For some time past, 1:0 fresh lies of this sort — none at least that in flagi-ancy can compare with the old stock — have been coined: the people, it may have been feared, would not bear it. But the old stock is made the most of: — several pin poses are continually answered by it: — purposes, as baneful to the people, as beuf ficial to those by whom the base currency is forced upon them. A vice, which for its mi^chievousness ought to be an object of universal abhorrence — the vice ot insincerity in its very grossest forms — has, to their own profit — such is the efficiency with which power, decked in false science, can produce delusion — been converted by them into an object of almost universal veneration.
To an eye that d^ies open itself, a curious sight is — to see how, in the very act of punishing this vice in others, they revel in it themselves. — No; never has man been punished by them for lying, but a string of lies has been uttered by the Judge, to help form the ground for punishing him. Every record is the discourse of some Judge or Judges. Look into any record, you will see the lies it teems wiih. Examine in detail the forms of judicial procedure, and see whether it be not in insincerity that they began, and from the beginning have continued. — No proposition so absurd, no practice so flagitious— that custom and hubit will not reconcile men to. When the King has made a man a Judge, amongst other powers is this of converting vice into virtue: this is among the articles of faith which hitherto the people have had the goodness to believe.
It may be ^oeu in another work (Suear not at all) whether the Clergy of the Eslablishment are not, on their part, trained up for years in a course, even confessed by themselves to be, that of habitual perjury: not to speak of the insincerity in so many other forms, with which without exception, men, on their entrance into that profession, are by authority of law compelled to defile them-•elves.
Of the sort of morality thus imbibed by the higher orders, who does not see — ye<, and feel but too sensibly— the effects? in particular the effects produced by it in Honourable House, and in the whole system of sham representation., on which it stands. To men thus educated, how can insincerity, when so constantly practised to their own sinister purposes — be otherwise than an object of fond nlfection, and sincerity an object of terror and abhorrence? Thus it is, that whatsoever regard for sincerity has place in the *' lower orders," it is not in comtquence but in spite of the example set tliem: set them by those, who, on no belter ground, than that of the riches and power with which fortune has favoured them, pretend to constitute the only class in which either wisdom or virtue is to be found.
Protest against high-seated vice in this and so many other shapes, the answer *^ — Yon are an enemy to Eiigiisk institutions: as if, only by continuing to practise it, Englishmen had a power of converting vice into virtue.
Note (*) XXIV. Page 49.
[Acceptance of a Peerage], This sonrce of mischief should be cut off: and, if under radicalism; of course it would be.
1. lu the hands of Monarch and Minister, it is a pprpetnally ready bribe, for those who could not be bought by bribe in any other shape.
2. It gives additional strength, to a body of men, whose interests are avow« ediy distinct from, and thereby unquestionably opposite to, the universal interest; and who have in their hands the means of niHking perpetii >lly repeated sacritices of the universal interest to that separate and sinister inte: est.
3. It is giving continual increase, to a breed of men who from increase of numbers and extravagance, are in large proportion continually slidmg down into a sort of elevated pauperism, which, accordinn to an avowed nirixim of Government, must be pampered at an expense proptntioned to it< tHCiiiiont elevation, See the avowal of the maxim proved— upon the Wiiitjs in the " Defence of Economy against Burke," and upon the Tories in the " Defence of Economy against Rose;" both printed in the Pamphleteer.
To a limitation of this sort the Peers themselves would naturally have no great objection. In the reign of George the First, by an odd concurrence of causes, it was favoured not only by the Lords, but by the Minister. But, as was altogether natural, it was etfectually opposed in Honourable House.
Note (t) XXV. Page 49.
For an exposition of the words annoyance and disturbance, see Appendix.
Note 0) XXVI. Page 49.
This Section has two objects: 1. To obviate the apprehension that annoyance may be given in the House to men of high habits by men of low habits; for, with men of this obnoxious description, to an unlimited amount, imagination, howsoever opposed by reason and experience, will, in the high-seated minds, be busy in peopling the House, supposing the Seats in it filled by free and universal suffrage.
2. To secure individual Members against groundless expulsion, and thereby their Constituents against injury, by the injustice of an occasional majority of the House.
It being clear that, under any order of things, every governing assembly must possess, over its own Members, whatsoever power is necessary to secure its proceedings against disturbance, — on this ground it is that Honourable House reserves to itself, of course, the power of excluding from its walls any person who shall have been pointed out by Monarch or Minister, to be so dealt with.
Thus it was, that, in 1764, to please the Monarch, it expelled John H'ilkes. The alledged cause was a libel; and a libel is — any discourse, in print or writing, which he who has power to punish for it chooses to punish for. Had that pretext failed, any words that had been spoken by him might have served: for, any words that Honourable House chose to expel a man for, might, and at all times may be, for that or any other purpose, voted scandalous: scandalous^ or upon occasion, what would form so much stronger and conmiodtous a ground, blasphemotis. For, on the field of religion, whatever a man says that another man does not like, is, according to that other man, blasphemy: whereupon, in so far as he has power, he makes the miscreant smart for it.
Under the sway of corruption, no species of annoyance can be imagined, that Honourable House would not submit to, rather than submit to have this privilege defined, and thereby confined to its real uses. Not so under Radical Keform.
The paramount objects here have been — to give effect to all legitimate causes of exclusion, and in so doing to put an exclusion upon all illegitimate ones. For this purpose, it was necessary to take what promised to be an exhaustive view of the legitimate ones. A temporary object was that which is herein above first mentioned: quieting the alarm which, in such a case, seemed liable to be felt by the opulent multitude, to whom personal ease is every thing, public interest nothing.
Note XXVII. Page 50.
Hitherto, so long as a Speaker has been indisposed, the business of the House, and thereby the business of the Nation, has been at a stand. On or without an intimation from a Monarch or a Minister, a Speaker, as well as any other man, may be indisposed whenever he pleases. The business of the nation is of no importance: a Speaker of the Commons House is not susceptible of infirmity, bodily or mental: — One or other of these maxims is what the present practice in this matter has for its ground: it rests with Honouiable House to say which. For the causes, see the Note xxiii to p. 47. Under Radicalism, the business of the Nation will not be of no importance: under Kadicalism, a Speaker will not be exempt from human infirmity.
Under real and preappointed law, the man in power, Monarch, Minister, Judge — be he what he may — is not altogether without check: there is a some* thing, which is or may be, in the eyes of every body, and which he may be expected at least to be bound by. Under imaginary and retrospective, or — as the phrase is — expost facto law, (for such is all Common Law) he is without check: on each individual occasion, he imagines whatever suits his sinister interest, and says — this is law. This (he says) is law: and, as if that were not enough, from the beginning of tilings, down to this time, so (if you will believe him) it has been; though this is the first time that any such thing ever entered into man's thoughts. See this in Blackstone: and this it is that makes " Common Law the perfection of reason." Of reason? but in what eyes? In the eyes of all those who have, or have had, the making of it; and of all those others whom they have made their dupes.
APPENDIX, INCLUDING GENERAL EXPLANATIONS.
On the present occasion, it was thought better not to incumber the text of the proposed Bill with any considerable portion of the matter, which, on the supposition of its being completed, would have been to be inserted in this place. The text of this part may eventually be added, together with the Reasons at large.
Of the particulars which, in this place, there will be occasion to bring to view, the use, if any, will not be confined within the limits of the present Bill: it may be seen extending itself over the whole field of legislation.
To an Appendix, on this as on other occasions, are proposed to be referred five distinguishable sorts of matter: 1. Fixation. 2. Exposition, or Explanation (including Definition). 3. Enumeration. 4. Abbreviation. 5. Forms of Instruments. For designation these names will, it is hoped, be found to serve. Exemplifications as well as explanations now follow.
1. Fixation. Instances there are, in which, senses more than one being plainly enough brought to view by the word or phrase in question, doubts may have place, in which of them it was meant that they should be understood. Of the operation termed Jixalion, the function in these cases is — to indicate, according to the occasion, some one of those senses to the exclusion of the rest.
Take for example the word day.
1. On some occasions it is employed to mean a determinate portion of the time occupied by a revolution of the earth round the Sun, 76 Appendix.
2. On other occasions, it is employed to mean no more than a portion of that time; namely, that portion, as far as it can be distinguished, during which the light of the sun is visible: in this latter case, the meaning is expressed without ambiguity by the words daytime, the day-time.
3. When a portion of time is spoken of, as the time within which a certain operation is required, forbidden, or permitted, to be performed,— and, for the designation of it, the word daysj in the plural, preceded by the name of a number, is employed, — as for instance,7i^c (Zay.<r, or ten days, — thence is liable to arise a question, whether in the portion of time thus designated, are to be considered as included so many days, each of them entire; or whether the intention will be satisfied, if the Grst only, or the last only, or both the first and the last, are respectively but the portion of a day. It is on these occasions, that in common usage, the words inclusive and exclusive come to be employed in conjunction with the word days. Fuller explanation cannot be given without more space than can be spared here.
For the removal of the ambiguity thus brought to view, in several parts of the present Bill, an appropriate fixation would need to be made. Of this case, the passages in which the word days is preceded by a blank space, afford so many instances.
4. In the instance of the word days, taken as above in the plural, a particular demand is created by the institution of the Sabbath. On the occasion in question, in the number of days mentioned, shall the Sabbath-day, where it happens to form one of them, be reckoned, and considered as included, or shall the number intended be understood to be that same number, over and above the Sabbath-day? The answer will depend on the nature of the occasion. If what is regarded as work be to be done in the intervals, the intervening Sabbath-day or Sabbath-days must be considered as added to the number: otherwise not.
II. Exposilion or Explanation, including Definition. The demand for fixation has place, in so far as, by the word in question, more senses than one are, all of them, more or less distinctly brought to view: what in this case is necessary is — to decide between them, by fixing upon some one of them to the exclusion of the rest. The demand for exposition or explanation has place, in so far as, were it not Appendix. 77 Appendix. 77 for riie operation thus denominated, it might happen that no object at all might present itself as clearly designated. Fixation has for its purpose, the removal of ambiguity: explanation, the clearing up of obscuriti/. Between the import of the words, as thus explained, the separation will not always be very distinct: especially since, by the same word, on the same occasion, a demand for both operations may be presented: and, although by the operation which happens to have been performed, no more than one of them may have been the direct object, the other, it may happen, has been accomplished.
Synonymous, or nearly so, to explanation^ is exposition.
Oi exposition there are several modes. For the complete enumeration and explanation of them, more room would be requisite than can be afforded in this place.
A mode commonly employed, or at least intended and supposed • * Why say " intended and supposed?" as if the thing intended on an occasion of this sort ever failed of being done? To this question something of an answer may here be expected. By logicians, when speaking of a definition, is commonly meant, as of course, the mode termed in Latin definitio per genus et differentiam: definition, afforded by the indication of a more extensive collection of objects, to which the object in question belongs — some genus (as the phrase is) of which it is a species, — together with the indication of some peculiar character or quality, by which it stands distinguished from all other objects included in that same collection — from all other species of that same genus: and this form is that which, when what is considered as a definition is given, is the form constantly intended and supposed to be given to it.
Now then, by him who undertakes to give a definition in this form, what is necessarily, howsoever tacitly, assumed, is — that there exists in the language a word, serving as the name of a genus of things, within which the species of things, indicated by the word he thus undertakes to define, is compreheuded. But words there are, and in uo small abundance, of which defiuitions of this sort are frequently undertaken to be given, — or which are supposed to be, as clearly and generally understood, as if definitions in this form could be and had been given of them, — but for which, all this while, no such more extensive denomination is afforded by this or any other language: and among them, words which, in law and politics, are in continual use, and npon the signification of which, questions of prime and practical importance are continually turning. Take for instance, the words riglit, power, obligation. Now, in the way in question,— namely, by indicatlnn of so many superior genus's of things, of which these words respectively designate so many species, — it is not possible to define these words. No ooe of these three words can you thus define. The word 78 Appendix.
78 Appendix.
to be employed, is that styled definition. By definitian seems commonly to be understood, the exhibition of some word of more extensive signification, within the signification of which, that of the word in question is included, — accompanied with the designation of some circumstance, whereby the object designated by it, stands distinguished from all others, that are in use to be designated by that more extensive appellative.
Man (for example) you can thus define: j'ou may do so, by saying that he is an animal; and then stating a quality, by which he is distinguishable from other animals. Here then is a word you can and do thus define. Why? Because, comprehending in its import that of this same word man, stands that same word animal, by which is accordingly designated a genus, of which man is a species. So likewise in regard to operations: for example, that of contracting, in the civil branch of the field of law; aud that of stealing, in the penal branch of that same thorny field. Contracting is one species of operation; stealiiig is another. But this you cannot say in the instance of right, or power, or obligation; for a right is not a species of any tiling: a power is not a species of any thing: an obligation is not a species of any thing.
The objects, of which the words man, animal, substance, are names, are exten* eive sorts or kinds of real entities; the objects, of which, the words right, power, obligation, are names, are not sorts or kinds of any real entities: the objects, of which they are sorts or kinds, are but so many fictitious entities.* * For expounding or explaining the import of any one of these names of ficti< tious entities, the nature of the case affords but one resource; and that is, the finding some class of real entities, which is more or less clearly in view as often as, to the name of a class of fictitious entities, any clear idea stands annext, — and thereupon framing two propositions; one, in which the name of the ficti. tious entity is the leading term; the other, in which the name of a corresponding class, either of real entities, or of operations or other motions of real entities, is the leading term: — this last so ordered, that, by being seen to express the same import, it shall explain and make clear the import of the first. This mode of exposition has been termed paruphrasis — paraphrase: giving phrase for phrase.
It is for want of observation made of this distinction, that all attempts to define words of tiie description in question, such as right, power, and oWtgation, have proved abortive. Of a regular and comprehensive body of law, framed in subservience to what are or ought to be the ends of law, a set of appropriate expositions for words of this description would be an indispensable accompaniment; but, for any such work this is no proper place.
In a Work entitled A Fragment on Government, published by the Author in 1776, without a name, and long since out of print, indication was, for the first lime, given of the utter impossibility of doing that which, in such numbers, men iave been continually supposing themselves to have done. Instead of a supC' riorgmus, what on this occasion has been brought forward has been some term Appendix. 79 III. Enumeratien, Of this word the import is sufficiently clear: it neither requires, nor admits of, fixation or explanation.
Of the occasion in question enumeration may have for its subjects either species or individuals. Of species or modes of operation, instances are afforded by the present Bill. They will bfe found in the ensuing example of Exposition, as applied to the words disturbance smd annoyance, which may be seen in black letter in the text of Section 3. Security <bc, against disturbance, <b-c.
Of the species contained under the given name of Offices, an cniimeration is proposed by the present Bill, namely, in Section 13, Eligible who, as constituting another portion of matter proper for the Appendix.
NOTE. Note that in the particular case here in question, namely, that of Offices^ &c. of a certain description, considered as having the effect of excluding the possessor from a Seat in the House — it is not altogether clear, that any enumeration of them would, to the purpose in question, be absolutely necessary; definition with exemplification might perhaps suffice. On the other hand, what is certain is — that without definition or explanation — without words of general description — enumeration, in a case such as this, would not suffice, Why? Because if enumeration were the only mode of designation employed, sinister ingenuity could not fail to set itself to work; under different names it would pour in objects on which it would bestow the desirable quality, free from the undesirable one; instead of Offices, it would attacli the emolument to functions, to situations — to trusts — to posts — to any thing: and thus the purpose of the law would be evaded. To establish distinctions where there are no differences, is among the endeavours and the performances — not only of Crown Lawyers, but of every Member of that profession, of which insincerity and artifice are not so much the confessed as the professed attributes.
or other bearing in its import such a resemblance to the term in question, as to be capable of being, on some occasions, with little or no impropriety, employed instead of it. A right is a power — or a power is a riglit — and so forth; shifting off the task of definition, backward and forward, from one word to another; shifting it off thus at each attempt, and never performing it.
But, though a rigtU is not itself a species of any thing, right has divers species perfectly and clearly distinguishable: namely, by means of the benefits, which they respectively confer, and the sanctions, by which they are respectively created: and for each of these species a separate exposition would be found requisite.
Give us our rights, say the thousands and the millions. Give us our rights they say, and they do well to say so. Yet, of all who say so, not one perhaps can say, not one perhaps ever conceived clearly, what it is he thus calls for — what sort of a thing a riglU is.
80 Appendix.
IV. Abbrevialion. To the result designated by this word, tht operations, designated by the three foregoing words, fixation, expla^ nation^ enumeration, may, any of them, be rendered subservient. For these several instruments of perspicuity, let the word, for which they are respectively in demand, present itself in the body of law in question, ever so many times, — the demand, for the sort of elucidation respectively afforded by them, may present itself that same number of times.
At the same time, if every time the principal word came to be employed, the adjunct or adjuncts, such as have been deemed necessary as above, were to be attached to it at full length, there is no saying to what enormity of extent the bulk of the body of law would thus be swelled. Happily, to the production of the effect required, no such full length repetitions are necessary. If, to the principal word in question, the adjunct or adjuncts deemed necessary are but annexed the first time it comes to be employed, every succeeding time the word is employed, the purpose of them may in great measure be answered, by a bare notice given of their existence.
For a memento of this sort, the typographic art affords an instrument as simple as it is efficient— c/i appropriate type: and if, throughout the whole tenor of the work, this type be not applied to any other use than this, any sort of type may serve.
In the text of the present Bill, may be seen an example. In Section 13, Security, 6-c. against disturbance, 6-c., to the words disturbance and annoyance, an elucidation, the tenor of which will be seen presently, is proposed to be applied in the Appendix. Of the aid thus provided for sincere conception, and the check for sinister application, notice is afforded by the type called Black Letter^ in which they are printed.
Thus, and without prejudice to certainly, may the operation of abbreviation be performed, upon a mass of law, by means of iht above described instruments of elucidation — any or all of them.
But it may also be performed without any of them. Examples may be seen in the Introduction to Buhn's Justice. Of the two parts contained in that Introduction, the first has for its title — " Certain abbreviations made use of in this ivork." Of these instances of abbreviations (23 in number) the first is in these words: " 1. The Appendix, B 1 word Justice is always to be understood to mean Juslice of the Peace ^ when not otherwise expressed," In this case, to the principal word Justice is added (we see] an adjunct: and the abbreviation consists in the constant omission of this adjunct. With few, if any exceptions, in the other twenty-two instances the instrument of abbreviation employed is the same; namely, omission of an adjunct: notice of the omission, once for all, having thus been given.
Of the abbreviation thus afforded, the utility cannot but have been felt by thousands and tens of tliousands. But, that from the abovementioned instrument^an appropriate type — the service so rendered could not but have received no small increase, will be no less manifest. For, among so many readers of that useful and masterly performance, scarcely perhaps has there been one, to whose mind the notice so given once for all at the commencement of the work, has, in all its parts, been at all times present. By an appropriate type, it would, on each occasion, have been revived. By the appropriate type, true it is, that the particular nature of the adjunct omitted would not have been expressed. But a notice which, on every occasion, would have thus been given, is — that to the word or phrase in question, an elucidation would be found provided, in some shape or other: and in what particular shape, is a point, which the nature of the context would not often leave exposed to doubt.
Abbreviation is not the only useful purpose, to which the separation thus proposed between text and authoritative comment is capable of being made subservient. Another is— the saving from the imputation of frivolousness, or even of ridiculousness, this or that matter of detail, the insertion of which may, by an attentive consideration of the subject, have been represented to the draughtsmen as indispensable. In a case of this sort, if he declines employing the expedient, his work will be liable to find itself in a dilemma, from which it will not be easy for him to disengage it without injury to it. If he omits the obnoxious matter altogether, he leaves the door open to wilful misrepresentation, to misapplication, and arbitrary rule: if he inserts it, he gives disgust to the thoughtless many, to whom the sensation of the moment is every thing, the future nothing — and who either can not or will not see, that by those who have the power, misinterpretation, wherever, in addition to a motive, any the slightest pretext can be 82 Appendix.
found for it, will be sure to be practised. At the same time, by the addition which it can not but make to the bulk of the mass of law, the subordinate species of matter, if not detached from that to which it is subordinate, will, in proportion to its bulk, contribute to render the whole mass to such a degree incomprehensible, that while inefficient as a protection, it will be efficient only as a snare.
True it is, that whether interwoven with the main body or detached from it, the matter of elucidation will not the less be the legislator's work. But in the main body it would present itself to all readers and on all occasions: in the Appendix it would as it were withdraw itself from the attention of readers in general, reserving itself to be consulted only by this or that particular class of readers, and by them only eventually, in case that by this or that event a call for their applying their attention to it should be made: and, in this case, as the occasion will place the importance of the explanation in its true light, it will thus be saved from the imputation of frivolousness.
V. Forms of Instruments. Of this species of matter, the form of a Vole-making Certificate in Section 2, and the form of a Recommendatorj/ Certificate in Section 3, afford so many examples; for matter of this sort, the Appendix has just been spoken of as being, generally speaking, a proper place. That it would have been such in the present instance will scarcely appear disputable. But, on the present occasion, so paramount was the importance of these two instruments— so much of the whole plan do they give. intimation of — that, though the Appendix could scarcely be denied to be a proper place, the Main body of the proposed Act ^YOuld, it was thought, be deemed the more proper place.
When the destination of this receptacle — the Appendix, is thus settled and determined — the structure of the work of which it forms a part will, in some sort be to be directed by it. To the Appendix may be referred whatsoever matters appear capable of being thus disposed of, consistently with the grand object — namely, the implanting and keeping, at all times, in the mind of the subject-citizen such part of the rule of action — such part and such only — as, according to his situation in rife, he may have need of for his guidance at all times: reserving for other parts those particulars which it will not be necessary for him lo Appendix. 83 form any detailed conception oF, till a particular state of things, calling for application to be made to that part of the law, has taken place. Thus, whatever concerns this or that species of contract, a man cannot have any need to trouble himself with, till either he has entered into a contract of that sort, or has in contemplation the entering into it, or has need to enter into it. But this refers to another division of the entire body of the law: namely, the division into the General Code and the collection of Particular codes; the General Code containing those parts of the rule of action which all persons have need to be informed of; the Particular Codes, those parts only which so many particular classes of persons have respectively need to be informed of.
As in the present proposed Act, so in any other Act, and in the whole body of the law, if any such work were any where to come into existence, here then would be two distinguishable parts — Main body and Appendix. In the Appendix would be included the Elucidations^ the Abbreviations., and the Forms of Instruments. To this part might also be consigned the Rationale, or collection of Rea,sons, supposing provision made of an instrument of elucidation and justification at once so useful, and so difficult to frame. I say the Rationale; for to this place it might be posted off, except in so far as, in thisor that instance, for the more immediate perception of this or that reason, it were thought fit, either to interweave it with the body of the Article to which it belonged (a mode frequently pursued in an Act of Parliament, and pursued in several places of the present Bill), or, in the form of a Note, to subjoin it, in the margin, at the bottom of the text.* * In its application to the penal branch of law, this mode stands exemplified in the first of those works of tlie Author's on legislation, which were edited in French by il7r. Dumont. In this way a quantity of letter-press, not larger than what has been seen contained in an Almanack, might supply a man with as large a quantity of legal information, as he would have need to carry in his head, with the addition of appropriate indication, sufficient to enable him upon occasion to present to his mind, in time for nse, whatever was not contained in it.
In every such abridgment, it being as truly the work of the legislator as the work at large of which it is an abridgment, every man would of course behold a rule of action, on which he could repose an equally safe confidence.
I cannot let this occasion pass without observing, that an abridgment thus made is the only sort of abridgment on which any such confidence can be placed. On the part of any iincommissioiml abridger, no degree of ability can have any 84 Appendix.
Taken together, Main body and Appendix would be the entire Code. Separated from the Appendix, the Main body would be a sort of Abridgment of the entire Code. Sanctioned by the same hand as that from which the Appendix received its sanction, the abridgment thus made would be an aulhoritative one.
Here follows the portion of c.v/)05i7on/ matter, proposed to be inserted in the Appendix for the exposition of the words disturbance and annoyance in section 13 of the text.
[Disturbance- — Annoyance'] Art. 1. To this purpose, it matters not in what shape, and by what means, the annoyance be produced, if among its effects be that of causing disturbance to the proceedings of the House.
Art. 2. It matters not to what sense^ or whdit faculty ^ the annoyance has been applied: as for example — 1. To the sense of hearing; by noise, whereby Members are prevented from hearing any thing spoken or read: for instance, by untimely vociferation, by stamping or scraping with the feet; or even by coughing or blowing of the nose, if performed, not through necessity, but for this or any other forbidden purpose.
2. To the sense oi sight; for example, by preventing any Member or Members from having the Speaker of the House in view, or the Speaker from having any other Member in view; or by repairing to the House, with the visible marks or other symptoms of any noisome disease.
3. To the sense oi smell; by uncleanliness in any shape.
4. To keallh in general: by a Member repairing to the House at a time when he is labouring under any infectious disease.
5. By personal injury in any shape, done, — or attempted, or intend* such effect as that of giving to his work a just title to any such confidence. In the original, suppose imperfections iu any abundance; in the abridgment, none. The greater the nnmber of these imperfections, the more delusive and dangerous to trust to will the abridgment be. For it is from what the original is, not from what it ought to have been, that the interpretation put upon it by the Judge will be deduced. Unless indeed it should happen to suit his private views to interpret it according to what it ought to have been. For wherever, through the medium of that which is, that which ought to have been and is not is disceruable, the Judge is upon velvet: with hands decorated with sham chains, he decides this way or that way, whichever he finds most agreeable and convenient.
/ Appendix. 85 ed, or proposed to be done, — to any Member, or any Officer of the House, or to any other person present.
6. To the tranquillity of the Assembly, by words or deportment, threatening personal injury, in any shape, — to be done, whether to the whole Assembly present, to any particular Member, or other person present. Here ends the Explanation.
In the particular case here exemplified, supposing that, as here, ia the designation of the proposed Ground for exclusion, words such as *^ annoyance" and *^ disturbance" (the words employed in the Bill) were employed, I durst not, without very particular exposition, such as that here proposed to be given, depend upon them as sufficient to secure the exclusion of sinister interpretation: in particular, on the part of Honourable House, even under any Constitution that would be given to it. In the reign of Charles the Second it was, that Honourable House concurred in an Act (18. C. 11. c 2, s. 1.) declaring the importation of Cattle into England from Ireland ^^ a nuisance," and punishing it as a crime. Were it not for the check, applied by specifications such as the above, — with less violent torture of words might the House, at any time, have applied that term of reproach, to the act of any Member, who, rendered obnoxious to Noble Lords and Honourable Gentlemen by attachment to the cause of the people, had, by some trifling indecorum, in language or deportment, afforded a pretence.