easily apprehend that a donation of this kind, dealing with the property of others, is of no effect. I shall not enter here upon any discussion as to the power of the Pope, that is the Bishop of the Roman Church, nor shall I advance anything but a hypothesis which is accepted by men of the greatest erudition, who lay the greatest stress on the power of the Pope, especially the Spaniards, who with their perspicacity easily see that our Lord Jesus Christ when he said " My kingdom is not of this world " thereby renounced all earthly power,1 and that while He was on earth as a man, He certainly did not have dominion over the whole world, and if He had had such dominion, still by no arguments could such a right be transferred to Peter, or be transmitted to the Roman Church by authority of the ' Vicar of Christ '; indeed, inasmuch as Christ had many things to which the Pope did not succeed,2 it has been boldly affirmed — and I shall use the very words of the writers — that the Pope is neither civil nor temporal Lord of the whole world.3 On the contrary, even if the Pope did have any such power on earth, still he would not be right in using it, because he ought to be satisfied with his own spiritual jurisdiction, and be utterly unable to grant that power to temporal princes. So then, if the Pope has any power at all, he has it, as they say, in the spiritual realm only.4 Therefore he has no authority over infidel nations, for they do not belong to the Church.5 It follows therefore according to the opinions of 1 Luke XII, 14; John XVIII, 36; Victoria, De Indis I, n. 25.
•Vasquius, Controversiae illustres, c. 21; Torquemada II, c. 113; Hugo on Dist. XCVI, C. VI; St Bernard, Admonitory epistle to Pope Eugene III, book 2; Victoria, De Indis I, n. 27; Covarruvias in c. Peccatum § 9, n. 7.
•Matthew XVII, 27; XX, 26; John VI, IS.
• Victoria, De Indis I, n. 28, 30; Covarruvias on I Corinthinas V, at the end; Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 12, a. 2; Ayala, De Jure I, 2, 29 [Best edition of Ayala is in The Classics of International Law, Carnegie Institution of Washington, 2 vol., 1912].
potioris partis tam Theologorum quam Canonistarum,1 non esse idoneum titulum adversus Indos, vel quia Papa dederit provincias illas tamquam dominus absolute, vel quia non recognoscunt dominium Papae; atque adeo ne Saracenos quidem isto titulo umquam spoliates.
'Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 66, a. 8; Silvius, De infidelibus § 7; Innocentius on Decretales Gregorii Papae IX, III, 34, 8 (De voto, c. Quod super his); Victoria, De Indis I, n. 31.
Cajetan and Victoria and the more authoritative of the Theologians and writers on Canon Law,1 that there is no clear title against the East Indians, based either on the ground that the Pope made an absolute grant of those provinces as if he were their sovereign, or on the pretext that the East Indians do not recognize his sovereignty. Indeed, and in truth, it may be affirmed that no such pretext as that was ever invoked to despoil even the Saracens.
'Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 66, a. 8; Silvius, De infldelibus § 7; Innocent on the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX, III, 34, 8; Victoria, De Indis I, n. 31. [Franciscus Silvius, or Sylvius, or du Bois (1581-1649), was a Belgian theologian.]
CAPVT IV Lusitanos in Indos non habere ius dominii titulo belli His igitur sublatis cum manifestum sit, quod et Victoria scribit,1 Hispanos ad terras remotiores illas navigantes nullum ius secum attulisse occupandi eas provincias, unus dumtaxat titulus belli restat, qui et ipse si iustus esset, tamen ad dominium proficere non posset, nisi hire praedae, hoc est post occupationem. Atqui tantum abest ut Lusitani eas res occupaverint, ut cum plerisque gentibus quas Batavi accesserunt, bellum eo tempore nullum haberent. Et sic igitur nullum ius illis quaeri potuit, cum etiam si quas ab Indis pertulissent iniurias, eas longa pace et amicis commerciis remisisse merito censeantur.
Quamquam ne fuit quidem quod bello obtenderent. Nam qui Barbaros bello persequuntur ut Americanos Hispani, duo solent praetexere, quod ab illis commercio arceantur, aut quod doctrinam verae religionis illi nolent agnoscere. Et commercia quidem Lusitani ab Indis impetrarunt,2 ut hac in parte nihil habeant quod querantur.
1 Vasquius, Controversiae illustres, c. 24; Victoria, De Indis II, n. 10.
CHAPTER IV The Portuguese have no right of sovereignty over the East Indies by title of war Since it is clear, (as Victoria also says),1 from the refutation of any claim to title from the Pope's Donation, that the Spaniards when they sailed to those distant lands did not carry with them any right to occupy them as provinces, only one kind of title remains to be considered, namely, that based upon war. But even if this title could be justified, it would not serve to establish sovereignty, except by right of conquest, that is to say, occupation would be a prerequisite. But the Portuguese were as far as possible from occupation of those lands. They were not even at war with most of the peoples whom the Dutch visited. So therefore no legal claim could be established there by the Portuguese, because even if they had suffered wrongs from the East Indians, it might reasonably be considered by the long peace and friendly commercial relations that those injuries had been forgiven.
Indeed there was no pretext at all for going to war. For those who force war upon barbarous peoples, as the Spaniards did upon the aborigines of America, commonly allege one of two pretexts: either that they have been refused the right to trade, or that the barbarians are unwilling to acknowledge the doctrines of the True Faith. But as the Portuguese actually obtained from the East Indians the right to trade,2 they have, on that score at least, no 'Vasquius, Controversiae illustres, c. 24; Victoria, De Indis II, n. 10.
Alter vero obtentus nihilo est iustior, quam ille Graecorum in Barbaros, quo Boethius respexit: 1 An distant quia dissidentque mores, Iniustas acies, et fera bella movent, Alternisque volunt perire telis?
Non est iusta satis saevitiae ratio.
Ista autem et Thomae et Concili Toletani et Gregori et Theologorum, Canonistarum, lurisprudentiumque fere omnium conclusio est: 2 Quantumcumque fides annuntiata sit Barbaris (nam de his qui subditi ante fuerunt Christianis Principibus item de Apostatis alia est quaestio) probabiliter et sufficienter, et si noluerint earn respicere, non tamen licere hac ratione eos bello persequi, et spoliare bonis suis.s Operae pretium est in hanc rem ipsa Caietani verba describere: * ' Quidam ', ait, ' infideles nee de iure nee de facto subsunt secundum temporalem iurisdictionem Principibus Christianis, ut inveniuntur pagani, qui numquam imperio Romano subditi fuerunt, terras habitantes, in quibus Christianum numquam fuit nomen. Horum namque domini, quamvis infideles, legitimi domini sunt, sive regali sive politico regimine gubernantur; nee sunt propter infidelitatem a dominio suorum privati, cum dominium sit 1 De consolatione philosophiae IV, carmen 4, 7-JO.
'Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 10, a. 8; Dist. XLV, C. V (De ludeis), C. Ill (Qui sincera); Innocentius, cf. note 1, page 17; Bartolus on Code I, 11, 1 (De paganis); Covarruvias in c. Peccatum, § 9, 10; Ayala, De Jure I, 2, 28.
1 Matthew X, 23.
* On Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 4, 66, a. 8.
grounds of complaint. Nor is there any better justification for the other pretext than the one alleged by the Greeks against the barbarians, to which Boethius makes the following allusion: " Unjust and cruel wars they wage, And haste with flying darts the death to meet or deal.
No right nor reason can they show; 'Tis but because their lands and laws are not the same." l Moreover the verdict of Thomas Aquinas, of the Council of Toledo, of Gregory, and of nearly all theologians, canonists, and jurists, is as follows:2 However persuasively and sufficiently the True Faith has been preached to the heathen — former subjects of Christian princes or apostates are quite another question — if they are unwilling to heed it, that is not sufficient cause to justify war upon them, or to despoil them of their goods.3 It is worth while on this point to quote the actual words of Cajetan:* 'There are some infidels who are neither in law nor in fact under the temporal jurisdiction of Christian princes; just as there were pagans who were never subjects of the Roman Empire, and yet who inhabit lands where the name of Christ was never heard. Now their rulers, though heathen, are legitimate rulers, whether the people live under a monarchical or a democratic regime. They are not to be deprived of sovereignty, over their pos- 'On the Consolation of Philosophy IV, 4, 7-10 [H. R. James' translation, •Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 10, a. 8; Dist. XLV, C. V, C. Ill; Innocent, see note 1, page 17; Bartolus on Code I, 11, 1; Covarruvias in c. Peccatum, § 9, 10; Ayala, De Jure I, 2, 28.
•Matthew X, 23.
4 On Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 4, 66, a. 8 [Thomas de Cajetan (1469-1534), an Italian cardinal, wrote voluminous commentaries on Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle, and the Bible], ex iure positive, et infidelitas ex divino iure, quod non tollit ius positivum, ut superius in quaestione habitum est. Et de his nullam scio legem quoad temporalia. Contra hos nullus Rex, nullus Imperator, nee Ecclesia Romana potest movere bellum ad occupandas terras eorum, aut subiciendos illos temporaliter; quia nulla subest causa iusta belli, cum lesus Christus Rex Regum, cui data est potestas in caelo et in terra, miserit ad capiendam possessionem mundi, non milites armatae militiae, sed sanctos praedicatores, sicut oves inter lupos. Vnde nee in testamento veteri, ubi armata manu possessio erat capienda, terrae infidelium inductum lego bellum alicui propter hoc quod non erant fideles, sed quia nolebant dare transitum, vel quia eos offenderant, ut Madianitae, vel ut recuperarent sua, divina largitate sibi concessa. Vnde GRAVISSIME PECCAREMVS, si fidem Christi lesu per hanc viam ampliare contenderemus; nee essemus LEGITIMI DOMINI illorum, sed MAGNA LATROCINIA committeremus, et teneremur ad restitutionem, utpote INIVSTI DEBELLATORES AVT OCCVPATORES. Mittendi essent ad hos praedicatores boni viri, qui verbo et exemplo converterent eos ad Deum; et non qui eos opprimant, spolient, scandalizent, subiciant, et duplo gehennae filios faciant, more Pharisaeorum '.
Et in hanc formam audimus saepe a Senatu in Hispania, et Theologis praecipue Dominicanis decretum fuisse, sola verbi praedicatione non bello Americanos ad fidem traducendos; libertatem etiam quae illis eo nomine erepta esset, sessions because of their unbelief, since sovereignty is a matter of positive law, and unbelief is a matter of divine law, which cannot annul positive law, as has been argued above. In fact I know of no law against such unbelievers as regards their temporal possessions. Against them no King, no Emperor, not even the Roman Church, can declare war for the purpose of occupying their lands, or of subjecting them to temporal sway. For there is no just cause for war, since Jesus Christ the King of Kings, to whom all power was given in heaven and on earth, sent out for the conquest of the world not armed soldiers, but holy disciples, " as sheep in the midst of wolves." Nor do I read in the Old Testament, when possession had to be obtained by force of arms, that the Israelites waged war on any heathen land because of the unbelief of its inhabitants; but it was because the heathen refused them the right of innocent passage, or attacked them, as the Midianites did; or it was to recover the possessions which had been bestowed upon them by divine bounty. Wherefore we should be most miserable sinners if we should attempt to extend the religion of Jesus Christ by such means. Nor should we be their lawful rulers, but, on the contrary, we should be committing great robberies, and be compelled to make restitution as unjust conquerors and invaders. There must be sent to them as preachers, good men to convert them to God by their teaching and example; not men who will oppress them, despoil them, subdue and proselytize them, and " make them twofold more the children of hell than themselves," * after the manner of the Pharisees '.
Indeed I have often heard that it has been decreed by the Council of Spain, and by the Churchmen, especially the Dominicans, that the Americans (Aztecs and Indians) should be converted to the Faith by the preaching of the Word alone, and not by war, and even that their liberty of •Matthew XXIII, IS.
restitui debere, quod a Paulo tertio Pontifice, et Carolo V Imperatore Hispaniarum Rege comprobatum dicitur.
Omittimus iam Lusitanos in plerisque partibus religionem nihil promovere, ne operam quidem dare, cum soli lucro invigilent. Immo et illud ibi verum esse, quod de Hispanis in America Hispanus scripsit, non miracula, non signa audiri, non exempla vitae religiosae, quae ad eandem fidem alios possent impellere, sed multa scandala, multa facinora, multas impietates.
Quare cum et possessio et titulus deficiat possessionis, neque res dicionesque Indorum pro talibus haberi debeant quasi nullius ante fuissent, neque cum illorum essent, ab aliis recte acquiri potuerint, sequitur Indorum populos, de quibus nos loquimur, Lusitanorum proprios non esse, sed liberos, et sui iuris; de quo ipsi doctores Hispani non dubitant.1 1 Victoria, De Indis II, 1.
which they had been robbed in the name of religion should be restored. This policy is said to have received the approval of Pope Paul III, and of Emperor Charles V, King of the Spains.
I pass over the fact that the Portuguese in most places do not further the extension of the faith, or indeed, pay any attention to it at all, since they are alive only to the acquisition of wealth. Nay, the very thing that is true of them, is the very thing which has been written of the Spaniards in America by a Spaniard, namely, that nothing is heard of miracles or wonders or examples of devout and religious life such as might convert others to the same faith, but on the other hand no end of scandals, of crimes, of impious deeds.
Wherefore, since both possession and a title of possession are lacking, and since the property and the sovereignty of the East Indies ought not to be considered as if they had previously been res nullius, and since, as they belong^o the East Indians, they could not have been acquired legally by other persons, it follows that the East Indian nations in question are not the chattels of the Portuguese, but are free men and sui juris. This is not denied even by the Spanish jurists themselves.1 1 Victoria, De Indis II, 1.
CAPVT V Mare ad Indos aut ius eo navigandi non esse proprium Limtanorum titulo occupationis Si ergo in populos terrasque et diciones Lusitani ius nullum quaesiverunt, videamus an mare et navigationem, aut mercaturam sui iuris facere potuerint. De mari autem prima sit consideratio, quod cum passim in iure aut nullius, aut commune, aut publicum iuris gentium dicatur, hae voces quid significent ita commodissime explicabitur, si Poetas ab Hesiodo omnes, et Philosophos; et lurisconsultos veteres imitati in tempora distinguamus, ea, quae tempore forte baud longo, certa tamen ratione, et sui natura discreta sunt. Neque nobis vitio verti debet si in iuris a natura procedentis explicatione auctoritate et verbis eorum utimur quos constat naturali iudicio plurimum valuisse.
Sciendum est igitur in primordiis vitae humanae aliud quam nunc est dominium, aliud communionem fuisse.1 Nam dominium nunc proprium quid significat, quod scilicet ita est alicuius ut alterius non sit eodem modo. Commune autem dicimus, cuius proprietas inter 'plures consortio 1 Castrensis on Digest I, 1, 5 (De iustitia et iure, L. Ex hoc iure); Dist. I, C. VII (Ius naturale).
CHAPTER V Neither the Indian Ocean nor the right of navigation thereon belongs to the Portuguese by title of occupation If therefore the Portuguese have acquired no legal right over the nations of the East Indies, and their territory and sovereignty, let us consider whether they have been able to obtain exclusive jurisdiction over the sea and its navigation or over trade. Let us first consider the case of the sea.
Now, in the legal phraseology of the Law of Nations, the sea is called indifferently the property of no one (res nullius), or a common possession (res communis), or public property (res publica). It will be most convenient to explain the signification of these terms if we follow the practice of all the poets since Hesiod, of the philosophers and jurists of the past, and distinguish certain epochs, the divisions of which are marked off perhaps not so much by intervals of time as by obvious logic and essential character. And we ought not to be criticised if in our explanation of a law deriving from nature, we use the authority and definition of those whose natural judgment admittedly is held in the highest esteem.
It is therefore necessary to explain that in the earliest stages of human existence both sovereignty and common possession had meanings other than those which they bear at the present time.1 For nowadays sovereignty means a particular kind of proprietorship, such in fact that it absolutely excludes like possession by any one else. On the other hand, we call a thing ' common ' when its ownership 'Paul de Castro on Digest I, 1,5; Dist. I, C. VII.
quodam aut consensu collata est exclusis aliis. Linguarum paupertas coegit voces easdem in re non eadem usurpare. Et sic ista nostri moris nomina ad ius illud pristinum similitudine quadam et imagine referuntur. Commune igitur tune non aliud fuit quam quod simpliciter proprio opponitur; doininium autem facultas non iniusta utendi re communi, quern usum Scholasticis 1 visum est facti non iuris vocare, quia qui nunc in iure usus vocatur, proprium est quiddam, aut ut illorum more loquar, privative ad alios dicitur.
lure primo Gentium, quod et Naturale interdum dicitur, et quod poetae alibi aetate aurea, alibi Saturni aut lustitiae regno depingunt, nihil proprium fuit; quod Cicero dixit: ' Sunt autem privata nulla natura '. Et Horatius: 2 Nam PROPRIAE telluris ERVM NATVRA neque Mum Nee me nee quemquam statuit.
Neque enim potuit natura dominos distinguere. Hoc igitur significatu res omnes eo tempore communes fuisse dicimus, idem innuentes quod poetae cum primos homines in medium quaesivisse, et lustitiam casto foedere res medias tenuisse dicunt; quod ut clarius explicent, negant ea tempore campos limite partitos, aut commercia fuisse ulla...promiscua rura per agros Praestiterant cunctis COMMFNIA cuncta FIDERI.3 'Vasquius, Controversiae illustres, c. I, n. 10; Lib. VI, V, 12, 3 (De verborum significatione, c. Exiit, qui seminat); Clem. V, 11 (De verborum significatione, c. Exivi de paradiso).
1 Avienus, Aratus 302-303.
V or possession is held by several persons jointly according to a kind of partnership or mutual agreement from which all other persons are excluded. Poverty of language compels the use of the same words for things that are not the same. And so because of a certain similarity and likeness, our modern nomenclature is applied to that state of primitive law. Now, in ancient times, ' common ' meant simply the opposite of ' particular '; and ' sovereignty ' or ' ownership ', meant the privilege of lawfully using common property. This seemed to the Scholastics r to be a use in fact but not in law, because what now in law is called use, is a particular right, or if I may use their phraseology, is, in respect to other persons, a privative right.
In the primitive law of nations, which is sometimes called Natural Law, and which the poets sometimes portray as having existed in a Golden Age, and sometimes in the reign of Saturn or of Justice, there was no particular right. As Cicero says: ' But nothing is by nature private property '. And Horace: 2 ' For nature has decreed to be the master of private soil neither him, nor me, nor anyone else '. For nature knows no sovereigns. Therefore in this sense we say that in those ancient times all things were held in common, meaning what the poets do when they say that primitive men acquired everything in common, and that Justice maintained a community of goods by means of an inviolable compact. And to make this clearer, they say that in those primitive times the fields were not delimited by boundary lines, and that there was no commercial intercourse. Avienus says: 3 ' It seemed that all lands without distinction were common to all '.
The word ' seemed ' is rightly added, owing to the changed meaning of the words, as we have noted above.
Recte additum est ' videri ' propter translationem ut diximus vocabuli. Communio autem ista ad usum ref erebatur: 1...pervium cunctis iter, COMMFNIS FSF.S omnium rerum fuit.
Cuius ratione dominium quoddam erat, sed universale, et indefinitum; Deus enim res omnes non huic aut illi dederat, sed humano generi, atque eo modo plures in solidum eiusdem rei domini esse non prohibebantur; quod si hodierna significatione sumamus dominium, contra omnem est rationem. Hoc enim proprietatem includit, quae tune erat penes neminem. Aptissime autem illud dictum est: 2 omnia rerum Vsurpantis erant, Ad earn vero, quae nunc est, dominiorum distinctionem non impetu quodam, sed paulatim vehtum videtur, initium eius monstrante natura. Cum enim res sint nonnullae, quarum usus in abusu consistit, aut quia conversae in substantiam utentis nullum postea usum admittunt, aut quia utendo fiunt ad usum deteriores, in rebus prioris generis, ut cibo et potu, proprietas statim quaedam ab usu non seiuncta emicuit.3 Hoc enim est proprium esse, ita esse cuiusquam ut et alterius esse non possit; quod deinde ad res posterioris generis, vestes puta, et res mobiles alias aut se moventes ratione quadam productum est.
Quod cum esset, ne res quidem immobiles omnes, agri 1 Seneca, Octavia 413-414.
* Digest VII, 5 (De usu fructu earum rerum, quae usu consumuntur vel nrinuuntur); Extravag. XIV, 3 et 5 (De verborum significatione, c. Ad conditorem, et c. Quia quorundam); Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 78.
But that kind of common possession relates to use, as is seen from a quotation from Seneca: 1 "Every path was free, All things were used in common."
According to his reasoning there was a kind of sovereignty, but it was universal and unlimited. For God had not given all things to this individual or to that, but to the entire human race, and thus a number of persons, as it were en masse, were not debarred from being substantially sovereigns or owners of the same thing, which is quite contradictory to our modern meaning of sovereignty. For it now implies particular or private ownership, a thing which no one then had. Avienus has said very pertinently: 2 ' All things belonged to him who had possession of them '.
It seems certain that the transition to the present distinction of ownerships did not come violently, but gradually, nature herself pointing out the way. For since there are some things, the use of which consists in their being used up, either because having become part of the very substance of the user they can never be used again, or because by use they become less fit for future use, it has become apparent, especially in dealing with the first category, such things as food and drink for example, that a certain kind of ownership is inseparable from use.3 For ' own ' implies that a thing belongs to some one person, in such a way that it cannot belong to any other person. By the process of reasoning this was next extended to things of the second category, such as clothes and movables and some living things.
When that had come about, not even immovables, such, 1Octavia 413-414 [Translation by E. I. Harris (Act II, Scene 1)]. 'Aratus 302.
•Digest VII, 5; Extravagantes of Pope John XXII, XIV, 3 and 5; Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 78.
puta, indivisae manere potuerunt; quamquam enim horum usus non simpliciter in abusu consistat, eorum tamen usus abusus cuiusdam causa comparatus est, ut arva et arbusta cibi causa, pascua etiam vestium; omnium autem usibus promiscue sufficere non possunt. Repertae proprietati lex posita est, quae naturam imitaretur. Sicut enim initio per applicationem corporalem usus ille habebatur, unde proprietatem primum ortam diximus, ita simili applicatione res proprias cuiusque fieri placuit. Haec est quae dicitur occupatio, voce accommodatissima ad eas res quae ante in medio positae fuerant; quo Seneca Tragicus alludit: 1 IN MEDIO est scelus POSITVM OCCVPANTI.
Et Philosophus: 2 ' Equestria OMNIVM equitum Romanorum sunt. In illis tamen locus meus fit PROPRIVS, quern OCCVPAVI '. Hinc Quintilianus dicit,3 quod omnibus nascitur, industriae esse praemium; et Tullius,* factas esse veteri occupatione res eorum qui quondam in vacua venerant.
Occupatio autem haec in his rebus quae possession! renituntur, ut sunt ferae bestiae, perpetua esse debet, in aliis sufficit, corpore coeptam possessionem animo retineri. Occupatio in mobilibus est apprehensio, in immobilibus 'Thyestes 203-204 (F. CXXII).
• De beneficiis VII, 12, 3.
' Ps. Quintilianus, Declamatio XIII (Pro paupere).
•Cicero, De officiis I.
for instance, as fields, could remain unapportioned. For although their use does not consist merely in consumption, nevertheless it is bound up with subsequent consumption, as fields and plants are used to get food, and pastures to get clothing. There is, however, not enough fixed property to satisfy the use of everybody indiscriminately.
When property or ownership was invented, the law of property was established to imitate nature. For as that use began in connection with bodily needs, from which as we have said property first arose, so by a similar connection it was decided that things were the property of individuals. This is called ' occupation ', a word most appropriate to those things which in former times had been held in common. It is this to which Seneca alludes in his tragedy Thyestes, " Crime is between us to be seized by one" 1 And in one of his philosophical writings he also says: 2 ' The equestrian rows of seats belong to all the equites; nevertheless, the seat of which I have taken possession is my own private place '. Further, Quintilian remarks 3 that a thing which is created for all is the reward of industry, and Cicero says 4 that things which have been occupied for a long time become the property of those who originally found them unoccupied.
This occupation or possession, however, in the case of things which resist seizure, like wild animals for example, must be uninterrupted or perpetually maintained, but in the case of other things it is sufficient if after physical possession is once taken the intention to possess is maintained. Possession of movables implies seizure, and possession of '203-204 [E. I. Harris' translation (Act II, Scene 1)].
• Speech XIII, In behalf of the poor man.
4 De officiis I.
instructio aut limitatio; unde Hermogenianus cum dominia distincta dicit, addit, agris terminos positos, aedificia collocata.1 Hie rerum status a poetis indicatur: Turn laqueis captare feras, et fallere visco Inventum.
Turn primum subiere domos.2 COMMVNEMQVE PEIVS, ceu lumina soils et auras Cautus humum longo signavit LIMITE mensor.3 Celebratur post haec; ut Hermogenianus indicat, commercium cuius gratia Fluctibus ignotis insultavere carinae* Eodem autem tempore et respublicae institui coeperunt. Atque ita earum quae a prima communione divulsa erant duo facta sunt genera. Alia enim sunt publica, hoc est, populi propria (quae est genuina istius vocis significatio) alia mere privata, hoc est, singulorum. Occupatio autem publica eodem modo sit, quo privata. Seneca: 5 ' Fines Atheniensium, aut Campanorum vocamus, quos deinde inter se vicini privata terminatione distinguunt '. Gens enim unaquaeque 1 Digest I, 1, S (De iustitia et iure, L. Ex hoc iure).
* Vergil, Georgics I, 139-140 [Turn primum etc. is probably meant to explain, the following lines 140-159], 4 Ovid, Metamorphoses I, 134 (exsultavere, Magnus).
« De beneflciis VII, 4, 3.
immovables either the erection of buildings or some determination of boundaries, such as fencing in. Hence Hermogenianus, in speaking of separate ownerships, adds the boundaries set to the fields and the buildings thereon constructed.1 This state of things is described thus by the poets Vergil and Ovid: " Then toils for beasts, and lime for birds, were found," * Then first men made homes.
" Then landmarks limited to each his right, For all before was common as the light." 3 In still another place, as Hermogenianus points out, Ovid praises commerce, for the sake of which: * ' Ships in triumph sail the unknown seas '.
At the same time, however, states began to be established, and so two categories were made of the things which had been wrested away from early ownership in common. For some things were public, that is, were the property of the people (which is the real meaning of that expression), while other things were private, that is, were the property of individuals. Ownership, however, both public and private, arises in the same way. On this point Seneca says: 5 ' We speak in general of the land of the Athenians or the Campanians. It is the same land which again by means of private boundaries is divided among individual owners '.
3 Ovid, Metamorphoses I, 135-136 [Dryden's translation I (English Poets PARTITA FINES regna constitute, novas Ecctruxit FREES.1 Hoc modo dicit Cicero agrum Arpinatem Arpinatum dici, Tusculanum Tusculanorum: ' similisque est ', inquit, ' privatarum possessionum descriptio. Ex quo quia suum cuiusque fit eorum, quae naturae fuerant COMMVNIA, quod cuique obtigit, id quisque teneat '.2 Contra autem Thucydides3 earn terrain quae in divisione populo nulli obvenit, aopisrov, hoc est, indefinitam, et limitibus nullis circumscriptam vocat.4 Ex his quae hactenus dicta sunt duo intelligi possunt. Prius est, eas res quae occupari non possunt, aut occupatae numquam sunt, nullius proprias esse posse; quia omnis proprietas ab occupatione coeperit. Alterum vero, eas res omnes, quae ita a natura comparatae sunt, ut aliquo utente nihilominus aliis quibusvis ad usum promiscue sufficiant, eius hodieque condicionis esse, et perpetuo esse debere cuius fuerant cum primum a natura proditae sunt. Hoc Cicero voluit: B ' Ac latissime quidem patens hominibus inter omnibus ipsos, inter omnes societas haec est; in qua omnium rerum, quas ad communem hominum usum natura genuit, est servanda communitas '. Sunt autem omnes res huius generis, in quibus sine detrimento alterius alteri commodari potest. Hinc illud esse dicit Cicero: * ' Non prohibere aqua profluente '. Nam aqua profluens qua talis non qua flumen Octavia 431-433.
De officiis I, 21, Duarenus on Digest I, 8 (De divisione rerum).
De officiis I, 61.
De officiis I, 52.