' For each nation ', Seneca says in another place, ' made its territories into separate kingdoms and built new cities V Thus Cicero says: " On this principle the lands of Arpinum are said to belong to the Arpinates, the Tusculan lands to the Tusculans; and similar is the assignment of private property. Therefore, inasmuch as in each case some of those things which by nature had been common property became the property of individuals, each one should retain possession of that which has fallen to his lot." 2 On the other hand Thucydides 3 calls the land which in the division falls to no nation, aoptffro?, that is, undefined, and undetermined by boundaries.* Two conclusions may be drawn from what has thus far been said. The first is, that that which cannot be occupied, or which never has been occupied, cannot be the property of any one, because all property has arisen from occupation. The second is, that all that which has been so constituted by nature that although serving some one person it still suffices for the common use of all other persons, is today and ought in perpetuity to remain in the same condition as when it was first created by nature. This is what Cicero meant when he wrote: " This then is the most comprehensive bond that unites together men as men and all to all; and under it the common right to all things that nature has produced for the common use of man is to be maintained." All things which can be used without loss to any one else come under this category. Hence, says Cicero, comes the well known prohibition: 6 ' Deny no one the water that flows by '. For running water considered as such and not as a Octavia 431-432 [Grotius here takes a slight liberty with the context].
De officiis I, 21 [Walter Miller's (Loeb) translation, page 23].
Duaren [a French humanist (1509-1559)], on Digest I, 8.
De officiis I, 51 [Walter Miller's (Loeb) translation, page 55].
De officiis I, 52.
est, inter communia omnium a lurisconsultis refertur: et a Poeta:1 Quid prohibetis AQFAS? VSVS COMMFNIS aquarum est. Nee solem PROPRIVM NATFRA nee AERA fecit, Nee tenues FNDAS: in PFBLICA munera vent.
Dicit haec non esse natura propria, sicut Vlpianus! natura omnibus patere, turn quia primum a natura prodita sunt, et in nullius adhuc dominium pervenerunt (ut loquitur Neratius 8); turn quia ut Cicero dicit, a natura ad usum communem genita videntur. Publica autem vocat tralatitia significatione, non quae ad populum aliquem, sed quae ad societatem humanam pertinent, quae publica luris gentium in Legibus vocantur, hoc est, communia omnium, propria nullius.
Huius generis est Aer, duplici ratione, turn quia occupari non potest, turn quia usum promiscuum hominibus debet. Et eisdem de causis commune est omnium Maris Elementum, infinitum scilicet ita, ut possideri non queat, et omnium usibus accommodatum: sive navigationem respicimus, sive etiam piscaturam. Cuius autem iuris est mare, eiusdem sunt si qua mare aliis usibus eripiendo sua fecit, ut arenae maris, quarum pars terris continua litus dicitur.* Recte igitur Cicero:6 'quid tarn COMMVNE quam Mare fluc- 1Ovid, Metamorphoses VI, 349-351 (aquis, 349, and ad publica, 351, Merkel). 'Digest VIII, 4, 13 (Communia praediorum, L. Venditor). 1 Digest XLI, 1, 14 (De adquirendo rerum dominio, L. Quod in litore); Comines, Memoirs III, 2; Donellus IV, 2; Digest XLI, 3, 49 (De usucapionibus). •Digest I, 8, 10 (De divisione rerum, L. Aristo). •Cicero, De officiis I, 52.
stream, is classed by the jurists among the things common to all mankind; as is done also by Ovid: * ' Why do you deny me water? Its use is free to all. Nature has made neither sun nor air nor waves private property; they are public gifts '.
He says that these things are not by nature private possession, but that, as Ulpian claims,2 they are by nature things open to the use of all, both because in the first place they were produced by nature, and have never yet come under the sovereignty of any one, as Neratius says; 3 and in the second place because, as Cicero says, they seem to have been created by nature for common use. But the poet uses ' public ', in its usual meaning, not of those things which belong to any one people, but to human society as a whole; that is to say, things which are called ' public ' are, according to the Laws of the law of nations, the common property of all, and the private property of none.
The air belongs to this class of things for two reasons. First, it is not susceptible of occupation; and second its common use is destined for all men. For the same reasons the sea is common to all, because it is so limitless that it cannot become a possession of any one, and because it is adapted for the use of all, whether we consider it from the point of view of navigation or of fisheries. Now, the same right which applies to the sea applies also to the things which the sea has carried away from other uses and made its own, such for example as the sands of the sea, of which the portion adjoining the land is called the coast or shore.* Cicero therefore argues correctly: ° ' What is so common as 1 Metamorphoses VI, 349-351.
• Digest XLI, 1, 14; Comines, Memoirs III, 2; Donellus IV, 2; Digest XLI, 3, 49. [Philippe de Comines (1445-1509), a French historian, and one of the negotiators of the treaty of Senlis (1493).]
tuantibus, LIT VS eiectis '? Etiam Vergilius auram, undam, litus cunctis patere dicit.
Haec igitur sunt ilia quae Roman! vocant communia omnium iure natural! 1 aut quod idem esse diximus, publica iurisgentium, sicut et usum eorum modo communem, modo pubb'cum vocant. Quamquam vero etiam ea nullius esse, quod ad proprietatem attinet, recte dicantur, multum tamen differunt ab his quae nullius sunt, et communi usui attributa non sunt, ut ferae, pisces, aves; nam ista si quis occupet, in ius proprium transire possunt, ilia vero totius humanitatis consensu proprietati in perpetuum excepta sunt propter usum, qui cum sit omnium, non magis omnibus ab uno eripi potest, quam a te mihi quod meum est. Hoc est quod Cicero dicit inter prima esse lustitiae munera, rebus communibus pro communibus uti. Scholastici dicerent esse communia alia affirmative, alia privative. Distinctio haec non modo lurisprudentibus usitata est, sed vulgi etiam confessionem exprimit; unde apud Athenaeum convivator mare commune esse dicit, at pisces capientium fieri. Et in Plautina Rudente servo dicenti,2 ' Mare quidem commune certost omnibus', assentit piscator, addenti autem, ' In mari inventust communi ' recte occurrit: Meum quod rete atque hami nancti sunt, meum potissimumst.
1 Institutes II, 1, 1 et 5 (De rerum divisione, § Et quidem natural!; § Litorum); Digest I, 8, 1, 2, 10 (De rerum divisione); Digest XLI, 1, 14 et SO (De adquirendo rerum dominio, L. Quod in litore, et L. Quamvis); Digest XLVII, 10, 13 (De iniuriis, L. Iniuriarum § si quis me); Digest XLIII, 8, 3 (Ne quid in loco publico, L. Litora) et 4-7.
the sea for those who are being tossed upon it, the shore for those who have been cast thereon '. Vergil also says that the air, the sea, and the shore are open to all men.
These things therefore are what the Romans call ' common ' to all men by natural law,1 or as we have said, ' public ' according to the law of nations; and indeed they call their use sometimes common, sometimes public. Nevertheless, although those things are with reason said to be res nullius, so far as private ownership is concerned, still they differ very much from those things which, though also res nullius, have not been marked out for common use, such for example as wild animals, fish, and birds. For if any one seizes those things and assumes possession of them, they can become objects of private ownership, but the things in the former category by the consensus of opinion of all mankind are forever exempt from such private ownership on account of their susceptibility to universal use; and as they belong to all they cannot be taken away from all by any one person any more than what is mine can be taken away from me by you. And Cicero says that one of the first gifts of Justice is the use of common property for common benefit. The Scholastics would define one of these categories as common in an affirmative, the other in a privative sense. This distinction is not only familiar to jurists, but it also expresses the popular belief. In Athenaeus for instance the host is made to say that the sea is the common property of all, but that fish are the private property of him who catches them.
And in Plautus' Rudens when the slave says: 2 ' The sea is certainly common to all persons ', the fisherman agrees; but when the slave adds: ' Then what is found in the common sea is common property ', he rightly objects, saying: ' But what my net and hooks have taken, is absolutely my own '.
Mare igitur proprium omnino alicuius fieri non potest, quia natura commune hoc esse non permittit, sed iubet, inimo ne litus quidem; 1 nisi quod haec addenda est interpretatio; ut si quid earum rerum per naturam occupari possit, id eatenus occupantis fiat, quatenus ea occupatione usus ille promiscuus non laeditur. Quod merito receptum est; nam cum ita se habet, cessat utraque exceptio per quam evenisse diximus, ne omnia in eius proprium transcriberentur.
Quoniam igitur inaedificatio species est occupationis, in litore licet aedificare, si id fieri potest sine ceterorum incommodo,2 ut Pomponius loquitur, quod ex Scaevola explicabimus, nisi usus publicus, hoc est communis impediretur. Et qui aedificaverit, soli dominus fiet, quia id solum nee ullius proprium, nee ad usum communem necessarium fuit. Est igitur occupantis; sed non diutius quam durat occupatio, quia reluctari mare possessioni videtur, exemplo ferae, quae si in naturalem se libertatem receperit, non ultra captoris est, ita et litus postliminio mari cedit.
Quicquid autem privatum fieri occupando, idem et publicum, hoc est populi proprium posse ostendimus.3 Sic litus Imperi Romani finibus inclusum, populi Romani esse Celsus 1 Donellus IV, 3.
' Digest XXXIX, 2, 24, (De damno infecto, L. Fluminum); other references same as note 1, page 29.
* Donellus IV, 2 et 9; also references in note 1, page 29.
Therefore the sea can in no way become the private property of any one, because nature not only allows but enjoins its common use.1 Neither can the shore become the private property of any one. The following qualification, however, must be made. If any part of these things is by nature susceptible of occupation, it may become the property of the one who occupies it only so far as such occupation does not affect its common use. This qualification is deservedly recognized. For in such a case both conditions vanish through which it might eventuate, as we have said, that all of it would pass into private ownership.
Since therefore, to cite Pomponius, building is one kind of occupation, it is permissible to build upon the shore, if this can be done without inconvenience to other people; 2 that is to say (I here follow Scaevola) if such building can be done without hindrance to public or common use of the shore. And whoever shall have constructed a building under the aforesaid circumstances will become the owner of the ground upon which said building is; because this ground is neither the property of any one else, nor is it necessary to common use. It becomes therefore the property of the occupier, but his ownership lasts no longer than his occupation lasts, inasmuch as the sea seems by nature to resist ownership. For just as a wild animal, if it shall have escaped and thus recovered its natural liberty, is no longer the property of its captor, so also the sea may recover its possession of the shore.
We have now shown that whatever by occupation can become private property can also become public property, that is, the private property of a whole nation.8 And so Celsus considered the shore included within the limits of the Roman Empire to be the property of the Roman people.
1 Donellus IV, 3.
'Digest XXXIX, 2, 24; other references same as note I, page 29.
1 Donellus IV, 2 and 9; also references in note 1, page 29.
existimat; quod si ita est, minime mirandum est, eundem Populum subditis suis occupandi litoris modum per Principem aut Praetorem potuisse concedere. Ceterum et haec occupatio non minus quam privata ita restringenda est, ne ulterius porrigatur, quam ut salvus sit usus lurisgentium. Nemo igitur potest a Populo Romano l ad litus maris accedere prohiberi, et retia siccare, et alia f acere, quae semel omnes homines in perpetuum sibi licere voluerunt.
Maris autem natura hoc differt a h'tore, quod mare nisi exigua sui parte nee inaedificari facile, nee includi potest j et ut posset, hoc ipsum tamen vix contingeret, sine usus promiscui impedimento. Si quid tamen exiguum ita occupari potest, id occupanti conceditur. Hyperbole est igitur 2 Contracta pisces aequora sentiunt lactis in altum molibus.
Nam Celsus iactas in mare pilas eius esse dicit qui iecerit.' Sed id non concedendum si deterior maris usus eo modo futurus sit. Et Vlpianus eum qui molem in mare iacit, ita tuendum dicit si nemo damnum sentiat. Nam si cui haec res nocitura sit, interdictum utique, ' Ne quid in loco publico fiat ' competiturum. Vt et Labeo, si quid tale in mare struatur, interdictum vult competere, ' Ne quid in mari, quo portus, static, iterve navigiis deterius sit, fiat '. * 1 Digest I, 8, 4 (De divisione rerum, L. Nemo igitur); XLIII, 8, 3 (Ne quid in loco publico, L. Litora).
* Horace, Odes III, i, 33-34.
•Digest XLIII, 8, 3 (as in note 1); 8, 2 (eod. tit, L. Praetor, § Adversus).
4 Digest XLIII, 12, 1 (De fluminibus, L. Ait praetor, § Si in mari).
There is not therefore the least reason for surprise that the Roman people through their emperors or praetors was able to grant to its subjects the right of occupying the shore. This public occupation, however, no less than private occupation, was subject to the restriction that it should not infringe on international rights. Therefore the Roman people could not forbid any one from having access to the seashore,1 and from spreading his fishing nets there to dry, and from doing other things which all men long ago decided were always permissible.
The nature of the sea, however, differs from that of the shore, because the sea, except for a very restricted space, can neither easily be built upon, nor inclosed; if the contrary were true yet this could hardly happen without hindrance to the general use. Nevertheless, if any small portion of the sea can be thus occupied, the occupation is recognized. The famous hyperbole of Horace must be quoted here: "The fishes note the narrowing of the waters by piers of rock laid in their depths." 2 Now Celsus holds that piles driven into the sea belong to the man who drove them.3 But such an act is not permissible if the use of the sea be thereby impaired. And Ulpian says that whoever builds a breakwater must see to it that it is not prejudicial to the interests of any one; for if this construction is likely to work an injury to any one, the injunction ' Nothing may be built on public property ' would apply. Labeo, however, holds that in case any such construction should be made in the sea, the following injunction is to be enforced: 'Nothing may be built in the sea whereby the harbor, the roadstead, or the channel be rendered less safe for navigation '.* 'Odes III, i, 33-34 [Bennett's (Loeb) translation, page 171].
'Digest XLIII, 12, 1.
Quae autem navigationis eadem piscatus habenda est ratio, ut communis maneat omnibus. Neque tamen peccabit si quis in maris diverticulo piscandi locum sibi palis circumsepiat, atque ita privatum facial; sicut Lucullus excise apud Neapolim monte ad villam suam maria admisit.1 Et huius generis, puto fuisse piscinas maritimas quarum Varro et Columella meminerunt. Nee Martialis alio spectavit, cum de Formiano Apollinaris loquitur: 2 Si quando NEEEVS sentit Aeoli regnum, Bidet procellas tut a de SVO mensa.
Et Ambrosius: 3 ' Inducis mare intra praedia tua ne desint belluae '. Hinc apparere potest quae mens Pauli fuerit, cum dicit/ si maris proprium ius ad aliquem pertineat, uti possidetis interdictum ei competere. Esse quidem hoc interdictum ad privatas causas comparatum, non autem ad publicas, (in quibus etiam ea comprehenduntur quae iure gentium communi facere possumus) sed hie iam agi de iure fruendo quod ex causa privata contingat, non publica, sive communi. Nam teste Marciano, quicquid occupatum est et occupari potuit,5 id iam non est iurisgentium, sicut est mare. Exempli causa, si quis Lucullum aut Apollinarem in private suo, quatenus diverticulum maris incluserant, piscari prohibuisset, dandum illis inter- 1 Pliny, Naturalis historia IX, 54, 170.
'De Nabuthe, cap. 3.
'Digest XLVII, 10, 14 (De iniuriis, L. Sane si maris).
Now the same principle which applies to navigation applies also to fishing, namely, that it remains free and open to all. Nevertheless there shall be no prejudice if any one shall by fencing off with stakes an inlet of the sea make a fish pond for himself, and so establish a private preserve.
Thus Lucullus once brought the water of the sea to his villa by cutting a tunnel through a mountain near Naples.1 I suspect too that the seawater reservoirs for fish mentioned by Varro and Columella were of this sort. And Martial had the same thing in mind when he says of the Formian villa of Apollinaris: 2 ' Whenever Nereus feels the power of Aeolus, the table safe in its own resources laughs at the gale '. Ambrose also has something to say on the same subject: 8 ' You bring the very sea into your estates that you may not lack for fish '. In the light of all this the meaning of Paulus is clear when he says * that if any one has a private right over the sea, the rule uti possidetis applies. This rule however is applicable only to private suits, and not to public ones, among which are also to be included those suits which can be brought under the common law of nations. But here the question is one which concerns the right of use arising in a private suit, but not in a public or common one. For according to the authority of Marcianus whatever has been occupied and can be occupied s is no longer subject to the law of nations as the sea is. Let us take an example. If any one had prevented Lucullus or Apollinaris from fishing in the private fish ponds which they had made by inclosing a small portion of the sea, according to the opinion of Paulus they would have the right of bringing 'Pliny, Natural History IX, 54, 170.
• See note 1, page 31.
dictum Paulus putavit non solum iniuriarum actionem, ob causam scilicet privatae possessionis.1 Immo in diverticulo maris, sicut in diverticulo flnminis, si locum talem occuparim, ibique piscatus sim, maxima si animum privatim possidendi plurium annorum continuatione testatus fuerim, alterum eodem iure uti prohibebo; ut ex Marciano colligimus, non aliter quam in lacu qui mei dominii est. Quod verum quam diu durat occupatio, quemadmodum in litore antea diximus. Extra diverticulum idem non erit, ne scilicet communis usus impediatur.2 Ante aedes igitur meas aut praetorium ut piscari aliquem prohibeant usurpatum quidem est, sed nullo iure, adeo quidem ut Vlpianus contempta ea usurpatione si quis prohibeatur iniuriarum dicat agi posse.3 Hoc Imperator Leo (cuius Legibus non utimur) contra iuris rationem mutavit, voluitque npoOvpa, hoc est, vestibula maritima eorum esse propria, qui oram habitarent, ibique eos ius piscandi habere; * quod tamen ita procedere voluit, ut septis quibusdam remoratoriis quas tnoxas Graeci vocant, locus ille occuparetur; existimans nimirum non fore ut quis exiguam maris portionem alteri invideret qui ipse toto mari ad piscandum admitteretur. Certe ut quis magnam maris partem, etiam si possit, publicis utilitatibus eripiat, non tolerandae est improbitatis, in quam merito Vir Sanctus invehitur: 5 1 Digest XLIV, 3, 7 (De diversis, L. Si quisquam).
* Digest XLI, 3, 45 (De usucapionibus, L. Praescriptio).
* Digest XLVII, 10, 13 (De iniuriis, L. Iniuriarum, § Si quis me). 4 Novella Leonis, 102, 103, 104; cf. Cuiacium XIV, 1.
an injunction, not merely an action for damages based on private ownership.1 Indeed, if I shall have staked off such an inclosure in an inlet of the sea, just as in a branch of a river, and have fished there, especially if by doing so continuously for many years I shall have given proof of my intention to establish private ownership, I shall certainly prevent any one else from enjoying the same rights. I gather from Marcianus that this case is identical with that of the ownership of a lake, and it is true however long occupation lasts, as we have said above about the shore. But outside of an inlet this will not hold, for then the common use of the sea might be hindered.2 Therefore if any one is prevented from fishing in front of my town house or country seat, it is a usurpation, but an illegal one, although Ulpian, who rather makes light of this usurpation, does say that if any one is so prevented he can bring an action for damages.' The Emperor Leo, whose laws we do not use, contrary to the intent of the law, changed this, and declared that the entrances, or vestibules as it were, to the sea, were the private property of those who inhabited the shore, and that they had the right of fishing there.4 However he attached this condition, that the place should be occupied by certain jetty or pile constructions, such as the Greeks call firoxal, thinking doubtless that no one who was himself allowed to fish anywhere in the sea would grudge any one else a small portion of it. To be sure it would be an intolerable outrage for any one to snatch away, even if he could do so, from public use a large area of the sea; an act which is justly reprehended by the Holy Man,5 who says: ' The lords of the earth claim for 4 XoveU of Leo, 109, 103, 104; See also Cujas XIV, 1.
• Hexameron V, 10, 27 [St Ambrose (c. 333-397), Bishop of Milan, is meant].
' SPATIA MARTS sibi vindicant IVRE MANCIPII, pisciumque iura sicut vernaculorum conditione sibi servitii subiecta commemorant. Iste, inquit, SINVS maris meus est; ille alterius. Dividunt elementa sibi potentes '.
Est igitur Mare in numero earum return quae in commercio non sunt,1 hoc est, quae proprii iuris fieri non possunt. Vnde sequitur si proprie loquamur, nullam Maris partem in territorio populi alicuius posse censeri. Quod ipsum Placentinus sensisse videtur, cum dixit: Mare ita esse commune, ut in nullius dominio sit nisi solius Dei; et loannes Faber, cum mare asserit relictum in suo iure, et esse primaevo, quo omnia erant communia.2 Alioquin nihil different quae sunt omnium communia ab his quae publica proprie dicuntur, ut mare a flumine. Flumen populus occupare potuit, ut inclusum finibus suis, mare non potuit.
Territoria autem sunt ex occupationibus populorum, ut privata dominia ex occupationibus singulorum. Vidit hoc Celsus, qui clare satis distinguit inter litora,3 quae Populus Romanus occupare potuit, ita tamen ut usui communi non noceretur, et mare quod pristinam naturam retinuit. Nee ulla lex diversum indicat.4 Quae vero leges a contrariae 1 Donellus IV, 6.
* Joannes Faber on Institutes II, 1 (§ Litorum); Digest XIV, 2, 9 (De Lege Rhodia, L. 'Af iueif).
• Digest XLIII, 8, 3 (Ne quid in loco publico, L. Litora).
4 Digest V, 1, 9 (De iudiciis, L. Insulae); XXXIX, 4, 15 (De publicanis, L. Caesar); Gloss, on Digest I, 8, 2 (De divisione reran, L. Quaedam); Institutes II, 1; Baldus on Quaedam (above).
themselves a wide expanse of sea by jus mancipii, and they regard the right of fishing as a servitude over which their right is the same as that over their slaves. That gulf, says one, belongs to me, and that gulf to some one else. They divide the very elements among themselves, these great men'!
Therefore the sea is one of those things which is not an article of merchandise,1 and which cannot become private property. Hence it follows, to speak strictly, that no part of the sea can be considered as the territory of any people whatsoever. Placentinus seems to have recognized this when he said: ' The sea is a thing so clearly common to all, that it cannot be the property of any one save God alone '. Johannes Faber 2 also asserts that the sea has been left sui juris, and remains in the primitive condition where all things were common. If it were otherwise there would be no difference between the things which are ' common to all ', and those which are strictly termed ' public '; no difference, that is, between the sea and a river. A nation can take possession of a river, as it is inclosed within their boundaries, with the sea, they cannot do so.
Now, public territory arises out of the occupation of nations, just as private property arises out of the occupation of individuals. This is recognized by Celsus, who has drawn a sharp distinction between the shores of the sea,3 which the Roman people could occupy in such a way that its common use was not harmed, and the sea itself, which retained its primitive nature. In fact no law intimates a contrary view/ Such laws as are cited by writers who are of 1 Donellus IV, 6.
* On Institutes II, 1; Digest XIV, 2, 9 [Johannes Faber (c. 1570-c. 1640) was Bishop of Vienna, and Court preacher to Emperor Ferdinand. He was known popularly as 'Malleus Haereticorum'].
sententiae auctoribus citantur, aut de insulis loqunntur, quas clarum est occupari potuisse, aut de portu qui non communis est, sed proprie publicus.
Qui vero dicunt mare aliquod esse Imperi Romani, dictum suum ita interpretantur, ut dicant ius illud in mare ultra protectionem et iurisdictionem non procedere; quod illi ius a proprietate distinguunt; nee forte satis animadvertunt idipsum quod Populus Romanus classes praesidio navigantium disponere potuit, et deprehensos in mari piratas punire, non ex proprio, sed ex communi iure accidisse, quod et aliae liberae gentes in mari habent. Illud interim fatemur, potuisse inter gentes aliquas convenire, ut capti in maris hac vel ilia parte, huius aut illius reipublicae iudicium subirent, atque ita ad commoditatem distinguendae iurisdictionis in mari fines describi, quod ipsos quidem earn sibi legem ferentes obligat,1 at alios populos non item; neque locum alicuius proprium facit, sed in personas contrahentium ius constituit.
Quae distinctio ut naturali rationi consentanea est, ita Vlpiani response quodam comprobatur, qui rogatus an duorum praediorum maritimorum dominus, alteri eorum quod venderet servitutem potuisset imponere, ne inde in •certo maris loco piscari liceret, respondet: rem quidem ipsam, mare scilicet, servitute nulla affici potuisse, quia per uaturam hoc omnibus pateret, sed cum bona fides contractus legem venditionis servari exposceret, personas possidentium et in ius eorum succedentium per istam legem obligari.
'Baldus, Quibus modis feudi amittuntur, c. In principio, 2 coL; Code XI, 13, 1; Angelus on Digest XLVII, 10, 14 (De iniuriis, L. Sane); Digest VIII, 4, 13 (Communia praediorum, L. Venditor fundi) et 4 (L. Caveri).
the contrary opinion apply either to islands, which evidently could be occupied, or to harbors, which are not ' common ', but ' public ', that is, ' national '.
Now those who say that a certain sea belonged to the Roman people explain their statement to mean that the right of the Romans did not extend beyond protection and jurisdiction; this right they distinguish from ownership. Perchance they do not pay sufficient attention to the fact that although the Roman People were able to maintain fleets for the protection of navigation and to punish pirates captured on the sea, it was not done by private right, but by the common right which other free peoples also enjoy on the sea. We recognize, however, that certain peoples have agreed that pirates captured in this or in that part of the sea should come under the jurisdiction of this state or of that, and further that certain convenient limits of distinct jurisdiction have been apportioned on the sea. Now, this agreement does bind those who are parties to it,1 but it has no binding force on other nations, nor does it make the delimited area of the sea the private property of any one. It merely constitutes a personal right between contracting parties.
This distinction so conformable to natural reason is also confirmed by a reply once made by Ulpian. Upon being asked whether the owner of two maritime estates could on selling either of them impose on it such a servitude as the prohibition of fishing in a particular part of the sea, he replied that the thing in question, evidently the sea, could not be subjected to a servitude, because it was by nature open to all persons; but that since a contract made in good faith demands that the condition of a sale be respected, the present possessors and those who succeed to 1 Baldus, Quibus inodis feudi amittuntur, chapter beginning In principle, second column; Code XI, 13, 1; Angeli on Digest XLVII, 10, 14; Digest VIII, Verum est loqui lurisconsultum de praediis privatis, et lege privata, sed in territorio et lege populorum eadem hie est ratio, quia populi respectu totius generis humani privatorum locum obtinent.
Similiter reditus qui in piscationes maritimas constituti Regalium numero censentur, non rem, hoc est mare, aut piscationem, sed personas obligant.1 Quare subditi, in quos legem ferendi potestas Reipublicae aut Principi ex consensu competit, ad onera ista compelli forte poterunt; sed exteris ius piscandi ubique immune esse debet, ne servitus imponatur mari quod servire non potest.
Non enim maris eadem quae fluminis ratio est: 2 quod cum sit publicum, id est populi, ius etiam in eo piscandi a populo aut principe concedi aut locari potest, ita ut ei qui conduxit, etiam interdictum Veteres dederint, de loco publico fruendo, addita condicione si is cui locandi ius fuerit, fruendum ah'cui locaverit;3 quae condicio in mari evenire non potest. Ceterum qui ipsam piscationem numerant inter Regalia, ne quidem ilium locum quern interpretabantur satis inspexerunt, quod Iserniam et Alvotum non latuit.
Demonstratum est * nee populo nee private cuipiam ius 1 C. Quae sint Regalia, in Feudis. • Balbus, De praescriptionibus IV, 5; 1, q. 6, n. 4.
•Digest XLVII, 10, 13 (De iniuriis, L. Iniuriarum, § 7, v. conducted); XLIII, 9, 1 (De loco publico fruendo).
their rights were bound to observe that condition. It is true that the jurist is speaking of private estates and of private law, but in speaking here of the territory of peoples and of public law the same reasoning applies, because from the point of view of the whole human race peoples are treated as individuals.