* Lord Loughborough, when Attorney-General*. The observation made by him in the year 1789, was reported to me presently after it was made. Not till many years after — some time, as I perceive, after what is in the text was written, was the true import perceived by me. The character in which at the time it presented itself to my view, was that of a gross absurdity: its true character was that of deep sagacity. By the principle of utility, what I understood, was — that principle which states as the only justifiable end of Government, the greatest ha])piness of the greatest number of the members of tlie community. At that time I still continued to take for granted (such was my simplicity) that this was the end generally aimed at, though often so widely missed By those, whose desire it was that on each occasion that end should be attained, it could not without self-contradiction be supposed that the endeavour to attain it could seem dangerous. But Loughborough was too well acquainted with the state of Government in this country (not to speak of other countries) not to know that it is the greatest happiness of the ruling few, and not that of the greatest number, that is the end pursued on each occasion by the ruling few. What then was the interest which, on that occasion, as on all occasions, that member of the ruling few, had at heart, and thence preferably if not exclusively, in mind? It was, of course, the interest of the ruling few. But the interest of the ruling few is, on the greatest part of the field of Government, in a state of continued opposition to that of the greatest number: accordingly a principle, which, in case of competition, and to the extent of the competition, called for sacrifices to be made of the interests of the class to which he belonged, and which alone was the object of his solicitude, could not but, in his eyes, be a dangerous one.
* Note written August 21, 1819: — " Great characters in high situations," a phrase employed about December 1809 by minister Percival, then Attorney-General, in calling down the vengeance of the law on I forget what alleged libeller, for using the appellation of " the Doctor" might be mentioned, and one of no small celebrity *, in which the same principle — the principle of utility — has been pronounced useless: — the principle itself, and consequently every investigation in which to the purposes of legislation or common life, application is endeavoured to be made of it.
What must be acknowledged is, that to make a right and effectual use of it, requires the concurrence of those requisites which are not always found in company: invention, discernment, patience^, sincerity; each in no inconsiderable degree; while, for the pronouncing of decisions without consulting it, decisions in the ipse dlvit style, nothing is required but boldness.
Not that, on any occasion on which it promises to suit his purpose, and he feels in himself a capacity to apply it to that purpose, the most decided scorner of it, ever fails to make use of it. It is only when, if consulted, its decisions would be against him, or he feels himself awkward at consulting it, that he ever takes upon him to do without it: and to prove any thing to be right or wrong, thinks it sufficient for himself to say so.
2. — Clamfication a had thing. — Good Method a bad thing.
On the same occasion in which a convenience was found in pronouncing the principle of utility useless, in speaking of Lord Sidmouth. By the picture it seemed to give of the character of the prosecution and of the persons who bore a part in it, it made a lasting impression oJi my mind. * The Edinburgh Review.
Sect. 2.] F.\LLACIES OF CONFUSION. 317 the like convenience was found in professing th6lik6 contempt for that quality in discourse which goes by the name of good method, or, simply, method, and that sort of operation called good classification, or, simply, classification.
When the subject a man undertakes to write upon, is to a certain degree extensive, as, for example, the science of morals, or that of legislation, whether what a man says be clear or not, of falsehood, will depend upon the goodness of the method in which the parts of it have been cast. 1. If for example, snow and charcoal were both classed under the same name and neither of them had any other, if the question were asked, whether the thing known by that name were white or black, no inconsiderable difficulty would be found in answering it either by a yes or no. 2. And if under favour of the identity of denomination, sugar of lead were to be used in a pudding instead of any of the sort of sugar usually applied to that purpose, practical inconveniences analogous to those which were experienced by Thornbury from eating pancake*, might probably be found to result from the mistake thus exemplified in the tactical branch of the art or science of life, call it v/hich you please.
In the course of an attempt made'* to cast the ' In the pancake in question, which, at a table at the Cape of Good Hope, was served up to a company of which Thornbury, better known by his travels in Japan, was one, white lead was employed instead of flour: — some recovered, and some died.
'' In a book written Anno 1781, published Anno 1789, under the title of Introduction to Morals and Legislation, SI8 FALLACIES OP CONFUSION. [Ch. 10.
whole multitude of pernicious actions into apt classes, — as a fruit, and proof, and test of the supposed aptitude, about a dozen propositions were mentioned as being capable of being without any deviation from the truth of thingSj ascribed to the pernicious acts, respectively, collected together under one denomination by the names respectively assigned to the four classes to which they were referred.
On the same occasion intimation was likewise given, that in the system of law and law terms in use, for the designation of offences, among English lawyers, no such fair general denomination could be found, to the contents of which an equal number, and it might perhaps have been added, any number at all of common propositions could, without error and falsehood, be ascribed. A system of classification and nomenclature which can never be employed without confounding at every turn, objects which, to prevent practical and painful accidents, require to be distinguished, must by every man, who has not a decided interest in maintaining the contrary, be acknowledged to be very ill adapted to those which are, or at least which ought to be, its purposes.
Here then was an intimation given, that the whole system of English penal law is in an extreme degree ill adapted to what ought to be the purposes of every system of law: and an implied invitation to those, if any such there were, who being conversant in the subject of law, had any desire to see it well adapted to its professed purposes, to show that the system was not in respect of the points indicated, a bad one, the radically bad one it was there represented to be, or else to take measures for making it better. But it being the interest of every one who is most conversant with this subject, that the whole system, instead of being as good as it can be made, should be as bad as those who live under it will endure to see it, the invitation could not in either branch be accepted.
In any other branch of science that can be named, Medicine, Chemistry, Natural History in all its branches, the progress made in every other respect is acknowledged to be commensurate to, and at once effect and cause in relation to the progress made in the art of classification: — nor in any one of those branches of science, would it, perhaps, be easy to find a single individual by whom the operation of classification would be spoken of as any thing below the highest rank in the order of importance. Why this difference? Because in any one of these branches of science there is scarce an individual to whose interest the advancement of the science is opposed: whereas among the professors of the l^w there exists not an individual to whose interest the advancement of the art of legislation is not opposed; — is not, either immediately detrimental or ultimately dangerous.
3. Simplification.
By the opposite vice, complication, every evil opposite to the ends of justice, viz., uncertainty of the law itself, unnecessary delay, expense and vexation in respect of the execution, is either produced or aggra- 320 FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [C/l. 10.
vated*. Consequently, to every one by whom any wish is entertained of seeing the mass of these evils reduced, a fervent desire is entertained of seeing the virtue of simplification infused into the system of law and judicial procedure. On an occasion that took place not long ago, if the account of the debates can be trusted, a gentleman was found resolute and frank enough to stand up and rank this virtue, if after that, such it may be called, among the worst of vices: the use of it was evidence of Jacobinism: evidence of the circumstantial kind indeed, but sufficiently conclusive.
If on a declaration to that effect any sentiment of disapprobation were visible in the language or deportment of that honourable house, none such are, at least, recorded: and if none such really were perceptible, this circumstance alone might afford no inconsiderable ground for the desire expressed by some, of seeing the character of that honourable house undergo a thorough change, 4. Disinterestedness a mark of profligacy.
In his pamphlet on his Official Economy Bill, to give up official emolument, is by Edmund Burke pronounced, in so many words, to be " a mark of the basest profligacy: " On somewhat more defensible grounds might this position itself be pronounced as strong a mark as ever * See Scotch Reform Table.
was exhibited, or ever could be exhibited, of the most shameless profligacy.
An assumption contained in it, besides others too numerous to admit of their being detailed here, is — that in the eyes of man there is nothing that has any value — nothing that is capable of actuating and giving direction to his conduct, but the matter of wealth: that the love of reputation and the love of power are themselves, both of them, without efficient power over the human heart.
So opposite is this position of his to the truth, that the less the quantity of money which, in return for his engagement to render official service, a man, not palpably unfit for the business of it, is content to accept, the stronger is the proof, the presumptive evidence thereby affi)rded, of his aptitude in all points, with relation to the business of that office: since it is a proof of his relish for the business — of the pleasure he anticipates from the performance of it*^.
Blinded by his rage, in this his frantic exclamation, wrung from him by the unquenched thirst for lucre, this madman, than whom none perhaps was ever more mischievous,— this incendiary, who contributed so much more than any other to light up the flames of that war, under the miseries occasioned by which the nation is still groaning, poured forth the reproach of " the basest profligacy" on the heads of thousands, before whom, • See Bentham par Dumont. Traite de^ Peines et des Recompenses: and Defences of economy against Edmund Burke and George Rose, Y had he known who they were, he would have been ready to bow the knee. Not to mention the whole magistracy of the empire, whose office is that of justice of the peace, — among other persons before whom he was in the habit of prostrating himself, of the verbal filth he thus casts around him, one large mass falls upon the head of the Marquess Camden, and from his, rebounds upon those other official heads, from which the surrender made of the vast mass of official emolument, drew forth the stream of eulogium which the documents of the day present us with..
5. How to turn this fallacy to account.
To let off a paradox of this sort with any chance of success, you must not be any thing less than the leader of a party. For if you are, instead of gaping and staring at you, men will but laugh at you, or think of something else without so much as laughing at you, because there is no laughing at any thing without thinking of it.
Moreover a thing of this sort succeeds much better in a speech, than in a book or pamphlet; and that, for several reasons.
The use of a speech is to carry the measure of the moment: and if the measure be but carried, no matter for the means. The measure being carried, the paradox is seen to be no less absurd and mischievous than it is strange: no matter; the measure is carried. War is declared, or a negotiation for peace broken off. Peace you will have some time or other, but in the mean time the paradox has had its effect. A law has passed: and that law an absurd and mischievous one. Some day or other the mischief may receive a remedy: but that day may not arrive these two or three hundred years *.
In a speech too, it is all profit, no loss. Your point may be gained, or not gained: your reputation remains where it was. It is your speech, or not your speech, whichever is most convenient. To A, who, under the notion of its being yours, admires it, it is your speech; to B, who, because it is yours, or because it is an absurd and mischievous one, spurns at it, it is not your speech. If the words of your paradox are ambiguous, as they will be, if they are well and happily chosen, — susceptible of two senses, an innoxious and a noxious one; this is exactly what is wanted. Ay who on your credit is ready to take it, and to adopt it in the noxious one which suits your purpose, is suffered silently to take it in that noxious one. But if jB, taking it in the noxious one, attacks you and pushes you too hard, then some adherent of yours (not you yourself, for it would be weak indeed for you to appear in the matter), some adherent of yours brings out the innocent sense, vows and swears it was that meaning that was yours, and belabours poor B with a charge of calumny.
If in the choice of your expression you have been * Till lately, the country has suffered in a variety of ways by the law made in the reign of Elizabeth to prevent good workmanship: the effect is felt, the cause men cannot bear to look at.
negligent or unfortunate, so that no more than one sense, and that one indefensible, can with any colour of reason be ascribed to it, you thus lose part of your advantage: but still no harm can happen to you; you disavow, that is your adherent, for you, disavows the very words: and thus every thing is as it should be.
Thus it is that from speeches — spoken and unminuted speeches — you derive much the same sort of advantage as is derived from that sort of sham law (which, in so far as it is made by any body, is made by judges, and is called conmion or unwritten law) by lawyers: thundering all the while the charge of insincerity or folly in all who have the assurance to ascribe to it either a different word, or a different meaning. To the supposed speech, as to-the supposed law, they give what words they please, and then to those words they give what meaning they please. The law, indeed, neither has, nor ever had, any determinate form of words belonging to it: whereas the speech could not have been spoken, unless it had had a set, and that a complete one, of determinate words belonging to it. But in the speech — the words never having been committed to writing, or if they have been, evidence of their being the same words not being producible, — the speech-maker is as safe as if he had never uttered any one of those words.
In the intellectual weakness of those on whom, in this form, imposition is endeavoured to be practised — in this degrading weakness, and in the state of ser- Sect. 5.] FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 3£5 vitude in which they are accordingly held by the shackles of authority*, may be seen the cause of that success, and thence of the effrontery and insolence, which this species of imposition manifests. In proportion as intellect is weaker and weaker, reason has less and less hold upon it; authority, fortified by the appearance, real or fallacious, of strong persuasion, more and more.
It is in this way that, strange as at first mention it cannot but appear — it is in this way — and when addressed to minds of such a texture, the more flagrant and outrageous the absurdity, the stronger its persuasive force. Why? because without the strongest ground, a persuasion — so strong a persuasion, of the truth of a proposition, at first sight at least, so adverse to truth, it is taken for granted, could not have been formed.
When the terrors of whicli religion is the source, are the instruments employed for inculcating it, the strength of the persuasion thus inspired, presents little cause for wonder. In the intensity of the exertion made for the purpose of believing, the greater the difficulty, the greater is, in case of success, the merit. Hence that most magnanimous of all conclusions, credo quia impossibile est. Higher than this, the force of faith — the force and consequently the merit — cannot go: by this one bound the pinnacle is attained; and whatsoever reward Omnipotence has in store for * See 1. Ad Vciccundiaiii,(l\\. 1. Fallacv ot Authority.
326 FALLACIES or CONFUSION, \Cfl. 10.
service of this complexion, is placed out of the reach of failure.
Be the absurdity ever so flagrant, — the nature of man considered, and how absolute the dominion which is exercised over him by the passions of fear and hope, — be the absurdity ever so flagrant, cause of just wonder can never be afforded, by any acceptance which it receives with the support afforded to it by the most irresistible of the passions: The understanding is not the source, reason is of itself no spring of action: the understanding is but an instrument in the hand of the will: it is by hopes and fears that the end of action is determined; all that reason does, is to find and determine upon the means: But where, at the mere suggestion of a set of men with gowns of a certain form on their backs, where at their mere suggestion (unsupported by any motive of a nature to act on the will), we see men living and acting under the persuasion that in the vice of lying, there is virtue to metamorphose into justice, the crime of usurpation; — here it is not the will that is confounded and overwhelmed, it is the understanding that is deluded '^ ' To form a ground for decision, a judge asserts as true, some fact which to his knowledge is not true: some fact for the assertion of which, if, in the station of a witness, and without having for his protection the power of a judge, a man were to venture the assertion of, he would by this same judge be punished with imprisonment and infamy. To screen it from the abhorrence due to it, this He, exceeding in wickedness the most wicked of the assertions commonly brought into view under that name, is decked up in the same appellation, fie- Sect, 5.] FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 327 Hon, which is employed in bringing to view the innoxious and amusing pictures of ideal scenes for which we are indebted to the poetic genius. What you are thus doing with the lie in your mouth? — had you power to do it without the lie? — Your lie is a foolish one. Have you no such power? — It is a flagitious one. In this mire may be seen laid the principal part of the foundation of English common law.
328 FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [Ch. 11 CHAPTER XI.
Non-causa pro causa: or, Cause and obstacle con-Jounded.
Ad judicium.
Rxpositmi.
When in a system which has good points in it you have a set of abuses, or any of them to defend; after a general eulogium bestowed on the system, or an indication more or less explicit of the good effects the existence of which is out of dispute, take the abuses you have to defend, either separately or collectively, (collectively is the safest course,) and to them ascribe the credit of having given birth to the good effects.
Cum hoc, ergd propter hoc.
In every political system which is of long standing, and which not having been produced, any considerable part of it, in prosecution of any comprehensive design, good or bad, but jnece-meal at different and distant times, according to the casual and temporary predominance of conflicting interests, whatsoever may be the good or the bad points in the state of things which at any given time constitutes the result of it, among the incidents which may be observed as having place in it, some, upon proper scrutiny and proper distinction made, may be seen to have operated in the character of elective or promotive causes; others, Ch. 11.] FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 3^9 in the character of obstacles or preventives; others, to have been in relation to them, iu the character of immaterial incidents or inoperative circumstances.
In such a system, whatsoever are the abuses or other imperfections in it, and whatsoever are the prosperous results observable in it, tliese prosperous results will have found, in the abuses and imperfections, not so many efficient or promotive causes, but so many obstacles or preventives.
Meantime, if so you can order matters that, instead of being recognised as having operated in the character of obstacles, the abuses in question shall be be^ lieved to have operated in the character of efficient or promotive causes, nothing can contribute more powerfully to the effect which it is your endeavour to produce.
If you cannot so far succeed as to cause the prosperous results in question to be referred to the abuses by which they have been obstructed and retarded, the next thing you are to endeavour at, is, to cause them to be ascribed to some inoperative circumstance or circumstances, having in appearance some connexion or other — the nearer the better — with the abuses, At any rate, you will, as far as depends upon you, cause the prosperous circumstances in question to be referred to any causes rather than the real ones: for in proportion as it becomes manifest of what causes they are the results, it will become manifest of what other circumstances they have not been the results; whereupon, no sooner is any one of the abuses you 330 FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [Ch. U.
have to defend, considered in this point of view, than a question will be apt to occur: — Well, and this? — what has been the use of this? To which no answer being found, the consequence is such as need not be mentioned.
Real knowledge being among the number of your most formidable adversaries, your endeavour must of course be to obstruct its advancement and propagation as effectually as possible.
Real knowledge depends in a great degree on the being able, on each occasion, to distinguish from each other, causes, obstacles, and uninfluencing circumstances: these, therefore, it must on every occasion be your study to confound as effectually as possible.
E.vposure.
Example 1. — Good Government. — Obstacle represented as a cause, — the influence of the Croxvn.
If the superiority of the Constitution of the English limited monarchy, as compared with all absolute or less limited monarchies, be in England a point undisputed, and regarded as indisputable, and the characteristic by which that limited monarchy is distinguished from all absolute and less limited monarchies, is, the influence, the superior influence of the mass of the people, — the influence exercised by the will of the nominees of the people on the wills of the nominees of the king, and thence on the conduct of the king himself, — a circumstance which, in so far as it operates, diminishes the efficiency of this influence, SecL }.] FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 331 and on many, if not most occasions, may be seen to destroy that efficiency altogether, — cannot with propriety be numbered among the causes of that superiority, but must, on the contrary, be placed to the account of the obstacles that obstructed it.
In point of fact, the members of the House of Commons, some really, all in supposition, nominees of the mass of the people, act, as to the nominees of the king, — viz. the members of the executive department,— with the authority of judges: viz. to the purpose of causing punishment to be inflicted under the name of punishment, in case of special delinquency, not without the concurrence of the House of Lords; but to the purpose of causing removal, without any such concurrence.
In so far as over the will of the nominees of the people as above mentioned, acting in their abovementioned character of judges, an efficient influence is exercised by the king or his nominees, the efficiency of this judicial authority is destroyed; the nominees of the king, in the exercise of their respective functions, committing any enormities at pleasure; and thereupon in the character though without the name of judges, absolving themselves, and, if such be their pleasure, praising themselves for what they have done.
In this case, the fallacy consists in representing, defending, and supporting, in the character of an indispensable cause of the acknowledged prosperous results, the sinister and corruptive influence in question; 332 FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. \Cll. 11.
— a circumstance which, so far from being in any degree a proniotive cause, is an obstacle.
In uhat way it operates in the character of an obstructive and destructive circumstance, has already been shown above. In what way, with relation to the same effect, it can operate as a cause, has never been so much as attempted to be shown: it has been on every occasion taken for granted, and this, on no other ground than that of its being a concomitant circumstance.
Example 2. — Effect, good Government: — Obstacle represented as a cause., — station of the bishops in the House of Lords.
To good government, neither in the situation of a bishop nor in any other situation can a man be contributory, any further than as he takes a part in it.
In that department of government which is carried on in the House of Lords, a man cannot bear a part any further than as he takes a part in the debates carried on there, or at least attends and gives his vote.
But of the whole body of bishops, including since the Union those from Ireland, a small part, upon an average scarce so many as a tenth, are seen to attend and give tlieir votes: and as for speaking — when any instance of it happens to take place, it sets men a-staring and talking as if it were a phenomenon.
How comes it that the number of those who vote, Sect, 2.] FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 333 and especially of those who speak, is so small? Because a general feeling exists, that to that class temporal occupations and politics are not suitable occupations.
And why not suitable?
1. Because in that war of personalities in which, in a large proportion, the debates in that as well as in the other House consist, a man of this class is in a peculiar degree vulnerable. The Apostles, did they bear any part in, had they any seat in, the Roman Senate, or so much as in the Common-council of the city of Jerusalem? Was it Peter, was it James, was it John, — was it not Dives, that used to clothe himself in purple and fine linen? — Walking from place to place to preach, comprised their occupations. If yours were the same, would you not be rather more like them than you are?
2. Because there is a general feeling, though not expressed in words, from a sort of decency and compassion, that a legislative assembly is not a fit place for a man who is not at liberty to speak what he thinks; and who, should he be bold enough to bring to view any one of the plainest dictates of political utility, might be put to silence and confounded by reference to this or that one of the 39 Articles, or by this or that text of Scripture, out of a Testament Old or New.
So many things of which, however improbable, he is bound to profess his belief.
So many things which, however indefensible by 334 FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [Ck. 11.
reason, he would be bound, were he to open his mouth, to defend.
Matter of duty to him to be, — matter of infamy not to be, — steeled against conviction.
So many vulnerable parts with which he is embarrassed, and with which an antagonist of his is not embarrassed.
So many chains with which he is shackled, and with which an antagonist of his is not shackled.
A man whose misfortune should it be to hear a word or two of reason, it would be his duty not to listen to it.
To a man thus circumstanced, to talk reason would have something ungenerous in it and indecorous: it would be as if a man should set about talking indecently to his daughter or his wife.
In vain would they answer, what has been so often answered, that neither Jesus nor his Apostles ever meant what they said — that every thing is to be explained and explained away. By answers of this sort, those and those alone would be satisfied, whose satisfaction, with every thing that is established, is immoveable, and not susceptible of experiencing diminution from any objections, or increase from any answers.
Example 3. — Effect, useful national learning; Obstacle stated as a cause, system of education pursued in Church-of -England Universities.
On the subject of learning, to the question whether with relation to it the universities might with more propriety be considered as causes or as obstacles, much need not here be said, after what has been said on the subject by the Reverend Vicesimus Knox, and of late by the Edinburgh Review.
If these fragments, with the exception of the scurrilous parts of the Review, were put together and made into a book, a most instructive addition to it might be made by a history of the treatment experienced from this quarter by the inventions of the quaker Lancaster. In the age of academical and right-reverend orthodoxy, learning, it would there be seen, is even to the very first rudiments of it, an object of terror and hatred.
Of this Quaker, though he undertook not to attempt to make converts, what is certain, is, that no school would, under his management, have been a school of perjury: and since, in so far as by his means the elementary parts of knowledge made their way among the people, intellectual light would take place of intellectual darkness, he experienced the hostility that might so naturally have been expected from those who love darkness better than light, to wit, for a reason which may be seen in that book, the knowledge of which it was his object to diffuse, as it was theirs to confine and stifle it.
In virtue and knowledge, in every feature of felicity, the empire of Montezuma outshines, as every body knows, all the surrounding states, even the Commonwealth of Tlascala not excepted.
Where (said an inquirer once, to the high priest of 336 FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [67/. 11.
the temple of Vitzlipultzli), where is it that we are to look for the true cause of so glorious a pre-eminence? *' Look for it!" (answered the holy pontiff,) " Where shouldst thou look for it, blind sceptic, but in the copiousness of the streams in which the sweet and precious blood of innocents flows daily down the altafs of the great God?"
" Yes," answered in full convocation and full chorus the archbishops, bishops, deans, canons, and prebends of the religion of Vitzlipultzli: — " Yes," answered in semi-chorus the vice-chancellor, with all the doctors, both the proctors and masters regent and non-regent of the as yet uncatholiciz'd university of Mexico:■'-* " Yes, in the copiousness of the streams in which the sweet and precious blood of innocents flows daily down the altars of the great God."
Example 4. — Effect^ national virtue; Obstacle represented as a cause^ opulence of' the clergy.
In several former works it has been shown *, that, be the effect what it may, — in so far as money or in any odier shape the matter of reward, is, in the character of an efliicient cause, employed in the view or under the notion of promoting it, — what degree of efii--ciency shall attend in such case the use made of the instrument, depends not so much upon its magnitude * Traite des Peine^ et des Recompenses, Defence of Economy against Burke, and Do. against Rose: both in the Pamphleteer, Anno 1817. Church-of-Englandism Examined, 1818.
Sect. 4.] FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 5^7 as upon the manner in which, and the skill with which, it is applied; and in particular, that in so far as that instrument is composed of public money, it is no less possible, and in some cases much more frequent, so to apply it that the production of that effect shall, instead of being promoted, be prevented: that when, as for working, a man is paid alike whether he does work or whether he does none, to expect w-ork from him is impossible, and to pretend to expect it, mere mockery: that after engaging to render an habitual course of service (for the rendering of which no extraordinary degree of talent or alacrity is necessary), a fit person has received that which is necessary to obtain his free engagement for the rendering it, every penny added has no other tendency than to afford him means and incentives to relinquish his duties for whatever other occupations are more suitable to his taste.
Now if this be true of all men, it is true of every man: and it is not a man's being called prebend, canon, dean, bishop, or even archbishop, that will in his case or in any other person's case make it false.