we have seen, by a change in consciousness, ca.Lnot be; identified with anything beyond consciousness; yet that there is something beyond consciousness to which it is due, is an inevitable conclusion; since to | think otherwise is to, think of change taking place without ah. antecedent.
More certain, then, than the Relativity of Relations as we conceive them, is the existence oi* Non-relative Forms to which they refer; since proof of ^he first involves perpetual assumption of the last. There is some ontologica-H order whence arises the phenomenal order we know as! Space; there is some ontological order whence arises the? phenomenal order we know as Time; and there is some' ontological nexus whence arises the phenomenal relation, we • know as Difference. v i CHAPTER Y.
THE EEV^ABILITY OF FEELINGS.
§ 96. As was poiniBd out in the second chapter of this part, Feelings almit of a double ciassification. On grounds of structure "hey are divisible into the centrallyinitiated and" the peripherally-initiated; which last are re-divisible into those which are peripherally initiated by external actions and t'^ose which are peripherally initiated by internal actions. And on grounds of function they are divisible by a line crossing these transversely, into those primary or vivid feelings produced by direct excitations, and those secondary <?r faint feelings produced by indirect excitations. The one c?lass, known as sensations, are sometimes called presentative feelings; and the other class, known as ideas (though, this word is more commonly applied to clusters of t!?iein), are sometimes called re-presentative feelings. ^ Thus far little regard «has keen paid to this grouping of feelings which has in vie^vv not difference of kind but difference of degree. Thousfh throughout the last two chapters, we have tacitly recoo-nizejd the distinction — though, in dealing with the relativities of* feelings and of relations, we have been obliged to take foi— granted an established connexion between the vivid feelings or sensations directly presented, and the faint feelings or i:deas in which they arc represented; yefc no definite statement3^ have been made respecting the i THE EEVIVABILITY OP FILLINGS. 229 dependence of the second class on th|e first. Here we have to inquire how, when vivid forms of '.feelings have been experienced^ it happens that faint forais of feelings like them afterwards arise. We have to inquiry what determines this revivability — what conditions they?.&re which render the revivals more or less distinct.* \ Since feelings are rarely,, or indeed], never, revived singly — since the things we remember aife, as the word implies,, put together out of feelings standinjg in certain relations; it results that in the illustrations to >t>e given we shall have to deal more with clusters of revived feelings than with individual revived feelings. But wh|at is alleged of the first always holds of the last. * § 97. Speaking generally, feelingte are revivable in proportion as they are relational. Th|e peripherally-initiated feelings of external origin are more rjepresentable than those of internal origin; and both of thjese can be represented with greater facility than the ceiitrg ,lly-initiated feelings.
The most highly relational feelings are the visual; and these are of all feelings the moist easily reproduced in thought. The redness of a soldiers coat, the blue of the sky, the whiteness of the snow-cpovered ground, can be revived in consciousness at any njionient with scarcely an effort, and with relatively-great clearness. The glare of an electric light may be so vividly | conceived as to produce something like a sense of dazzling. Ideal feelings of sound arise before the rpind with a facility and a strengtE almost as great. The report of a cannon, the * I here use the word revivability rather than the word recoverability, because it has less objectionable implicatioins. To recover anything involves a voluntary act; and to call a thing recoverable, is to say that it is some-.,, thing which can be re-obtained by a voluntary act. But ajjreat part of our if ideal feelings arise without volition, arid of ten^in spite of volition. Ther word revivable applies equally well to th^j ideal feelings which are voluntary and those which are involuntary. \ 230 THE IOT; OF PSYCHOLOGY.
blast of a trumpet, a, S™^> or a Mss> ma7 be imagined instantly and very distf inc%- Sensations of touch and pressure, if less ret Presentable, are representable readily and with considerable | clearness. The softness and hardness, the smoothness and. roughness, of different surfaces, have tolerably distf *ct ideal forms that recur with ficilitv Thi3 ^ess relational feelings externally initiated— those of tasl.^ and smell—are neither so easily nor so strongly reproduced! A colour or sound may be remembered in an instant; W-^ a specified flavour or odour is not so quickly recalled, an*1 the ideal feeling does not approach in vividness so nearly t?e° *ke real feeling.
We pass to the periipheraUy-initiated feelings of internal origin A particular m muscular effort canno.t be represented as quickly or as •cleaapy as a particular sound or colour; and though an intense| pain suffered in a limb may be recalled with considerable distinctness, it is observable that the ideal pain does no| t approach so nearly to the real pain as does a remembered ^ scream to the consciousness of an actual scream, or as doe^ the thought of a flash of lightning to the perception of a flasftt of lightning. When we come to those peripherally-initiated feelings to which ordinary states of the viscera- give rise, we find the degree of revivability very smalf.1- It is difficult to call into consciousness the feeling of ^feSBK?!- To think of the circumstances along with which^ hunger occurs is easy; but after a hearty meal it is next to jimpossible to represent any degree of that craving for fooci^ which existed before the meal. Similarly with thirst. I Of the centrally-initiate^ feelings or emotions, the like is true in a qualified sense J. As before 'pointed out, there is not between actual anc1! ideal emotions the same sharp division as between actual and ideal feelings of other kinds. Emotions are excited, no^\ by physical agencies themselves. relations among them. Hence, only complex relations are ideal THE EEVIVABILITY OF PEELINGS. 231 emotions aroused. When so aroused, however, they may rise to any degree of vividness,, until they become actual emotions. But the fact which we ha^e here to note as conforming to the principle enunciated., is that an emotion cannot be at once revived in the same way that a feeling of light or sound can. It is impossible to bring instantly into consciousness the passion of anger, or that of joy, in however faint a form. Representation of either can be achieved, only by imagining, and dwelling upon, some circumstances calculated to produce it; and this takes an appreciable; time.
§ 98. The revivability of past feelings varies inversely as the vividness of present feelings. This antagonism holds to a certain degree between past and present feelings in general; but it holds to a much greater degree between past and present feelings belonging to the same order.
Take first the general antagonism. Every one knows that when a tremendous sound or &n astounding spectacle absorbs the attention, it is next t£> impossible to think of anything else — nest to impossible to entertain irrelevant ideas. Indeed, consciousness soraeiines becomes so entirely filled with the present overpowering impressions as to extrade our habitual ideas: producing what we call absence of mind. Less extreme illustrations are furnished by the interruptions to currents of voluntary thought that result from violent pains or loud noises-* And that the shutting out of primary feelings facilitates* the revival of secondary feelings, is also implied by the co-mmon habit of closing the eyes when trying to imagine anything very clearly.
The more special antagonisms &re of considerable interest. We saw" in a previous chapter1 that primary feelings of any order, while they have much power of excluding from consciousness primary feelings ctf the same order, have less power of excluding from consciousness primary feelings of other orders. Here we have? to note, what may.be re- 232 THE INL,DUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
garded as a corollary, greater obstacles to . that primary feelings of any order are secondary feelings of that order than they are to secondai ' impressions of great d resistance to the imagi a melody. The ;y feelings of other orders. Visual tistinctness offer a scarcely-appreciable nation of sounds — say those forming •il in thought of a person recognized yesterday, is but little I -interfered with by the flavours of the things we are eating, i' ^°r do tie sensations received from, objects held in the hanl-ds, hinder us much from thinking of things we have seen, oy* listened to, or tasted, or smelt. Butm the sounds we are heading tend very decidedly to keep out of consciousness other D* sounds of which we wish to think. Visual sensations stanjd considerably in the way of visual ideas. And there are j! still more conspicuous antagonisms between the primary jfeelings and the secondary feelings of lower orders. ^ The different degree^ of these antagonisms are, indeed, worthy of notice: sineje they admit of being generalized, and are not without sig;*nincance. The law appears to be that among the most relational feelings, the primary of any order resist the secondary of the same order to the least extent; and that the resistance becomes more decided in proportion as we descend to feelings that are less and less relational. $• Beginning with the most relational feelings, it "Ks observable that only by a very intense visual serjsation are the ideas of other visual sensations entirely excluded. Thus it is impossible while staring* at the pun to think of green; but it is quite possible, or even e.;asy, while looking at a surface coloured red, to think of a| patch of green covering part of its area; and we can, with Considerable distinctness, imagine the clustered colours fonnin- g the remembrance of any object, while the retina is receiving^ the clustered colours yielded by actual objects quite differer.it from it. Of auditory impressions the like may be) said. Loud sounds prevent us from bringing the ideas of < -ther sounds into consciousness; THE EEVIVABILITY OF FEELINGS. 238 but they must be extremely loud tc<> d0 this. And when listening to an orchestra, it will be foi^md that while., during the forte passages, it is difficult to imagine some other musical combination than that which is being? heard, it is comparatively easy during the piano passage^. Much the same holds among feelings of touch.? The sensations yielded by an object held loosely, do not prevent us from remembering the sensations yielded by other quite* different objects; and it is needful to grasp an actual object: very strongly, so that the sensations of touch, or rather off pressure, verge into those of pain, before remembered taictual feelings are quite extruded. When we come to siUch comparatively-unrelational feelings as the gustatory andi olfactory, we find this antagonism far more marked. While tasting something decidedly bitter, sweetness cannot "^e thought of: indeed, tastes of even moderate intensity ^trnost prevent us from imagining other tastes. And this: antagonism reaches its extreme among the visceral feeli ags, where, indeed, iii appears to be absolute. / § 99. Other things being equjal, the revivability of a feeling varies with its strength; \ and other things being equal, its revivability varies with thle number of times it has been repeated in experience. Thef triteness of these truths must not prevent us from here briefly noticing them.
The glow of a gorgeous sunset! continues to be recallable long after faintly coloured scenes of the same date have been forgotten. The sound of /a trumpet may be more quickly and clearly imagined thaii that of a bassoon. It is easier to remember the taste of Something that is intensely sour or sweet or bitter than the "feast e of something that is almost insipid. And a very severe pain leaves a trace in memory which, lasts long after-- the traces left by slight aches and discomforts have disappeared.
How repetitions even of fa "tit feelings produce great revivability of them, we see OR comparing our domestic THE OF PSYCHOLOGY.
experiences with, less tlie paper in a frequc be very distinctly rec heard daily, may be t than the tone of a voi -common experiences. The colour of tinted room, subdued though it is, can Called. The tone of a voice which is thought of much more easily and truly 3e, not more marked in character, that has been heard but on:£® or But the other things are usually not equa 3 which we have supposed to be equal, 1. Besides the psychological state which, as we have seei < ^ influences the revivability, there is the physiological state ways. These we must § 100. The degree o part on the extent to was capable of undei evolving much of the c excitation was received which also influences it in several i-now consider.
F revivability of a feeling depends in which the nervous centre concerned 'tigoing much molecular change, and Concomitant feeling, when the original ?<g Several factors co-operate to determine its capability. A! them. An active circu the materials required e complete state of repair is one of lation is another. A blood rich in /or both disintegration and integra- ^respective shares of these factors tion is a third. The cannot be determined; But the influences of 1 identified. *1 When the attention 1 lias been long occupied with any the three usually vary together. at "leastj> may be Prett7 clearly class of impressions — • that is to say, the nervous class 01 impressions — wi •••IJULC-U-J u-u.au *.& w ousjj v±±^ XAV/J.YV/IAO centres concerned have ^been worn by persistent action, the impressions received' I cannot be recalled as clearly as those received when thes p nervous centres were unworn. Excluding cases in which; Abnormal excitement of the local circulation has been produ.. 'ced (cases to be dealt with under the next head), it is a fan^liar fact that after many hours spent in listening to music g, or in looking at pictures, the clustered sensations, auditory or visual, are either not revivable at all, or are les^, distinctly revivable than those which came first in the coi <cert or the picture gallery. If THE BEVIVABILITY OF FE^/j^GS. 235 we take longer periods of continued activity, broken though they are by short periods of rest,, a likie fact meets us. The experience of every tourist supplies fan instance. His first grand mountain-views he can call to n^ind more clearly than the equally-grand views he had aflfer being among the mountains for a month. « That feelings excited when the gen $ral circulation is very vigorous are more revivable than usu'al, is a truth that may be variously exemplified. Evidence jis furnished by both temporary and permanent exaltations of the circulation. Impressions of trivial things in which no particular interest was taken, often sttrvive in memory when impressions of much more importa?;at or imposing things fade away; and, on considering the) circumstances, it will frequently be found that such imppessions were received when the energies were hipJ^-wheM exercise,, or pleasure, or both, had greatly raised the actior|. of the heart. That at times when strong emotion has excised the circulation to an exceptional degree, the clustered surrounding objects are revivable wi sensations yielded by th great clearness, often throughout life, is a fact noticed py writers of fiction as a trait of human nature. >As with these quicker variations of vascular activity, so with the slower variations. The receptivity of impressions is hi^h during those portions ' of life in which the blood is prcipelled in full and rapid j currents. Feelings, peripheral oif_ central, experienced in! youth, are long remembered; ^nd while the vigour^ of manhood continues, the sensaticins and emotions leave lasting traces. j Equally, or more, obvious is thje converse truth, that the revivability of feelings excited duning a stjatjg^of^ feebleness is comparatively small. The effects of depressed circulation, whether produced by disorder or by age, alike show this. The lowered action of the heart which accompanies great nervous prostration, has for one of its eficcls a marked decrease of receptivity. Things seen and 2J-J5 THE DICTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY, •i said and heard are forgotten very quickly — often in a few days. Even the lowered vital activity which we know as great fatigue, is charac:^1^6^ by a diminished retentiveness of impressions. ^ When we pass to that flagging of the circulation wh*ci- accompanies the decline of life, abundant evidence nieets us. Gradually as the vigour decreases there conie^ ai1 increasing failure of memory.
:The experiences of a month ago, or of last week, or of yesterday, are not revp-^able: and in the closing stages of decay things that were Booked at and sounds that were heard but a few minutes ago,',are found to have left no traces.
* There is reason to think tnat, independently of the general circulation, exaltations \and depressions of the cerebral circulation, whether normally or abnormally produced, also affect the degree of revivabilitjj of the feelings experienced.
*» § 101. All the circu^ns^aT3ces under which an excitation originally occurred being supposed the same, the degree of revivability of the feeling tnat was produced, varies with the physiological conditions tiiat exist when the revival takes place or is attempted. ", Other things equal, a given past feeling may be broughtv ™-io consciousness vividly, faintly, or not at all, according a| tne nervous centre concerned is or is not well repaired ana ^11 supplied with blood at the moment the remembran06 ls suggested. The evidence assignable in proof of th!-S proposition is mostly entangled with that assigned in propf of t]ie last '* bnt a sufficiency of it may be disentangled.
In that state of high 'spirits which results from good nutrition and raised circu1^0^ it is observable that the memories are more distini^ t]ian ^^- Ideas rise nP in abundance without effort.' Similarly, the vascular excitement caused by emotion, providing it does not reach that extreme pitch at which i* prostrates the heart, causes a rush of unusually vivid ideas— ideas so vivid tliat ihey are sometimes, as under great fear> mistaken for realities.
TEE BEYIVABILITY OF FipLTNGS.
How decreased revivability of feel fogs originally strong, goes along with, enfeebled circulation, is exemplified in those exhausted by long illnesses. l Highly nervous subjects, too, in whom the action of the h^eart is greatly lowered* habitually complain of loss of memory and inability to think — symptoms which diminish as fast,Jas the natural rate of circulation is regained. Itl is, however, in old age that the relation between failure of circulation and decreased revivability of feelings which were efficiently impressed, is most familiar. The power to recall experiences received during adult and declining life, when! the vital energies were flagging, is the first to disappear; aikd presently experiences received during early life, when the \ital energies were high, cease to be distinctly revivable.
It may be well to add that variat] ions of local circulation, as well as of general circulation, affe ct the ability to revive exemplify the extreme The illusions of delirium vividness to which revived feelings \ feelings.
bral circulation is excessive; and caused by cerebral anaemia exempl § 102. Of course quality as we] he loss of consciousness ies the converse result.
as quantity of blood Js a factor, modifying alike* the stre ngth with whiclh an impression is retamecf and the faci recalled. The influence of this fa| in producing some of the effects al 3ove ascribed to variations of circulation; for quality of bloc along with the vigour of its pro] tions, however, show us that qua] When the circulation has be> stimulants, there is an easy andj may rise when the cerety with which it can be bor has doubtless a share generally rises and falls ulsion. Abnormal deviaity has its separate effects, artificially exalted by rapid current of thoughts, sMwSig itself in what we describe as unusual brilliancy. And when the exaltation is proiluced Sy certain drags, as. opium and hashish, the revived Impressions of things seen and heard, approach in vividness-: to the original impressions. We have another class of examples in insane people.
THE INDt ACTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
\ That in them there has atrisen some abnormal quality of blood, is now a generally-received opinion; and to this abnormal quality is ascribed that jjjundue vividness of the representative feelings which causes a;| confusion of them with presentative feelings. i These extreme cases* warranb us in supposing that there are minor variations in^ the revivability of feelings, accompanying those minor raj Rations in the quality of the blood which are caused by ^differences in the activities of the viscera and differences ^ the supplies of food and oxygen.
§ 103. The correspoi p.dence of these several a posteriori a P giori conclusions derivable from the conclusions with the data of Psychology, mus The fact that feelings of the same order more is to be expected if i ct be noticed, of any order tend to exclude ideas than they do- ideas of other orders, particular bundles of nerve-fibres and groups of aerve-ve.|sicjes are, the agents of particular orders of feelings; for, i%ailifestly, when the structures concerned are undergoing th|ose molecular changes which have vivid feelings for their cot ^relatives, other molecular changes, which have faint feeling fol r ^^ correlatives, must be greatly obscured. Moreover, we | mav see w^j $£s exclusion Ts more stringentamongthe nnrela^ ional orders of feelings than among ings; since, in proportion as an the relational orders of fee order of feelings is relation, centre, and in proportic complex, it becomes eas;y pied in one way while an another way.
That strong environing al, it must have a complex nervous L as a nervous centre becomes for one part of it to be occupther part of it is occupied in actions generate feelings which are more distinctly revivab e tlia.n ttose generated by weak environing actions, is also a ^ fact inferable from physiological premises. For as strong e^-^Qj^g actions produce strong nervous discharges and g:^eat amounts of those central molecular changes of which| feelings are the correlatives, it i- THE EEVIVABILITY OP FEELINGS. 239 is obvious that they must produce in high, degrees those structural changes, whatever they niay be, to which the revivability of the feelings is due.,-' Similarly, it follows that those exaltations of vital activity which facilitate such structural changes, and aid the rapid nutrition which perpetually prepared the parts for them, must conduce to the revivability of tlie feelings experienced 5 while depression of the energies must do the reverse.
rt CHAPTER "VI.
THE BEVIVAB1LITY 0?' RELATIONS BETWEEN FEELINGS, § 104. Much that wis said in the last chapter in illustra* tion of the propositions Jt sets forth, serves to illustrate the parallel propositions to ^e set forth in this chapter. Mind being composed of feeling3 and relations between feelings, and everv mental act in\V^nS "both kinds of components, it happens that, in exemplifying the revivability of feelings as modified by various concfctions> tliere ^as beeri exemplified.also the revivability of re]|ati°ns between feelings.
Nevertheless, there remiam to be enunciated truths which in the last chapter were bi°-t tacitly implied, and other truths that were not even remote^ indicated, ^or though revival of a feeling involves revive ^ of tne relations in which it was originally experienced; aiM though revival of a cluster of feelings, constituting an o|dinaiT idea> involves revival of a whole plexus of relations if- ^hich the feelings stood to one another; there is not invMved ^ tne recognition of these facts, the further fact that Delations may be in great measure parted from the related feeing3 an(3- revived by themselves. Since quite different pair^ of impressions may stand to one another in the same rel^tion of co-existence; and since a sequence may hold together impressions now of this order and now of that; and sinc^ ^Differences the same in degree may be presented here by 'impressions of one species and here by impressions of anotlier; ^ results that relations of THE KEVIFABILITY OF DELATIONS. 241 Co -existence, of Sequence, and of Difference, come to "be separable from particular pairs of impressions,, and acquire a ^wasi-independence. Their independence never becomes complete; for a relation cannot be conceived without two related terms. But being common to terms of all orders, they come to be conceived apart from terms of any particular order — can have their terms changed in consciousness without being themselves changed; and thus gain a kind of revivability so far independent of any particular terms,, as to have an illusive appearance of being independent of all terms.
What we have here to do, then, is to consider the revivability of relations as dissociated little or much from related feelings. Though the several forms of thought under which our feelings are presented and re-presented cannot exist without some contents, yet their contents may be in great part extruded; and we have to observe how these comparatively empty forms comport themselves in respect of their revivabilities, as influenced by psychological and physiological conditions.
§ 105. Eelations in general are more revivable than feelings in general. Whether it be a compound relation of Coexistence, or a compound relation of Sequence, or a compound relation of Difference, we shall find that the relation is more distinctly representable, and more enduring in memory, than are its terms.
Naturally, this truth is the least conspicuous among the most relational feelings, since these being highly revivable, there is a comparatively small margin for difference between their revivability and that of the relations between them. Still the difference may even here be perceived. If we recall a room frequented in childhood, the relative positions of the door, the windows, the fireplace, arise in consciousness instantly: we may or may not think of some of the colours, but if we do, it is by a subsequent £ 242 THE INDUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY act. Similarly with the tactually-disclosed coexistent impressions which we remember as a knife-handle. The combination of these constituting the conception of its shape, recurs more readily in thought than does the particular intensity of any one of the pressures,, or than does the particular feeling of coldness.
With relations of sequence as exhibited among the auditory feelings,, this contrast is more decided. To begin an air in the right key, most persons find very difficult: without the help of an instrument, the first note is often wrong by a third or even a fifth. But the duration of the first note is more nearly remembered. Though the time at which the air is taken may differ somewhat from the time as originally heard, it does not differ so much as the pitch. It is further observable, as showing the same thing, that while the rhythm of a melody may be repeated in thought with great exactness, we cannot delight ourselves by recalling with the same exactness the rich timbre of the tones in which we heard the melody rendered.
When we descend to the least relational feelings, the greater revivability of relations than of their terms becomes very manifest. We remember for a long time with accuracy the spot in which an acute pain was felt, though the pain itself is not representable with anything like its original acuteness; and if the pain was a throbbing one, we can recall its intervals with approximate correctness. So, too, is it with the central feelings. The succession of certain strong emotions passed through yesterday, is easier to recall than the emotions themselves. It is the same with the relation of each emotion to its antecedents. The circumstances under which we were angry may be reproduced in consciousness instantly; but the anger itself cannot be reproduced instantly.
It is worth considering whether the possibility of extended and complex thinking does not in part depend on this greater revivability of relations than of their terms.
THE KEVIVAlilUTY OF RELATIONS.
We "habitually pass in thought from concept to concept, brienv recognizing the essentials of eacli — the essential relations of its elements to one another and to other tilings. If the feelings between which all these relations exist arose in consciousness with as much promptness and vividness, consciousness would be so encumbered with materials that involved processes of reasoning would be greatly impeded, if not prevented.
§ 103. As different orders of feelings are more or less relational, so, too, in a sense, different orders of relations are more or less relational. For just as some kinds of feelings are more capable of entering into relations with one another than other kinds are, so some kinds of relations are more capable of entering into relations with one another than other kinds are. Understanding the expression in this sense, we may say that the most relational of relations are those of Co-existence. Co-existences may be trebly compounded, and are, indeed, trebly compounded in most acts of thought: impressions are presented and represented in those triple relations of position involved in the conception of place. Sequences are much less relational; for they can enter into relation with one another not in three directions at once, but only in one direction. Successive intervals of time stand related to one another as greater, or less, or equal; and in the beats and bars of music, these relations of equality and difference in portions of time are themselves compounded into other relations — relations, however, which are essentially serial. The least relational of relations are the primary ones — those of Difference; for though these enter into relations with one another whenever we contemplate two differences as equal, or more or less unequal, in degree, yet (unless it be in the higher divisions of Mathematics) they do not enter into relations more compound than these.
This description of the several classes of relations as more or less relational, is introductory to the fact here to tM4 THE INDUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
hp set down, that just as the most relational of feelings are the most revivable, so, too, are the most relational of relations the most revivable. Relations of Co-existence, whether we take any particular plexus of them constituting the perception of a form, or whether we take the &u-oTeolatfi of them constituting the consciousness of Space, Lnve a revivability far exceeding that of all other relations. We think of distances, of directions, of sizes, of shapes, of arrangements among objects, with little or no effort and with great clearness; and these variously- compounded relations we conceive as frameworks which we can imagine to be occupied by other objects, or to be unoccupied. The revivability of relations of Co-existence is, indeed, so extreme that they cannot be wholly suppressed — an assemblage of them greater or less in extent, partly occupied and partly unoccupied, forms an inextinguishable element of consciousness.
Relations of Sequence, less relational than those of Coexistence, are less revivable. Though it is true that, as organized into the abstract conception of Time, relations of Sequence can no more be wholly excluded from consciousness than those of Co-existence, yet, as thus abstracted, they do not form so dominant an element of consciousness: the integrated aggregate of space-relations habitually present in thought, is much larger and much clearer than the integrated aggregate of time-relations. It is observable, too, that particular space-relations are more clearly and correctly representable than particular time-relations. We can mark out with greater accuracy the length of an inch or of a foot, than we can assign the length of an interval as being one minute or as being ten minutes.
Simple relations of Difference (those between feelings) are neither so readily nor so accurately revivable as relations of Difference between co-existences or between sequences, nor as the relations of Co-existence and Sequence themselves. We can better remember the proportion between TII"3 CEVIVAlJlLITY OF DELATIONS. -rJ two lengths which we observed simultaneously, and can more truly reproduce in thought the ratio between the rhythms of movements in a machine, than we can recall the degree of contrast between two lights we saw or two weights we lifted; and where the differences are between the unre-Jational feelings, as tastes, and smells, and visceral sensations, we can recall them but vaguely.
§ 107. As presented feelings hinder the representation of other feelings,?.o do presented relations hinder the representation of other relations; but they do this in a smaller degree. It is with relations, too, as with feelings, that the antagonism of the presented to the represented is more manifest between those of the same order than between those of different orders. Omitting superfluous illustrations, we will note a few distinctive traits only.