It is a proposition that, be it ever so true, is not evident, but requires argument deduced from experience to render it so, that by such service as is rendered by the English clergy, virtue is in any degree promoted.
It is a proposition that, be it to a certain extent ever so true, is to a certain extent notoriously not true, that to the procurement of such service, money z S38 FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [C/l. 11.
from any source is necessary. For without a particle of money passing from hand to hand, service of this sort is rendered by men one towards another, viz. among the people called Quakers: and if for the exhibiting to view the comparative degrees of efficiency with which service of this sort is rendered, — work of this sort done, — who is there that will take upon him to deny that the highest degree of the scale would be found occupied by the people called Quakers, or disputed with them by the people called Methodists, while the very lowest would be recognised as being occupied without dispute by the members sacred or profane of the established and most opulently endowed Church of England.
It is another proposition that still remains to be proved, that, admitting that for the procurement of this service — to the whole extent in which for the production of virtue it is wanted, — money is necessary, it is also necessary that for the raising of the necessary quantity, money should by the power of Government be forced out of the pockets of unwilling contributors.
Ch. 12.] FALLACIES OF CONFUSION". 339 CHAPTER XII.
Partiality-preachers Argument.
Ad judicium. From the abuse, argue not against the use, Exposition, From abuse it is an error (it has been said) to argue against use.
The proposition is an absurd one, make the best of itj but the degree of absurdity will depend upon the turn that may be given to the sentence.
Whichsoever be the turn given to it, the plain and undeniable truth of the case as between use and abuse will alike serve for the exposure of it.
Be the institution what it may, whatsoever good effects there are that have resulted from it, these constitute, as far as experience goes, the use of it: whatsoever ill effects have resulted from it, these, in so far at least as they have been the object of foresight and the result of intention, constitute the abuse of it.
Thus as to past results: and the same observation applies to expected future ones.
Exposure.
Now then come the fallacies to the propagation of ivhich it may and must have been directed.
1. In taking an account of the effects of an institu- 340 FALtACIES OF CONFUSION. [Ch. 12.
tion, you ought to set down all the good effects and omit all the bad ones.
This is one of the purposes to which it is capable of being applied: this needs not much to be said of it.
2. In taking an account of the effects of an institution good and bad, you ought not to argue against it on the supposition that the sum of the bad ones is greater than the sum of the good ones, merely from the circumstance that among all its effects taken together, there are some that belong to the bad side of the account.
In this latter sense, such is the character of the maxim that nothing can be said against the truth of it. As an instruction, it is too obvious to be of any use: in the way of warning, it cannot by possibility do any harm, nor is it altogether out of the sphere of possibility, that iu this or that instance it may have its use.
Applied to a man's pecuniary affairs it amounts to this: viz. Conclude not that a man has no property because he has some debts.
Ch, \3.] FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 341 CHAPTER XIII.
The End justifies the Means.
Ad judicium.
In this case surely, if in any, exposition is of itself exposure.
The insertion of this article in the list of fallacies was suggested by the use made of it in the Courier Newspaper of the 27th of August 1819, as reported and commented upon in the Morning Chronicle of the 28th a.
The end justifies the means. Yes: but on three conditions, any of which failing, no such justification has place.
1. One is, that the end be good.
2. That the means chosen be either purely good, or if evil, having less evil in them than on a balance there is of real good in the end.
* The Courier Newspaper is, in tlie other public prints, perpetually spoken of as enjoying the favour of the Monarch of the day. 1 have all along been upon the watch to see whether a denial in any shape of that assertion would be given. I have never been able to hear of any such thing. The fact admitted, a conclusion which can scarcely be refused is, that the principles manifested in that paper are the principles entertained and acted upon by that royal arbiter of our fate, in whose disposal the lives and fortunes of about twenty millions or thereabout in the three kingdoms, and sixty millions in Asia, are placed. VVithout deigning to wait for and receive, or if received, to have regard to the evidence on the other side, at the solicitation of Lord Sidmouth, Secretary of State, the Prince 342 FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [Ck. 13.
3. That they have more of good in them, or less of evil, as the case may be, than any others, by the employment of which the end might have been attained.
Laying out of the case these restrictions, note the absurdities that would follow.
Acquisition of a penny loaf is the end I am at. The goodness of it is indisputable. If by the goodness of the end, any means employed in the attainment of it are justified, instead of a penny, I may give a pound for it: thus stands the justification on the ground of prudence. Or, instead of giving a penny for it, I may cut the baker's throat, and thus get it for nothing: and thus stands the justification on the ground of benevolence and beneficence.
In politics, what is the use of this fallacy? In the mouth of one whose station is among the ins, it will serve for whatsoever cruelties those by whom power is exercised may at any time find a pleasure in committing on those over whom power is exercised, for Regent by one letter dated August 1819 bestows his approbation upon the conduct maintained by the Manchester Magistrates, on the occasion of the slaughter committed by their officers — by the armed yeomanry on an vmarmed multitude: and by another, dated the same month, upon Sir John Bing, the General Commander of the Regulars, for the support given by him to it. What shall we say of this? Let prudence give the answer. The Secretary is worthy to serve such a Sovereign: the Sovereign is worthy to be served by such a Secretary. — Every stroke he adds to his own portrait, the faithful servant adds to that of his royal patron and protector. A complete portrait thus formed V)y lines copied from the Courier, would constitute a most instructive and interesting piece.
Ch. 13.] FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 'Z4i^ the purpose of confirming themselves in the power of committing more such cruelties.
The INS, as such, hav e the power to commit atrocities, and that power having sinister interest for its spur, is never suffered to be idle. For the use of this fallacy, in so far as it can be worth their while to employ a cloak, they have therefore a continual demand.
The OUTS, acting under the impulse of the same spur, sharpened by continual privation, and continually repeated disappointment, have on their part a still more urgent demand for the same fallacy, though the opportunities of making application of it but rarely present themselves to their hands.
The oracular party adage-— invented by the Whigs: — Not men but measures, or Not measures but men: — for according as you complete the sentence, you may word it either way, — This bold but slippery instrument of fallacy has manifest alliance with the present. Seating in office fit men, being the end, every thing depending upon that end, and the men in question being the only ones by which it can be attained, no means can be imagined by which such an end may not be justified.
344 FALLAClliS OF CONFUSION. [C/l. 14 CHAPTER XIV.
Oppostr-Generats Justijlcation: — Not measures but men; or, Not men but measures.
Ad invidiam.
According to the notions commonly entertained of moral duty under the head of probity, and in particular under the head of that branch of probity which consists in sincerity, wliatsoever be the nature and extent of the business in question, private or public, it is not right for a man to argue agajnst his own opinion;— \yhen his opinion is so and so, to profess it to be the reverse, and in so doing to bend the force of his mind to the purpose of causing others to embrace the opinion thus opposite to his real one.
That, in particular, if being a member of the House of Commons, and in opposition, a measure which to him seems a proper one, is brought on the carpet on the ministerial side, it is not right that he should declare it to be, in his opinion, pernicious, and use his endeavours to have it thought so, and treated as sucii by the House; and so again, if, being on that same side, a measure such as to him appears pernicious, is brought on the carpet on the side of opposition, it is not right that he should declare it to be, in his opinion, beneficial and fit to be adopted, and accordingly use his endeavours to make it generally thought so, and as such adopted by the House.
All aphorism, said to have been a favourite one with the late Mr. Charles Fox, is the proposition at the head of this chapter.
Not men but measures! or, Not measures but men! are the two forms in either of which, according as the ellipsis is filled up, the aphorism may be couched.
Not 7neasures but men! is the more simple expression of the two, it being in that form that the aphorism is marked out for approbation: reprobation being the sentiment attached to its opposite. Not men but measures I If you look to speeches, then comes the constant and constantly interminable question — what were the words in the speeches. The words are in that case on each occasion genuine or spurious, the interpretation correct or incorrect, according as it suits the purpose of him who is speaking of it, and more particularly of him who spoke it, that it should be.
But on one occasion we have the aphorism from the pen of Charles Fox himself: and then, if applied to the question of sincerity or insincerity, as above, it is found to have no direct bearing on it.
" Are to be attended to,'' are the words employed on this occasion to complete the proposition. " How vain, how idle, how presumptuous (says the declaimer in his attempt to put on the historian) is the o[)inion that laws can do every thing! and how weak and pernicious the maxim founded upon it, that measures not men, are to be attended to! ' Weak enough as thub expressed, it niust be con- '316 F7\LLACl£S OF CONFUSION. [Ck. 14.
fessed: and abundantly too weak to be by a statesman considered as worth noticing even by so vague and ungrounded a note of reprobation. — As if any one ever thought of denying that both ought to be " attended to r and as if, even in a debating ckib, words so vague and unmeaning as '■^ attended to^ were a fit subject of debate.
What must be confessed is, that to a man who wishes well to his country, and sees a set of men who in his opinion are a bad set, conducting the affairs of it, few things are more provoking than by this or that comparatively unimportant, but so far as it goes beneficial measure, to see them obtain a degree of reputation of which one eftect may be to confirm them in their seat.
But what seems not to have been sufficiently " attended to'' is, that it is by the badness of their measures that the only warrant for giving to the men the appellation of bad men can be grounded: that if they are really the bad men they are supposed to be, have a little patience, and they will come out with some bad measure, against which, it being by the supposition bad, and by yourself looked upon as such, you may without prejudice to your sincerity, point your attacks: and if no such bad measure ever came from them, the imputation of their being bad men, is rather premature.
Distressing indeed to a man of real probity must be the alternative: to sec a set of men fixed in this their all-commanding seat, and making a proportionally extensive and pernicious use of it; or, for the purpose of taking what chance is to be had of precluding them from this advantage, to keep on straining every endeavour to make tlie House and the public look upon as pernicious, a measure of the utility of which he is himself satisfied.
In the abomination of long and regularly corrupt parliaments lies the cause of this distress.
Under this system, when the whole system of abuses has a determined patron on the throne, and that patron has got a set of ministers that suit this ruling purpose, misrule may swell to such a pitch, that without any one measure in such sort bad that you can fix upon it and say this is a sufficient ground for punishment, or even for dismission, the State may be at the brink of ruin: — meantime some measure may be introduced, against which, though good or at least innoxious of itself, the people, by means of some misrepresentation of matter of fact, or some erroneous opinion or other which prevails among them, may to the disgrace and expulsion of the ministry be turned against it, and then comes the distressing alternative.
But were the duration of the assembly short, and the great and surely effective mass of the matter of corruption expelled and kept out of it, no such alternative would ever present itself. The chance of ridding the country of a bad set of ministers would be renewed continually. The question supposed to be tried on each occasion might be the question really tried: whereas at present on each occasion the question tried is but one and the same, viz. Shall the ministry or shall it not continue?
The question brought on the carpet is like the wager in a feigned issue, a mere farce, which, but for its connection with the principal question above mentioned, would not be deemed worth trying, and would not be tried.
CHAPTER XV.
Rejection i?istead of Amendment.
Ad judicium.
E.vposition.
This fallacy consists in urging in the character of a bar, or conclusive objection against the proposed measure, some consideration, which, if presented in the character of a proposed amendment, might have more or less claim to notice.
It generally consists of some real or imaginary inconvenience, alleged commonly, but not necessarily, as eventually to result from the adoption of the measure.
This inconvenience, supposing it real, will either be preponderant over the promised benefit or not preponderant.
In either case it will be either remediable or irremediable.
If at the same time irremediable and preponderant, then it is, and then only, that in the character of an objection it is of itself conclusive.
By him in whose mind discernment and candour are combined, this distinction will be not only felt, but brought to view. If in respect of adequate discernment there be a failure, it will not be felt: if in respect of candour only, it will have been felt, but it will not be brought to view.
The occasion by which opportunity is afforded for the working of this fallacy, is the creation of any new office, including the mass of emolument which, without inquiry into the necessity, or any means taken for keeping down the quantum of it within the narrowed limits which the good of the service admits of, is, by the union of habit with the sinister interest that gave birth to it, annexed as of course, upon their creation, to all new offices.
The fallacy, what there is of fallacy in the case consists in the practice of setting up the two univer^ sally applicable objections, viz.?ieed of eco?iomt/, and mischief or danger from the increase of the influeiice of the crown, in the character of peremptory bars to the proposed measure.
Exposure, Exposure, The groimd on which an objection of this stamp may with propriety be considered and spoken of under the denomination of a fallacy, is where the utility of the proposed new establishment is left unimj)eached, and the sole reason for the rejection proposed to be put upon the proposed measure consists in the above topics or one of them.
In such case, on the part of him by whom any objections so inconclusive in their nature are relied on, the reliance placed on them amounts to a virtual acknowledgement of the utility of the proposed new establishment: inasmuch as in an address from one rational being to another, nothing seems, upoil the face of the statement at least, more unnatural, tiian that if Ch. \5.] FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 551 a man could find any objection that would apply to the particular establishment in question in contradistinction to all others, he should confine himself to an objection vvhich applies alike to almost all existing establishments; that is, to almost the whole frame of the existing government.
Such is the case where the two common-place objections in question, or either of them, are brought out in the character of objections by themselves, and without being accompanied by any specific ones.
But even when added to specific ones, an objection thus inconclusive in its nature, if urged in a direct way, and dwelt upon with any emphasis, can scarcely, at least while there remain any useless places unabolished, or any overpaid places, from which the overplus of emolument remains undefalcated, be exempted from the imputation of irrelevancy.
At any rate, wherever it happens that a minister at present in office sees opposite to him in the House another person who has at any time been in office, it seems an obseiTation not very easy to answer in the character of an argument ad hominem, should it be said, " When you were in office, there were such and such offices which were of no manner of use; these you never used your endeavours to abolish, notwithstandino the use that would have resulted from the abolition, in the shape of diminution of needless expenditure and sinister influence: yet now, when a set of offices is proposed, for which you cannot deny but that there is.so?)ie use, your exertions for the benefit 352 FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [C'/f. 15.
of economy are reserved to be directed against these useful ones."
No doubt but that on the supposition that the two opposite masses of advantage and disadvantage being completely in equilibrio, — advantage in the shape of service expected to be rendered in the proposed new offices on the one hand, disadvantage in the shape of expense of the emolument proposed to be attached to them on the other, — a weight much less than that of the mischief from the increase of sinister influence,-would suffice to turn the scale.
Take also another supposition. Suppose (wliat is not in every case possible) that the value of the service expected to be obtained by means of the proposed new offices is capable of being obtained, and has accordingly been obtained in figures. Suppose on the other hand (what will very frequently be feasible) that the expense of the establishment may with sufficient precision be obtained in figures, and being so obtained, on striking the balance, found to be less than the advantage so expected from the service. Suppose lastly, (what is impossible) that the value of the mischief which, in the shape of introduction of additional influence, were with sufficient precision capable of standing expressed in figures had been so expressed, and being so expressed^ the quantity of mischief in this shape were found sufficient to turn the scale on the side of disadvantage.
Here would be a sufficient reason for tlie rejection of the proposed establishment, and Ihence a sufficient Ch. 15.] FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. S53 warrant for bringing into the field the argument in question, common-place as it is. But in regard to this last supposition at any rate, how far it is from being capable of being realized, is but too evident.
Upon the whole, therefore, so far at least as concerns the objection drawn from the increase that would result to the sinister influence of the crown, it may be said that whatsoever time is spent in descanting upon this topic may be set down to the account of lost time.
It is a topic, the importance of which is surdy sufficient to entide it to be considered by itself. The influence of the crown, it ought always to be remembered, can no otherwise receive with propriety the epithet sinister, than in so far as, by being directed to and reaching a member of Parliament or a parliamentary elector, it affects the purity of Parliament. But by a system of measures properly directed to that end, the constitution of Parliament might be eflfectually guarded against any degree of impurity capable of being productive of any sensible inconvenience, whatsoever were the lucrativeness of the utmost number of offices, for the creation or preservation of which so much as a plausible reason could be found: and were it otherwise, the proper remedy would be found, not in the refusal to create any new office, the service of which was understood to overbalance in any determinate and unquestionable degree the mischief of the expense, but in the taking the nomination out of the hands of the crown, and vesting it in some other and independent hands.
354 FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [Cll. 15.
The putting all placesinthese respects upon the same footing— necessary and unnecessary ones, — properly paid and overpaid ones, — 'wears out and weakens that energy which should be reserved for, and directed with all its force against, unnecessary places, and the overplus part of the pay of overpaid ones.
Another occasion on which this fallacy is often wont to be applied, is the case in which, from the mere observation of a profit as likely from any transaction to accrue to this or that individual, a censure is grounded, pronouncing it dijob.
The error in case of sincerity, the fallacy in case of insincerity, consists, in forgetting that individuals are the stuff of which the public is made; that there is no way of benefiting the public but by benefiting individuals; and that a benefit which, in the shape of pleasure or exemption from pain, does not sooner or later come home to the bosom of at least some one individual, is not in reality a benefit — is not entitled to that name.
So far then from constituting an argument in disfavour of the proposed measure, every benefit that can be pointed out as accruing or likely to accrue to any determinate individual or individuals, constitutes, as far as it goes, an argument in favour of the measure.
In no case whatsoever — on no imaginable supposition— can this consideration serve with propriety in the character of an argument in disfavour of any measure. In no case whatsoever — on no imaginable supposition — can it, so far as it goes, fail of serving Ch, 15.] FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. S55 with propriety in the character of an argument in favour of the measure. Is the measure good? — It adds to the mass of its advantages. Is the measure upon the whole a bad one? — It subtracts, by the whole amount of it, from the real amount of the disadvantages attached to the measure.
At the same time in practice, there is no argument, perhaps, which is more frequently employed, or on which more stress is laid, without doors at any rate, if not within doors, than this, in the character of an argument in disfavour of a proposed measure: no argument which, even when taken by itself, is with more confidence relied on in the character of a conclusive one.
To what cause is so general a perversion of the faculty of reason to be ascribed?
Two causes present themselves as acting in this character: 1. It is apt to be received (and that certainly not without reason) in the character of evidence — conclusive evidence — of the nature of the motive, to the influence of which the part taken by the supporters of the measure, or some of them, (viz. all who in any way are partakers of the private benefit in question,) ought to be ascribed.
In this character, to the justness of the conclusion thus drawn, there can in general be nothing to object.
But the consideration of the motive in which the part taken either by the supporters or the opposers of a measure finds its cause, has elsewhere been shown S56 rALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [C/l. 15.
to be a consideration altogether irrelevant*; and the use of the argument has been shown to be of the number of those fallacies, the influence of which is in its natural and general tendency unfavourable to every good cause.
The other cause is the prevalence of the passion of envy. To the man to whom it is an object of envy, the good of another man is evil to himself. By the envy of the speaker or writer, the supposed advantage to the third person is denounced in the character of an evil, to the envy of the hearers or the readers: — denounced, and perhaps without any perception of the mistake, so rare is the habit of self-examination, and so gross and so perpetual the errors into which, for want of it, the human mind is capable of being led.
In speaking of the passion or affection of envi/, as being productive of this fallacious argument, and of the error, but for which shame would frequently restrain a man from the employment of it, it is not meant to speak of this passion or this affection as one of which, on the occasion in question, the influence ought to be considered as pernicious on the whole.
So far from being pernicious, the more thoroughly it is considered, the more closely it will be seen to be salutary upon the whole; and not merely salutary, at least in the best state of things that has yet been realized, but so necessary, that without it, society would hardly have been kept together.
* See Part 2. Personalities.
Ch. 15.] TALLACJES OF CONFUSION. 357 The legislator who resolves not to accept assistance from any but social motives, from none, save what in his vocabulary pass under the denomination of pure motives, will find his laws without vigour and without use.
The judge who resolves to have no prosecutors who are brought to him by any but pure motives, will not find that part of his emolument which, under the present system of abuse, is composed of fees, and may save himself the trouble of going into court — of sitting on penal causes. The judge who should determine to receive no evidence but what was at the same time brought to him, and, when before him, guided by pure motives, need scarcely trouble himself to hear evidence.
The practical inference is — that, if he would avoid drawing down disgrace upon himself instead of upon the measure he is opposing, a nrian ought to abstain from employing this argument in confutation of the fallacy; since, in as far as he employs it, he is employing in refutation of one fallacy (and that so gross an one, that the bare mention of it in that character may naturally be sufficient to reduce the employer to silence), he is employing another fallacy, which is of itself susceptible of a refutation no less easy and conclusive.
It is only by the interests, the affections, the passions (all these words mean nothing more than the same psychological object appearing in different characters), that the legislator, labouring for the good and in the service of mankind, can effect his j)urposes. Those interests, acting in the character of motives, may be of the self-regarding class, the dissocial, or the social: — the social he will, on every occasion where he finds them already iu action, endeavour not only to engage in his service, but cherish and cultivate: the self-regarding and the dissocial, though his study will be rather to restrain than encourage them, he will at any rate, wherever he sees them in action or likely to come into action, use his best endeavours to avail himself of directing their influence, with whatever force he can muster, to his own social purposes.
PART THE FIFTH.
Characters common to all these Fallacies.
Upon the whole, the following are the characters which appertain in common to all the several arguments here distinguished by the name of fallacies: 1. Whatsoever be the measure in hand, they are, with relation to it, irrelevant.
2. They are all of them such, that the application of these irrelevant arguments, affords a presumption either of the weakness or total absence of relevant arguments on the side on which they are employed.
3. To any. good purpose they are all of them unnecessary.
4. They are all of them not only capable of being applied, but actually in the habit of being applied, and with advantage, to bad purposes: viz. to the obstruction and defeat of all such measures as have for their object and their tendency, the removal of the abuses or other imperfections still discernible in the frame and practice of the government.
5. By means of their irrelevancy, they all of them consume and misapply time, thereby obstructing the course, and retarding the progress of all necessary and useful business.
6. By that irritative quality which, in virtue of their irrelevancy, with the improbity or weakness of which it is indicative, they possess, all of them, in a degree more or less considerable, but, in a more particular degree such of them as consist in personalities, they are productive of ill-humour, which in some instances has been productive of bloodshed, and is continually productive as above, of waste of time and hindrance of business.
7. On the part of those who, whether in spoken or written discourses, give utterance to them, they are indicative either of improbity or intellectual weakness, or of a contempt for the understandings of those on whose minds they are destined to operate.
8. On the part of those on whom they operate, they are indicative of intellectual weakness: and on the part of those in and by whom they are pretended to operate, they are indicative of improbity, viz. in the shape of insincerity.
The practical conclusion is, that in proportion as the acceptance and thence the utterance of them can be prevented, the understanding of the public will be strengthened, the morals of the public will be purified, and the practice of government improved.
Ch. 2.] MISCHIEF PRODUCIBLE. 361 CHAPTER 11.
Of the mischief producible by Fallacies, The first division that presents itself in relation to the mischief of a fallacy, may be expressed by the words specific and general.
The specific mischief of a fallacy, consists in the tendency which it has to prevent or obstruct the introduction of this or that useful measure in particular.
The general mischief, consists in that moral or intellectual depravation which produces habits of false reasoning and insincerity: — this mischief may again be distinguished into mischief produced within doors and mischief produced without doors.
Under the appellation of mischief within doors, is to be understood all that mischief, that deception, which has its seat in the bosom of any member of the supreme legislative body.
Under the appellation of mischief without doors, all that which has its seat in the bosom of any person not included in that body, — of any person whose station is among the people at large.
362 CAUSES OF UTTERANCE. [C/l. 3.
Causes of the utterance of these Fallacies.
The causes of the utterance of these fallacies may, it should seem, be thus denominated and enumerated.
1. Sinister interest — self-conscious sinister interest.
4. Self-defence, i. e. sense of the need of selfdefence against counter fallacies.
First Cause.
Sinister interest, of the operation of which the parti/ affected by it is conscious.
The mind of every public man is subject at all times to the operation of two distinct interests; a public and a private one. His public interest is that which is constituted of the share he has in the happiness and M'ell-being of the whole community, or of the major part of it: his private interest is constituted of, or by, the share he has in the well-being of some portion of the community less than the major part: of which private interest the smallest possible portion is that which is composed of his own individual — his own personal — interest.
In the greater number of instances, these two interests are not only distinct, but opposite: and that to Ch. 3.] CAUSES OF UTTERANCE. 363 such a degree, that if either be exclusively pursued, the other must be sacrificed to it.
Take for example pecuniary interest: It is the personal interest of every public man, at whose disposal public money extracted by taxes from the whole community is placed, that as large a share as possible, and if possible the whole of it, should remain there for his own use: it is at the same time the interest of the public, including his own portion of the public interest, that as small a share as possible, and if possible no part at all, remain in these same hands for his personal or any other private use.
Taking the whole of life together, there exists not, nor ever can exist, that human being in whose instance any public interest he can have had, will not in so far as depends upon himself, have been sacrificed to his own personal interest. Towards the advancement of the public interest all that the most public-spirited, which is as much as to say the most virtuous of men can do, is to do what depends upon himself towards bringing the public interest, that is his own personal share in the public interest, to a state as nearly approaching to coincidence, and on as few occasions amounting to a state of repugnance, as possible with his private interests.