies as data to Psychology.: Let us briefly note how the structural and functional facts set down in the preceding part, yield deductively the inferences above reached inductively.
A nerve is a thread of unstable nitrogenous substance running from periphery to centre or from centre to periphery, along which, when one of its ends is disturbed, there runs a wave of molecular change to the other. The w:ave of change set up by a peripheral disturbance is not like the action which causes it; and the waves of change set up in different nerves by different peripheral disturbances have no such unlikenesses as have the disturbances themselves. Hence being obliged to conclude that the kind of feeling depends either on the character of the nerve-centre, or on the way in which the molecular disturbance is brought to the nerve-centre, or on both; it becomes inconceivable that any resemblance exists between the subjective effect andjjhat objective cause which arouses it through the intermediation of changes resembling neither.
Similarly with the quantitative variations. Seeing, as we did, that every nervous disturbance propagated from periphery to centre undergoes a multiplication, the degree of which depends primarily on the particular multiplying structures passed through, and secondarily on the changeable physiological conditions which favour or hinder the multiplication; ' it is clear that, if what on its physical side is a central nervous disturbance, is on its psychical side a feeling, there cannot be constant proportions between feelings and the environing stimuli to which they answer. Quantita-. tively as jrolljas qualitatively^ feeling must be relative to the nature and state of the subject.
§ 88.. But now let us not overlook an all-important implication very generally overlooked, and the overlooking of 203 THE IK-T)UCTIOXS OP PSYCHOLOGY.
which leads to elaborate systems of erroneous inferences of verr remarkable, not-* to say astonishing, kinds.
All the foregoing ai -'guments, and all arguments of kindred Inatu7'^, *et out bv"as"stiming objective existence. Not a step can b^ 'taken towards* the truth that our states of consciousr --- a-e tlie ra]v things we can know, without tacitly or. 3 an unknown something beyond con-The proposition that whatever we feel has an Vxi>renee which is Relative to ourselves only, cannot be oroveil. nav cannot e^11 ^e intelligibly expressed, without ••^-e^rii^ " direct! v or'-' "DJ implication, an external existence ' which is not relative to ourselves. "When it is argued that what we are conscious!* °^ as sound has no objective reality a> sueli. since its antecedent is also the antecedent to what we are conscious of i as jar, and that the two consequents, ' being unlike one another, cannot be respectively like their 'common antecedent;* ^-e validity of the argument depends whnllv on the existence of the common antecedent as something that- has rem4^ne<3- unchanged while consciousngss ha~s been changing. 'K after finding that the same tepid water niav feel warm Ho one hand and cold to the other, it is inferred that warr&th is relative to our own nature and our own state; the inference is valid only supposing the activity to which these: different sensations are referred, is an activity out of ourselves which has not been modified by our own activities. ' One of two things irn^st be asserted: — Either the antecedents of each feeling, £r state of consciousness, exist only as previous feelings or states of consciousness; or else they, or some of them, exist apart from, or independently of, consciousness. If the first is asserted, then the proof that whatever we feel exists relatively to ourselves only, becomes doubly meaningless. Tc> Sa7 that a sensation of sound and a sensation of jar cannot ' ^ respectively like their common antecedent because they. are no^ like one another, is an empty proposition; since the two feelings of sound and jar THE IlELATIVITY OF FEE&INGS. 209 ne^er liaye a common antecedent in; consciousness. Tlie combination of feelings that is folloiwed by the feelinoof jar, is never the same as the combination of feelings that is followed by the feeling of i sound; and hence, not having a common antecedent, ivfc cannot be argued that they are nnlike it. Moreover,.' if by antecedent is: meant constant or uniform antecedent (and any other meaning is suicidal) then the proposition that the antecedent of sound exists only in consciousness, is absolutely irreconcilable with the fact that the feeling of sound often abruptly breaks in upon the series of feelings otherwise determined, where no antecedent of the specified kind has occurred. The otlier alternative, there-* fore, that the active, antecedent of each primary feeling exists independently of consciousness, is th^ only thinkable one| Ib is the one implicitly asserted in the very proposition that feelings are relative to our own natures; and it is taken for granted in every step of every argument by which this proposition is proved. j Thus^we come once more by anotlier route to the conclusion already twice reached. BT "(the first part of First Principles, when treating of the relaiivity of knowledge, it was shown that the existence of a nfrn-relative is unavoidably asserted in every chain of reasoning by which relativity is proved. In the second part o£ {First Principles y when dealing with the Data o£ Philosophy^ it was shown that the co-existence of subject and object ifs a deliverance of consciousness which, taking precedence! of all analytic examination, but subsequently verified by analytic examination, is a truth transcending all others in certainty. And here again, the validity of the conclusion that whatever we feel exists as we feel it only in ourselves, we find to depend entirely upon the postulate that feelings have antecedents out of ourselves.
' i CHAPTER IT* i THE RELATIVITY <)P BELATIOXS BETWEEN FEELINGS, i