If the Ego posits a smaller degree of activity in itself, then, of course, it posits passivity in itself, and activity in the Non-Ego. But the Ego can not have the power to absolutely posit a lower degree of activity in itself, since, according to the concep tion of substantiality, it posits all activity and noth ing but activity in itsell Hence, the positing of a lower degree of activity must be preceded by an activity of the Non-Ego, which must have first really canceled a part of the activity of the Ego. But this is equally impossible, since, according to the conception of causality, activity can be ascribed to the Non-Ego only in so far as a passivity is po sited in the Ego.
In other words, under the conception of causality alone, it is well conceivable how an outside observer could ascribe activity to the Non-Ego; but not how the Ego itself could ascribe the cause of its passivity to the activity of the Non-Ego. The Ego might be determined, but could never posit itself as determined; for the passivity in the Ego would b? merely posited in the Ego, but not posited in the Ego/rr itself.
On the other hand, under the conception of sub stantiality, even supposing the Ego to have the power of absolutely limiting itself independently of any Non-Ego, and, moreover, the power of be coming conscious of this limitation; what warrant would the Ego have to refer its limitation to a Non-Ego? To assume a Non-Ego as cause of the limi tation? None at all; on the contrary, it would re- • gard itself as the cause thereof Hence, the Ego would be determined, but not determined through MLC Non-Ego.
Both conceptions in their separateness, therefore, do not explain what is to be explained, and the con tradiction remains: If the Ego posits itself as de termined, it is not determined through the Non-Ego; and if it is determined through the Non-Ego, it does not posit itself as determined.
Let us now establish this contradiction more definitely: The Ego can not posit itself as passive without positing activity in the Non-Ego; but it can not posit activity in the Non-Ego without positing pas sivity in itseK Hence, it can do neither alone.
Result: 1. The Ego does not posit passivity in itself, in so far as it posits activity in the Non-Ego, and vice 'versa; it, therefore, does not posit at all (Not the condition is denied, but the conditioned; not the rule of reciprocal determination generally, but its application to the present instance.)
2. But the Ego is to posit passivity in itself, and in so far activity in the Non-Ego, and vice versa.
The one proposition denies what the second one affirms; they are, therefore, related like negation and reality. These are united through quantity. Both propositions must be valid, hence they must be valid each only in part. Hence: The Ego posits partly passivity in itself, in so far af it posits activity in the Non-Ego; but it posits partly not passivity in itself, in so far as it posits activity in the Ego, and vice versa.
The Ego posits partly passivity and partly not passivity in the Non-Ego, in so far as it posits ac tivity in the Ego.
That is to say, an activity is posited in the Ego, to which no passivity in the Non-Ego corresponds; and an activity in the Non-Ego, to which no passi vity in the Ego corresponds. Let us call this sort of activity independent activity. But such an inde pendent activity in the Ego and Non-Ego contra dicts the law of oppositing, which has now been closer determined by the law of reciprocal determi nation; hence it contradicts chiefly the conception of reciprocal determination, which rules in our pre sent investigation. For that conception says: All activity in the Ego determines a passivity of the Non-Ego, and vice versa; and our new result estab lishes an independent activity in the Ego, which does not determine a passivity in the Non-Ego, and vice versa.
But both results must be valid. Hence, they must be united in quantity. Both must be vaKd only in part. The conception of reciprocal deter mination is to be valid only in part, that is, is itself to be determined, to have its validity confined by a certain rule to a particular extent Or the inde pendent activity of our result is to be independent only to a certain extent In the Ego is to be an activity determining and determined by a passivity in the Non-Ego; and in THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 12?
the Non-Ego is also to be an activity determining and determined by a passivity of the Ego. To this activity and passivity the conception of reciprocal •determination is applicable.
At the same time, there is to be in the Ego and in the Non-Ego an independent activity, not deter mining a passivity in the other.
Both propositions are to be valid. It must be possible, therefore, to think them as united through a synthetical conception in one and the same act.
Such a conception would be about as follows: The reciprocal activity and passivity determines ihc independent activity, and the independent activity determines the reciprocal activity and passivity. If this be true, then, 1. The independent activities of the Ego and Non-Ego do not reciprocally determine each other directly, but only indirectly, through their recipro cally determined activity and passivity.
2. And the law of reciprocal determination is valid only in so far as related to the reciprocal acti vity and passivity and independent activity; but is not valid as related to independent activity alone.
This result involves the following three proposi tions: 1. An independent activity is determined through reciprocal activity and passivity.
2. An independent activity determines the reci procal activity and passivity.
3. Both are mutually determined through each •other; and it is all the same whether we proceed from reciprocal activity and passivity to indepen dent activity, or vice versa.
An independent activity is dctcrmiiud through re ciprocal activity and passivity.
Concerning this proposition, we have first to in quire its significance, and next to apply it to the conceptions of causality and substantiality in their contradiction.
Its significance. We have said before, that our present undertaking involves a restriction of the conception of reciprocal determination. This is done by showing the ground of the application of that conception.
According to that conception, by positing acti vity in the one, (the Ego or Non-Ego,) passivity is immediately posited in its opposite, and vice versa. It is also clear from the rule of opposition, that, if a passivity is to be posited, it must be posited in the opposite of the active. But why is passivity to be posited at all, that is, why is a reciprocal deter mination to occur at all?
Activity and passivity, as such, are opposed; and yet passivity is immediately posited through acti vity, and vice versa. Hence, they must be equal toeach other in a third conception, = X, which makes possible the transition from the one to the other,, without destroying the unity of consciousness. This third is the ground of relation between activity and passivity in the reciprocity, (§ 3.)
This ground of relation is not dependent upon reciprocal determination, but the latter is depen dent upon it, becomes possible only through that ground of relation. True, in reflection, this ground is posited through reciprocal determination, but also posited as independent of it and its reciprocity.
This ground is, moreover, determined in reflection through the reciprocity; that is, if the reciprocal de termination is posited, the ground of relation of its activity and passivity is posited in that sphere, which contains within it the sphere of reciprocal determination. In other words, through this ground of relation a higher sphere is posited round about the sphere of reciprocal determination. The ground of relation fills up the sphere of determination in general, while reciprocal determination fills up only a part of that sphere.
This ground is a reality; or, if reciprocal deter mination is thought as an act, is an activity. And thus an independent activity is determined through reciprocal activity and passivity.
APPLICATION UNDER CONCEPTION OF CAUSALITY.
By means of this conception, which gave us the first instance of an activity and passivity mutually determining each other, an activity of the Non-Ego is posited through a passivity of the Ego. This first instance of a reciprocal determination (of a re ciprocity, as we shall usually call it) is now to de termine and posit an independent activity.
The reciprocal determination in this instance starts from passivity. Passivity is posited, and through and by means of passivity activity is posit ed. The passivity is posited in the Ego. Hence, if an activity is posited in opposition to the passi vity, the activity must be posited in the Non-Ego, the opposite, according to the conception of reci procal determination. Of course, in this transition from the Ego to the Non-Ego, there is also a ground of relation which we know already as quantity. (The absolute totality of reality or activity is always the same. If only part of it is posited in the Ego, or if passivity is posited in the Ego, the correspond ing part of reality or activity is posited in the Non-Ego.) This ground of relation can be properly called here the ideal ground; and, hence, the passi vity of the Ego is the ideal ground of the activity of the Non-Ego. (Namely, since the whole activity is not posited in the Ego, the part not posited in the Ego is posited in the Non-Ego.)
But why is an activity to be posited at all as op posite of the passivity in tJic Ego, from which the conception of reciprocal determination starts. If it is posited, it must, certainly, as we have shown, be posited in the Non-Ego; but why is it to be posited at all, why is the conception of reciprocal determi nation to be applied here at all?
In the Ego is posited a passivity; that is, a quan tum of its activity is canceled. This passivity, or this diminution of its activity, must have a ground; for the canceled activity is a quantum, and every quantum is determined through another quantum, by means of which it is neither a smaller nor a larger quantum, but precisely this quantum, accord ing to the law of determination in general, (§ 3.)
In the Ego the ground of this diminution can not be, for the Ego only posits activity in itself, and not passivity; it posits itself as being, not as not-being. Hence, the ground, by virtue of the law of opposi tion, (§ 2,) must be posited in the Non-Ego; or the Non-Ego contains the ground of this diminution.
Here we speak no longer of mere quantity, but of quality. Passivity is opposed to the Ego here in so far as the Ego is only activity, and hence the ground of it can not be posited in the Ego, but must be posited in the Non-Ego. Now, the ground of a quality is called real ground. An activity of the Non-Ego, independent of the reciprocal deter mination of the two opposites of activity and pas sivity, nay, presupposed for the very possibility of that reciprocity, is thus the real ground of the pas sivity of the Ego; and this independent activity is posited, so that wre may have a real ground of that passivity. Hence, through the above reciprocity is posited an independent activity, (of the Non-Ego.; We have now seen how, through the reciprocity between passivity of the Ego and activity of the Non-Ego, an independent activity of the Non-Ego is posited and determined. It is posited in order to get a ground for a passivity posited in the Ego; and hence extends no further than this passivity. There is, hence, no original reality and activity of the Non-Ego for the Ego, except in so far as the Ego is passive. No passivity in the Ego, no acti vity in the Non-Ego. This result is valid even when this activity is spoken of as an activity, indepen dent of the conception of causality. Even the thing in itself is only in so far as the conception of causality extends, and has validity only in so far as, at least, the possibility of passivity is presupposed in the Ego. (A result which will receive its com plete determination and applicability only in the practical part of our science.)
Let it, therefore, be well remembered, that the conclusion as to the Non-Ego being real ground isvalid only in so far as it is true that the passivity in the Ego is qualitative; which it is only in the conception of causality.
As soon as we get to the second reciprocal con ception, substantiality, we shall see that under that conception the passivity of the Ego can not be thought at all as qiialitativc, but only as quantita tive, as diminished activity; and that under that conception, therefore, the Non-Ego again becomes merely ideal ground.
A philosophy which starts from positing the Non-Ego as cause of all representation, and the repre sentation as its effect, and which thus posits the Non-Ego as the real ground of all, the Non-Ego being simply because it is and what it is, (Spino za's Fate,) and the Ego being simply an accidence of the Non-Ego, and not substance at all; such a system is a dogmatic Realism, (or material Spinozism,) a system which presupposes the impossibi lity of making the highest abstraction, namely, abstraction from the Non-Ego; and which is ut terly ungrounded, as it does not establish any final ground On the other hand, a system which makes the Ego the substance of representation * and represen tation the accidence of the Ego, the Non-Ego be ing not real ground thereof at all, but merely ideal ground, and having, therefore, no reality beyond re presentation — such a system is a dogmatic Ideal ism. In such a system no ground can be assigned for the limitation of reality in the Ego, (for the affection through which a representation arises.) Such a system has certainly undertaken the highest abstraction, and is therefore completely grounded But it is incomplete, because it does not explain what is to be explained.
The true question in dispute between dogmatic Realism and dogmatic Idealism is, therefore, in which manner shall we explain Representation? Through the conception of Causality! asserts Real ism. Through the conception of Substantiality! asserts Idealism.
In the theoretical part of our science this ques tion will remain undecided; or, rather, it will be answered thus: Both modes of explanation are cor rect. Under certain conditions you must take the one, and under certain conditions the other. (A system which shows up this is a Critical Idealism, such as Kant has established in completest form.)
But this answer involves human — that is, all finite — reason in self-contradiction; and this con tradiction must be solved. It is solved in the prac tical part of our science.
The absolute being of the Ego can not be relin quished -without annihilating the Ego itself, and hence the question is finally decided in favor of the Ego, precisely as dogmatic Idealism decides it Our Idealism, however, not being dogmatic, does not assert this to be so, but shows, that it SHALL be so. In other words, our system explains the problem by positing the Ego (which is in so far practical) as an Ego which shall contain in itself the ground of the existence of the Non-Ego, through which the ac tivity of the Ego as intelligence is diminished. This "being an (in time) infinite idea, our explanation, in stead of explaining, rather shows that and v.'/ry what is to be explained can not be explained. (Or, that to ask for an explanation is a self-contradiction.)
APPLICATION UNDER CONCEPTION OF SUBSTAN TIALITY.
By means of the conception of substantiality, through activity in the Ego a passivity in the Ego is posited and determined. The reciprocal deter mination of this activity and passivity in the Ego was the second instance of reciprocal determination which we discovered; and this reciprocity is also to determine an independent activity.
In themselves, passivity and activity are oppo- THE SCIENCE OF KNOWELDCE. 135 sites; and we have seen how it is possible that, through one and the same act which posits a cer tain quantity of activity in the one, the same quan tity of passivity can be posited in its opposite. But it is an evident contradiction that activity and pas sivity should both together be posited, not in two opposites, but in one and the same, (in the Ego.)
True, this contradiction has been partly solved in the general deduction of substantiality, by show ing that passivity is in its quality nothing but di minished activity, and is in its quantity only not the totality of activity; and that it, therefore, can be related to the totality of activity, and can thus be posited as diminished activity. The ground of re lation between both being thus activity.
But if the Ego posits within itself diminished activity, and if the Non-Ego is also to have dimi nished activity, how are both these diminished acti vities to be distinguished? that is, how are the Ego and Non-Ego to be distinguished? For the ground of distinction between the Ego and the Non-Ego Juts been destroyed.
Unless this distinction is possible, the required reciprocal determination is also not possible, and indeed none of our deduced determinations are pos sible. All our deductions would be canceled.
Hence, the diminished activity of the Ego must • have a character altogether peculiar to itself, whereby it may be characterized as the activity of the Ego, and can never be taken for activity of the Non-Ego. This character is absolute positing, (§ I.) But absolute signifies unlimited, and yet that activity of the Ego is to be diminisJicd, limited. The dimi nished activity is, therefore, to be both absolute and limited. That is, in so far as it is an acting in general, it is absolute, unconditioned; you may act or not But in so far as it is directed upon an object, it is limited; when you act, the act must be directed upon this object, and can not be directed upon any other.
We see, therefore, how this reciprocal determina tion posits an independent activity. For the acti vity in that reciprocity is itself independent, not however, in so far as it stands in that reciprocity, but in so far as it is activity. In so far as it enters the reciprocity, it is limited, and in so far passivity. We see, also, how the reciprocity determines this independent activity, that is, in the mere reflection. For the activity was assumed as absolute only in so far as to make possible the reciprocity. Hence, this activity is posited as absolute only in so far as reciprocal activity and passivity arc to be determined by it; and itself is, therefore, determined by the ex tent of this reciprocity. (It is not an absolute acti vity in general?) An absolute activity of this cha racter is called Power of Imagination, as we shall see in time.
IL AN INDEPENDENT ACTIVITY DETERMINES A RECI PROCAL ACTIVITY AND PASSIVITY.
Let us first obtain the significance of this propo sition, and its distinction from the former. The former had reference merely to the content of the reciprocity, not to its form. It simply said, if a reciprocity is to be, then there must be links which stand in reciprocal relation and can be interchanged. Thus the question arose: How are these links pos sible? And then we were led to show up an inde pendent activity as ground of these links.
But now we have to start from that which con stitutes the reciprocal determination as reciprocity, as an interchange, as a going from one opposite to another. Here, therefore, we do not seek the ground of the content of the reciprocity, but the ground of its fonn. This formal ground of the re ciprocity is also to be an independent activity; and it is this we now have to prove.
Illustration.
The magnet attracts iron; iron is attracted by the magnet. These are two exchangeable proposi tions; that is, through the one the other is posited. This is a presupposed fact, presupposed as ground-€d; and hence, if you look to the content of this re ciprocal relation, you do not ask, Who posits the one proposition through the other, and tww does this positing occur? You assume the reciprocity as Jiaving occurred if you look to the content of the reci procity; and you only ask, Why are these t'jjo pro positions contained among the sphere of proposi tions, which can be thus posited the one through the other? There must be something in both which makes it possible to interchange them. Hence, you look up this, their material content, which makes them interchangeable.
If, however, you look to the fonn of the recipro city, if you reflect on the occurring- of the inter change, and hence abstract from the propositions which are interchanged, then the question no long er is: With what right are these propositions inter changed? but simply: How is interchange effected at all? And then it is discovered, that there must be an intelligent being outside of the iron and mag net, which, observing both and uniting both in its consciousness, is compelled to give to the one the opposite predicate of the other; (to the one the predicate of attracting, to the other the predicate of being attracted.)
The first mode gives simply a reflection upon a, phenomenon; the second mode a reflection upon that reflection; the reflection of the philosopher upon the mode of observation.
APPLICATION UNDER THE CONCEPTION OF CAUSALITY.
In the reciprocity of causality, passivity in the Ego posits activity in the Non-Ego. The mere formal expression of this reciprocity is a positing through a not-positing, that is, a transferring. Such is thefwma/ character of the reciprocity here; and, hence, such is the material character of the activity which establishes that reciprocity. This activity is independent of the reciprocity, since the latter only is possible by means of it; and is independent also of the two links of the reciprocity as such; for only through it do they become reciprocally inter changeable, since it is the activity which inter changes them. But all positing belongs to the Ego; hence this activity of transferring, to make possible a determination through the conception of causality, belongs to the Ego. The Ego carries over, transfers, activity from itself into the Non-Ego; and thus posits through activity passivity in itself. In so far as the Ego is active in carrying over this activity, in so far the Non-Ego is passive; activity is transferred into it (Of course, this contradicts our former conclu* sion establishing an independent activity of the Non-Ego; but we must wait and see how both will be reunited.) It must also be remembered that this activity is independent of the reciprocity which first becomes possible through it There might be another reciprocity which does not become possible through it. Our result, therefore, is this: Even in so far as the Ego is passive, it must also be active, though perJtaps not merely active; and this result may be important enough.
APPLICATION UNDER THE CONCEPTION* OF SUB STANTIALITY.
In the reciprocity of substantiality, activity is to "be posited as limited by means of absolute totality; that is to say, that part of the absolute totality -which is excluded by the limit is posited as not posited through the positing of the limited activity. Hence, the mere formal character of this recipro city is a not-positing by means of a positing. That which is wanting in the limited activity is posited in the absolute totality; is not posited in the limited activity; it is posited as not posited in the recipro city, (in the reciprocal determination of activity and passivity.) By this conception of substantiality we start, therefore, from an absolute positing, from a positing of the absolute totality.
Hence, the material character of that act, which itself posits this reciprocity, must also be a notpositing through a positing, and through an absolute positing. We abstract utterly from the question whence the not-positedness in the limited activity may come, and what may be its ground. The limit ed act is presupposed as existing, and the only ques tion is: How may it interchange with unlirnitedness?
All positing in general, and particularly absolute positing, belongs to the Ego; the act which posits the present reciprocity starts from absolute posit ing, and therefore belongs to the Ego. It is inde pendent of the reciprocity, for that becomes possible only through it This not positing through a posit- THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 14!
ing we may call an externalizing. A certain quan tum of the absolute totality is excluded, externalized, from the posited diminished activity, is posited as not contained in it, but as outside of it. The cha racteristic distinction between the externalizing and the previous transferring is this: in transferring something is certainly also excluded from the Ego; but this we do not reflect upon, looking merely to its being posited again in the opposite, the Non-Ego. It is a transferring to another. But in ex ternalizing we merely exclude from the Ego, and do not say whether the excluded be posited in an other, and if so in what To this activity of externalizing passivity must "be opposed; and it really is thus. For a part of the absolute totality is externalized, is posited, as not posited. The activity has an object; a part of the totality is this object. To what substrate of reality this passivity may be assigned, whether to the Ego or to the Non-Ego, is not the question "here; and it is very important that no other conclu sions should be drawn from our result than are contained in it, and that the form of the reciprocity "be comprehended in all its purity.
(Each thing is what it is; it has those realities which are posited when it is posited, (A = A.) To call something an accidence of a thing is to say that something is not included in the positing of the thing, does not belong to its real nature, and is to "be excluded from its original conception. It is this determination of the accidence which we have now explained. Nevertheless, in another sense the acci dence is also ascribed to the thing and posited in it. How this is done we shall see hereafter.)
in.
BOTH THE RECIPROCITY AND THE ACTIVITY, INDE PENDENT THEREOF, MUTUALLY DETERMINE EACH OTHER.
Let us again, as heretofore, first try to get at the significance of this proposition, and then proceed to apply it As we have now, however, acquired a twofold reciprocity, ^form and a content of it, and also a twofold independent activity, which, on the one hand, determines the form, and, on the other hand, is (in reflection) determined by the content of the reciprocity; we must make more clear the above proposition by uniting these several links through the synthesis of reciprocal determination. Hence, that proposition involves the following three: (a.) The activity, independent of the jforw of the reciprocity, determines the activity, independent of its content, and vice versa; that is, both are syn thetically united and mutually determine each other.
(£.) The form of the reciprocity determines its content, and vice versa; that is, both are syntheti cally united and mutually determine each other.
(c.) The reciprocity (as synthetical unity) deter mines the independent activity, (as synthetical uni ty,) and vice versa; that is, both determine each other mutually and are synthetically united.
(a.) The activity independent of tlie form, and the activity independent of the content cf the reciprocity, *arc mutually to determine each other.
That activity which is to determine the form of the reciprocity, or the reciprocity as such, but is to "be absolutely independent of it, is a going over from one of the links of the reciprocity to the other.
That activity which determines the content of the reciprocity is an activity which posits that into the links whereby it is made possible to go from the one to the other.
The latter activity gives the X which is in both Jinks, and can be contained only in both, but not in one of them merely; and which makes it impossible to remain content with the positing of the one link, but forces us to posit at the same time the other "Jink, because it shows up the incompleteness of the one without the other. This X is that to which the unity of consciousness clings, and must cling if no hiatus is to arise in it; it is, as it were, the con ductor of consciousness.
The former activity is consciousness itself, in so far as it floats over the interchanging links while •clinging to X, and in so far as it is a unit; although it changes its objects, these links, and necessarily, must change them if it is to be a unit The former determines the latter signifies, the going from the one link to the other is the ground of the content of the reciprocity; the latter deter mines the former signifies, the content of the reci procal links is the ground of the going from the one to the other as act. Both mutually determine 144 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE each other signifies, therefore: by positing the mere going over, you posit in each link that which makes this going over possible, and by positing them as reciprocal links you immediately go from the one to the other. The going from one link to the other becomes possible only by doing it; and it is only possible in so far as it is actually done. It is an absolute act without any other ground. The ground of the going over from one link to the other lies in consciousness itself, not outside of it Conscious ness, because it is consciousness, must go from one link to the other, and would not be consciousness if it did not, because a hiatus would arise in it.
(£.) The form of the reciprocity and its content are mutually to determine each other, The reciprocity, as we have said before, is distin guished from the activity prcsiipposcd through it, by abstracting from this presupposed activity, (for instance, by abstracting from the activity of an in telligence which observes the reciprocity.) In this view, the intcrcJianging links of tJie reciprocity are tJwught as iutcrcJianging through themselves; we transfer into the things what in truth is only in us. How far such an abstraction may be valid will ap pear in time.
From such a stand-point, therefore, the links in terchange through themselves. And their mutual joining is the fonn, while the activity and passi vity, occurring in this joining, (namely, each joins and is joined,) is the content of the reciprocity. We shall call this content here the mutual Relation of the interchanging links.
Now, that joining is to determine the relation of the links; that is, immediately and through the mere joining of the links, as joining, is the relation to be determined, and vice versa. Their joining and their relation is to be one and the same. In other words: The relation of the links consists in this, that they interchange, and they have no other mutual relation. If they are not posited as interchanging, they are not posited at all Again: through this mere form of a reciprocity being posited between them, the content of the re ciprocity is immediately and completely determined. The links intcrcJiange necessarily and only in one possible manner, which is absolutely determined by the very fact that they interchange. If they are posited, a determined interchange or reciprocity of them is posited; and if a determined reciprocity of them is posited, then they are posited. The links and a determined reciprocity are one and the same.
(c.) The independent activity as synthetical unity determines the reciprocity as synthetical unify, and vice versa; iJiat is, both of these synthetical unities mutually determine each other, and are themselves synthetically united.
The activity and synthetical unity has been dis covered as an absolute going from one link to an other, the latter as an in itself absolutely determined joining. The former determines the latter signifies, by the going from one link to the other their join ing is posited. The latter determines the former signifies, as the links join, the activity must necessardy go from the one to the other. Both deter mine each other mutually signifies, the positing of the one posits the other, from each you can and must proceed to the other. It is all one and the same, and the whole is absolutely posited; rests on itself! To make this important result clearer, we apply it to the propositions involved in it