The activity which determines the form of the reciprocity determines all that occurs in the reci procity, and vice versa. Determines the form: that is, the mere reciprocity in its form, or the joining of the links, is not possible -without the act of go ing from the one to the other, and only through the going from the one link to the other is their joining posited; and vice versa. Xo joining of the links, no going from the one to the other; no going from the one to the other, no joining. Both is one and the same, and is distinguishable only in reflection.
Determines also the content: that is, through the necessary going from one of the links to the other these reciprocal links are first posited as such, and indeed since they are only posited as such, posited at all, and vice versa; through the positing of these links as interchanging links is the activity first posited which goes from the one to the other.
Hence, you may start from which of the moments you will, the positing of the one always involves the positing of the other three.* * Four moments and their unity, that is to say, fire in alL This fivefold FICHTE has shown up in other works with particular ear nestness, as occurring in even- synthesis of consciousness. — TRANS LATOR'S NOTE.
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, M7 The activity which determines the content of the reciprocity determines the whole reciprocity: that is, it posits that by means of which the going over is made possible, and hence necessary. It therefore posits the activity of the form, and through it all the rest Hence, the activity returns into itself by means of the reciprocity, and the reciprocity returns into itself by means of the activity. Every thing re produces itself, and no hiatus is possible; from each link you are driven to all the others. The activity of the form determines that of the content; the activity of the content determines the content of the reciprocity; the content of the reciprocity de termines its form; the form of the reciprocity the activity of the form, etc. They are all one and the same synthetical condition. The act returns into itself through its circular movement. But the whole circular movement is absolutely posited. It is because it is, and there is no higher ground for it And now, having shown the full significance of our proposition, let us proceed to apply it as here tofore.
APPLICATION UNDER THE CONCEPTION OF CAUSALITY.
Our proposition was: TJie reciprocity and tJic ac~ Jivity independent of it are mutually to determine other.
148 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE According to the just established scheme this involves the following: isL The activity of the form determines that of the content, and vice versa.
2d. The form of the reciprocity determines its content, and vice versa.
3d. The synthetically united activity determines the synthetically united reciprocity, and vice versa.
I. — The activity of tJie fonn determines that of the. content, and vice versa.
As mere form, this activity was characterized as a transferring, that is, a positing through a notpositing. This activity of the form is to determine the activity of the content of the reciprocity, which latter was found to be an independent activity in the Non-Ego, which made possible a passivity in the Ego. This latter is determined by the former, means: The activity is posited in the Non-Ego through the Ego, but only in so far as something is not posited. The activity of the Non-Ego is thus inclosed in a limited sphere, that is, in the activity cf the form. The Non-Ego is active only in so far as it is posited active through the Ego, in virtue of a not-positing. No positing by a not-positing — no activity of the Non-Ego. But, on the other hand, the activity of the content, or the independent ac tivity of the Non-Ego, is to determine that of the form, that is, the transferring or the positing through a not-positing.
This means, therefore: the activity of the Non-Ego is to determine the transferring as a transferring; or, it is to posit the X, whereby the incom pleteness of the one link is shown up, and thus the necessity of positing it, as interchanging link, or as a link in reciprocity with another link. This second link is a passivity, as passivity. Hence, the Non-Ego is the ground of a «0/-positing, and thus determines and conditions the activity of the form. No activity of the Non-Ego, no positing through a not-positing.
Here we have again the conflict of Realism, which says that activity can not be transferred unless an independent reality of the Non-Ego is presup posed; and of Idealism, which says, that all reality of the Non-Ego is simply transferred to it by the Ego. This conflict is to be reconciled.
This is done in the following synthesis: Activity in the Non-Ego is passivity in the Ego, and both are altogether one and the same. Neither is the ground of the other; both are one and the same act. In so far as the Ego does not posit in itself, it posits in the Non-Ego, that is, in so far it is itself Non-Ego.
Let us explain this: When the Non-Ego is con sidered as limiting the Ego, it is not considered at all zs, positing^ but merely as canceling; hence, it is opposed to the Ego as qualitatively distinct, is real ground of a determination in the Ego. But when the Ego is viewed as limiting itself, it is still viewed as positing; that is, as positing a negative; hence, as in part positing, and in part not-positing. The Ego is, therefore, only quantitatively opposed to it- I5O THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
self — is only the ideal ground of a determination in itself; and since it posits that which it does not posit in itself, in the Non-Ego, it is the ideal ground of the reality of the Non-Ego, to which that deter mination corresponds. But that the ideal ground should thus become a real ground in the Non-Ego, this is what common sense can not comprehend.
Ideal ground and real ground are, therefore, one and the same. The reason why common sense refuses to comprehend it is because it considers the Ego as an external thing. Just as in exter nal things we distinguish the real ground of their mutual relation, that is, the independent content or quality which makes them related; and the ideal ground of their relation; that is, that we posit them as related; so common consciousness posits its Ego as an external thing, related to other things by an inherent something; for instance, as the magnet is related to iron. But in the Ego positing itself is the same as being. In it real and ideal ground are one and the same. Again, not positing itself, -and not being, is for the Ego the same. The Ego does not posit something as itself means, the Ego is not that something. The Non-Ego is to influence the Ego means, it is to cancel a positing in the Ego; it is to cause the Ego not to posit Again, the Ego is to recognize a Non-Ego means, it is to posit reality in the Non-Ego; for the Ego recognizes no other reality but what itself posits. Activity of the Ego and of the Non-Ego are one THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. \$\ and the same means: the Ego can only posit some thing not in itself, by positing it in the Non-Ego; and can only posit in itself by not positing in the Non-Ego. The Ego must posit, however, as sure as it is an Ego; but it need not posit in itself.
Passivity of the Ego and of the Non-Ego is also one and the same. The Ego does not posit some thing in itself means, that something is posited in the Non-Ego.
Activity and passivity of the Ego are one and the same. For what the Ego does not posit in itself it posits in the Non-Ego.
Activity and passivity of the Non-Ego are one and the same. In so far as the Non-Ego is to in fluence the Ego, to cancel something in the Ego, this something has been posited in the Non-Ego by the Ego.
Thus the synthetical solution is complete. None of the moments are grounds of the others; all are one and the same.
The question, What is the ground of the passi vity in the Ego? is, therefore, not a proper one, for there is no such passivity. But one question may be put: What is the ground of this whole reci procity? To say simply it is because it is, is not allowable, for only the Ego is absolutely posited; and the mere Ego does not involve this reciprocity. Such a ground, however, if it is to be found, is not to be found in the theoretical part of the science of knowledge, because it is not involved in its funda mental principle, that " the Ego posits itself as •determined by the Non-Ego." On the contrary, the theoretical part presupposes such a ground At the same time, our expression, " limited, re stricted activity of the Ego," is now perfectly clear. It is an activity which is directed upon something in the Non-Ego, hence an objective activity. The activity of the Ego generally is not at all limited, and can not be limited; but its positing of tlie Ego is limited by this, that it must posit a Non-Ego.
II. — The form and tJic content of tJie reciprocity determine each other mutually.
The form of the reciprocity is the mere mutual in terchange of the links — the content is that in them, which makes them capable of this mutual inter change, and impels them to realize it The charac teristic form of the reciprocity is here (under the ca tegory of causality) a becoming through a vanishing. •(From time we must abstract as yet. The X which becomes through the — X, which vanishes, must both be thought together, or, rather, not at all in time.) The characteristic of the content of this reciprocity is essential opposition of the two links, or the qualita tive incompatibility of both.
The form is to determine the content means, the two links are essentially opposed, because and in so far as they cancel each other. Their actual mutual canceling determines the sphere of their opposition. If they do not cancel each other, they are not essentially opposed. (A seeming paradox, to be explained directly.)
The content determines the form-- means, their •essential opposition determines fheir mutual cancel ing; only on condition that the links are opposed, and only in so far as they are mutually opposed •can they cancel each other. Form and content mutually determine each other signifies, the essen tial opposition of the links necessitates their mutual canceling, and hence their actual connection and influence upon each other, and vice versa. Both is one and the same.
The real result of this synthesis is, that a neces sary connection is posited between the links. This synthesis denies the possibility to distinguish a "being in itself from a being in the reciprocity; both are posited as interchanging links, and are other wise not posited at all Real and ideal opposition are one and the same. This is what appears para doxical, but it does not appear so when it is re membered that the one link is the Ego, to which nothing is opposed, which it does not posit as op posed to itself, and which is opposed to nothing, "but to what it posits itself as opposed.
III. — The synthetically united activity and the synthetically united reciprocity mutually determine each other, and constitute in tJicinsclvcs a syntlictical unity.
The activity as synthetical unity may be called a mediated positing, (a positing of reality by means of a not-positing;) the synthetically united reci procity is the identity of essential opposition and real canceling.
The former determines the latter signifies: The mcdiatcncss of the positing is the ground and the condition of the identity of essential opposition and real canceling. These two links are identical be cause of the mcdiatcncss of the positing.
If the interchanging links were posited immedi ately, opposition and canceling would be distinct. Call these links A and B. Let A = A and B = B; but now posit also A = — B, in some quantitative respect, and B = — A; and, nevertheless, they do not necessarily cancel each other. For you may abstract from their characteristic as opposites, and again view them as having been posited immedi ately and independent of each other, (A = A and B = B,) in which case they are no longer posited as interchanging links, but also as reality in them selves. Interchanging links can only be posited mediately; A is = — B, and nothing else; and B= — A, and nothing else; and from this mediateness of the positing follows their essential op position and their mutual canceling, and the iden tity of both. For if A and B are thus posited, as existing merely in essential opposition to each other, and if they can receive no other predicate (not even that of a thing) — if A can therefore not be posited as real otherwise than through not positing B, and B not except through not positing A — their common essence evidently con sists in this, that the one is posited through the not-positing of the other, and hence — if we abstract from an intelligence which posits them — that they •do cancel each other. Their essential opposition and mutual canceling are, therefore, identical, in so far as each link is only posited through the notpositing of another.
Now, this is the case with the Ego and the Non-Ego. The Ego can transfer reality into the Non-Ego only through not positing the same in itself; and into itself only through not positing the same in the Non-Ego. (We speak here of transferred, not of absolute reality.) The essence of the Ego and the Non-Ego, therefore, as interchanging links, consists only in this, that they are opposed to each other, and cancel each other. The mediateness of the positing (that is, the law of consciousness, " no subject no object, and vice versa"} is the ground of the essential opposition of the Ego and the Non-Ego, and hence of all the reality of the Non-Ego as well as of the Ego; that is, in so far as this real ity is posited simply as posited, or, ideal reality; for the absolute reality remains, of course, in the positing. This mediateness, so far as we have now advanced in our synthesis, is not again to be grounded through that whereof it is the ground, nor can it be so in any proper application of the prop osition of the ground. The ground of this mediateness, therefore, can not be contained either in the reality of the Non-Ego, or in the posited reality of the Ego. The ground must, therefore, be in the absolute Ego; and this mediateness must be itself absolute, that is, grounded in and through itself This, on our present standpoint, very correct result establishes a new and still more abstract M idealism than we had before. In that former ideal ism, an itself posited activity was canceled through the nature and the essence of the Ego, canceled absolutely, without further ground; and this abso lute canceling made an object and subject, etc., possible. Representations developed themselves as such, out of the Ego in a manner utterly un known and inaccessible to us.
In the present idealism the activity has its law immediately in itself; it is a mediate activity and no other, simply because it is mediate. From this its mediateness every thing else, reality of the Non-Ego, and, in so far, negation of the Ego; and negation of the Non-Ego, and, in so far, reality of the Ego, can be completely explained Representa tions develop themselves out of the Ego according to a determined and cognizable law of its nature. It is only the ground of this law of mediation which is here inaccessible.
This idealism necessarily abolishes the former, since it explains what to the former was inexplainable from a higher ground. The fundamental prin ciple of this latter idealism would be, the Ego is finite simfly be -cause it is finite.
Now, although such an idealism rises higher, it. does not rise high enough, does not rise to the absolutely posited and unconditioned. True, finity is to be absolutely posited; but all finite is, by its very conception, limited by its opposite, and abso lute finity is thus, an in itself contradictory concep tion.
I shall call the former idealism, which cancels something posited in itself, qualitative idealism,; and the latter, which originally posits itself a limited quantity, quantitative idealism.
2d, The latter determines the former signifies: the mediateness of the positing is determined by this, that the essence of the interchanging links consists merely in their essential opposition; only through the latter fact is the mediateness possible, For if their essence were not thereby exhausted, the not-positing of the one would by no means necessitate the positing of the other in its complete essence; but if their essence consists only in this, then they can only be posited mediately.
From this view the essential opposition is the absolute fact — not the mediateness of the positing as above — and is the ground of that mediateness.
A system which takes this view, results in a quantitative realism, well to be distinguished from our previous qualitative realism. In the system of qualitative realism an independent Non-Ego, hav ing reality in itself, impresses the Ego and restricts the activity thereof. The quantitative realist re cognizes, on the contrary, that reality is posited in the Non-Ego for the Ego only by the applying of the law of the ground, though he, also, does main tain the real existence of a limitation of the Ego, •whereof t lie Ego is not the cause. The qualitative realist asserts the independent reality of & determin ing; the quantitative realist merely the independent reality of a dctennination. The latter says, there is 158 THE SCJEXCE OF JfA'Otrr f DCE.
a determination in the Ego of -which the gronnd can not be posited in the Ego. This to mrp is a fact; that is, that determination exists for "him absoluteh' without any ground. True, the law of the ground compels him to relate it to the 3v on-Ego as the real ground of that •determination: but he also knows that that law of the ground is his own, and hence he is not deceived by it It appears at once trrat this system is the same as that of critical ideal ism; and KAJTT, indeed, has established no other -han this, as indeed, from the standpoint of reflec tion he had placed himself trpon, he neither could nor wished to -establish another one.
The above cuantitative idealism is distinguished ' ^ although both assume a finrrv of the JElgo. the former system p:>sit? that £rin- as absolutely posit ed; the latter system as accidental but alsD as uneiplainable. Quantitative realism iibolishes cuatititative idealism, because:t explains without its assist ance. though mikir.- the same error, the existence of an object in consciousness. I sav. with the szme error, for it also can not explain, how 2. real deter mination may become an ideal one, how an in itself existing determination may become a determination for iJic posiiiKg £•£&- True, we have seen now how the essential oppo sition determines and grounds the mediateness of the positing; but through what is positing itself grounded t Jf a positing is to be realized, then, of course, it can only be through mediation; but posit ing in itself is an absolute act of the absolutely undetermined and undeterminable Ego. Hence, this system can not explain the possibility of pro ceeding from the limited to the unlimited. The above quantitative idealism removes this difficulty by abolishing the unlimited altogether, but this involves it in the contradiction, that it absolutely posits a limited.
Probably by uniting both syntheses we shall obtain a critical quantitative idealism as the true result.
3d. Each is to determine the other signifies: to oppose and to be opposed, being and being posited, ideal and real relation is to be the same. This can only be when the positing and the posited of the relation is one and the same, that is, when the posited is Ego. The Ego is to be in relation to an X, which, in so far, must be a Non-Ego, by which relation the Ego is posited only through the not positing of this Non-Ego, and vice versa. The Ego, however, is in a relation only in so far as it posits itself in a relation. Hence, it is the same whether you say of the Ego it is posited in this relation, or it posits itself in this relation. Ideal and real rela tion are the same.
Let us develop more clearly the important result of this synthesis, a result, however, which is only derived from the fundamental principle of the theo retical part of our science, and has only validity so far as that principle has it The Ego can only J6O TJJE SCJEXCE OF £ posit through a non-positing, that is, can only mediately posit itself as veil as the Xon-Ego. It is always positing, but it is f>osiltd only through poshing the Non-Ego, as not posited, or through negating it. Jn other -words, the Ego is <<tf/7' the opposite of the Non-Ego, and cicr 1*73*. N o Ego, no Non-Ego; no I, BO Thon; no siib^ect, BO object. Subject is that •which is not object, and has no other predicate as vet, and -z-izf z-crsa.
This result establishes the critical cv.r.ntitatrre idealism of -which we spoke.
The difficult j Ts~as to assign a ground for the de termination of the activity of the Ego as such. Quantitative realism assigns this ground to the passivity of the Ego, caused by a real Xon-Ego. Ouantitative idealism assigns it to the positing of the Ego, Tv.?.t is, posits the Ego simply as c^sclutfjj limited through itself The present system asserts that both are •wrong, that the l2?r of —?.r ceiermination is neither a merely subjective and ideal having its ground only in the Ego, nor an objective and real one, having its ground net in the Ego; but that it must be both in the object and subject. Hcr& f This question can not yet be ans-srered.
APPLICATION UXDER CATEGORY OF SUBSTAN TIALITY.
We have the same three propositions: i st The activity of the form and of the content mutuallv determine each other.
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. l6l 2d. The form and content of the reciprocity mu tually determine each other.
3d. The synthetically united activity and the synthetically united reciprocity mutually determine each other.
L TJu activity of the form and of the content mutitaUy determine each otJicr.
While the characteristic of the category of cau sality was the positing through a non-positing, the characteristic of the activity of the form under the category of substantiality is the positing of some thing as not posited through the positing of another as posited, that is, negation through affirmation. The not-posited is posited as not posited. Hence, it is not annihilated as before, but merely excluded, excluded from a certain sphere. Hence, again, it is not negated through positing generally, but through a determined positing. The not-posited has, there fore, merely a negative character; it is not this de termined sphere. Call the posited sphere A, the excluded not-posited, B. A, by itself, is posited as absolute totality; but this can not be if B is any wise posited. A is, therefore, posited both as total ity and not-totality; totality with reference to A, not-totality with reference to B. But B is merely determined negatively as not A. Hence A is posit ed as determined, and in so far total part of an un determined whole, which whole embraces both spheres, the determined and the undetermined spheres. This higher sphere must be posited to make both lower ones possible, and the activity which posits it is the activity of the content we are looking for.
Example.
Let us posit iron = A as absolute totality in itself. It excludes motion = B. Now take a piece of moving iron = C. By excluding motion = B from the conception of iron = A, you do not deny the moving iron = C, but you place this C in an undetermined sphere, because you do not know under what condition the motion = C is connected with the iron. The sphere, A, is totality of the iron, and also is it not, because it excludes = C which equally belongs to iron. Hence, you posit a higher sphere, embracing both moving and not-moving iron. In so far as iron fills this higher sphere it is substance; in A it is merely a thing. Motion and not-motion are its accidences.
The activity of the form determines that of the content signifies: only by excluding from the abso lute totality can you posit a higher sphere; no ex clusion, no higher sphere; no accidence in the Ego, no Non-Ego. The absolute totality of the Ego is positing itself. If an object is posited by it, this ob jective positing is excluded from that sphere, and placed in the opposite sphere of not-positing itself. Not to posit itself and to posit an object is the same. It excludes simply because it excludes, and did it not exclude, the higher sphere of gaifral positing would not be possible. It will be seen that the word positing itself has here a double significance, first, that of absolute totality, and se condly, that of a determined part of an undeter mined whole. Also, that substance signifies the all-embracing, not the permanent, as is generally supposed. (This results again in a system of quantitative idealism.)
The activity of the content determines that of the form signifies: the higher sphere is absolutely posited, and only through it is the exclusion (as real act of the Ego) possible. This again opens a quali tative realism, which maintains that the Ego and the Non-Ego are posited as opposites, that the Ego is generally positing; and that, if the Ego docs not posit the Non-Ego, it must certainly posit itself; but this must is accidental, and determined through the ground of the positing, which ground is not con tained in the Ego itself. According to this realism, the Ego is a representing being, which must be governed by the quality of the things.
Neither this result nor the previous one is to be valid; both must, therefore, be mutually modified. Because the Ego is to exclude something from it self, a higher sphere must be, and be posited; and vice versa. Or, there is a Non-Ego because the Ego posits something as its opposite, and it posits some thing as its opposite because a Non-Ego is, and is posited. This will again establish the above criti cal idealism.
IL IL Tiff (fin end tJu c&nicnl cf the rcdf-r-x^ fy cslcratixjc each clkfr.
Tbt fvmj cnc-i-lns r: t!->* err'-pf^g ctf tbs tccalrrr, B is txil^dec 5"^=i rts i osrt "on ss 15-o^.tcc. in rest, m cti'?n to iron. Your former ccnofrtzr-n cf iron is, tbenefore, no longer surnclen^ an£ yc -~ cc»~p!ete it b}- adding the characteristic cf srtractability bv the nragnet. Xow. from the one view, rzxr is essen tial to iron, and ir^ticr. accidental; from the other, bfih are accidental because both are detertnin-ed by tbe absence or presence of the ma~net. Hence. voa are in a cuandarv; unless A~OU can assiirn a ground why you take the first or second view, that is, unless you can determine from what totality you must proceed, whether from the determined totality which has been absolutely posited, or from the determinable totality which has arisen from it and from the excluded sphere.
The form of the reciprocity determines its con tent signifies-: the mutual exclusion determines which of both totalities is absolute. That which excludes another from the totality is, in so far as it excludes, the totality, and vice versa. If the abso lutely posited A excludes B, then, in so far, A is totality; and if B is reflected upon, and hence A not regarded as totality, in so far A + the unde termined B is the determinable totality. Result: There is no other ground of the totality than a rela tive one. You may optionally take either view. Take the absolutely posited conception of iron, and rest is essential; take its merely determinable con ception, and rest is accidental. Both conceptions are right, and you may take whichever you choose. The distinction is purely relative.
The content of the reciprocity determines its form signifies: the determinability of the totality, as explained by us, and vjliich is therefore posited, determines the mutual exclusion; that is, one of the totalities is the absolute one, either the de termined (B) or the merely determinable, (A + B.) If B is the absolute totality, then that which it excludes is also absolutely excluded. Result-There is an absolute ground of the totality, and it is not merely relative. It is not the same whether you take the determined or the determinable con ception of iron, and whether you posit rest as essential or accidental to it. If from some un known ground the determined conception of iron must be the first conception, only motion and not rest is its absolute accidence.
The form and the content mutually determine each other signifies: absolute and relative ground of the determination of the totality are the same; the relation is absolute, and the absolute nothing but a relation.
Both the results heretofore attained were wrong. There is an absolute law, our synthesis now says, for the determination of the totality, but this law is not contained in either of the above modes of de termination, but in positing both as imitually deter mining each other. Neither of the two totalities is the desired totality; both together, determining each other, give the true totality. Not A is abolute total ity, nor A + B, but A determined by A + B. The determinable is determined by the determined, and vice versa, and the thus resulting unity is the true totality.
What does this mean: the determined and the determinable must mutually determine each other? Evidently this: the determination of that which is to be determined is determinability. It is a deter minable, and nothing else; therein its whole essence is expressed. This determinability is the looked-for totality; that is, determinability is a fixed quantum, THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. l6/ has its limits, beyond which no further determina tion occurs, and all possible determinability lies within these limits.
The Ego posits itself; this is the absolute total ity of the reality of the Ego. The Ego posits an object. This objective positing must be excluded from the sphere of the self-positing of the Ego; and yet must also be ascribed to the Ego. Thus we obtain the sphere A + B as (unlimited as yet) totality of all the acts of the Ego. Now, both these spheres, the A and the A B, are mutually to determine each other. A gives what it has, abso lute limit; A -I- B gives what it has, content Thus the Ego is now positing an object, and then it is not the subject; or the subject, and then it is not an object; in so far as it posits itself, as posit ing under this rule. In this manner both spheres are united, and unitedly first form a single limited sphere; and in so far the determination of the Ego consists in its determinability through subject and object.
Determined determinability is the totality we sought, and such a totality is called Substance. No substance, unless you first proceed from the ab solutely posited, (the Ego, here,) which posits only itself; or, unless something is first excluded from it, (the Non-Ego, here.) But the substance which as such is nothing but determinability, and yet is to be fixed determinability, is no substance, (not ^//-embracing,) unless again determined by the absolutely posited, (here, by the itself-positing.)
The Ego posits itself as self-positing by excluding the Non-Ego, or it posits the Non-Ego as positing by excluding itself. Remark the two characters of the self-positing in this sentence; the first an un conditional, the second a conditional positing, determinable by excluding the Non-Ego.
Example.
Example.
If the determination of iron in itself be rest, then a change of place is excluded from it, and, in so far, iron is not substance, for it is not dctmninable. Still, the change of place is to be ascribed to the iron. This you can not do so as utterly to cancel its rest; for if you do, you cancel the iron itself as posited by you. Hence, you only cancel that rest in part, and the change of place is thus determined and limited by the rest of the iron; that is, the change of place occurs only within the sphere of a certain condition, (for instance, within the attraction of a magnet.) Beyond this sphere the iron is again in rest Who does not notice here the double sig nificance of the word rest? In the first instance, it is unconditioned; in the second, conditioned, namely, by the absence of a magnet Again, as A + B is determined by A, so B is determined, for it now belongs to the sphere of the determined determinable; and A itself is now a determinable. Hence, in so far as B itself is now de termined, it also can determine A and B, and must determine it in order to form an absolute relation. Hence, if A and B is posited, and A is in so far placed within the sphere of the determinable: A and B is again determined by B.