Hamilton and denied the validity of Mr. Bentham's. The month after, the question was taken up by Professor Jevons, who, differing entirely from Professor Baynes, gave reasons for assigning the credit of the discovery to Mr. Bentham. Considering that Professor Baynes, both as pupil of Sir W. Hamilton and as expositor of his developed logical system, is obviously liable to be biassed in his favour, and that, contrariwise, Professor Jevons is not by his antecedents committed on behalf of either claimant, it may I think, be held that, leaving out other reasons, his opinion is the most trustworthy. Other reasons jus tify this estimate. The assumption that Sir W. Hamilton, when he reviewed Mr. Bentham's work, did not read as far as the page on which the discovery in question is indicated, though admissible as a defence, cannot be regarded as a very satisfactory ground for a coun ter-claim. That in Mr. Bentham's work the doctrine is but briefly in dicated, whereas by Sir W. Hamilton it was elaborately developed, is an objection sufficiently met by pointing out that Mr. Bentham's work is an " Outline of a New System of Logic; " and that in it he has said enough to show that if, instead of being led into another career, he had become a professional logician, the outline would have been ade quately filled in. While these notes are still standing in type, Prof. Baynes has published (in the Contemporary Review for July, 1873) a rejoinder to Prof. Jevons. One who reads it critically may, I think, find in it more evidence against, than in favour of, the conclu sion drawn. Prof. Baynes' partiality will be clearly seen on compar ing the way in which he interprets Sir W. Hamilton's acts, with the way in which he interprets Mr. Bentham's acts. He thinks it quite a proper supposition that Sir W. Hamilton did not read the part of Mr. Bentham's work containing the doctrine in question. Meanwhile, he dwells much on the fact that during Sir W. Hamilton's life Mr. Bentham never made any claim; saying — "The indifference it displays is incredible had Mr. Bentham really felt himself entitled to the honour publicly given to another:" the implication being that Mr. Bentham was of necessity cognizant of the controversy. Thus it is reasonable to suppose that Sir W. Hamilton read only part of a work he reviewed on his own special topic; but " incredible " that Mr. Ben tham should not have read certain letters in the Athenceum /—the fact being that, as I have learnt from Mr. Bentham, he knew nothing about the matter till his attention was called to it. Clearly, such a way of estimating probabilities is not conducive to a fair judgment. Prof.
Baynes' unfairness of judgment is, I think, sufficiently shown by one of his own sentences, in which he says of Mr. Bentham that, " while he constantly practises the quantification of the predicate, he never appears to have realized it as a principle." To an unconcerned ob server, it seems a strong assumption that one who not only " con stantly practises" the method, but who even warns the student against errors caused by neglect of it, should have no consciousness of the " principle " involved. And I am not alone in thinking this a strong assumption: the remark was made to me by a distinguished mathe matician who was reading Prof. Baynes' rejoinder. But the weakness of Prof. Baynes' rejoinder is best shown by its inconsistency. Prof. Baynes contends that Sir W. Hamilton " had been acquainted with the occasional use of a quantified predicate by writers on logic " earlier than Mr. Bentham; and Prof. Baynes speaks of Mr. Bentham as hav ing done no more than many before him. But he also says of Sir W.
Hamilton that, " had he at the time, therefore, looked into Mr. Ben tham's eighth and ninth chapters, the mere use of a quantified predi cate would have been no novelty to him, although, as I have said, it might have helped to stimulate his speculations on the subject." So that though Mr. Bentham did not carry the doctrine further than previous logicians had done, yet what he wrote about it was calculated "to stimulate" "speculations on the subject" in a way that they had not been stimulated by the writings of previous logicians. That is, Prof. Baynes admits in one part of his argument what he denies in another. One further point only will I name. Prof. Baynes says: — " Professor De Morgan's emphatic rejection of Mr. Bentham's claim, after examining the relevant chapters of his 'Outline,' is in striking contrast to Mr. Herbert Spencer's easy-going acceptance of it." Now though, to many readers, this will seem a telling comparison, yet to those who know that Prof. De Morgan was one of the parties to the controversy, and had his own claims to establish, the comparison will not seem so telling. To me, however, and to many who have remarked the perversity of Prof. De Morgan's judgment, his verdict on the mat ter, even were he perfectly unconcerned, will go for but little. Who ever will take the trouble to refer to the Athenaeum for November 5, 1804, p. GOO, and after reading a sentence which he there quotes, will look at either the title of the chapter it is taken from or the sentence which succeeds it, will be amazed that such recklessness of misrepre sentation could be shown by a conscientious man; and will be there after but little inclined to abide by Prof. De Morgan's authority on matters like that here in question.]
15 These words are translated for me from Die Entwicklung der Naturwissenschaft in den letzen Junfundzwanzig Jahren. By Profes sor Dr. Ferdinand Cohn. Breslau, 1872.
16 1 am told that his reasons for this valuation are more fully given " Revue des Deux JUondes, 1 Fevrier, 1873, p. 731.
19 Histoire des Sciences et des Savants, &c.
20 Before leaving the question of Academies and their influences, let me call attention to a fact which makes me doubt whether as a judge of style, considered simply as correct or incorrect, an Academy is to be trusted. Mr. Arnold, insisting on propriety of expression, and giving instances of bad taste among our writers, due, as he thinks, to absence of Academic control, tacitly asserts that an Academy, if we had one, would condemn the passages he quotes as deserving condem nation, and, by implication, would approve the passages he quotes as worthy of approval. Let us see to what Mr. Arnold awards his praise. He says: — " To illustrate what I mean by an example. Addison, writing as a moral ist on fixedness in religious faith, says: — '" Those who delight in reading books of controversy do very seldom ar rive at a fixed and settled habit of faith. The doubt which was laid revives again, and shows itself in new difficulties; and that generally for this reason, — because the mind, which is perpetually tossed in controversies and disputes, is apt to forget the reasons which had once set it at rest, and to bo disquieted with any former perplexity when it appears in a new shape, or is started by a different hand.'
" It may be said, that is classical English, perfect in lucidity, measure, and propriety. I make no objection; but in my turn, 1 say that the idea expressed is perfectly trite and barren," &c., &c.
In Mr. Arnold's estimate of Addison's thought I coincide entirely; but I cannot join him in applauding the " classical English " convey ing the thought. Indeed, I am not a little astonished that one whose taste in style is proved by his own writing to be so good, and who to his poems especially gives a sculpturesque finish, should have quoted, not simply without condemnation but with tacit eulogy, a passage full of faults. Let us examine it critically, part by part. How shall we interpret into thought the words " arrive at a...habit "? A habit is produced. But " arrival " implies, not production of a thing, but coming up to a thing that pre-exists, as at the end of a journey. What, again, shall we say of the phrase, " a fixed and settled habit"? Habit is a course of action characterized by constancy, as distinguished from courses of action that are inconstant. If the word "settled" were unobjectionable, we might define habit as a settled course of action; and on substituting for the word this equivalent, the phrase would read " a fixed and settled settled course of action." Obviously the word habit itself conveys the whole notion; and if there needs a word to indicate degree, it should be a word suggesting force, not suggesting rest. The reader is to be impressed with the strength of a tendency in something active, not with the firmness of something passive, as by the words " fixed and settled." And then why " fixed and settled"? Making no objection to the words as having inappli cable meanings, there is the objection that one of them would suffice: surely whatever is fixed must be settled. Passing to the next sentence, we are arrested by a conspicuous fault in its first clause — " The doubt which was laid revives again." To revive is to live again; so that the literal meaning of the clause is " the doubt which was laid lives again again." In the following line there is nothing objection able; but at the end of it we come to another pleonasm. The words run:— "and that generally for this reason,— because the mind..." The idea is fully conveyed by the words, " and that generally because the mind." The words " for this reason " are equivalent to an ad ditional "because." So that we have here another nonsensical dupli cation. Going a little further there rises the question — Why "contro versies and disputes "? ' Dispute ' is given in dictionaries as one of the synonyms of ' controversy '; and though it may be rightly held to have not quite the same meaning, any additional meaning it has does not aid, but rather hinders, the thought of the reader. Though, where special attention is to be drawn to a certain element of the thought, two almost synonymous words may fitly be used to make the reader dwell longer on that element, yet where his attention is to be drawn to another element of the thought (as here to the effect of controversy on the mind), there is no gain, but a loss, in stopping him to interpret a second word if the first suffices. One more fault remains.
The mind is said " to be disquieted with any former perplexity when it appears in a new shape, or is started by a different hand." This portion of the sentence is doubly defective. The two metaphors are incongruous. Appearing in a shape, as a ghost might be supposed to do, conveys one kind of idea; and started by a hand, as a horse or a hound might be, conveys a conflicting kind of idea. This defect, however, is less serious than the other; namely, the unfitness of the second metaphor for giving a concrete form to the abstract idea. How is it possible to ' start ' a perplexity I ' Perplexity,' by deriva tion and as commonly used, involves the thought of entanglement and arrest of motion; while to 'start' a thing is to set it in motion. So that whereas the mind is to be represented as enmeshed, and thus impeded in its movements, the metaphor used to describe its state is one suggesting the freedom and rapid motion of that which enmeshes it.
Even were these hyper-criticisms, it might be said that they are rightly to be made on a passage which is considered a model of style. But they are not hyper-criticisms. To show that the defects indicated are grave, it only needs to read one of the sentences without its tautologies, thus: — " The doubt which was laid revives, and shows it self in new difficulties; and that generally because the mind which is perpetually tossed in controversies is apt to forget the reasons which had once set it at rest " &c. &c. Omitting the six superfluous words unquestionably makes the sentence clearer— adds to its force without taking from its meaning. Nor would removal of the other excres cences, and substitution of appropriate words for those which are unfit, fail similarly to improve the rest of the passage.
And now is it not strange that two sentences which Mr. Arnold admits to be "classical English, perfect in lucidity, measure, and propriety," should contain so many defects: some of them, indeed, deserving a stronger word of disapproval f It is true that analysis discloses occasional errors in the sentences of nearly all writers— some due to inadvertence, some to confusion of thought. Doubtless, from my own books examples could be taken; and I should think it unfair to blame any one for now and then tripping. But in a passage of which the diction seems " perfect " to one who would like to have style refined by authoritative criticism, we may expect entire con formity to the laws of correct expression: and may not unnaturally be surprised to find so many deviations from those laws. Pos sibly, indeed, it will be alleged that the faults are not in Addison's English, but that I lack the needful aesthetic perception. Having, when young, effectually resisted that classical culture which Mr. Arnold thinks needful, I may be blind to the beauties he perceives; and my undisciplined taste may lead me to condemn as defects what are, in fact, perfections. Knowing absolutely nothing of the master pieces of ancient literature in the original, and very little in trans lation, I suppose I must infer that a familiarity with them equal to Mr. Arnold's familiarity, would have given me a capacity for admiring these traits of style which he admires. Perhaps redundance of epithets would have afforded me pleasure; perhaps I should have been delighted by duplications of meaning; perhaps from inconsistent metaphors I might have received some now-unimaginable gratifica tion. Being, however, without any guidance save that yielded by Mental Science— having been led by analysis of thought to conclude that in writing, words must be so chosen and arranged as to convey ideas with the greatest ease, precision, and vividness; and having drawn the corollaries that superfluous words should be struck out, that words which have associations at variance with the propositions to be set forth should be avoided, and that there should be used no misleading figures of speech; I have acquired a dislike to modes of expression like these Mr. Arnold regards as perfect in their propriety.
Almost converted though I have been by his eloquent advocacy of Culture, as he understands it, 1 must confess that, now I see what he applauds, my growing faith receives a rude check. While recogniz ing my unregenerate state, and while admitting that I have only Psychology and Logic to help me, I am perverse enough to rejoice that we have not had an Academy; since, judging from the evidence Mr. Arnold affords, it would, among other mischievous acts, have further raised the estimate of a style which even now is unduly praised.
21 Culture and Anarchy, p. 16.
NOTE TO CHAPTER X.
1 Shortly after the first publication of this chapter, I met with a kindred instance. At a Co-operative Congress: — " Mr. Head (of the firm of Fox, Head, & Co., Middlesbrough) * * * remarked that he had thrown his whole soul daring the last six years into the carrying out of the principle involved in the Industrial Partnership at Middles brough with which he was connected. In that Industrial Partner ship there was at present no arrangement for the workmen to invest their savings. A clause to give that opportunity to the workmen was at first put into the articles of agreement, but, as there was only one instance during three years of a workman under the firm apply ing to invest his savings, that clause was withdrawn. The firm consequently came to the conclusion that this part of their scheme was far ahead of the time." — Times, April 15, 1873.
NOTES TO CHAPTER XI.
I Fronde, Short Studies on Great Subjects, Second Series, 1871, Daily papers, Feb. 7, 1873.
Times and Post, Feb. 11, 1873.
Craik, in Pid. Hist., vol. iv., p. 853.
0 When, in dealing with the vitiation of evidence, I before re ferred to the legislation here named, I commented on the ready acceptance of those one-sided statements made to justify such legis lation, in contrast with the contempt for those multitudinous proofs that gross abuses would inevitably result from the arrangements made. Since that passage was written, there has been a startling justification of it. A murder has been committed at Lille by a gang of sham-detectives (one being a government employe); and the trial has brought out the fact that for the last three years the people of Lille have been subject to an organized terrorism which has grown out of the system of prostitute-inspection. Though, during these three years, five hundred women are said by one of these criminals to have fallen into their clutches — though the men have been black mailed and the women outraged to this immense extent, yet the practice went on for the reason (obvious enough, one would have thought, to need no proof by illustration) that those aggrieved pre ferred to submit rather than endanger their characters by complain ing; and the practice would doubtless have gone on still but for the murder of one of the victims. To some this case will carry convic tion: probably not, however, to those who, in pursuance of what they are pleased to call " practical legislation," prefer an induction based on a Blue Book to an induction based on Universal History.
II See case in Times, Dec. 11, 1872.
NOTES TO CHAPTER XII.
Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia, vol. ii. p. 370.
Lubbock's Prehistoric Times. Second edition, p. 442. Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia, vol. ii. p. 11. Five Years' Residence at Nepaul. By Capt. Thomas Smith.
NOTES TO CHAPTER XIV.
1 Probably most readers will conclude that in this, and in the preceding section, I am simply carrying out the views of Mr. Darwin in their applications to the human race. Under the circumstances, perhaps, I shall be excused for pointing out that the same beliefs, otherwise expressed, are contained in Chapters XXV. and XXVIII. of Social Statics, published in December, 1850; and that they are set forth still more definitely in the Westminster Review for April, 1852 (pp. 498—500). As Mr. Darwin himself points out. others be fore him have recognized the action of that process he has called " Natural Selection," but have failed to see its full significance and its various effects. Thus in the Review-article just named, I have contended that " this inevitable redundancy of numbers— this con stant increase of people beyond the means of subsistence," necessitates the continual carrying-off of " those in whom the power of self-pres ervation is the least; " that all being subject to the " increasing difficulty of getting a living which excess of fertility entails," there is an average advance under the pressure, since " only those who do advance under it eventually survive; " and that these. " must be the select of their generation." There is, however, in the essay from which 1 here quote, no recognition of what Mr. Darwin calls " spon taneous variation," nor of that divergence of type which this natural selective process is shown by him to produce.
2 And even then there are often ruinous delays. A barrister tells me that in a case in which he was himself the referee, they had but six meetings in two years.
NOTES TO CHAPTER XV.
1 " The Statistics of Legislation," read before the Statistical So ciety, May, 1873, by Frederick H. Janson, Esq., F.L.S., vice-president of the Incorporated Law Society.
J Among recent illustrations of the truth that frequent repetition of Christian doctrines does not conduce to growth of Christian feel ings, here are two that seem worth preserving. The first I quote from The Church Herald for May 14, 1873.
" Mr. J. Stuart Mill, who has just gone to his account, would have been a remarkable writer of English, if his innate self-consciousness and abounding self-confidence had not made him a notorious literary prig. ***** His death is no loss to anybody, for he was a rank but amiable infidel, and a most dangerous person. The sooner those ' lights of thought,' who agree with him, go to the same place, the better it will be for both Church and State."
The second, which to an English manifestation of sentiment yields a parallel from America, I am permitted to publish by a friend to whom it was lately addressed: — " (From a Clergyman of 28 years' service.)
" J. TYNDALL, — How it ought to ' heap coals of fire on your head,' that, in return for your insults to their Religion, in your various works, the American people treated you with distinguished considera tion. You have repeatedly raised your puny arm against God and His Christ! You have endeavoured to deprive mankind of its only consolation in life, and its only hope in death (vide ' Fragments of Science,' &c.), without offering anything instead, but the ' dry-light ' of your molecules and atoms. Shall we praise you for this? We praise you not!
" ' Do not T hate them, 0 Lord, that hate Thee?'
" Every suicide in our land (and they are of daily occurrence) is indirectly the effect of the bestial doctrines of yourself, Darwin, Spen cer, Huxley, et id omne genus.
" ' The pit is digged up for you all?'
" ' Woe unto you that laugh now, for ye shall mourn and lament.' " With the supremest contempt, I remain, 3 To show how little operative on conduct is mere teaching, let me add a striking fact that has fallen under my own observation. Some twelve years ago was commenced a serial publication, grave and un interesting to most, and necessarily limited in its circulation to the well-educated. It was issued to subscribers, from each of whom a small sum was due for every four numbers. As was to be expected, the notification, periodically made, that another subscription was due, received from some prompt attention; from others an attention more or less tardy; and from others no attention at all. The defaulters, from time to time reminded by new notices, fell, many of them, two subscriptions in arrear; but after receiving from the publishers letters intimating the fact, some of these rectified what was simply a result of forgetfulness: leaving, however, a number who still went on receiv ing the serial without paying for it. When these were three subscrip tions in arrear, further letters from the publishers, drawing their attention to the facts, were sent to them, bringing from some the amounts due, but leaving a remainder who continued to disregard the claim. Eventually these received from the publishers intimations that their names would be struck off for non-payment; and such of them as continued insensible were at length omitted from the list. After a lapse of ten years, a digest was made of the original list, to ascertain the ratio between the number of defaulters and the total number; and to ascertain, also, the ratios borne by their numbers to the numbers of their respective classes. Those who had thus finally declined paying for what they had year after year received, constituted the following percentages: — Subscribers of unknown status...27 per cent.
Physicians 29 „ Clergymen (mostly of the Established Church). 31 „ Secularists 32 „ Journalists 82 „ Admitting that the high percentage among the journalists may have been due to the habit of receiving gratis copies of books, we have to note, first of all, the surprising fact that nearly one-third of these highly educated men were thus regardless of an equitable claim. Further, on comparing the subdivisions, we discover that the class undistinguished by titles of any kind, and therefore including, as we must suppose, those whose education, though good, was not the high est, furnished the smallest percentage of defaulters: so far as the evi dence goes, it associates increase of intellectual culture with decrease of conscientiousness. And then one more thing to be noted is the absence of that beneficial effect expected from repetition of moral pre cepts: the Clergy and the Secularists are nearly on a level. So that, both in general and in detail, this evidence, like the evidence given in the text, is wholly at variance with the belief that addressing the in tellect develops the higher sentiments.
4 Even after the reform of the Poor-Law, this punishment for good behaviour was continued. Illustrations will be found in the beforementioned Tracts on the Poor-Laws, by a late uncle of mine— illustra tions that came under his personal observation as clergyman and as guardian.
5 The comparisons ordinarily made between the minds of men and women are faulty in many ways, of which these are the chief: — Instead of comparing either the average of women with the aver age of men, or the elite of women with the elite of men, the common course is to compare the elite of women with the average of men. Much the same erroneous impression results as would result if the relative statures of men and women were judged by putting very tall women side by side with ordinary men.
Sundry manifestations of nature in men and women, are greatly perverted by existing social conventions upheld by both. There are feelings which, under our predatory regime, with its adapted standard of propriety, it is not considered manly to show; but which, contrari wise, are considered admirable in women. Hence repressed manifesta tions in the one case, and exaggerated manifestations in the other; leading to mistaken estimates.
The sexual sentiment comes into play to modify the behaviour of men and women to one another. Respecting certain parts of their general characters, the only evidence which can be trusted is that fur nished by the conduct of men to men, and of women to women, when placed in relations which exclude the personal affections.
In comparing the intellectual powers of men and women, no proper distinction is made between receptive faculty and originative faculty. The two are scarcely commensurable; and the receptivity may, and frequently does, exist in high degree where there is but a low degree of originality, or entire absence of it.
Perhaps, however, the most serious error usually made in drawing these comparisons is that of overlooking the limit of normal mental power. Either sex under special stimulations is capable of manifest ing 'powers ordinarily shown only by the other; but we are not to consider the deviations so caused as affording proper measures. Thus, to take an extreme case, the mammas of men will, under special excita tion, yield milk: there are various cases of gynaecomasty on record, and in famines infants whose mothers have died have been thus saved. But this ability to yield milk, which, when exercised, must be at the cost of masculine strength, we do not count among masculine attri butes. Similarly, under special discipline, the feminine intellect will yield products higher than the intellects of most men can yield. But we are not to count this productivity as truly feminine if it entails decreased fulfilment of the maternal functions. Only that mental energy is normally feminine which can coexist with the 'production and nursing of the due number of healthy children. Obviously a power of mind which, if general among the women of a society, would entail/lisappearance of the society, is a power not to be included in an estimate of the feminine nature as a social factor.
6 Of course it is to be understood that in this, and in the succeed ing statements, reference is made to men and women of the same society, in the same age. If women of a more-evolved race are com pared with men of a less-evolved race, the statement will not be true.
1 As the validity of this group of inferences depends on the occur rence of that partial limitation of heredity of sex here assumed, it may be said that.I should furnish proof of its occurrence. Were the place fit, this might be done. I might detail evidence that has been collected showing the much greater liability there is for a parent to bequeath malformations and diseases to children of the same sex, than to those of the opposite sex. I might cite the multitudinous instances of sexual distinctions, as of plumage in birds and colouring in insects, and especially those marvellous ones of dimorphism and polymorphism among females of certain species of Lepidoptera, as necessarily imply ing (to those who accept the Hypothesis of Evolution) the predominant transmission of traits to descendants of the same sex. It will suffice, however, to instance, as more especially relevant, the cases of sexual distinctions within the human race itself, which have arisen in some varieties and not in others. That in some varieties the men are bearded and in others not, may be taken as strong evidence of this partial limitation of heredity; and perhaps still stronger evidence is yielded by that peculiarity of feminine form found in some of the negro races, and especially the Hottentots, which does not distinguish to any such extent the women of other races from the men. There is also the fact, to which Agassiz draws attention, that among the South American Indians males and females differ less than they do among the negroes and the higher races; and this reminds us that among European and Eastern nations the men and women differ, both bodily and mentally, not quite in the same ways and to the same degrees, but in somewhat different ways and degrees — a fact which would be inexplicable were there no partial limitation of heredity by sex.