We now turn to the objection (raised above by the purvapakshin) that mantras and arthavadas, as merely sub¬ serving other purposes, have no power of setting forth the personality of the devas, and remark that not the cir¬ cumstance of subordination or non-subordination to some other purpose, but rather the presence or absence of a certain idea furnishes a reason for (our assuming) the existence of something. This is exemplified by the case of a person who, having set out for some other purpose, (nevertheless) forms the conviction of the existence of leaves, grass, and the like, which he sees lying on the road.—But, the pfirvapakshin may here object, the instance quoted by you is not strictly analogous. In the case of the wanderer, perception, whose objects the grass and leaves are, is active, and through it he forms the conception of their existence. In the case of an arthavada, on the other hand, which, as forming a syntactical unity with the corresponding injunctory passage, merely subserves the purpose of glorifying (the latter), it is impossible to determine any energy having a special object of its own. For in general any minor syntac¬ tical unity, which is included in a more comprehensive syntactical unity conveying a certain meaning, does not possess the power of expressing a separate meaning of its own. Thus, for instance, we derive, from the combination of the three words constituting the negative sentence, 4 (Do) not drink wine, 5 one meaning only, i. e. a prohibition of drinking wine, and do not derive an additional meaning, viz. an order to drink wine, from the combination of the last two words, ‘ drink wine. 5 —To this objection we reply, that the instance last quoted is not analogous (to the matter under discussion). The words of the sentence prohibiting the drinking of wine form only one whole, and on that account the separate sense which any minor syntactical unity included in the bigger sentence may possess cannot be accepted. In the case of injunction and arthavada, on the other hand, the words constituting the arthavada form a separate group of their own which refers to some accomplished thing 1, and only subsequently to that, when it comes to be considered what purpose they subserve, they enter on the function of glorifying the injunction. Let us examine, as an illustrative example, the injunctive passage, ‘He who is desirous of prosperity is to offer to Vdyu a white animal/ All the words contained in this passage are directly con¬ nected with the injunction. This is, however, not the case with the words constituting the corresponding arthavada passage, ‘For Vayu is the swiftest deity; Vayu he ap¬ proaches with his own share; he leads him to prosperity/ The single words of this arthavada are not grammatically connected with the single words of the injunction, but form a subordinate unity of their own, which contains the praise of Vayu, and glorify the injunction, only in so far as they give us to understand that the action enjoined is connected with a distinguished divinity. If the matter conveyed by the subordinate (arthavada) passage can be known by some other means of knowledge, the arthavada acts as a mere anuvada, i. e. a statement referring to something (already known) 2.
When its contents are contradicted by other means of knowledge it acts as a so-called gu/zavada, i. e. a statement of a quality 3 * *. Where, again, neither of the two mentioned conditions is found, a doubt may arise whether the arthavdda is to be taken as a guzzavada on account of the absence of other means of knowledge, or as an arthav&da referring to something known (i. e. an anuvada) on account of the ab¬ sence of contradiction by other means of proof. The latter alternative is, however, to be embraced by reflecting people. —The same reasoning applies to mantras also.
There is a further reason for assuming the personality of the gods. The Vedic injunctions, as enjoining sacrificial offerings to Indra and the other gods, presuppose certain characteristic shapes of the individual divinities, because 1 As opposed to an action to be accomplished.
2 Of this nature is, for instance, the arthavada, ‘ Fire is a remedy for cold/ 3 Of this nature is, for instance, the passage 6 the sacrificial post is the sun' (i. e. possesses the qualities of the sun, luminousness, See.; a statement contradicted by perception).
without such the sacrificer could not represent Indra and the other gods to his mind. And if the divinity were not represented to the mind it would not be possible to make an offering to it. So Scripture also says, ‘ Of that divinity for which the offering is taken he is to think when about to say vausha/’ (Ai. Br. Ill, 8, i). Nor is it possible to con¬ sider the essential form (or character) of a thing to consist in the word only 1; for word (denoting) and thing (denoted) are different. He therefore who admits the authorita¬ tiveness of the scriptural word has no right to deny that the shape of Indra, and the other gods, is such as we understand it to be from the mantras and arthavadas.— Moreover, itihasas and pura;zas also—because based on mantra and arthavada which possess authoritative power in the manner described—are capable o r setting forth the per¬ sonality, &c. of the devas. Itihasa and pura^a can, besides, be considered as based on perception also. For what is not accessible to our perception may have been within the sphere of perception of people in ancient times. Smrzti also declares that Vyasa and others conversed with the gods face to face. A person maintaining that the people of ancient times were no more able to converse with the gods than people are at present, would thereby deny the (incon¬ testable) variety of the world. He might as well maintain that because there is at present no prince ruling over the whole earth, there were no such princes in former times; a position by which the scriptural injunction of the ra^asuyasacrifice 2 would be stultified. Or he might maintain that in former times the spheres of duty of the different castes and Isramas were as generally unsettled as they are now, and, on that account, declare those parts of Scripture which define those different duties to be purposeless. It is there¬ fore altogether unobjectionable to assume that the men of ancient times, in consequence of their eminent religious 1 And therefore to suppose that a divinity is nothing but a certain word forming part of a mantra.
2 The ragasuy a-sacrifice is to be offered by a prince who wishes to become the ruler of the whole earth.
merit, conversed with the gods face to face. Smrzti also declares that ‘ from the reading of the Veda there results intercourse with the favourite divinity 5 (Yoga Sutra II, 44). And that Yoga does, as Smrzti declares, lead to the acquirement of extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of body, and so on, is a fact which cannot be set aside by a mere arbitrary denial. Scripture also proclaims the great¬ ness of Yoga, ‘ When, as earth, water, light, heat, and ether arise, the fivefold quality of Yoga takes place, then there is no longer illness, old age, or pain for him who has obtained a body produced by the fire of Yoga’ (vSVet. Up. II, 12). Nor have we the right to measure by our capabilities the capability of the ri shis who see the mantras and brahmazza passages (i. e. the Veda).—From all this it appears that the itih&sas and purazzas have an adequate basis.—And the conceptions of ordinary life also must not be declared to be unfounded, if it is at all possible to accept them.
The general result is that we have the right to conceive the gods as possessing personal existence, on the ground of mantras, arthavadas, itihasas, purazzas, and ordinarily prevailing ideas. And as the gods may thus be in the con¬ dition of having desires and so on, they must be considered as qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. Moreover, the declarations which Scripture makes concerning gradual emancipation 1 agree with this latter supposition only.
34. Grief of him (i. e. of (Tanasruti) (arose) on account of his hearing a disrespectful speech about himself; on account of the rushing on of that (grief) (Raikva called him.Sudra); for it (the grief) is pointed at (by Raikva).
(In the preceding adhikarazza) the exclusiveness of the claim of men to knowledge has been refuted, and it has been declared that the gods, &c. also possess such a claim. The present adhikarazza is entered on for the purpose of removing the doubt whether, as the exclusiveness of the 1 In one of whose stages the being desirous of final emancipation becomes a deva.
claim of twice-born men is capable of refutation, the vSudras also possess such a claim.
The purvapakshin maintains that the vSudras also have such a claim, because they may be in the position of desiring that knowledge, and because they are capable of it; and because there is no scriptural prohibition (ex¬ cluding them from knowledge) analogous to the text, ‘ Therefore 1 the vSudra is unfit for sacrificing 5 (Taitt. Sa^h. VII, i, i, 6). The reason, moreover, which disqualifies the vSudras for sacrificial works, viz. their being without the sacred fires, does not invalidate their qualification for know¬ ledge, as knowledge can be apprehended by those also who are without the fires. There is besides an inferential mark supporting the claim of the vSudras; for in the so-called sa^/varga-knowledge he (Raikva) refers to Cana^ruti Pautraya^a, who wishes to learn from him, by the name of vSudra 'Fie, necklace and carriage be thine, O vSudra, together with the cows ’ (. Kh. Up. IV, 2, 3). Sm riti moreover speaks of Vidura and others who were born from vSudra mothers as possessing eminent knowledge.—Hence the vSudra has a claim to the knowledge of Brahman.
To this we reply that the vSudras have no such claim, on account of their not studying the Veda. A person who has studied the Veda and understood its sense is indeed qualified for Vedic matters; but a vSudra does not study the Veda, for such study demands as its antecedent the upanayana-ceremony, and that ceremony belongs to the three (higher) castes only. The mere circumstance of being in a condition of desire does not furnish a reason for qualification, if capability is absent. Mere temporal capability again does not constitute a reason for qualification, spiritual capability being required in spiritual matters. And spiritual capability is (in the case of the vSudras) excluded by their being excluded from the study of the Veda.—The Vedic statement, moreover, that the vSudra is unfit for sacrifices intimates, because 1 The commentaries explain 4 therefore 9 by ‘ on account of his being devoid of the three sacred fires./ This explanation does not, however, agree with the context of the Taitt. Sazdi.
founded on reasoning, that he is unfit for knowledge also; for the argumentation is the same in both cases 1.—With reference to the purvapakshin’s opinion that the fact of the word ‘ *Sudra 5 being enounced in the sa//zvarga-knowledge constitutes an inferential mark (of the.Sudra’s qualifica¬ tion for knowledge), we remark that that inferential mark has no force, on account of the absence of arguments. For the statement of an inferential mark possesses the power of intimation only in consequence of arguments being adduced; but no such arguments are brought forward in the passage quoted 2 * *. Besides, the word 6 S udra ’ which occurs in the sa//zvarga-vidya would establish a claim on the part of the.Sudras to that one vidyd only, not to all vidyas.
In reality, however, it is powerless, because occurring in an arthavada, to establish the.SAdras’ claim to anything.—The word ‘ vSiidra’ can moreover be made to agree with the con¬ text in which it occurs in the following manner. When CanaiTuti Pautraya;za heard himself spoken of with dis¬ respect by the flamingo ( £ How can you speak of him, being what he is, as if he were like Raikva with the car? 5 IV, 1,3), grief (ju£) arose in his mind, and to that grief the rzshi Raikva alludes with the word.Sudra, in order to show thereby his knowledge of what is remote. This explanation must be ac¬ cepted because a (real) born.Sudra is not qualified (for the sa^varga-vidya). If it be asked how the grief (suk) which had arisen in Gana.rruti*s mind can be referred to by means of the word 5 udra, we reply: On account of the rushing on (adravaTza) of the grief. For we may etymologise the word vSudra by dividing it into its parts, either as ‘ he rushed into grief’ (.Sudani abhidudrava) or as ‘grief rushed on 1 The Siidra not having acquired a knowledge of Vedic matters in the legitimate way, i. e. through the study of the Veda under the guidance of a guru, is unfit for sacrifices as well as for vidyd.
2 The linga contained in the word ‘-Siidra’ has no proving power as it occurs in an arthavada-passage which has no authority if not connected with a corresponding injunctive passage. In our case the linga in the arthavada-passage is even directly contradicted by those injunctions which militate against the -Sudras’ qualification for Vedic matters.
[ 34 ] Q him/ or as c he in his grief rushed to Raikva; ’ while on the other hand it is impossible to accept the word in its ordinary conventional sense. The circumstance (of the king actually being grieved) is moreover expressly touched upon in the legend 1.
35. And because the kshattriyahood (of ^ctnamiti) is understood from the inferential mark (supplied by his being mentioned) later on with ATaitraratha (who was a kshattriya himself).
Ganamiti cannot have been a Sudra by birth for that reason also that his being a kshattriya is understood from an inferential sign, viz. his being mentioned together (in one chapter) with the kshattriya ATaitraratha Abhipratarin. For, later on, i. e. in the passage complementary to the sawvargavidyd, a kshattriya ATaitrarathi Abhipratarin is glorified, ‘Once while Saunaka K&peya and Abhipratarin KAkshaseni were being waited on at their meal a religious student begged of them 5 ( Kh. Up. IV, 3, 5). That this Abhipratarin was a Afaitrarathi (i.e. a descendant of ATitraratha) we have to infer from his connexion with a Kapeya. For we know (from 5 ruti) about the connexion of ATitraratha himself with the Kapeyas (‘ the Kctpeyas made ATitraratha perform that sacrifice;’ T&ndya. Br. XX, 12, 5), and as a rule sacrifices of one and the same family employ officiating priests of one and the same family. Moreover, as we understand from Scripture (‘from him a ATaitrarathi descended who was a prince 2 * * ’) that he (ATaitraratha) was a prince, we must 1 Ha/rasavaky&d dtmano^nadaraw jrutva ^namite^ sug ut> pannety etad eva katha m gamy ate yenasau.yfidra^abdena su^yate tatraha sprz'jyate keti. Ananda Giri.
2 I translate this passage as I find it in all MSS. of -Sankara consulted by me (noting, however, that some MSS. read /fcaitrarathinamaika^). Ananda Giri expressly explains tasmad by /ritraratMd ity artha^.—The text of the Ta«</ya Br. runs: tasmad ^aitrarathinam eka^ kshatrapatir gayate, and the commentary explains: tasm&t kdrawad adyapi ^itravamotpannanazra madhye eka eva ra^a kshatraunderstand him to have been a kshattriya. The fact now of (Janajruti being praised in the same vidyi with the kshattriya Abhipratirin intimates that the former also was a kshattriya. For as a rule equals are mentioned together with equals. That (Jana^ruti was a kshattriya we more¬ over conclude from his sending his door-keeper and from other similar signs of power (mentioned in the text).— Hence the.Stidras are not qualified (for the knowledge of Brahman).
36. On account of the reference to ceremonial purifications (in the case of the higher castes) and on account of their absence being declared (in the case of the.Sudras).
That the.Sftdras are not qualified, follows from that circumstance also that in different places of the vidy&s such ceremonies as the upanayana and the like are referred to. Compare, for instance,.Sat. Br. XI, 5, 3, 13, ‘He initiated him as a pupil;’ Kh. Up. VII, 1, 1, ‘Teach me, Sir! thus he approached him;’ Pra. Up. I, 1, ‘Devoted to Brahman, firm in Brahman, seeking for the highest Brahman they, carrying fuel in their hands, approached the venerable Pippal&da, thinking that he would teach them all that.’— Thus the following passage also, ‘ He without having made them undergo the upanayana (said) to them’ (Kh. Up. V, 11, 7), shows that the upanayana is a well-established cere¬ mony 1.—With reference to the 6udras, on the other hand, the absence of ceremonies is frequently mentioned; so, for instance, Manu X, 4, where they are spoken of as ‘onceborn ’ only (‘the.Stidra is the fourth caste, once-born ’), and Manu X, 126, ‘ In the.Sudra there is not any sin, and he is not fit for any ceremony.’
patir baladhipatir bhavati.—Grammar does not authorise the form ^aitraratha used in the Sfitra.
1 The king A,rvapati receives some Brdhmawas as his pupils without insisting on the upanayana. This express statement of the upanayana having been omitted in a certain case shows it to be the general rule.
Q 2 37. And on account of (Gautama) proceeding (to initiate Gabala) on the ascertainment of (his) not being that (i.e. a 6udra).
The Gtidras are not qualified for that reason also that Gautama, having ascertained Gabala not to be a Gfidra from his speaking the truth, proceeded to initiate and instruct him. ‘None who is not a Brahma^a would thus speak out. Go and fetch fuel, friend, I shall initiate you. You have not swerved from the truth 5 (Kk. Up. IV, 4, 5) 5 w’hich scriptural passage furnishes an inferential sign (of the Gfidras not being capable of initiation).
38. And on account of the prohibition, in Srimti, of (the 6udras’) hearing and studying (the Veda) and (knowing and performing) (Vedic) matters.
The vSfidras are not qualified for that reason also that Snmti prohibits their hearing the Veda, their studying the Veda, and their understanding and performing Vedic matters. The prohibition of hearing the Veda is conveyed by the following passages: ‘ The ears of him who hears the Veda are to be filled with (molten) lead and lac, 5 and ‘ For a wSudra is (like) a cemetery, therefore (the Veda) is not to be read in the vicinity of a.Sudra. 5 From this latter passage the prohibition of studying the Veda results at once; for how should he study Scripture in whose vicinity it is not even to be read? There is, moreover, an express prohibition (of the vSfidras studying the Veda). ‘ His tongue is to be slit if he pronounces it; his body is to be cut through if he preserves it.’ The prohibitions of hearing and studying the Veda already imply the prohibition of the knowledge and performance of Vedic matters; there are, however, express prohibitions also, such as ‘he is not to impart knowledge to the 6udra, 5 and ‘ to the twice-born belong study, sacrifice, and the bestowal of gifts. 5 —From those 6udras, however, who, like Vidura and ‘the religious hunter, 5 acquire knowledge in consequence of the after effects of former deeds, the fruit of their knowledge cannot be withheld, since knowledge in all cases brings about its fruit.
Smrzti, moreover, declares that all the four castes are qualified for acquiring the knowledge of the itihasas and purazzas; compare the passage, c He is to teach the four castes’ (Mahabh.).—It remains, however, a settled point that they do not possess any such qualification with regard to the Veda.
39. (The pr&zza is Brahman), on account of the trembling (predicated of the whole world).
The discussion of qualification for Brahma-knowledge— on which we entered as an opportunity offered—being finished we return to our chief topic, i. e. the enquiry into the purport of the Vedanta-texts.—We read (Ka. Up. II, 6, 2), ‘ Whatever there is, the whole world when gone forth trembles in the prazza. It (the prazza) is a great terror, a raised thunderbolt. Those who know it become immortal V —This passage declares that this whole world trembles, abiding in prazza, and that there is raised something very terrible, called a thunderbolt, and that through its knowledge immortality is obtained. But as it is not immediately clear what the prazza is, and what that terrible thunderbolt, a discussion arises.
The purvapakshin maintains that, in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the term, pr&zza denotes the air with its five modifications, that the word ‘ thunderbolt’ also is to be taken in its ordinary sense, and that thus the whole passage contains a glorification of air. For, he says, this whole world trembles, abiding within air with its five forms —which is here called prazza—and the terrible thunderbolts also spring from air (or wind) as their cause. For in the air, people say, when it manifests itself in the form of Par^anya, lightning, thunder, rain, and thunderbolts manifest themselves.—Through the knowledge of that air immortality 1 As the words stand in the original they might be translated as follows (and are so translated by the pftrvapakshin), ‘ Whatever there is, the whole world trembles in the piazza, there goes forth (from it) a great terror, viz. the raised thunderbolt.’
vedAnta-sCtras.
also can be obtained; for another scriptural passage says, 4 Air is everything by itself, and air is all things together. He who knows this conquers death.’—We therefore con¬ clude that the same air is to be understood in the passage under discussion.
To this we make the following reply.—Brahman only can be meant, on account of what precedes as well as what follows. In the preceding as well as the subsequent part of the chapter Brahman only is spoken of; how then can it be supposed that in the intermediate part all at once the air should be referred to? The immediately preceding passage runs as follows, 4 That only is called the Bright, that is called Brahman, that alone is called the Immortal. All worlds are contained in it, and no one goes beyond it.’ That the Brahman there spoken of forms the topic of our passage also, we conclude, firstly, from proximity; and, secondly, from the circumstance that in the clause, 4 The whole world trembles in pra^a/ we recognise a quality of Brahman, viz. its constituting the abode of the whole world. That the word prcbza can denote the highest Self also, appears from such passages as ‘the prd^a of prd/za’ (Brz.
Up. IV, 4, 18). Being the cause of trembling, moreover, is a quality which properly appertains to the highest Self only, not to mere air. Thus Scripture says, 4 No mortal lives by the pra^a and the breath that goes down. We live by another in whom these two repose’ (Ka. Up. II, 5, 5). And also in the passage subsequent to the one under discussion, ( 4 From terror of it fire burns, from terror the sun burns, from terror Indra and Viyu, and Death as the fifth run away,’) Brahman, and not the air, must be sup¬ posed to be spoken of, since the subject of that passage is represented as the cause of fear on the part of the whole world inclusive of the air itself. Thence we again conclude that the passage under discussion also refers to Brahman, firstly, on the ground of proximity; and, secondly, because we recognise a quality of Brahman, viz. its being the cause of fear, in the words, 4 A great terror, a raised thunderbolt.’ The word 4 thunderbolt ’ is here used to denote a cause of fear in general. Thus in ordinary life also a man strictly 23I carries out a king’s command because he fearfully considers in his mind, ‘ A thunderbolt (i. e. the king’s wrath, or threatened punishment) is hanging over my head; it might fall if I did not carry out his command.’ In the same manner this whole world inclusive of fire, air, sun, and so on, regularly carries on its manifold functions from fear of Brahman; hence Brahman as inspiring fear is compared to a thunderbolt. Similarly, another scriptural passage, whose topic is Brahman, declares, ‘From terror of it the wind blows, from terror the sun rises; from terror of it Agni and Indra, yea, Death runs as the fifth.’—That Brahman is what is referred to in our passage, further follows from the declara¬ tion that the fruit of its cognition is immortality. For that immortality is the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman is known, for instance, from the mantra, ‘ A man who knows him only passes over death, there is no other path to go ’ (vSVet. Up. VI, 15).—That immortality which the purvapakshin asserts to be sometimes represented as the fruit of the knowledge of the air is a merely relative one; for there (i.e. in the chapter from which the passage is quoted) at first the highest Self is spoken of, by means of a new topic being started (B ri. Up. Ill, 4), and thereupon the inferior nature of the air and so on is referred to. (‘Everything else is evil.’)—That in the passage under discussion the highest Self is meant appears finally from the general subjectmatter; for the question (asked by Na^iketas in I, 3, 14, ‘ That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future tell me that ’) refers to the highest Self.
40. The light (is Brahman), on account of that (Brahman) being seen (in the scriptural passage).
We read in Scripture, ‘ Thus does that serene being, arising from this body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest light’ (Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3). Here the doubt arises whether the word ‘ light ’ denotes the (physical) light, which is the object of sight and dispels dark¬ ness, or the highest Brahman.
The pfirvapakshin maintains that the word c light 5 denotes the well-known (physical) light, because that is the conven¬ tional sense of the world. For while it is to be admitted that in another passage, discussed under I, i, 24, the word ‘light’ does, owing to the general topic of the chapter, divest itself of its ordinary meaning and denote Brahman, there is in our passage no similar reason for setting the ordinary meaning aside. Moreover, it is stated in the chapter treating of the naafts of the body, that a man going to final release reaches the sun (‘ When he departs from this body then he departs upwards by those very rays; ’ Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 5). Hence we conclude that the word ‘light 5 denotes, in our passage, the ordinary light.
To this we make the following reply.—The word ‘light’ can denote the highest Brahman only, on account of that being seen. We see that in the whole chapter Brahman is carried on as the topic of discussion. For the Self, which is free from sin, &c. is introduced as the general subjectmatter in VIII, 7,1 (‘ the Self which is free from sin ’); it is thereupon set forth as that which is to be searched out and to be understood (VIII, 7, 1); it is carried on by means of the clauses, ‘I shall explain that further to you’ (VIII, 9, 3 ff.); after that freedom from body is said to belong to it, because it is one with light (‘ when he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him, 5 VIII, 12, 1)— and freedom from body is not possible outside Brahman— and it is finally qualified as ‘the highest light, the highest person 5 (VIII, 12, 3).—Against the statement, made by the purvapakshin, that Scripture speaks of a man going to re¬ lease as reaching the sun, we remark that the release there referred to is not the ultimate one, since it is said to be con¬ nected with going and departing upwards. That the ulti¬ mate release has nothing to do with going and departing upwards we shall show later on.
41. The ether is (Brahman), as it is designated as something different, &c. (from name and form).
Scripture says, ‘ He who is called ether (aka.s*a) is the revealer of all forms and names. That within which these