§ S9. The mildest jcriticism on tliis title will probably "be thai it is an awkwarcf. combination of words; and an outspoken critic will retry likely condemn it either as nonsensical or as meaningless. ^Nevertheless it has a definite meaning not properly; expressible by any other title.
Hind we found to be composed of feelings and the relations between feeling's. In the last chapter, it was shown that the kinds and amounts of feelings are determined by the nature of the subject — exist, as we know thenx, only in consciousness, and have no resemblance to the agents beyond consciousness; which cause them. And^it^is the {purpose of this chapter to show that in like manner the •forms and degrees of Delations between feelings are determined by the nature of the subject — exist, as we know them, • only in consciousness, and no more resemble the connexions between outer agents than the feelings they unite resemble these outer agents.
The most highly compounded relations between feelings, are those in which they are present to consciousness not simply as co- existing but as co-existing in certain relative positions — ^existing, that is, along with many of those intervening and surrounding positions, which are the units o£ our conception of Space. The relativity of these compound relations o£ Co- existence, as we may call them, must be dealt with first. After them we will pass to THE RELATIVITY OF RELATIONS. 211 the compound relations of §£qa£ac-e> or those m whicli feelings are known not simply as", having occurred in succession, but as occupying certain "positions in the series of states of consciousness, between which there are intervening positions occupied by other, states — relations of Sequence, that is, in which Time, regarded as having an assignable quantity, is an eletnent. We will next consider the compound relations of Difference, or those iu which beyond the mere consciousness of;Difference, there is a consciousness of the degree of Difference — relations of Difference, that is, in which the related feelings are conceived as differing in strength b}7 assignable amounts. The relations of Co-existence, of Sequence, and of Difference, considered under their simplest aspects apart from quantitative implications, may then occupy us.
§ 90. l?o great effort of imagination is required to see that the consciousness of space of three dimensions, constituted of trebly-compounded relations of Co-existence, is a consciousness that varies qualitatively according to the structure of the species. It needs but to call to mind how greatly our conception of space is itiodified when we are in a dark place of which we know not the bounds, to perceive that those inferior creatures which liave no eyes, and cannot, as we do in the dark, supplement present tactual experiences by remembered visual experiences, must have conceptions of space quite unlike int quality to our own, which are abstracted in so large a degree from visual I experiences. Not only must the consciousness | of trebly-compounded relations of Co-existence be quali- I tatively different in such inferior creatures, but also those of doubly-compounded and singly-compounded relations of Co-existence. A creature with eyes is capable of having all the relative positions constituting an area, impressed on consciousness with apparent simultaneity; but a creature •without eyes can become conscious of these multitudinous .- '.i ft.Hr AUCTIONS Of PSYCHOLOGY.
.:.. J,/..-,-«.:.,,,, T_n^of them in distinct succession. And J: * % 'dimension is knowable bv the seeing .,™^_-> 0^ Qp^m:nj-ly-instantaneous consciousness of the -.^.v^.^.:.: Of j-^-o things impressing it, the conscious-„..,.,...-.V.^ ^e]cffre ^positions in a creature without ej^es /.,,.-.,. ^ -Wo-;: <,,,e so close as to be touched at the same;, ^n,-~ ]-^ two^p?llt=i °^ ^e creatlire^s body) cannot be -.^,.n,viri.-y i^^tanraneof 5^ ^u^ must ^ast Curing the apprecis,T;\a.,-,^.;*-.^ reciniT"ed fc)r Illllscu^ar niovement of a lirnb, or of t: e V;dv from ore to t^e other. Of course such qualitative j: -V,v^, £P, amoncy coriipound relations of Co-existence as present to consciousnf ss^ musti ^ave coun^ess gradations, determined by the perfectio11 of ^t and the range of s^cr^t It niay ^e added that there is even a srieeics of qualitative * variation that occurs in the same ci-oature usinsr the saPe senses. Take two objects suf-£-:-->n*lv far apart to -§^ve standing room between them. H'lvin^ contemplated \ ^e^ relation of position jfrom a distance, contemplate if a^es^ a^er having so placed the I.GUV that one of them Is ^n ^rOD-^ an<^ OI3e °^ them is behind. I: will be found that wh,at is conceived as a single relation in the one case cannot l}e so Conceived in the other. While standing between the twro objects, it is possible to think of their relative positions or1^ bF thinking successively of their two relations of positicl11 witil self- That compound relations of Co-e?istence as conceived by dijGferent species, vary quantitatively ^th the structures of the species, s/cins. to say the least, VG1T probable. Animals having great locomotive powersi are nofc ^eij to have the same conceptions of given spnpes as a^iinals whose locomotive powers are very small. TV a creature so constructed that its experiences of the larger sPaces around have been gained by long and quick boun^-3^ distances can scarcely present the aspects they do to a feature which traverses them by slow and many steps.
THE RELATIVITY OP LEIATIOXS* £1?, The dimensions of our bodies and the spaces moved through by our linibs, serve us as standards of comparison with environing dimensions; and conceptions of smallness or laro-eness result according as these environing dimensions are much less or much greater than the organic dimensions. Hence, the consciousness of a given relation of two positions in space, must vary quantitatively with variation of "bodily bulk. Clearly, a mouse, -which has to run many times its own length to traverse the space which a man traverses at a stride, cannot have the same conception of this space as a man. Quantitative changes in these compound relations of Co-existence are traceable by each person in his own niental history, from childhood to maturity. Distances which seemed great to the boy seem moderate to the man; and buildings once thought imposing in height and mass, dwindle into insignificance.
The physiological state of the organism also modifies quantitatively this form of consciousness to a considerable extent. De Quincey, describing some of his opium-dreams, says that " buildings and landscapes were exhibited in proportions so vast as the bodily eye is not fitted to receive. Space swelled) and was amplified to an extent of unutterable infinity." It is not an uncommon thing with nervous subjects to have illusive perceptions in which the body seems enormously extended: even to the covering an acre of ground.
A more special modification of bodily state also affects the conception. Like all other nervous structures, the nervous structures employed in the apprehension of space have their receptivity temp orarily diminished by action. As the appreciation of a delicate taste is hindered when the palate has just been excited by a very strong taste; so a small or moderate magnitude is under- estimated when a great magnitude has just before occupied the attention. Abuilding that appeared large when it stood amid smaller buildings, loses much of its seeming largeness if a far larger building is erected close TEE JXD CCTIOXS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
to it. Or, to take a bet ter case— when the Sun is seen in the mid*" of the <kv wi ta norLe but great angular spaces between it and the hor'izon> it} looks yeiT muc]l less tlia11 ifc does when close to the, horizon, where the angular space it subtends is comparably6 side b-y side wit]l sma11 Angular spaces.
* Yet a-^ain, compound relations of Co-existence vary with the position of the^obse^6^ not °ll]J quantitatively, but, in a certain sense, qualita -t^ely; for so only can we express the truths that api)are!n* s*ze depends.on distance from the eye, and that apparent -^orm changes with every change in the Doint of view. ^ne impressions made on us by two objects to both X ^hich we are close, are considerablv removed from ont^ another in consciousness. But as we recede from such tw<D objects, that compound relation of Co-existence which forfms our conception of their relative positions, diminishes quantitatively, and at last disappears altogether: the two impressions they give us merge into one. The facts t-Iaa* ^e co-existent positions forming a circle become to perception an ellipse when viewed obliquely, and a straight* ^ne when viewed edgeways, illustrate the truth that * compound relations of Co- existence undergo a species of quar-itat^ve variation as the place of the percipient varies. This i^ind of variation is doubtless due to differences among the' rates of -quantitative variation of the many component relaT.-^ons j ^u^ ^ ^s none the less to be regarded as a qaalitatrv;6 variation, since differences ot quality in general are Resolvable into differences in the ratios of the co-operative i-aetors.
We are thus driven to ti*16 conclusion that what w^con-;ceive as space-relations, ca nnot ^e, either in their, natures or 'degrees, like those eonneo^oas among external tMngs.,J;o jwhich they are due, The-J change both qualitatively and.quantitatively with the st ructure, the size, the state, and •the position, of the percipu;11^ ^d- when we see that what is, objectively considered/ ^e saQle connexion between THE JSELATIYITY OP RELATIONS. 215 •fcliiiigs, may,, as a space-relation in consciousness., be single OT- double — when we remember that,.according as we are XL ear or far off, it may be too large >to be simultaneously perceived or too small to be perceived at all; it becomes iimpossible to suppose any identity be?tween this objective connexion and some one of the multitudinous subjective eolations answering to it.. = § 91. The compound relations of Sequmce. or those in •vsrliich we conceive phenomena as having occurred, not slxnply one after another, but a§; occupying places in consciousness between which there are intervals measured by Intervening places, and from which,^ "by abstraction, we dorive our conception of Time, do ne^t at first sight appear to vary qualitatively. Eeasons may,: however, be assigned for suspecting qualitative variations ini them.
Such qualitative variations as profeably occur, are determined by differences of specific structure. A stationary cx-eature without eyes, receiving; distinct sensations from external objects only by contacts whhch happen at long and irregular intervals, cannot have in, its consciousness any compound relations of sequence save] those arising from the slow rhythm of its functions. Even -in ourselves the respiz-atory intervals, joined sometimes wit*h the intervals between -fclie heart's pulses, furnish part of tfye materials from which our consciousness of duration is derived; and had we no continuous perceptions of external changes, and consequently no ideas of them, these rhi^hmical organic actions •would obviously yield important dajfca for our consciousness of Time: indeed, in the absence of locomotive rhythms, our sole data. Eemembering this, and remembering that the sequences with which we are chiiefly occupied, and from -v^Mch our conception of Time is chiefly abstracted, are not •tliese sequences derived from internal actions, but the sequences in our impressions of external actions, it will be manifest that there is most lifcfely a marked qualitative difference between derived solely from tliat developed com outer changes, but] AUCTIONS OP PSYCHOLOGY.
that undeveloped sense of dtrration the experiences of inner changes., and ijeption of Time derived mainly from conceived to be a form of "botli 1 S~\ J * », m outer and inner cfhanges. Quantitative variations in compoWd relations of Sequence as existing in consciousness, &kQ manifestly caused by the stmctural differences whfich constitute differences of species. Subjective rhythms, partly of the vital functions and partly of the locomotive i functions,, mark out consciousness into tolerably regular intervals; thus yielding measures between states of consciousness otherwise caused — standards of duration. Hence" a small creature, in which. tJfa.es e rhythms are very rapid, must have a consciousness of a given objective internal widely unlike the consciousness of it possessed by a liirge animal, whose rhythms are relatively very slow. A gnfat/s wings make ten or fifteen thousand strokes per second, i Each stroke implies a separate nervous action. Eacli- such nervous action, or cliange in a nervous centre, is c probably as appreciable by the g-nat as is a quick movement!- of his arm by a man. And if tliis, I or anything like this,;* is the fact, then the Jime occupied [ by a given external chi^ge, measured by many movements ' in the one case, must ^eem much longer than it seems^ jm,; the olher^case, when mt^asure(^x^J.Hig}£ ^I?.331611^ How ao-e determines u quantitative variations in compound ^£3 " 3- • — — — -—...,„- -- — •• -- -1relations oiSequence, isvt a matter of common remark. Probably these are in part d^e to differences of size, and concomitant differences in $he rhythms of the functions, vital and locomotive: it requires a greater number of a cblld-'s movements than of a mien's movements to measure a day. But that the change in athe estimation of intervals is not wholly thus caused, is ^manifest from the fact that after maturity is reached, thery, or at any rate the longer ones, continue to undergo a seei^i^g abbreviation. Months to o^Jjcoanagpear no longer! %§.9--, THE RELATIVITY OE RELATIONS. 217 A further quantitative variation,; essentially similar in origin to that which takes place nvith advancing years> accompanies variation in external cir-cunistances, when this increases or decreases the numbers of vivid experiences within a given interval. If, after a monotonous life, a journey of pleasure brings within a week many exciting novelties., the remark habitually made is, that it seems far more than a week since home scenes were left behind. Even a comparatively monotonous 'state of consciousness: appears long if it is intense: instance the time during which/ a severe pain is suffered; or instance an interval of impatient expectation, the seeming length of which is popularly illustrated by the proverb — " The watchied pot never boils/'' The estimation of Time varies also) with the constitutional state. Whatever exalts the vital activities, and so makes mental impressions stronger, exaggerates the conceptions of durations. This is notably the case in persons under the influence of.opium. Detailing his experiences of this influence, De Quiiicey says that he soniejtimes seemed " to have lived for 70 or 100 years in one nijvht;" nay, to have had, "feelings representative of a millennium passed in that time, or, however, of a duration far beyond the limits of any human experience/'' / One more cause of quantitative variation in the consciousness of a compound relation of j Sequence, is change of position among our experiences. I Intervals of Time, like " intervals of Space, become apparently small in proportion' to their remoteness. An evening/ spent at a friend's house, seems of considerable length whe^i looked back iipon at the; moment of departure. When /recalled a week after, it subtends by no means so great ah angle in consciousness;' and the angle it subtends in consciousness when we are reminded of it a year after, is very small. There is a conviction that it was several hours lobg; but when contemplated it cannot be made of equal apparent length with the several hours just passed, any more,'than the apparently-small 213 THE IXIIDCCTIOXS OP PSYCHOLOGY.
distance between two', objects on tlie horizon, can be made in actual perception lij'.ke the great interval which appeared between them when ipve saw them close at hand. In other words, there is a for ^-shortening of protensive quantity analogous to the fo;' "re-shortening -of extensive quantity; whence it results thjjat the intervals between passing experiences begin to selem less as soon as they are past, and continually dwindle a*\s we get farther from them, until at last their lengths become inappreciable. To this law of mental perspective is ^lue the feet that, in retrospect^ life seenis no, longer at for:";ty than it did at twenty.
Hence, concerning.'compound relations of -Sequence, as concerning compound delations of Co-existence, we must say that probably they are Bnot qualitatively like the connexions to which they answer,-; and certainly they are not quanti- •: tatively like them. £ For suspecting that whatever : objectively originates (four subjective conception of Time, is : no i identical in nature ^ dth it, we have the reason that Time, ;.•; considered as an abstract from relations of Sequence, must I present a different aspe (ct according to the degree of its disj sociation from paruciila*ir sequences. To a lowly-endowed creature, conscious onlv* of internally-initiated changes, it I cannot appear what it Idoes to a creature chiefly occupied t with changes thai are externally initiated.; since, in the last, it is partially dissociated from both orders -of changes.
1 Whence it seenis inferable that, only partially dissociated as it is, it cannot have -. in consciousness that qualitative character which absolute., dissociation would give it, and 'f which we must suppose it jto have objectively. And I that compound relations o*>f Sequence as we conceive them, cannot be quantitatively/ like the connexions beyond consciousness to which, thsy refer, is proved by -the fact that they vary in their apparent;* lengths with the structure of the organism, with its size, with its age, with its constitutional state, with the number amd vividness of the impressions it receives, and with, their relative positions in consciousness.
THE RELATIVITY OP RELATIONS. 219 Manifestly, as no one of tliese variously-estimated lengths can be taken as valid rather tlian the others, it becomes impossible to suppose equalitj between an interval of time as present to consciousness and any nexus of tilings which it symbolizes.
§ 92. Deeper than the compound relations of Coexistence and Sequence, is the compound relation of DifEeBgpe; since,, besides being involved in the comparisons of spaces and of times, this is involved in comparisons of the Forces manifested in Space and Time. We may fitly limit ourselves to illustrations taken from this last class of cases.
As into a conception of two things co-existing at an assignable distance apart, there enters the consciousness of many or few co-existing positions between them; and as into the conception of two changes separated by an assignable interval of time, there enters the consciousness of many or few intervening sequent positions; so into the conception of two forces that have an assignable inequality, there enters the consciousness of many or few degrees of difference;" and the conceived amount of difference is determined by the number of these degrees. What we have here to observe is, that our conceptions of^jimounts, of difference, so constituted, Have relativities analogous to those which exist in our conceptions of amounts of spaces' and amounts of times.
That the compound relation of Difference varies qualitatively according to the structure of the species, we have no distinct evidence. But since a cornpound relation of Difference has to be conceived in terms of impressions that differ; and since the conception df Difference cannot be dissociated from the order of impressions in which it is presented, if there is but one such order; it may be inferred thai;, in proportion as the impressions become more multitudinous in their kinds, the conception of Difference becomes more independent of particular differences; and that, therefore, in higher creatures it is not qualitatively the same as in lower; creatures.
That quantitative! variations in the conception accompany specific uniikenessesi of structure, becomes manifest when it is remembered that ja difference in forces does or does not give rise to a difference in feelings, according as the organization is or is (not highly recipient. Inmdent forces that seem alike to a Slowly-endowed creature, seeni conspicuously unlike to a creature endowed with the sense-organs required ibr aj^r^cijating ihem. Where eyes are so little developed that approaching objects are recognized only as intercepting the sunshine, it is obvious that contrasts of light and shade which seem marked to animals with developed eyes, are cpuite imperceptible. Similarly among; highly- endowed animals of diverse kinds. Between odours both of which producfB in a man no impression whatever, a dog perceives differences |of strength, probably of many degrees. Even the structural lunlikenesses of individuals entail such results. A.goo.d ealr detects several gradations between tones which to a bad fear seem alike.
The bulk^ of the prjfeanism is also a.factor in m^di^ing quantitatively th^^rell'ition of Difference. The manifestations of force betweeifi which a creature can perceive unlikenesses, are limited'?? at the one extreme by its ability to bear them and at th® other extreme by its capacity for being sensibly affected! by them; and its size partly determines these limits. A. grain and half-a-grain are hardly distinguishable by theirl pressures on the finger; but if sucanimal not more than a grain in livisible into many degrees would between them. Conversely, a man trast in weight between a ton and o put forth a force sufficient to lift cely be questioned that in the conprt, now loaded with one and now |s produced would have an unlikenes^ cessively borne by an j weight, a difference doubtless be perceptiblq cannot perceive the coi] half-a-ton, for he fails either; but it can scarj sciousness of an elepl with the other, the feeling THE RELATIVITY OF RELATIONS. ^1 that might be graduated. Objective differences, all equal in degree, are thus manifestly appreciable by any creature only within a range that is really very narrow. Moreover, it is demonstrable that towards either extremity of this range, the conceptions of Difference become quantitatively more and more vague; and no.^ere^ throughout the range can there be maintained a parallelism between the contrasts of inner feelings and the contrasts of outer forces to which they refer. l?or when a mass ispoised in the hand, certain muscles,^re strained to the degree required to support the mass plus the arm. If the weight of the mass is small, the weight- of tiie arm becomes the larger part of the force to be antagonized; while if the mass is large, the weight of the aritf becomes the smaller part. Clearly, then, the effort put fort*1 for the support of the arm being a constant element in tBe compared states of consciousness, must modify the seeming difference between weights to a different extent according as t]ie absolute amounts of the weights are increased dr decreased.
How variations of constitutional ^tate; whether determined by disorder or by age, also cap56 quantitative variations in the relations of Difference as 'conceived by us, need not be shown in detail. It is obvious from wliat kas beea said that all exaltations and depress^0313 of energy and of sensibility, must alter the range wi^n which differences are appreciable, and must modify thel appreciations of them: more especially towards each extremp °* the range.
We conclude,, then, that the cpmp ound relation of Difference as we know it, is ^dependent o on.constitutional state. The same have no subjective difference -answ< forces between which it exists Are either excessive or defective in amount. Within the lif i structure, OIL size, and Dbjective difference may Ting to itj because the of appreciation, the same objective difference may seem (great or small according to the percipient's nature and temporary condition. And as we cannot fix on any one of thesj^ relations in consciousf ^ ness, rather than any other, as like the reality beyond consciousness, we inus't infer that there is no likeness between any one of them ancl the reality beyond consciousness.
§ 93. But now 'what are we to say about the pure relations of Co-exis^tence, of Sequence, and of Difference; considered apart from amounts of Space, of Time, and of Contrast? Can we^ say that the relation of Co-existence^ conceived simply as >( implying two terms that exist at the same time, but are ^not specified in their relative positions, has anything ans wearing to it beyond consciousness? Can we say that out of fpurselves there is such a thing as Succession, corresponding to the conception we have of one thing coming after a^nother, without reference to the time between them? Ai^d can. we say that what we know as Difference, apart fr£>m any particular degree of it, has objective unlikeness &s its cause?
The reply is that yipe cannot frame ideas of Co-existence, of Sequence, and of Difference, without there entering into them ideas of cjuantit-y.. Though we have examined apart the compound relations of these orders, into which consciousness of quantity avowedly enters; and though, in above defining the sample relations of these orders, the avowed contemplation! of quantity is excluded; yet, on looking closely into thtp matter, we find that a tacit recog-!nition of quantity is always present. Co-existence cannot be I thought "of without iome amount of space. Sequence i cannot^ be thought oi? without some interval of time. ; Difference ^ cannot.be tl nought of without some degree of ^| contrast. Hence what l^ias been said above respecting these relations in their definitely Tcompound forms, applies to them under those form|% which, by a__fiction, we regard^as simple. AH the proofed of relativity that held where the conceived quantities w0re large, hold however small the conceived quantities became. And as the conceived quantities cannot disappear!* from consciousness without the THE RELATIVITY OF RELATIONS 223 relations themselves disapp earing., it follows inevitably that the relativities hold of the relations, themselves in their ultimate elements. We are thus forced to the conclusion that the relations of Co-existence, of Sequence, and of Difference, as we know them, do not obtain beyond consciousness., Let us simplify the matter by reducing derivative relations to the fundamental relation; £.,nd we shall, then see more clearly the truth of this apparently -incredible proposition.. * Every particular relation of Co-existence involves a cognition of some difference in thepositionsgof the things co-existing; resolvable, ultimately, into differences of relative position towards self. And differences ^f relative position can be known only through differences between the states of consciousness accompanying the disclosure of the positions. But while positions in Space, and co-existing objects occupying them, are known through relations; of Difference between the feelings accompanying disclosure of them;. they are known through relations of Likenf ss, in respect of their order of presentation. The relation! of JJo^existence, which? is that out of which all Space-conceptions are built, is one in which neither term is first or (last: the terms exhibit; equality in their order — no difference in their order.
Phenomena occurring in "succession, like those occurring simultaneously, are known as occuptfing different positions in consciousness. Intervals between jthem are distinguished by differences in the feelings that aris^ in passing over the intervals; and where the intervals are alifce, they are so classed from the absence of such differences. ' But while the relations among phenomena in Time are; known as such or such through conceptions of Difference £ncl E"o-difference yielded by comparisons of them, they are! known as alike in this, that their terms are unequal in or4er of presentation — differ. in their order, Thus all Space-relations and l^me-relations— all relations 224 THE rSpUCTIONS OP PSYCHGLO&Y.
of Co-existence and Sequence,, are known through, relations.of Difference and No 4 difference. Sequence is Difference of; order; Co-existence iss No-difference of order. Hence we ^have at last to deal Jwith the relations of Difference and No-difference. And our entire consciousness being built up of feelings which {present these relations, both in themselves and in the secondary feelings constituting consciousness of their order,, tlie whole question of the relativity of relations among feelings is reducible to the question of the relativity of the relatjion of Difference. This is readily demonstrable. f The sole elements, a|nd the indissoluble elements, of the relation are these: — A. feeling of some kind; a feeling coniirg next to it, \ which, being distinguishable as another feeling, provesfs itself to be not homogeneous with the first; a feeling of "shock., more or less decided, accompanying the transition:1. This shock, which arises from the difference of the two feelings., becomes the measure of that difference — constitutes fby its occurrence the consciousness \of a relation of difference, and by its degree the consciousness of the amount of "^difference. That is, the relation of Difference as present!in consciousness is nothing mo_re, ithan a change in consciousness. How, then, can it fresemble, or be in anj- way akin to, its source beyond ^consciousness? Here * are two colours which, we call "V -unlike. As they exist" objectively, the two colours are quite independent — there* is nothing between them, answering to the change which f, results in us from, contemplating first one and then the cither. Apart from our consciousness they are not linked fas are the two feelings they produce in us. Their relation as we think it, being nothing else than a change of ouif- state, cannot possibly be parallel to anything between then\_, when they liave both remained unchanged. ": 'i § 94. It is proper to po^nt out that all these conclusions, THE RELATIVITY OF RELATIONS. 225 down to the last of them, are in harn&ony with those which may be directly deduced from the dat& supplied by Physiology to Psychology. j Each feeling being the concomitant of some molecular change in a portion of vesicular nei^ye -matter; and each relation being1 the concomitant of so'me wave of molecular transformation propagated along a ierve-iibre, or fibres, from one portion of vesicular nervetmatter to another; it results, in the first place, that the \ various relations as we know them are composed of elements essentially alike; and it results., in the second place, that not being intrinsically different in their ultimate natures, they cannot resemble intrinsically-different objective connexions.
Indeed^ it needs but to think for &n instant of a brain as a seat of nervous discharges, intermediate between actions in the outer world and actions in the world of thought, to be impressed with the absurdity of supposing thai; the connexions among outer actions, after being transferred through the medium of nervous discharges, caia re-appear in the world of thought in the forms they originally had.
§ 95. But here let us not omit toj recognize the assumption made throughout, and ine^iaply made in all reasoning used to prove the relativity cbf relations, that there: exist beyond consciousness, conditions of objective _inani- • festation which are symbolized^ by;jrela,tiop.s as we conceive '••• them. I: The very proposition that what we know as a relation! is qualitatively and quantitatively! determined by our own] nature, and does not resamble any order or nexus beyondi consciousness, implies that there exists some such order or nexus beyond consciousness; and levery step in every argu-i ment by which this proposition is established, distinctly posits this order or nexus, and cannot be taken on any other condition. Further, the argument assumes, andjs obliged...to assume, fundamental; differences,_of objective order which are symbolized by fundamental differences of subjective order.
For to say that w;hat we know as a relation between positions in Space, canjnot be like any objective nexus, since this relation of positions as conceived by us varies indefinitely, is to say thai] there exists an objective nexus which has not varied. Two- verdicts of consciousness respecting a given magnitude are found to be unlike under unlike conditions of perception; whence it is inferred that neither of them is like the magnitude. But the inference is nonsense if by this magnitude is meant something in consciousness, instead of something beyond consciousness. As it was before shown in the case of feelings, so it might here be shown in the case of relations Between feelings, the reasoning used becomes both false in |ts premises and meaningless in its conclusion. /Of course, changing the terms, the like holds with periods1 of Time. Every argument proving that our conceptions of Time are relative, falls to pieces on 1 withdrawing the assumption that there exists some form of ' Things from which Timje, as a form of Thought, is derived.
The assumption of ail objective source for the subjective relation of Difference, ijs implied in the last two assumptions. If, as shown above, aljl special cognitions of spaces and times involve cognition^ of differences • and if, as shown above, Space in general], which is resolvable into relations of Co-existence, and Tim«p in general, which is resolvable into relations of Sequence, sire separable from one another as being respectively constituted, the last by difference of order, and the first by nofdifference of order; it is clear that the^postulation of 'objectives _ sources of these subjective forms, implies postulation~"6f a|n objective source of Difference.^ And this postulation of V a objective source of Difference, equally implied in all ^tle arguments which prove the relativity of the conceptual of Difference, has for its^ulti^ •j mate^arrant the deepest assignable wammt— the Persistence |ofJForce. Though the relation of Difference, constituted, as THE RELATIVITY OF RELATIONS. 227 I.