isL The Ego we have hitherto been al^e only to characterize as feeling, as a feeling Ego an.1 nothing else. The reflected Ego is limited me «, there fore, it feels itself limited, feels an outsid >mpulsion. Again, in so far as the Ego posr- elf as limited, it goes beyond the limit, that i> >osits, at the same time, a Non-Ego, but without iousness of its action.
The feeling of compulsion is, there-" ' nited with a contemplation, but an unconscio - 'templation, of the Non-Ego.
Both the itself- feeling E^o and the cr> •: ited Non-Ego must be synthetically unii<-: < is done by the limit The Kgo, because i it- 2l8 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
self limited, posits the contemplated Non-Ego as the cause of its limitation, as the explanation of the feeling of compulsion.
But the difficulty is, where does the original feel ing of compulsion arise from? To be sure, I ex plain it by the Non-Ego, but the feeling precedes the contemplation of the Non-Ego. Hence, it must be explained independently of the Non-Ego. This question leads to our second, the antithesis.
2d. The act of the reflecting Ego we have cha racterized as absolutely spontaneous, ideal activity of the Ego. As such it must be posited, that is, as going beyond the limit into the infinite. But to be reflected upon, it can not go into the infinite; hence, in its going beyond the limit, it must nevertheless be limited. There must be a limitation conjointly with the unlimitedness. How?
The activity can not be reflected as activity, (the Ego can never become immediately conscious of its activity,) but as substrate, that is, as product of an absolute activity of the Ego, a product contem plated by the Ego without consciousness of the contemplation. Hence, in so far as the Ego re flects upon the absolute spontaneity of its reflection in the first act, an unlimited product of the activity of the Ego, as such, is posited. This product, po sited as product of the Ego, must be placed in rela tion to the Ego. It can not be related to the contem plating Ego, for this Ego has not yet been posited; it must be related to the Ego which feels itself limited. But this latter Ego is opposed to that Ego which produces through freedom an unlimited; the Ego which feels itself limited is not free, but is under compulsion; and the producing Ego is not compelled, but produces spontaneously.
Thus, indeed, it must be, if relation and syn thetical union is to be possible and necessary; and we have only to find the ground of the relation.
This ground must be activity with freedom, or absolute activity. But such an activity can not be predicated of the limited Ego; hence, a union of both seems impossible.
One step more, and we shall find the surprising result, putting an end to all old errors, and reinstat ing reason for evermore in her eternal rights.
The Ego is to be the relating. Hence, the Ego necessarily, absolutely of itself, and against the out ward ground of limitation, proceeds beyond itself, and thus appropriates the product which, through freedom, it makes its own product; ground of re lation and the relating link are the same.
Of this act the Ego never becomes conscious, and never can become conscious; its essence con-i sists in absolute spontaneity, and, as soon as you! reflect upon it, it ceases to be spontaneity. The Ego is only free in acting; as soon as it reflects upon this act, it ceases to be free, and the act be comes product From the impossibility of the consciousness of a free act arises the whole distinction between ideality and reality, between representation and the thing' in itself.
Freedom, or, which is the same, the immediate acting of the Ego, is the uniting link of ideality and reality. The Ego is free in positing itself as free, in liberating itself; and it posits itself as free, or liberates itself in being free. Detenninateness and being are one; acting and product are one; in de termining itself to act, the Ego acts; and in acting it determines itsel£ The Ego can not posit itself in reflection as free, for this would be a contradiction which could never lead to freedom. But it appropriates something as product of its o\vn free activity, and thus mediately posits itself free.
3d. The Ego is limited in feeling itself, and posits itself in so far as limited. This was our first state ment. The Ego is free, and posits itself at least mediately as free, because it posits the limitation as product of its free activity. This was our second statement. Both statements, limitation in feeling and freedom in producing, are utterly opposites. They might be united by showing that the Ego could posit itself in different respects as free and limited. But our statements have distinctly assert-•ed that the Ego is to posit itself as limited, because and in so far as it posits itself free, and *v ice versa. The Ego is to be free and limited in one and the same respect, and this is the contradic tion which is to be solved in a third statement Let us look at the two statements a little closer.
THESIS.
THESIS.
1st. The Ego is to posit itself as limited because and in so far as it posits itself as free; or, the Ego is free only in so far as it acts. Now, What is act ing? What its distinction from not-acting? All acting presupposes power. Absolute acting means, a power determining itself solely through and in itself, that is, giving itself a direction. Before, the power had no direction, was latent power, a mere tendency to apply power. The Ego, to posit itself as absolutely acting, must, therefore, in reflection, also be able to posit itself as not-acting. To deter mine itself as acting presupposes rest Again, the power gives itself a direction, that is, an object. Gives itself an object; hence, it must have had the object before; must have received the object passively. Hence, a self-determining to act on the part of the Ego presupposes passivity.
New difficulties even-where! But from them «/ the clearest light will be thrown upon a subject ANTITHESIS.
2d. The Ego is to posit itself as free because and in so far as it posits itself as limited. The Ego posits itself as limited means, it posits a limit to its activity, (it does not produce this limit, but posits it as posited by an opposite power, a Non-Ego.) Hence, in order to be limited passively, the Ego must previously have acted; its power must have had a direction, and a self-determined direction. All limitation presupposes free activity.
3d. The Ego is as yet for itself limited, necessi tated, in so far as it goes beyond the limitation and posits a Non-Ego -which it contemplates without self-consciousness. Now, this Non-Ego is, as we have seen from our higher stand-point, a product of the Ego, and the Ego must reflect upon it as its product. This reflection necessarily occurs through absolute self-activity.
But the Ego, this very same activity, can not, at the same time, produce a Non-Ego and reflect upon it as its production.
Hence, it must interrupt its first activity; and must so interrupt it through absolute spontaneity. Only thus, indeed, is absolute spontaneity possible. For the Ego is to determine itself. But the Ego is in essence nothing but activity. Hence, it must limit one of its acts; and, because it is nothing but activity, it must limit the act by another opposite act.
Again, the Ego is to posit its product, the oppo site Non-Ego as its product Through the same act which interrupts the first one it thus posits the Non-Ego, and elevates it to a higher degree of re flection. The lower, first region of reflection is thus broken off; and all we have to do now is to seek the point of union of both forms of reflection.
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 22J But since the Ego is never immediately conscious of its acting, it can posit the product as its product only through a new reflection by mediation.
Through this new reflection the product must be posited as product of absolute freedom, the distinc tive characteristic whereof is, that it might be other wise, or might be posited otherwise. Contemplation floats between several determinations, and posits amongst all possible determinations only one, where by the product receives the peculiar character of an image* In so far as the Ego posits this image as product of its activity, it necessarily opposes to it something which is not its product, which is no longer determinable, but perfectly determined, and thus deter mined through itself, not through the Ego. This is the real tiring by which the Ego is guided in * Let us exemplify this by an object with various characteristics. In the first contemplation, the productive contemplation, I am lost in an object I reflect upon myself at first, find myself, and dis tinguish myself from the object But as yet all is mixed and con fused in the object, and it is nothing further than an object I then begin to reflect upon its several characteristics, for instance, its figure, color, etc, and posit them in my consciousness. At each separate characteristic of this kind, I am at first in doubt and hesi tating. I then make some arbitrary scheme of a figure, color, etc, the basis of my observation, and now observe closer. And now I first begin to determine my scheme of the figure, perhaps as a cube, and my scheme of a color, perhaps as dark green. By this process of going from an undetermined product of free imagination to its complete dcterminateness in one and the same act, that which ocean in my consciousness becomes an image, and is posited as an image. It becomes my product, because I must posit it as determined through absolute self-activity.
224 THL SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
sketching its image, and which must, therefore, ne cessarily appear to it in its imaging, (in its repre sentation.) This real thing is the product of the interrupted act, but which can not now be possibly posited as such product.
The Ego images after this thing. Hence, the thing must be entertained in the Ego and accessi ble to its activity; or, in other words, we must be able to show a ground of relation between the thing and the image of the thing. Such a ground of re lation is the perfectly determined but unconscious contemplation of the thing. For and in this coniemplation all the characteristics of the thing are perfectly determined, and in so far it is related to the thing, and the Ego is passive in the contempla tion. Still, it is also an act of the Ego, and, hence, relatable to the Ego, active in the imaging of this thing. The Ego has access to this contemplation and determines the image in accordance with the characteristics furnished in the contemplation. In other words, the Ego reviews spontaneously the several characteristics of the thing, enumerates them, and gives its attention to them. Or, this un conscious contemplation is the ground of all har mony we assume between our representations and the things, and explains the whole difficulty.
In imaging, the Ego is perfectly free. The image is determined thus, because the Ego freely so determines it; and this freedom makes the image relatable to the Ego, and capable of being posited in the Ego as its product. But the image is to be THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 22C not empty, but corresponding to a thing outside of the Ego; hence, it must be relatable to this thing. The thing has become relatable to the Ego, as we have seen, by means of a presupposed immediate unconscious contemplation thereof. The image, to be related to the Ego, must be determined by the thing so as to be an exact counterpart of it, and this complete and same determination of image and thing is their ground of relation. There is no dis tinction now at all between the image and the un-* conscious contemplation of the thing.
But this result is a contradiction of our formei statement, that nothing which is necessarily de termined as such or such can be a product of the Ego.
What in our former statement was a representa tion, now becomes a thing per se, and the question still remains, whether there are only things and no representations, as the last result would imply, or representations and no real things, as our former statement asserted.
A synthetic solution of these conflicting state ments would assert: an image is not at all possible without a thing; and a thing — at least for the Ego — is not possible without an image.
The Ego is to relate the image to the thing. This relation, we must show, is not possible with out presupposing the image as such, that is, as free product of the Ego. In other words, the thing is not possible without the image.
Again, the Ego is to construct the image with freedom. It must be shown that this is not possi ble without presupposing the thing; or, that the image is not possible without the thing, of course, for the Ego.
ist The Ego is to relate the image to the thing. As this act of the Ego does not occur in immediate consciousness, it is difficult to see how a distinction can be posited between the image and the thing, unless the Ego occurs mediately in consciousness, that is, unless the object (or unconscious produc tion) of the activity of the Ego (the thing) is posited as product of freedom, that is, as accidental, as a thus which could be otherwise.
The thing is thus posited as accidental, in so far as the perfectly determined image is related to it The perfectly determined image, for instance, or quality, is the red color. This is to be related to a thing by an absolute act of the Ego. The thing is to be determined by the image. Hence, the thing must be posited before this relation, and independently of it, as such, which may be, or may not be, thus determined; and is only thus posited as accidentally determined in consequence of the act of relation. Plence, the thing discovers itself, since its quality is altogether accidental, as presup posed product of the Ego, which has no predicate but that of being. The free act, and the necessity that such a free act should occur, is the only ground for proceeding from the undetermined to the de termined, and vice versa.
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 22?
ANOTHER ILLUSTRATION OF THIS POINT.
You say A is red. A, the first posited, is posited as, firstly, completely determined by itsel£ A is A, and nothing else. Now, you add and say, A is red. Red is also completely determined, it is what it is, and nothing else. Now, you join both togeth er. What was A, as far as redness is concerned, before this joining? Evidently altogether undeter mined. You might have predicated any color of it. It is the joining, expressed by the copula is, which makes the undetermined determined, which negates all other determinations but the one stated, If A had been previously determined, you could not have made an assertion of it Result: If the reality of tJie thing (as substance) is presupposed, the quality thereof is posited as acci dental, aiid hence the thing is mediately posited as product of the Ego.
It is the quality of the thing to which we relate the Ego.
2d The Ego is to construct the image with per fect freedom. In so far as it does this, floating be tween many possible determinations of the thing and choosing one, the Ego mediately posits itself as Ego, and limits itself The image is not yet de termined, but it is being determined; the Ego is in the act of determining. We will call this its condi tion, A. (It is the inner contemplation of the Ego in constructing.)
In so far as the Ego acts, it posits over and against this free floating image, and mediately against itself, the imaging, the perfectly determined quality, of which we have said above that it is taken up and seized by the Ego, by means of the im mediate but unconscious contemplation of the thing. This determined quality is posited as opposite, hence as excluded from the Ego. We will call it B.
If A is totality, B is excluded from it; but, if B is posited, A is excluded from the totality. For the Ego posits the quality as determined, and must do so if it is to posit itself as free in the imaging. The Ego must, therefore, reflect on this determina tion of the quality; and by this the Ego is excluded from the totality; that is, it is no longer self-suffi cient, no longer through itself, but through another and an opposite; that is, its condition, its reflection, the image within it, can no longer be explained altogether out of itself, but only by an external other. Hence, we brre A 4- B, or A determined by B as totality. (External, determined, pure con templation.)
The reflection must turn upon A 4- B in this their connection, that is, it must turn upon the quality, as a dctmr^r^d, particular quality, if the quality is to be in the Ego, or in consciousness. This reflection occurs, of course, like every reflec tion, through absolute spontaneity; the Ego reflects because it is Ego. It does not become conscious of this spontaneity; b^t the object of its reflection. as such, becomes product of this spontaneity, and THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 22O, must, therefore, bear the character of a product of a free act, that is, accidtntalncss. But it can not be accidental in the same manner in which it is posit ed as determined, hence it must be so in another respect. We shall soon see how.
This accidental character makes it a product of the Ego; the Ego, therefore, determines itself again, and this it can not do without opposing to itself something, that is, a Non-Ego.
(The Ego reflects with freedom, an act of deter mining which, by its very nature, becomes itself determined; but it can not reflect or posit a limit without, at the same time, absolutely producing something as that which forms the limit. Deter mining and producing, therefore, always go toge ther; and it is this which keeps up the identity of consciousness.)
This something, opposed to the Ego, is necessary in relation to the determined quality; and this quali ty is accidental in relation to the something. Again, this something, like the quality, is opposed to the Ego, and hence, like it, is a Non-Ego, but a neces sary Non-Ego.
But the quality, as determined, as something against which the Ego is merely passive, we have seen, must be excluded from the Ego; and the Ego, when reflecting upon it as so determined, must thus exclude it 230 TJIE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
Now, we have just found another Non-Ego, which the Ego, in reflecting, excludes as determined and necessary. Both, therefore, must be placed in rela tion to each other and be synthetically united. Their ground of union is that both are Non-Ego, and hence, in relation to the Ego, both are one and the same; their ground of distinction is, that the quality is accidental, might be otherwise; but the substrate, as such, is necessary in relation to the quality. The quality must have a substrate, but the substrate must not necessarily have this particular quality. Such a relation of the accidental to the necessary in their synthetical union is called the relation of substantiality.
The reflection must turn upon the excluded B, the necessary Non-Ego. From this reflection it follows that A + B, which was heretofore posited. as totality, can no longer be totality, that is, can no longer be the only contents of the Ego, and hence accidental It must be determined by the necessary B. The formula now is, A + B determined by B.
First of all, the quality, the image, or whatever you choose to call it, must be thus determined by the necessary Non-Ego. This quality was posited as accidental, the thing as necessary; both, there fore, as opposites. Now, in the reflection of the Ego, they must be united in the same Ego. This is done by absolute spontaneity. The union is al together product of the Ego. The union is posited means, a product is posited through the Ego. The Ego, however, is never immediately conscious of its THE SCIENCE OF A'.VOH'LEDGE. 2JI acting, but only in and by means of the product The union of both must, therefore, be posited as acci dental; and since all accidental is posited as arising through acting, it follows that the union itself must be posited as having arisen through acting. But that which, in its existence, is itself accidental and dependent, can not be posited as acting; hence, only the necessary can be thus posited. Hence, in the reflection, and by means of it, the conception of acting is transferred to the necessary, though in reality this conception lies only in the reflecting, and the accidental is posited as product thereof as expression of the free activity of the necessary. Such a synthetical relation is called the relation of causality, and the thing, viewed in this synthetic union of the necessary and the accidental in it, is the real thing* * We append at this important point the following remarks: 1. The just discovered act of the Ego is evidently an act through the power of imagination in contemplation; for, firstly, the Ego unites opposites in it, which is the business of imagination; and, secondly, it loses itself in this act, and transfers what is in it upon the object of its activity, which is the characteristic of contempla tion.
2. The so-called category of causality shows itself here, therefore, as having its origin only in the power of imagination, and thus it is indeed; nothing can get into the understanding except through the power of imagination, What alteration the understanding mar make of this product of the imagination can here already be fore seen. We have posited the thing as acting free without any rule, (and until the understanding comprehends its own manner of acting it is thus posited in consciousness as /.iff,) because the power of imagination transfers to it its own free acting. The sequence of a law is wanting. Whenever understanding shall be directed upon That which we have called expression of the ac tivity of the thing, and which we found perfectly determined, is posited in the Ego, and is determined the «hi«g so as to comprehend it according to law, then the thing will also appear as working in obedience to those laws.
3. KA.TT, who causes the categories to be originally generated as forms *f thinking, and who, from his point of view, is very correct in this, stands in need of the schemes sketched by the understand ing in order to make possible their application to the objects; hence, he does as we do, and makes them accessible to the working of the imagination. In the science of knowledge these categories arise in frrpCTnatirtn itself, at the same time and together -with the efy'eeti, aad in order to make these first possible.
4. MAIXON vkws the category of causality in the same manner as the science of knowledge; only he calls this procedure of the human mind a deception. But we have seen that that can not be called deception which is proper and necessary by virtue of the laws of a rational being, and which can not be avoided unless we wish to cease being rational beings. But the real point of dispute lies here. MAIMON would say: "Supposing, as I admit, that your laws of thinking are a priori, then you can certainly apply them to objects only by the power of imagination; and hence, in applying them, object and law roust be, at the same time, in imagination. But how do yon get the object?" The answer is, Imagination itself must pro duce the object If you assert the object to be produced in any other manner, you become a transcendent dogmatist, and utterly removed from critical philosophy.
5. MAIMON has only doubted the applicability of the law of causality, but he might as well have doubted all <3 priori laws. This HUME does. He says: " It is your self who transfer the con ception of causality which you have in you to the external things, jmd hence your knowledge has no objective validity." KANT admits the first part of the sentence not only with respect to the law of causality, but for all h priori laws; but he rejects the conclusion by proving that an object is only possible for a subject MAIMON says, it is only by imagination that you apply the law of causality to objects; hence your knowledge has no objective validity, and it is a mere deception if you apply your laws of thinking to objects. The science of knowledge admits the premise not only for the law of for the Ego, as we have also seen. Hence, the Ego mediately is determined by the thing, and thus, ceasing to be Ego, becomes itself product of the Non-Ego, because that which fills it is product of the Non-Ego or of the thing. The thing, by means of this its expression, works even upon the Ego, and the Ego is no longer posited through itself, but posited in this its determination through the thing, (This is the famous influence of the thing upon the Ego, or the physical influence of the LOCKE school and of the new eclecticians, who, from the utterly heterogeneous components of the LEIBNITZ and the LOCKE systems, have composed an unconnected whole, the true statement of which we have just now attempted, but which has truth also only in this transitory connection.)
But the Ego can not be Ego and product of the Non-Ego. Such, however, was the result of our formula: A + B determined by B. Hence, this formula must be again posited in the Ego, or must be again determined by A A, that is, the effect which was said to have been produced in the Ego by the thing, is posited with respect to the Ego as accidental. Hence, there is necessarily opposed to this effect and to the Ego, in so far as it is determined thereby, an indepen dent in itself and through itself existing Ego. Just as we opposed to the accidental in the Non-Ego causality, but for all a priori laws, but shows by a closer determina tion of the object that our knowledge has objective validity for that very reason, and can only have it on that condition.
the necessary thing, so we now oppose to the acci dental in the Ego the necessary or the E.go fer se; and this latter, like the necessary Non-Ego, is pro duct of the Ego itsel£ The necessary is substance; the accidental an accidence of it. Both must be synthetically united as one and the same Ego. But since they are absolute opposites, they can only be united by absolute activity of the Ego, whereof the Ego never becomes immediately con scious, but rather applies it to the objects of the reflection, thus positing the relation of causality between the two. In the reflecti:.:h-r accidental becomes effect of the activity of;,>/j?l solute Ego and hence something real for the Ego, its utter ance. That it is effect of the Non-Ego is altogether lost sight of in this reflection, since it can not be posited at the same time as effect of the Ego and of the Non-Ego. Thus, the thing and its utter ance are completely excluded from the Ego and opposed to it Both the Ego and the Non-Ego exist in themo o selves necessary, and both completely independent of each other; 'both utter themselves in this inde pendence, each by its own activity and power, which power, however, is as yet perfectly free.
We have now shown how we came to oppose an acting Ego and an acting Non-Ego, and to consider both as completely independent of each other. In our present view the Non-Ego exists because it exists, and is altogether determined through itself; but that it is imaged, represented by the Ego, is accidental for the Non-Ego. Again, the Ego acts ab solutely through itself; but that it images the Non-Ego is accidental for it The utterance of the thing in its appearance is product of the thing; but the appearance, in so far as it exists for the Ego, is again product of the Ego.
The Ego can not act without having an object; hence, the acting of the Ego posits that of the Non-Ego. Again, the Non-Ego can not act, that is, for tJu Ego, unless the acting of the Ego is preposited. The utterance of both powers is, therefore, neces sarily synthetically united, and we must now show the ground of their union, their harmony.
This union occurs through absolute spontaneity. But what is posited through freedom has the cha racter of the accidental; hence, the present syn thetical union must have this character. It is, therefore, the accidental unity of the acting we have to examine, or the r.ccidental junction of the acting of the Ego, and of the acting of the Non-Ego in a third, which is and can be nothing but their junction, and which we shall call for the present a foint.
TIME AND SPACE, Contemplation is determined in time, and the con templated in space.
We have determined contemplation, in our last paragraph, as the synthetical union of the acting of the Ego and of the acting of the Non-Ego through their accidental junction in a point This contem plation occurs in the Ego means, it is posited as acci dental. The contemplation X is posited as contem plation accidental means, another contemplation — not another object, determination, or any such thing, but — another contemflatwn, which we shall call Y, is opposed to it Y is necessary when opposed to X, and X is accidental in opposition to Y. Y is, therefore, completely excluded from the Ego, which rests in the contemplation of X.
X, as contemplation, necessarily rests in a point. So does Y, but in an opposite, distinct point One point is not the other.
The question is now, What necessity is it which Y has in relation to X, and what accidentalness which X has in relation to Y? Clearly, the con templation Y and its point are necessarily syntheti cally united if X is to be united with its point, or the union of X and its point presupposes that of Y and its point, but not vice versa. In that point wherein X is posited another contemplation viight be posited; at least, so the Ego judges; but in the point of Y none but Y can be posited, if X is to be posited as contemplation of the Ego. Only in so far as the accidentalness of this synthesis is posited, is X to be posited as contemplation of the Ego; and only in so far as to this accidentalness is op posed the necessity of the same synthesis is the accidentalness itself to be posited.
The much more difficult question remains, how the points X and Y are to be otherwise determined than through the respective contemplations X and Y. As yet they are only points wherein a causal ity of the Ego and the Non-Ego meet It is, how ever, dear that, if X is to be posited as the point wherein another contemplation may be posited, and Y as its opposite in which no other can be posited, both points dirempt from their contemplations, and must be distinguishable from each other. We can not yet see Jww this is possible, but we can see t/utt it must be possible if ever a contemplation is to be ascribed to the Ego.
1st We have shown before that, if A is posited as totality, B is excluded. If A signifies the image to be determined spontaneous!}', B signifies the inde pendent and necessary quality of the image. ' We now apply this here. — From the contemplation X, as such, the determined object X is excluded; and the same in the contemplation Y. Both objects, as such, are determined; that is, the Ego in contem plation must posit them exactly as it posits them. This, their determinateness, is to remain, of course.
But the same relation which exists between the contemplations must exist between the objects. Hence, the object X is accidental 'in reference to Y, but Y necessary in reference to X. The deter mination of X necessarily presupposes that of the Y, but not vice versa.
But since both objects, as objects of contemplation* are perfectly determined, their postulated relation can have no reference to this determinateness, but must refer to another as yet unknown determinateness, one through which something does not be come an object generally, but an object of a con templation distinguishable from another contempla tion. The required determination does not belong to the inner determinations of the object, (in so far as it is A = A,) but is an external one. Unless we have the required distinction, a contemplation can not be posited in the Ego. The distinction, however, is not possible without this external determinateness of the object, and the object can not be an object of contemplation without this determinateness. It is, therefore, the exclusive condition of all contemplation. We call this unknown some what through which the object is to be determined O; the way in which Y is determined through it, we call Z; and the way in which X is determined through it, V.
The mutual relation is, therefore, as follows: X must be posited as to be or not to be synthetically united with V, and hence V also as to be united thus with X or with any other object; but Y must be posited as necessarily in synthetical union with Z, if X is to be united with V.
If V is posited as to be united with X, or as not to be united with X, Y is posited necessarily as united with Z. From this it results that every pos sible object may be united with V except Y, for Y is already inseparably united. Thus, also, may X be united with every possible O, except with Z, for this is inseparably united with Y.
X and Y are both completely excluded from the THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 2J9 Ego; the Ego loses and forgets itself completely in their contemplation. The relation we have here.shown up is, therefore, to be ascribed to the things themselves; the relation appears to the Ego as not •dependent upon its freedom, but aS determinedthrough the things.
The relation was: because Z is united with Y, X is excluded from it It must, therefore, applied to the things, be expressed thus: Y excludes X from Z; Y determines X negatively. If Y extends to the point d, X goes to this point; if it only extends to c, X goes to c. But since the only ground why X can not be united to Z is this, that Y excludes it, X certainly begins where Y ceases to exclude it; hence, continuity belongs to both.