Both activities are to be one and the same. Let us find their synthetical connection, and then we shall doubtless see how the required causality is possible; for such a connection would be this very relation of causality, since it would make the in it self returning activity the cause of the objective activity; and through the former the Ego would determine itself to the latter; the pure activity •would return into the Ego, but in so returning de termine the Ego as determining the Non-Ego, and, THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. Zfy hence, mediately it would be directed upon the Non-Ego, while immediately it would be directed upon the Ego.
The self-positing of the Ego is, therefore, now to be the cause of its positing the Non-Ego. But if this were so, then the Ego would posit the Non-Ego by positing itself, and thus would cancel itsel£ Moreover: the second fundamental principle from which we started (—A not = A) resulted in this, that the Ego opposits a Non-Ego to itself absolute ly, and without any ground. The present result, therefore, unqualified, would overthrow § 2, and hence our whole system. That second fundamental principle, however, showed itself — though absolute in form — to be conditioned in content; the opposite was to be an opposite of the Ego. Let us examine this.
THESIS.
THESIS.
The Ego opposes absolutely to itself an object, an opposite Non-Ego. In the positing thereof the Ego is utterly independent. That is, the Ego may posit the object where it chooses, but is conditioned in this, that by positing the object it limits itself. The Ego is finite, because by positing the Non-Ego it limits itself; it is also infinite, because it may posit the Non-Ego infinitely. It is finite in its infinity; infinite in its finity. It is utterly inde pendent, absolute in positing an object; it limits itself simply because it does. But this absolute self-limitation is opposed to § I, to the absolute self-positing the Ego, and hence impossible.
ANTITHESIS, The Ego posits an cbjcct, and thus posits an acti vity independent of its own, opposed to its own. This activity of the object must be, in one sense, in the Ego, (since the Ego posits it,) but in another sense in the Non-Ego, in the object In the latter sense it must be opposed to that activity of the Ego which posits it, (since to this it is related,) and hence, if there is to be an object, tlic possibility of positing it presupposes an activity in tJte Ego differ ent from the activity ivhich posits tlie object. Let us call this unknown activity X.
SYNTHESIS.
SYNTHESIS.
X zf ill not be canceled by the object, since both are opposites. Both are to be posited; each must be independent of the other. X must be absolutely grounded in the Ego, since it depends not upon the positing of the object, but rather the object depends upon it X is, therefore, posited by the absolute self-positing of the Ego. Again, X must be infi nite, since it is opposed to the object which can be extended into the infinite, X is, therefore, the infi nite activity, posited by the Ego in itself, and winch is related to the objective activity of the Ego as the ground of possibility to the grounded; that is. the object is posited only in so far as an activity of the Ego meets resistance; no such activity of the Ego, no object. Again, it is related as the determining to the determined; that is, only in so far as that acti vity is resisted can an object be posited; no resist ance, no object Now, consider this infinite activity in relation to the activity of the object. Both are utterly inde pendent of each other; there is no relation between them. And yet, when an object is posited, they must be so related by means of the objective acti vity of the Ego, of which X is the ground. That, is, they are related in so far as an object is posited; not, not. Again, as the object is absolutely posited, so the relation must be absolute, without ground. They are absolutely related means, they are posited as equals. At the same time, as sure as an object is posited, they are not equal They sJiall be equal, but are not. (Kant's Categorical Imperative.)
The question remains, In which of both is the ground of relation to be posited? Which is to rule? The Ego is the totality of all reality; it is to be absolutely independent; all else dependent upon it. The object is, therefore, to be equal to the Ego; and' it is the absolute Ego which demands this for the very sake of its absolute being.
For instance: let the activity Y be given, (in what will hereafter appear as object,) and place an activ ity of the Ego in relation to it Thereby you think an activity outside of the Ego, (= — Y,) which is equal to that activity of the Ego. Wherein now lies the equality ground of this relation? Of course, in the thesis that all activity is to be equal to that of the Ego. — Y lies, therefore, in a world wherein 2/0 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, all activity would really be equal to that of the Ego, and is an ideal. Now, since Y is not equal to — Y, but is opposed to it, we ascribe Y to an object, Without this relation and the absolute thesis which is the ground of it, there would be no object for the Ego; and the Ego would be every thing, and for that very reason nothing.
The absolute Ego, therefore, relates itself abso lutely to a Non-Ego ( — Y) which it appears is to be a Non-Ego in its form, (that is, in so far as it is to be any thing outside of the Ego, a thing in itself,) but not in its content, since it is to be perfectly equal to the Ego. But it can not be thus perfectly equal so long as it is, though but in form, a Non-Ego; and, hence, the activity of the Ego related to it can not be a determining, but merely a tendency toward determination, RESULT.
RESULT.
The pure, self-returning activity of the Ego is, in its relation to a possible object, a tendency; and, according to the above, an infinite tendency. This tendency is the condition of the possibility of all object; no tendency, no object.
The pure activity of the Ego is, therefore, now, as was required, the cause of the objective activity of the Ego, since no object can be posited without it. But in so far as this pure activity originally is directed upon no object — both, therefore, being mutually independent of the other — it is not its cause, but related to it by an absolute act of the Ego. This absolute act of the Ego, as act, is in its form (in its realization) absolute, (and this, its abso luteness, is the ground of the absolute spontaneity of reflection in the theoretical part, and of the will in the practical part of the science of knowledge, as we shall see;) but in its content (in this, that it is a relation} it is conditioned by the absolute self-posit ing of the Ego as totality of all reality. In other words, that the pure activity is placed in relation to an object, has not its ground in the pure activity as such; but that, if it is so posited, it must be posited as a tendency; of this itself is the ground.
A system which would assert that the pure acti vity, as such, is directed upon an object, would be a system of intelligible fatalism. As applied to finite beings, the argument would be: Since no pure ac tivity is posited unless it manifests itself, and since in finite beings it can not manifest itself, it must be posited by something outside. This system would be valid for a Godhead, that is, a being, with whose pure activity its objective activity were also posited. But such a being is not conceivable.
The thesis, that all reality must be absolutely posited through the Ego, is the thesis of what has been called practical reason. We have now shown that practical and theoretical reason are inseparable. Theoretical intelligence is impossible without the practical power, since an object is impossible with out a tendency.
2J2 TJfE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
FURTHER DIFFICULTY.
But how can the tendency of the pure activity be placed in relation to the activity of the object, unless the latter is first given to the Ego? To ex plain the latter activity from the former would in volve a circle and explain nothing. There must be an absolute first ground of the relation.
The Ego is only = Ego, it has no other deter mination; it is all, and it is nothing, because it is nothing for itself An inequality, an Other appears in it TJiat this Other appears is a fact, and can not be proven a priori; every one must find it so. This Other can not be deduced from the conception of the absolute Ego as simply a positing of itself If we imagine an intelligence outside of the Ego, to that intelligence the Other would appear as limit ing the Ego; but the Ego itself is to be that intel ligence and to posit that limit If the Ego is equal to itself, it must strive to cancel this limit, to restore the activity, not inter rupted by itself, and then it can -compare and relate its condition of limitation to its condition of re stored activity, and thus establish a mere self-rela tion.
Let us suppose the activity of the Ego to tend from A to C without check. Between A and C there is nothing to distinguish, nothing of which the Ego can become conscious. In C this activity — the ground of all consciousness, but never itself made conscious — is checked. But by its nature it can not be checked. Hence, it continues beyond C, but as an activity which has been checked, and now maintains itself only through its own power. But as such it continues only to that point where the check ceases = D. Byond D it is again not an object of consciousness.
Limited and restored activity are, therefore, syn thetically united in the Ego, and mutually condition each other. Neither can be posited without the other. This synthesis of limited and restored acti vity in the mere subject is, therefore, the condition of all positing of the Ego. As such purely sub jective relation it is called feeling.
Now, since the ground of this feeling is posited in an activity of the object, and since this activity of the object is thus given, as was required, to the relating subject through feeling, we have shown how the activity of the object can be related to the pure activity of the Ego.
Let us now return to our stand-point Its result was, no infinite tendency of the Ego, no finite ob ject in the Ego. By this result we thought to have solved the contradiction. We said, the infinite activity is not objective, but only returning into it self, whereas the finite activity is objective. But, since we have now placed this infinite activity, as tendency, in relation to the object, we have made it also in so far objective activity; and thus we have now one infinite objective, and one finite objective activity of the Ego, which is a contradiction, to be solved only by showing that the infinite activity is objective in another manner than the objective ac tivity.
The infinite activity (tendency) of the Ego, in so far as it is objective, must be finite, (determined.) Now, since the objective activity is posited as its opposite, it must be posited in a different manner. If both were finite in the same manner, they could not be distinguished. This finite objective activity, presupposing, as we have shown, the activity of an object, and thus having its ground not in itself, but outside of itself, goes upon an object not grounded in itself, that is, a real object.
Now, the infinite activity can, therefore, not be finite in this manner. It can not depend upon and determine the real world, which presupposes an ac tivity of the Non-Ego reciprocally related to the objective activity of the Ego. The infinite activity determines, on the contrary, a world wherein through the Ego is posited all reality, wherein no activity of the Non-Ego is presupposed, an ideal world, ab solutely posited through the Ego.
How, then, is it also finite? In so far as it tends upon an object at all, and as it hence must deter mine that object. When the real object was placed in relation to the objective activity of the Ego, not the act of determining it, as such, depended upon the Non-Ego, but the limit of the determination. But in regard to the ideal object, both the act of determining it, and the limit of the determination, is to be dependent upon the Ego; and the Ego is THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, 2/5 conditioned only in that it must positJimits at aJ, which, however, it can infinitely extend.
The ideal is absolute product of the Ego; it may be extended infinitely, but in every determined mo ment it has its limit The undetermined tendency generally — which, however, can not properly be called tendency, since it has no object, and can, in deed, have no name — is infinite, but, as such, it can not enter consciousness, since consciousness is only possible through reflection, and, hence, through determination.
But as soon as you reflect upon it, you neces sarily posit it as finite. And as soon as you be come conscious that it is finite, you extend it again and make it infinite. Then, when you ask once more, Is it now infinite? you make it again, by that very question, finite; and so on ad infinitum.
Infinite and objective is, therefore, contradictory. This contradiction could only be solved by alto gether removing the object But it is removed only in a finished infinity, that is, never. The Ego can infinitely extend the object of its tendency; but, if it had extended it in any one moment to an infinity, the object, as such, would have vanished, and the idea of infinity would have been realized. But this is a contradiction.
In this contradiction lies the certitude of immor tality. The very conception of the Ego involves this, that it ever infinitely extends its object, but never completes it It always posits the absolute 27.6 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
Ego as totality of reality, but because this, its posit ing, is directed upon objects, (a world,) it never com pletes the positing. The moral world (the only real world) is always complete, and is always real ized in every act; but is, at the same time, never realized in the actual objective world, for the very reason that, being objective, it extends into the in finite.
Were the Ego more than a tendency, that is, if it had infinite causality, it would not be an Ego, would not posit itself, and hence be nothing. If, again, it had not this infinite tendency, it could also not posit itself, for it could not posit its opposite; hence, it would again be no Ego, be nothing.
OTHER STATEMENT OF THE SAME RESULT.
Our RESULT was, that the pure, self-returning activity, in its relation to a possible object, is an infinite tendeiuy. A tendency, that is, an activity which meets resistance, has, therefore, no causality as such, and is in so far partly conditioned by a Non-Ego, which has as such no causality. Such a causality is, therefore, required. TJiat the require ment of such an absolute causality must be origi nally contained in the Ego, we have proven by showing that the contradiction between the Ego as intelligence and as absolute Ego could not be other wise solved; and hence our proof was only apogogical; but Jwju this requirement originated in the Ego we have not yet shown. This direct and genetic proof or deduction must, however, be possible. It must be possible to show up in the Ego not only a tendency to have a determined causality, (deter mined through a Non-Ego,) but a tendency to have causality in general — the latter to be the ground of the former.
An activity which goes beyond the object be comes a tendency only because it goes beyond the object, and hence only on condition of an object But we must now show up a ground in the Ego for its going out of itself at all, and show how this go ing beyond itself of the Ego is solely grounded in the Ego itself, and how it precedes all resisted ac tivity, and first makes it at all possible.
In other words, we must show up in the absolute Ego the ground of the possibility of the influence of an Other (of a foreign Non-Ego) upon itself. We must show how, although it only posits itself, it re mains susceptible to the positing of another.
The Ego is, therefore, to find originally in itself an heterogeneous, foreign, distinguishable Other.
//; itself, not outside of itself. If the latter were true, the Other would not \)tfor the Ego. Hence, in some respect, the Other must be equal, relatable, to the Ego, must belong to it The Ego is = absolute activity, (self-positing;) if the heterogeneous Other is, therefore, any ways to be ascribed to the Ego, it must be an activity of the Ego, which as such can not be foreign, but the direction of which may perhaps be foreign, that is, may not be grounded in the Ego. If the activity 2/S THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
of the Ego extends into the infinite and is thrown back into itself, the activity, as such, always re mains activity of the Ego; only its direction, its return, is foreign to the Ego. Now, here arise these important questions: How does the Ego get to distinguish between the direction of its activity out-ward into the infi nite, and inward back into itself, and why does it ascribe the latter to a foreign Other?
The absolute essence of the Ego is self-positing, as we know. As such it has, doubtless, a self-re turning direction, (if we can speak of directions as yet, though we touch here upon the source of all directions, centripetal and centrifugal,) that is to say, a centripetal direction. But since all determi nation involves negation, or the positing of another, centripetal direction involves the silent presupposi tion of the centrifugal. Rightly taken, the true scheme of the above absolute Ego would be the mathematical point, which is content and form to gether, that is, which is all that it is, "ivlicre it is. But the absolute Ego is not simply a self-positing, (which would make it an objective thing,) but it is a positing of itself for itself. Through this far the above centripetal direction at once receives its complement in the centrifugal. The direction of the activity of the Ego is centripetal in so far as it is reflecting, and centrifugal in so far as it is that which is reflected upon, and this centrifugality is infinite. Both the centripetal and the centrifugal directions are equally grounded in the Ego, are both one and the same, and are only different when reflected upon as different.
All centripetal power in the world of nature is purely product of the power of imagination of the Ego, in virtue of a law of reason to gather the manifold into unity.
But both directions can not be distinguished, unless a third link is found whereby they can be related to each other. As yet this third link has not been found; both directions are as yet undistinguishable, and consciousness, therefore, impos sible.
SECOND REMARK.
God's self-consciousness could only be explained by the presupposition that God thinks his own being. But since in God the reflected would be all in one and one in all, and the reflecting would be also one in all and all in one, God could not distin guish between reflecting and reflected, between consciousness and the object thereof; and hence his self-consciousness could not be explained. In deed, the self-consciousness of God can be explained or comprehended by no thinking which is subject to the law, that all determination is a negation.
The infinitely extending activity of the Ego is to be somewhere checked and repelled; and the Ego is not to fill up infinity. That this is so can not be shown, but can only be known as fact; but it can be shown that this must be so if consciousness is to be realized. But still the requirement that the Ego should fill up the infinity remains, and when taken up in reflection it is found that the require ment has not been satisfied, that the activity has been checked, repelled; and only through this third link of the requirement is a distinction possible and a centripetal direction established, which is as such distinguishable from the first centrifugal direction of the Ego whereby it sought to fill up infinity. The centrifugal direction is the original direction of the absolute Ego, the centripetal direction the reflected direction of the checked Ego.
RESULTS.
1st Because the Ego is a for-itscJf positing, a reflecting, of itself, docs it go beyond itself; and be cause in thus positing itself it must posit itself as the totality of all reality has it a tendency to causa lity.
2d. In so far as the Ego simply posits itself it is complete in itself, and posits no other. But since it must posit itself as self-posited, (that is, far it self,) it thus, by this second (as it were) positing, posits the possibility that something could be in it self not posited through itself, and thus externalizes itself.
The first positing gives the activity of the Ego which is to be checked; the second positing makes it possible that the first activity can be checked for the Ego, or that the Ego can posit itself as deter mined. And thus we have discovered an original self-relation of the Ego, through which alone an external influence upon the Ego is made possible.
3d. The absolute Ego posits itself as the totality of all reality. In applying this positing to the infi nite objective world, the Ego becomes a practical or moral Ego. In this, its morality, it is not abso lute, since it goes beyond itself by the tendency of its reflection; nor is it theoretical, since its reflec tion tends upon the absolute Ego alone, and does not take the check into account at all It is simply moral — and gives the moral, the ideal world, the •world to be posited.
But if the reflection takes the check into account and thus considers its externalization limited, we obtain the real world determined by the Non-Ego. In doing this the Ego is theoretical, or intelligence.
Without the practical, moral faculty of the Ego the intelligence is not possible; for, unless the Ego goes beyond the check, there is no check, no Non-Ego for and in the Ego. Again, unless the Ego is intelligence, it can not be practical or self-con scious, since only the foreign check makes possible a distinction of the directions of the Ego's activity.
ADDENDA.
ADDENDA.
We have thus obtained as the last ground of all reality for the Ego an original reciprocal causality between the Ego and an external Other, of which only this can be predicted, that it must be the op posite of the Ego. By this reciprocity nothing new or foreign is posited rn the Ego; it is only the ground of all motion and activity of the Ego; and, since the Ego is nothing but activity, the ground of the existence of the Ego. The Ego is, there fore, dependent, so far as its existence is concerned. But in regard to the determinations of this exist ence, it is utterly independent. In other words: That the Ego must be determined, in order to be, is an absolute first fact; but that its determina tions are all its own has been clearly developed. Or: The point wherein we first attain conscious ness does not depend upon us; but all the infinite determinations of our course from this point de pend wholly upon us. Our theory is, therefore, realistic, in so far as it absolutely posits an Other, a foreign check or power; but all possible determi nations of this Other it undertakes to deduce from the determining faculty of the Ego.
Our science is also idealistic. For by explaining consciousness, from an independent Other, it re members that this very explanation necessarily takes already the stand-point of consciousness, and follows its laws; whereas, the moment you seize the Other in thought, it ceases to be an independent Other, and becomes the production of thinking. But the pos sibility of this thinking again presupposes real con sciousness, and hence that independent Other which makes consciousness only possible.
* In short: Every thing in its ideality -is dependent upon the Ego; but in its reality even the Ego is dependent. But in the Ego ideal and real ground are one and the same, and hence the reciprocity between the Ego and the Non-Ego is at the same time a reciprocity of the Ego with itself, a selfrelation. The Ego can posit itself as limited by the Non-Ego, if it does not reflect that itself posits this Non-Ego; it can posit itself as limiting the Non-Ego by so reflecting. ' This, that the finite spirit must posit for itself an absolute somewhat outside of itself, (the. thing per se,) and at the same time knows that it exists only for it, (is a necessary uoumcn,) is the circle, which we may infinitely extend, but can never break through. A system which does not take account of this circle is a dogmatic idealism; a system which believes to have gone beyond it is a tran scendent realistic dogmatism.
We have said the consciousness of finite beings can only be explained by presupposing an indepen dent power. Can only be explained for whom? Who are they that want explanation? The finite beings themselves. As soon as we speak of " ex plaining," we are already in the field of finiteness; for all explanation, that is, not a gathering of all determinations at once, but a gradual rise from one determination to another, is finite; and this very determining or limiting is the bridge which carries the explanation, and which the Ego has in itself. The opposite power is independent of the Ego in .284 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
regard to its being and determination, which seeks.to modify the practical activity of the Ego, or the tendency of the Ego, to posit itself as the totality -of all reality; but it is dependent upon the ideal.activity, the theoretical power of the Ego. It is for the Ego only, in so far as it is posited through •the Ego, and otherwise it is not for the Ego. In dependent reality the other has only in so far as it is related to the practical (moral) activity of the Ego; in so far as it is related to the theoretical activity of the Ego, (the intelligence,) it is utterly.dependent, and subject to its laws. But, again, how can it be in relation to the theoretical except through the practical Ego, and vice versa f Here we have, again, no ideality, no reality, and vice •versa. Hence, we can also say: The final ground •of all consciousness is a reciprocal causality, selfrelation, in the Ego, by means of a Non-Ego, an Other, which may be viewed in various ways.
All seeming objections to the science of know ledge can be traced to an inability to hold this final result. This may be mar/fe^ced in T.O ways. You jnay either reflect that, since this result is an idea, it must also be in the Ego, and then you become a dogmatic idealist, and must deny dogmatically all -external reality; or you cling to the sayings of your feeling, and of your common sense, (with which our science, rightly understood, perfectly •agrees,) and then you deny what is clearly put be fore you, or accuse our science of dogmatic ideal- THE SCIENCE CF KNOWLEDGE. 2%$ ism, because you do not gather its meaning. Nei ther should be done; but you should float between the two opposite determinations of this idea. This is the business of creative power of imagination, with which surely all human beings are gifted, but which not all have under their complete control.
V.
SECOND PART PRACTICAL PART SECOND PART or THI PR ACTI C AL PART, or THX INTRODUCTORY.
THE result we have attained now as our final one is this: In positing the tendency of the Ego, a counter tendency of the Non-Ego is posited at the same time which holds it in balance.
With this result we shall have to do as we did with the result of the theoretical part of our science, that is to say, the Ego must posit it now in itseiC. It must become for the Ego; the Ego must realize it. The realization of the theoretical result has snown itself up as the quantitative side of the con struction of the universe, contemplation, sensation, time, and space, etc.; the realization for the Ego of the practical result will, therefore, undoubtedly give its qualitative side, impulse, feeling, qualities of things, etc.
29° THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
I. To clear the way, let us first state more pre cisely the contents of our result: The conception of a tendency is the conception of a cause which is not cause. But every cause presupposes activity. Eveiy tendency has power; if it had no power, it could not be cause.
2. The tendency, as such, has necessarily its de termined quantity as activity. It wants to be cause. But it does not become cause, does not attain its end, and hence is checked. If it were not checked, it would be cause, and not tendency.
3. The tendency is not checked, limited by itself for the conception of tendency involves that it should seek to be causality. If it limited itself, it would not be tendency. Hence, every tendency must be limited by another power opposed to it 4. This opposing power must also be a tendency* that is, strive to be causality; for, if it did not so strive, it would have no relation to the first tendency. Moreover, it must not have any causality; for, if it Lad causality, it would annihilate the tendency of its opposite by annihilating its power.
5. Neither of the two opposite tendencies can have causality. If one of them had it, the power of the opposite would thereby be annihilated, and they would cease to be opposite tendencies. Hence, they must hold each other in balance, THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 2<)l THE TENDENCY OF THE EGO IS POSITED AS IMPULSE, THE COUNTER TENDENCY OF THE NON-EGO AS . CHECK, AND THE BALANCE OF BOTH AS FEELING.
The tendency of the Ego, the opposing tendency of the Non-Ego, and their mutual balance is now to be posited, that is, to become for the Ego.
A. The tendency of the Ego is posited as such.
1. It is posited generally as something after the general law of reflection; hence, not as activity, as something in motion, but as a fixed, permanent something.
2. It is posited as a tendency. Tendency is a desire to have causality; it must, therefore, in this, its character, be posited as causality. Now, this causality can not be posited as directed upon the Xon-Ego, for then it would be posited as real effec tive causality, and not as tendency. Hence, it can only return into itself, only produce itself. But an itself-producing tendency, which is also something fixed, permanent, decided, is called an impulse.
(The conception of an impulse involves, ist. That it should be grounded in the inner essence of that ^hereunto it is ascribed, hence, that it should be produced by the causality of that essence upon it self by its self-positing; 2d. That it should be for that very reason something fixed and enduring; 3d. That it should seek to have causality outside of it self, but should have none in so far as it is merely impulse. Hence, the impulse is purely in the sub- 292 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGEject, and never goes beyond the sphere of the sub ject) B. The tendency of the Ego can not be posited without the positing of a counter tendency of the Non-Ego; for the tendency of the former desires to have causality and has none; and that it has not causality can not be grounded in itself, for the very conception of a tendency is the desire to have cau sality. Hence, the ground of its not having causa lity must be posited outside of the Ego, and again only as a tendency, otherwise the tendency of the Ego, or the impulse, as we now call it, would be suppressed.
C. The balance between both must be posited. The question here is not that this balance must be posited, for this has been shown before, but * Wliat is posited in and through the Ego by posit ing this balance? The Ego tends to fill up the in finite; it also tends to reflect upon itself, which it can not do without being limited; and in regard to the impulse, without being limited through a rela tion to the impulse.
Let us suppose the impulse to be limited in the point C; then in C the tendency to reflection is satis fied, but the ivtfulse to Jiavc real causality is limited. The Ego, then, limits itself in C, and is placed in self-relation; the impulse urges it further on, the reflection holds it still, and through the reflection it holds itself still Both united is the expression of a compulsion? of an / can not. An / can not involves, first, a fur^ ther onward tendency, for else that which I can not would not be for me; second, limitation of real activity; and, thirdly, that the limiting should not be in me, but outside of me, or else there would be no tendency, and instead of an / can not we should have an I will not.
This utterance or expression of the / can not in the Ego is called feeling. In feeling is intimately united, first, activity — / feel, I am the feeling, (and this activity is that of the reflection;) and, secondly, limitation — I feel, am passive, not active, there is a compulsion. This limitation necessarily presup poses a tendency to go beyond. For else it would not be limited, for itself, of course. Feeling is altogether subjective. To explain it we require, it is true, an objective, a limiting, which is the busi ness of the theoretical part of the science of know ledge, but not to deduce it as occurring in the Ego, as being posited in the Ego.
EXPLANATORY REMARK.
EXPLANATORY REMARK.
Here we see sun clear what so many philoso phers, who can not get rid of transcendent dogma tism, can not comprehend, that is, tJiat and liow the Ego develops out of itself whatsoever occurs in it, without ever going beyond itself or breaking through its own circles. And how else could an Ego indeed be an Ego? There is a feeling in the Ego; this is a limitation of the impulse; and if it is a determined feeling, (distinguished from other 294 HIE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
feelings,) I he possibility whereof is as yet not visi ble, then it is the limitation of a determined im pulse, distinguished from other impulses. The Ego must posit a ground of this limitation, and must posit it outside of itself. It can posit the impulse as limited only by an opposite, and hence the impulse evidently determines what is to be posited as object If the impulse is posited as Y, the object must, therefore, necessarily be not-Y. But as all this occurs in consciousness necessarily, a consciousness of this act never occurs, and each one assumes that he has received externally what nevertheless he has only produced by his own power in accordance with his own laws. Still, such a pro ceeding has also objective validity, for it is the uni versal procedure of all finite reason, and there is and can be no other objective validity than the one shown up.