This exclusion, this continuity is not possible unless X and Y are both in a common sphere, (which •we do not know as yet,) and meet in one point in this sphere. The positing of this sphere constitutes the synthetic union of both as required. Hence, such a common sphere is produced by the absolute -spontaneity of the power of imagination.
2d We have shown before that, if the excluded B is reflected upon, A is thereby excluded from the to tality, from the Ego. But since B has been posited in the Ego by reflection, and is, therefore, itself posited in union with A as totality, (as accidental,) it follows that another B, in reference to which it is accidental, must be excluded or posited as a neces sary opposite. We now apply this here.
Y is now, with reference to its synthetical union with an unknown O, determined; and X in respect to, and by means of, Y, is also at least negavtiely determined But if they are to be united with A, or to be po sited in the Ego, they must be posited as accidental also in this respect, that is, a necessary X and Y must be opposed to them, in regard to which they are accidental: substances whereof they are accidences.
This necessary X and Y, whereof the accidental X and Y in the Ego are the utterances, are their presupposed powers, free powers. The same rela tion which exists between X and Y as utterances exists, therefore, between these powers. The ut terance of power Y is utterly independent of that of power X; but the latter in its utterance is de pendent upon and conditioned by Y. Conditioned, that is, the utterance of Y does not determine the utterance X positively, but negatively; not the qualitativeness of X, but in this that X can not utter itself in a certain manner.
But it has been expressly stated that X as well as Y are to utter themselves through free, unlimited causality. How, then, can X be conditioned by Y? Evidently X has causality as well as Y, and the causality of the latter is not the condition of that of the former; Y does not compel or urge X to utter itsel£ Nor does it determine the character of this, the utterance or causality of X. But how, then, does it condition it?
X and Y are to be in a synthetical relation to an THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, 24!
unknown O. For in and only through their rela tion to O are they mutually related. Each must, therefore, have- an independent relation to O.
O must be a something which leaves to both per fect freedom of causality, for in this, their free cau sality, are they to be united with O. And since the resistance of every power to a causality limits that causality, O can have no power, no activity, no intension. It can, therefore, have no reality at all, and is nothing.
We have seen how Y and Z being synthetically united, X is excluded from Z. We have also seen, now, that this synthetical union of Y and Z is ef fected through the own free causality of the inner power Y. Not that Z is product of the power Y, but, being necessarily united with Y, it must also have a distinctive feature. Now, this union of Y and Z excludes the causality of X and its product from Z; hence, Z is the sphere of causality of Y, and is nothing but this sphere; it is nothing in it self, has no reality, and can have no predicate but the one just shown up.
Again, Z is sphere of causality only of Y; for, by being posited as such a sphere of Y, X and all other possible object is excluded from it. The " sphere of the causality of Y " means the same as " Z;" both are in all respects the same. The causality of Y fills vp Z, that is, excludes all other but the causality of Y.
If Z goes to c, d, or e, the causality of X is thus far excluded. But, since the latter is only excluded because Y excludes it, there is necessarily conti nuity between the spheres of causality of both, and both meet or join in a point The power of imagi nation unites both and posits Z and — Z, or, as we determined it above, V = O.
But the causality of X is to remain free altlwugk excluded from Z. This exclusion would not leave X free, if the causality of Y in Z negated or can celed something in X, or made any in itself possible utterance of X impossible. Hence, it must be that no possible utterance cf X does ever come in conflict with the causality of Y and Z; there must not be any such tendency of filling up Z in X. There must be in X itself a ground by virtue of which Z is not its sphere of causality; there must not be in X any ground of a possibility that Y could be its sphere of causality.
Y and X, therefore, unite accidentally in a point, in the absolute synthetical union of absolute opposites, without any mutual influence or action upon each other.
3d. We have shown before that A + B must be determined through B. Hitherto only B has been thus determined; but mediately A also is determined through it This formula we interpreted: that which is in the Ego— that is, contemplation — is determined through the Non-Ego, and is mediately a product thereof We now apply this here.
X is product of the Non-Ego, and is, in regard to its sphere of action, determined in the Ego; Y is the same, both through themselves in their absolute freedom. Both through their accidental junc tion determine also the point of this junction; and the Ego is only passive in regard to it But this can not be. The Ego, as sure as it is an Ego, must produce this determination with free dom.
We have solved this same problem before in this way: The whole reflection of substantiality is de pendent upon the absolute freedom of the Ego. We now solve the problem in the same way. The Ego is absolutely free to reflect or not reflect upon Y and X as an abiding, as a simple. If it does so reflect, it must, by the law of that reflection, un doubtedly place Y in the sphere of action Z, and posit C as a limit between the spheres of action of Y and X; but it also may not so reflect, and may posit, instead of X and Y, ever}' possible object as substance through its absolute freedom.
Suppose the spheres Z and V as connecting in the point C. In the sphere Z, the Ego can posit an a or a b instead of Y; it can make Z the sphere of action of both, and their limit, the dividing line, G. Let us now call the sphere of action of a, H. Then the Ego can now again proceed to take this H, and, instead of positing a in it as indivisible sub stance, it can posit E and D in it, and so on ad infnitum. But, if an a and a b have once been posit ed, the Ego must assign to them a sphere of action connecting in one point This accidentalness of Y and its sphere of action for the Ego the Ego must now posit as real through its power of imagination. O is thus posited as an extended, continuous, infinitely indivisible, and is SPACE.
REMARKS.
ist The power of imagination, by positing the possibility of other substances with other spheres of action in the space Z, first diranpts space from the thing which actually fills it, and sketches an empty space; of course, only as an attempt, and transitively in order to fill it immediately again with any desired substances and their spheres of action. Hence, there is no empty space but in this transi tion from the filling up of space by A to its being filled up by B, C, D, etc.
2d The infinitely smallest part of space is always a space, a continuity, but not a mere point, or the limit between placc-s in space. It is thus a continuity, because in it can be posited, ari is po sited in so far as itself is posited, a. power which necessarily utters itself, and which can not be posit ed except as uttering itself. But it can not utter itself unless it has a sphere of its utterance, which is nothing but such a sphere.
3d, Hence, intensity and extensity are necessarily synthetically united, and one can not be deduced without the other. Every power fills up (not through itself, /<?r the power is not in space, and is, in fact, nothing at all without utterance, but through its necessary product, which is this same synthetical ground of union of intensity and extensity) a place in space; and space is nothing but this sphere, filled or to be filled by these products.
4th. Apart from the inner determinations of the things, (their qualitativeness,) which only refer to feeling, (more or less pleasure or disgust,) and which are not at all accessible to the theoretical faculty of the Ego, as, for instance, that the things are red or smooth, bitter or sweet, heavy or light, etc., these things are only distinguishable from each other by the space they occupy. Hence, that which pertains to these things in such a manner that it is only as cribed to them and not to the Ego, though it does not belong to their inner essence, is the space which they occupy.
5th. But all space is equal, and through it, there fore, no distinction and determination is possible, except in so far as one thing = Y has been posited in a certain space, and thus determined and charac terized space. In that case 3'ou can say of X, it is in another space than Y. All determination of space presupposes a space filled up, and determined by that filling up. Posit A in the infinite empty space, it remains as undetermined as it was before, and you can not answer my question, Where is it? for you have no fixed point from which you can measure it. The place which it occupies is only determined through A, and A is only determined through that place. Hence, there is in reality no determination except in so far as you posit one; it is a synthesis through absolute spontaneity. To express this sensuously, A might move continuously from one point to another in space, and you would not observe the movement, because for you there •would be no points, but only the limitless, endless spaces. For you it would always remain where it is, because it would always remain in space. But if you put B aside of it, then B is determined; and if I ask you where it is, you reply, By the side of A. This satisfies me, unless I ask again, But where is A? If you posit C, D, E, etc,, aside of B, then you have for all of them relative determina tions of place; but you may fill up space as far as you like, and you will always have in the filled up space only a finite space which can have no relation to the infinite space. This finite space is only de termined in so far as you have determined it by virtue of an absolute synthesis. An evident truth, it seems to me, which ought long since to have proven the ideality of space.
6th. The object of the present contemplation is characterized as such by this, that we posit it through the power of imagination in a space as empty space. But this, as we have shown, is not possible, unless a filled up space is presupposed. A dependent succession of the filling up of space, but in which, from reasons we shall show up hereafter, one can always go further back infinitely.
To restore the freedom of the Ego, and to posit the Non-Ego as accidental, we posited the Ego as free to connect Z with Y, or a, b, c, etc.; and through positing this freedom we first discovered O as space. This sort of accidentalness remains; but the question is, whether it has solved the prob lem.
True, the Ego is generally free to posit in space Y, X, or a, b, c, etc.; but, if it is to reflect upon X as substance, from which presupposition we started, it must necessarily, as we have shown, posit Y as determined substance, and as determined by the space Z; hence, in that condition it is not free. Nor is it then free in determining the place of X is space, for it must place X aside of Y. Hence, the Ego, under this condition, remains always deter mined by another. But it sJiall be free; and the contradiction must be solved. This is done as fol lows: Y and X must both be determined and opposed to each other in another manner than through their determinedness and determinabflity in space; for both have been posited above independent of their space, and as distinct from each other. They must have other characteristics, in virtue of which the sentence A = A is applied to them; for instance, that X is red, Y yellow, etc. Their place in space has no reference to these determinations, does not make Y, as yellow, the determined in space, or X as red, the determinable in space. It only posits one of both as determined, and the oth er as determinable, without any reference to any inherent characteristics they may possess. Thus freedom attains its sphere again. Freedom must oppose a determined and a determinable; but it can make either opposite the determined or the de- T48 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
terminable. Whether X be determined through Y, or vice versa, depends only upon the spontaneity of the Ego. In other words, it is the same what series you describe in space, whether from A to B, or vice -versa; whether you place B on the side of A, or A on the side of B, for the things mutually exclude each other in space.
This, its freedom of making either determined or determinable, the Ego posits through the power of imagination. It floats between determinedness and determin ability, ascribes to both both, or, which is the same, to neither neither. But if a contempla tion and object of a contemplation is to be, then the Ego must make one of the in themselves determined two a dctcrmijiable in space.
Why it posits X or Y, or a, b, c, d, etc., as de terminable admits of no ground, and can not admit of a ground, for it is an act of absolute spontaneity. This shows itself as accidentalness. But it must be well observed wherein this accidentalness con sists, namely, in the being posited, or in the existence of the determinable. The positing of this determi nable becomes an accidence of the Ego, to which the Ego itself, as shown before, must be opposited as its substance.
Ego and Non-Ego are now again complete oppo sites, and independent of each other. Inner powers of the Non-Ego work with absolute freedom, fill up their spheres of action, accidentally meet in a point, and thus mutually exclude each other, without limit ing their respective freedom, from their spheres of •action, or from their places in space. The Ego, again, posits as substance whatsoever it chooses, divides space, as it were, amongst substances, spon taneously decides which shall be the determined and which the determinable in space, or in what direction it will course through space.
Thus, all connection between the Ego and the Non-Ego is broken off; both are only connected by empty space, which, being empty, and only the sphere wherein the Non-Ego, rcaliter with freedom, posits its products, and the Ego, idealitcr, posits also with freedom its products, as imaginary pro ducts of a Non-Ego, does limit neither nor connect one with the other. The opposition of both and the independent existence of the Ego and the Non-Ego is explained; but not the required harmony between both. Space is justly called the form, that is, the subjective condition of the possibility of the external contemplation. Unless there is another form of contemplation, the required harmony be tween representation of a thing and a thing itself and their mutual relation; hence, also, their oppo sition through the Ego, is impossible. Let us find this form.
TIME.
I. Y and X, in all their possible and mutual relations, are products of the free causality of the independent Non-Ego. But this they are not for t/if Ego, nor are they indeed at all/or the Ego with out a free causality of the Ego itsel£ 25° THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, 2. This causality of Ego and Non-Ego, there fore, must be reciprocal causality, that is, the utter ances of both must meet in a point, in the absolute synthesis of both through imagination. This point of union the Ego posits by its absolute power, and it posits this point as accidental, that is, tJie connect ing of the causality of both opposite is accidental.
3. If Y or X is to be posited, such a point of union must be posited; or, in other words, the positing of an object involves such a union with the causality of the Ego.
4. The Ego is perfectly free in regard to the determinateness or undeterminateness of the X or Y means, therefore, the Ego is perfectly free to connect Y or X with the point (and tfats with the Ego) or not 5. This thus determined freedom of the Ego must be posited through the power of imagination, that is, the mere possibility of a synthesis of the point with a causality of the Non-Ego must be posited. This is only possible if the feint can be posited apart from the causality of tlie Xcm-Ego.
6. But such a point is nothing but a synthesis of the causality of the Ego and of the Non-Ego. Hence, by altogether removing it from the causality of the Non-Ego, you destroy the point. Hence, we only remove the determined X from the point, and unite the point instead with an undetermined pro duct (a, b, c, or d, etc., a Non-Ego) so as to have it retain its determined character as synthetical point 7. The Ego is really synthetically to unite the point with X. This is our whole presupposition,, for we require a contemplation of X, which, even as contemplation, is not possible -without such a synthesis. This synthesis, as we have also shown, occurs through absolute spontaneity. But, by uniting X with the point, all other possible powers are excluded from the point 8. This synthetical connection of X with the point is to be a real connecting, and to be posited as such, that is, it is to bear the characteristic of absolute spontaneity, namely, accidentalmss, and this not merely in the respect heretofore mentioned,, but in its very characteristic as a connecting of a synthesis. But such accidentalness of its character as syntlicsis is only possible through opposition with another necessary synthesis of a determined Y with a point; of course, not with the point of X, for from that point all other is excluded, but with another opposite point. Let us call this point c, and the point with which X is connected d.
9. This point c, like d, is synthetical point of union of the causality of the Ego and of the Non-Ego But it is opposed to d in this, that with d the syn thetical union is considered as dependent upon freedom, as that which might be otherwise, while with c the union is considered as necessary.
10. This accidentalness of the synthetical union with d must be posited; hence, also, must the ne cessity of the union with c be posited. Both must, therefore, be posited in this respect as necessary ••and accidental in regard to each other. If the syn-• thetical union with d is to be posited, that with c »must have been posited before, but not vice versa.
11. Now, this synthesis with d is really to be 'posited; hence, it is posited as dependent, as condi tioned by the synthesis with c. But c is not, vice • versa, conditioned by d.
12. Again, the synthesis with c is to be exactly. as the synthesis with d, that is, an arbitrary, acci- • dental synthesis. If it is posited as such, another: synthesis with b must again be opposed to it as ne- • cessary, as the synthesis of which it is dependent • and by which it is conditioned. The synthesis with • c, if posited accidental, must thus be posited as preeeded by a synthesis with b, and dependent upon that, but not vice versa. The synthesis with b, • again, must be posited as accidental, and hence, as preceded by another synthesis, and so on ad infini- • turn. Thus, we attain a series of points as points • of synthetical union between a causality of the Ego • and of the Non-Ego in contemplation, wherein each point depends upon a determined other which does not depend upon it, and wherein each lias a deter- • rained other which is dependent upon it while k- • self does not depend upon this other; in short, we • obtain a time series.
13. The Ego posited itself as perfectly free to unite with the point whatever it might choose, hence the whole infinite Non-Ego. The thus de- ' termined point is only accidental and not necessary; is only dependent without having another which is THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 2$$ dependent upon it, and is called the present point, the present moment 14. Hence, if we abstract from the synthetical union of a determined point with the object — and thus from the whole causality of the Ego, which is only connected with the Non-Ego through this point — all things, considered in themselves, and in dependent from the Ego, are at tlie same time in space, that is, are synthetically linkable with one and the same point. But they Can be posited in perception only after each otJier in a successive se ries, wherein each link depends upon another which does not depend upon it.
CONCLUDING REMARKS.
CONCLUDING REMARKS.
a. There is for us no past except in so far as it is thought in the present. Whatsoever was yesterday is not; it is only in so far as I think in the present moment that it *was. The question, Has not really a time passed away? is just of the same nature as the question, Is there a thing in itself? Of course, a time has past if you posit one as past, and, if you ask that question, you do posit a past time; if you do not posit it, you will not ask that question, and then no time has past for you. A very evident observation which ought long ago to have led to the cor. ect conception of the ideality of time.
b. But a past is necessary for us; for only on Condition of a past is a present, and only on condition of a present is consciousness possible. This proof we recapitulate as follows: Consciousness is only possible on condition that the Ego posit a Non-Ego as its opposite, and this oppositing de mands that the ideal activity of the Ego should be directed upon the Non-Ego. This activity belongsto the Ego only in so far as it is free; hence, in sofar as it may be directed upon any of all possible objects. In this, its freedom, it must be posited and is posited, and it is the character of the present moment that any other possible perception might fill it This, again, is only possible if another mo ment is posited wherein no other perception can be posited than that which is posited therein; and this is the character of the past moment. Con sciousness, therefore, is necessarily consciousnessof freedom and of identity; of freedom, as we have shown; of identity, because every moment, to be a moment, must be connected with another.
The perception, B, is no perception, unless an other perception, A, is presupposed You may posit C now, and then A may vanish, but you will now have to posit B as the condition of C, and so on ad infinitum. This is the law of the identity of consciousness, for which we only need, strictly speaking, two moments. There is no first moment of consciousness, only a second.
c. True, the past moment can again be posited in consciousness, can be represented or reproduced in the present, can be posited as having occurred in the same subject, if you reflect that another per- •ception might have filled him. In that case, you again oppose to it a preceding moment, in which, if you posit in the latter a determined perception, no other perception could occur but that which did occur in it Hence, we can always go back in this scries of moments so far as we please into the infi nite.
d. A determined quantity of space is always at the same time; a quantity of time always in a suc cession, one moment after another. Hence, we can only measure the one through the other: space through the time we need to pass over it; time through the space we, or any other regular moving body, (the sun, the pendulum, etc.,) can pass through In it IV. PRACTICAL PART PRACTICAL PART FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE.
The Ego posits itself as determining the Non-Ego.
We might proceed to evolve this principle in the •same manner as we did the fundamental principle of the theoretical part; but a shorter way is possi ble. For there is one chief antithesis in this prin ciple which embraces the whole conflict between the Ego as intelligence, and in so far limited, and the Ego as absolutely posited, and hence unlimited being, and which compels us to assume as connect ing link a practical power of the Ego. We shall first look up this antithesis.
The Ego is Ego; it is absolutely one and the same Ego by virtue of its being posited through itself, <§!.)• Now, in so far as the Ego is particularly repre senting, or an intelligence, it is as such also one, true enough; is one power of representation under necessary laws, but it is not in so far one and the same with the absolute through itself posited Ego.
For, although the Ego, in so far as it is already intelligence, is in its particular determinations within this sphere of the intelligence determined through itself, and although also in so far nothing ever oc curs in the Ego which it has not posited within itself, yet this sphere itself, considered generally and in itself, is not posited by the Ego for itself, but is posited for it through an external something. True, the mode and manner of representing objects is determined through the Ego itself; but that the Ego is at all representing, is an intelligence, is not determined through the Ego, as we have seen. For we could only think representation on the pre supposition that the undetermined and infinite acti vity of the Ego receives a check. Hence, the Ego, as intelligence generally, is dependent upon an un determined and as yet altogether undeterminable Non-Ego; and only by means of such a Non-Ego is the Ego intelligence,* But the Ego is to be in all its determinations ab solutely posited through itself, and, hence, perfectly independent of any possible Non-Ego.
Hence, the absolute Ego and the intelligent Ego (if it is permissible to express myself thus) are not • Whosoever may conjecture a profound significance and vast consequences in this expression is a welcome reader to me. A finite being is finite only as intelligence; the practical (moral) legis lation which he is to have in common with the infinite can not de pend upon any thing external one and the same, but opposed to each other, which contradicts the absolute identity of the Ego.
This contradiction must be solved, and that can only be done as follows: Since it is the dependence of the Ego, as intelligence, which is to be removed, the Ego must determine through itself tJiat same un known Non-Ego, to which the check has been as cribed, which makes the Ego intelligence. Thus, the absolute Ego would determine the Non-Ego of the representation immediately, and the represent ing Ego mediately, by means of that determination of the Non-Ego, and the Ego would become com pletely independent, that is, self-determined.
The Ego, as intelligence, stood in the relation of causality to the Non-Ego to which it ascribed the check. The Non-Ego was the cause; it the effect For the causality relation consists in this, that, by restricting activity in the one, the same quantity of activity which is restricted is posited in the opposite of the one, according to the law of mutual determination. Now, if the Ego is to be intelligence, part of its infinitely extending activity must be canceled, and thus posited in its opposite, the Non-Ego. But since the absolute Ego can not be restricted at all, being absolute activity and nothing but absolute activity, it must be assumed, as we have shown, that the postulated Non-Ego is also determined, that is, passive, and hence the quantity of activity which is opposed to this passi vity of the Non-Ego must be posited in the oppo site of the Non-Ego, that is, in the Ego; not in the 262 TffE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
Ego as intelligence, however, since as such it is de termined by the Non-Ego, but in the absolute Ego. And such a relation being a relation of causality, it follows that the absolute Ego is to be cause of the Non-Ego, in so far as the Non-Ego is last ground of all representation.
The absolute Ego is only active and thus deter mines the Non-Ego, which is now passive, in so far as this Non-Ego is to determine the Ego as intelli gence. The activity opposed to this passivity of the Non-Ego is now posited in the absolute Ego as a determined activity; and thus the Ego, as in telligence, and as absolute, is placed in a state of self -relation. The grounds of this circuitous way of the Ego to influence itself are as yet unknown, but may, perhaps, appear in the future.
The absolute Ego is, therefore, cause of that in the Non-Ego which remains, when we abstract from all forms of representation; for those forms re sult, as we have shown, from the laws of represen tation in the Ego as intelligence. That is, the abso lute Ego is to be the cause of the mysterious thing in itself, the hidden substance, the check; all the rest follow necessarily in the manner shown.
But, whereas it was easy enough to show how — after once assuming the check — the Ego as intelli gence is cause of all the necessary laws of repre sentation, it is a far different question, How can the Ego be cause of the Non-Ego? Surely not through absolute positing.
For the Ego can certainly posit itself without any further ground, and must posit itself if it is to posit any thing else; for that which is not can not posit, and the Ego is (for itself) only by virtue of its positing itself The Ego can not posit the Non-Ego without limiting itself. For the Non-Ego is the complete opposite to the Ego, and whatsoever the Non-Ego is, that the Ego is not; hence, in so far as the Non-Ego is posited, the Ego is not posited. If the Non-Ego were posited without quantity, that is, unlimited and infinite, then the Ego would not be posited at all, which is a contradiction. Hence, the Non-Ego must be posited in a determined quantity, and the Ego must be restricted by the posited quantity of reality of the Non-Ego.
The Ego is, therefore, in our presupposition to posit a Non-Ego absolutely and without any ground, or to limit itself without any ground The ground thus to limit itself must, therefore, be in the Ego itself; it must have the principle in itself to posit itself, and also the principle not to posit itself Hence, the Ego in its essence must be contradic tory and self-annihilating, and cancels itself.
We stand here at a point from which the true significance of our second fundamental principle, a Non-Ego is opposed to the Ego, and thus the true sig nificance of our whole science of knowledge, can be more clearly explained than was heretofore possible, Of that second fundamental principle of the whole science of knowledge only part is absolute; but part of it presupposes a fact, which a priori can not be shown up at all, but only in the experience of each individual Namely, besides the self-positing of the Ego there is to be another positing. This is a priori a mere hypothesis; that there is such another positing (or, that there is any thing at all) can not be pro ven, but can only be shown up by a fact of con sciousness; and every one must prove it to himself by this fact, but no one can prove it to another by demonstrations.
(True, he might reduce any admitted fact, through thinking, to that highest fact; but such a fact would only show to the other, that by admitting any fact he has also confessed that highest fact.) But it is absolutely certain and grounded in the essence of the Ego that, if there is such another positing, then it must be an oppositing, and that which is thus posited must be a Non-Ego. In other words, how the Ego can distinguish something from itself can not be proven by any higher ground of possibility; on the contrary, the fact that the Ego thus does dis tinguish (separate or dirempt) is itself the ground of all deduction and all grounding. But it is abso lutely certain that all positing, which is not a posit ing of the Ego, must be an oppositing. Hence, the argumentation of the science of knowledge is d priori valid, that is, it establishes only propositions which are d priori certain; but reality it obtains only in experience. If any one could not become conscious of the postulated fact — it can be certainly known that this can not be the case with any finite rational being — then the whole science of know ledge has no content for him; and yet its formal correctness he also must acknowledge. Let me illustrate this: For a Godhead, that is, for a consciousness (to us unthinkable) for which the self-positing of the Ego is the positing of all, our science of knowledge would have no content; for its consciousness would embrace no other positing than the self-positing of the Ego; but ihtform of our system would be valid even for God, since it is the form of pure reason itself.
The contradiction existing between the indepen dence of the Ego as absolute being, and the depen dence thereof as intelligence, we sought to remove by postulating the absolute Ego as cause of the Non-Ego. But this postulate we also discovered to be a contradiction; for if the Ego has causality upon the Non-Ego, then the Non-Ego ceases to be Non-Ego, ceases to be the opposite of the Ego, and becomes itself Ego. But the Ego has itself posited the Non-Ego as its opposite, and, if that positing is canceled, then the Ego itself ceases to be Ego. The contradiction lies, therefore, in this, that al though the Ego is to be the cause of the Non-Ego, the Non-Ego is to remain opposed to the Ego. We must solve this contradiction.
In so far as the Ego is absolute, it is infinite and unlimited. Every thing that is the Ego posits, and what it does not posit is not; and whatever it posits it posits as Ego, and it posits the Ego as every thing it posits. Hence, as absolute Ego the Ego contains in itself all reality, that is, an infinite, unlimited reality..
But in so far as the Ego opposits a Non-Ego, it necessarily posits limits, and posits itself in these limits. It divides the totality of posited reality be tween the Ego and Non-Ego, and hence posits it self necessarily in so far as finite.
Here we have, therefore, a still higher contradic tion: The Ego posits itself one time as infinite, and then again as finite. How can this contradiction be reunited?
The Ego posits itself as infinite in so far as its activity is directed upon itself, or returns in itself; for then the product of this activity, being the Egoagain, is infinite. (Infinite product — infinite acti vity, and vice versa.)
The Ego posits itself as finite in so far as its acti vity is directed upon a Non-Ego which it opposes ta itself. This is no longer pure (infinite) but object ive, limited activity.