for their own fake, and who pra&ifeth virtue from no other motive but the fole love of her own innate beauty. That philofopher obferves, likewife, that there is a certain political habit, fuch as the Spartans, and others had, who thought virtue was to be valued and pradUfed on account of the natural advantages that attend it. For which reafon, he adds, they are indeed good men, but they have not the halohagathia, or fupreme confummate virtue.
From hence it is plain that, according to Arijlotle, a man may be a good man, without believing virtue its own reward, or being only moved to virtue by the fenfe of moral beauty. It is alfo plain, that he diftinguifheth the political virtue of nations, which the public is every where concerned to maintain, from this fublime and fpeculative kind. It might alfo be obferved, that this exalted idea did confift with fuppofing a Providence, which infpec~ts and rewards the virtues of the beft men. For, faith he in another place, # if the gods have any care of human affairs, as it appears they have, it mould feem reafonable to fuppofe, that they are moil delighted with the mod excellent nature, and mod approaching their own, which is the mind, and that they will reward thofe who chiefly love and cultivate what is moft dear to them. The fame philofopher obferves, f that the bulk of mankind are not naturally difpofed to be awed by (hame, but by fear: nor to abftain from vicious practices, on account of their deformity, but only of the punifhment which attends them. And again, % he tells us, that youth, being of itfelf averfe from abftinence and fobriety, mould be under the reftraint of laws, regulating their education and employment, and that the fame difcipline mould be continued even after they became men. For which, faith he, we want laws, and, in one word, for the whole ordering of life: inafmuch as the generality of mankind obey rather force than reafon, and arc influenced rather by penalties, than the beauty of virtue; Zemiais e to kalo. From all which it is very plain, what Arijlotle would have thought of thofe, who fhould go about to lefTen or deftroy the hopes and fears of mankind, in order to make them virtuous on this fole principle of the beauty of virtue.
XIV. Alc. — But, whatever the Stagirite and his peripatetics might think, is it not certain the ftoics maintained this doctrine in its higheft fenfe, aflerting the beauty of virtue to be all-fufficient j that virtue was her own reward •, that this alone could make a man happy, in fpite of all thofe things which are vulgarly efteemed the greateft. woes and miferies of human life? And all this they held at the fame time that they believed the foul of man to be of a corporeal nature, and in death difTipated like a flame or vapour.
Cri. — It mult be owned, the ftoics fomctimes talk,, as if they believed the mortality of the foul. Seneca, in a letter of his to Luci/ius, {peaks much like a Minute Philofopher, in this particular. But in feveral other places, he declares himfelf of a clear contrary opinion, affirming, that the fouls of men, after death, mount aloft into the heavens, look down upon earth, entertain themfelves with the theory of celeftial bodies, the courfe of nature, and the converfation of wife and excellent men, who having lived in diftant ages and countries upon earth, make one fociety in the other world. It muft alfo be acknowledged, that Marcus A?itoninus fometimes fpeaks of the foul, as perifhing, or diffolving into its elementary parts: But it is to be noted, that he diftinguifheth three principles in the compofition of human nature, the foma, pfuche, nous, * body, foul, mind, or, as he otherwife exprefieth himfelf, far kid, pneumatiotiy and egemonihn, flefh fpirit, and governing principle. What he calls the pfuche, or foul, containing i44 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial, m.]
the brutal part of our nature, is indeed reprefented as a compound diflbluble, and actually diflblved by death: But the nous, or to egemonikon, the mind, or ruling principle, he held to be of a pure celeftial nature, theou apospafma% a particle of God, which he fends back intire to the ftars and the Divinity. Befides, among all his magnificent leflbns, and fplendid fentiments, upon the force and beauty of virtue, he is pofitive as to the being of God, and that not merely as a plaftic nature, or foul of the world, but in the ftricl: fenfe of a Providence, in fpe&ing and taking care of human affairs. * The ftoics, therefore, though their (tile was high, and often above truth and nature, yet it cannot be faid, that they fo refolved every motive to a virtuous life into the fole beauty of virtue, as to endeavor to deftroy the belief of the immortality of the foul, and a diftributive Providence. After all, allowing the difinterefted ftoics (therein not unlike our modern quietifts) to have made virtue its own fole reward, in the moll rigid and abfolute fenfe, yet what is this to thofe who are no ftoics? If we adopt the whole principles of that feci:, admitting their notions of good and evil, their celebrated apathy, and, in one word, fetting up for complete ftoics, we may poflibly maintain this doctrine with a better grace: at lead, it will be of a piece, and confident with the whole. But he who (hall borrow this fplendid patch from the ftoics, and hope to make a figure by inferting it in a piece of modern compofition, feafoned with the wit and notions of thefe times, will indeed make a figure, but perhaps it may not be, in the eyes of a wife man, the figure he intended.
XV. Though it muft be owned, the prefent age is very indulgent to every thing that aims at profane raillery; which is alone fufficient to recommend any fantaftical compofition to the public. You may behold the tinfel of a modern author pafs upon this knowing and learned age for good writing •, afTe&ed ftrains for wit; pedantry for politenefs; obfcurities for depths *, ramhjmgs for nights; the moft aukward imitation for original humor; an,d all this upon the fole merit of a little artful profanenefs.
Alc. — Every one is not alike pleated with writings of humor, nor alike capable of them. It is the fine irony of an author of quality, ' That certain reverend authors, 'who can condefcend to lay-wit, are nicely qualified to hit f the air of breeding and gentility, and that they will in * time, no doubt, refine their manner to the edification of * the polite world; who have been fo long feduced, by ' the way of raillery, and wit.' The truth is, the various tafte of readers, requireth various kinds of writers. Our feci hath provided for this, with great judgment. To profelyte the graver fort, we have certain profound men at reafon and argument. For the coffee-houfes, and populace, we have declaimers of a copious vein. Of fuch a writer, it is no reproach to fay, jiuit lutukntus,« he is the fitter for his readers. Then, for men of rank and politenefs, we have the fined, and wittieft Railleurs in the world, whofe ridicule, is the lure teft of truth.
. Euph. — Tell me, AiciphroTi, are thofe ingenious Rail* teursy men of knowledge?
Alc. — Very knowing.
Euph. — Do they know, for inflance, the Copernfcan fyftem, or the circulation of the blood?
Alc. — One would think vou judged of our feci, by your country neighbors: There is nobody in town, but knows all thofe points.
Euph. — You believe then, antipodes, mountains in the moon, and the motion of the earth.
Alc— We do.
Euph. — Suppofe, five or fix cent, a man had stained thefe notions. efpr'Us oi Englifj court y how do you think they would have been received?
Alc. — With great ridicule.
Euph. — And now it would be ridiculous to ridicule them.
Alc. — It would.
Euph. — But truth was the fame, then and now.
Alc— It was.
Euph. — It mould feem, therefore, that ridicule is no fuch fovereign touchftone, and teft of truth, as you gentlemen imagine.
Alc. — One thing we know: Our raillery and farcafms gall the black tribe, and that is our comfort.
Cri. — There is another thing, it might be worth your while to know: That men, in a laughing fit, may applaud a ridicule, which mall appear contemptible when they come to themfelves: Witnefs the ridicule of Socrates by the comic poet, the humour and reception it met with, no more proving that, than the fame will your's, to be juft, when calmly conlidered by men of fenfe.
Alc — After all, thus much is certain, our ingenious men make converts by deriding the principles of religion. And, take my word, it is the raoft iiiccefsful and pleafing method of conviction. Thefe authors laugh men out of their religion, as Horace did out of their vices: Admifli circum prxcordia ludunt. But a bigot cannot relifti or find out their wit.
XVI. Cri. Wit without wifdom, if there be fuch a thing, is hardly worth finding. And, as for the wifdom of thefe men, it is of a kind fo peculiar, one may well fufpe£t it. Cicero was a man of fenfe, and no bigot, neverthelefs he makes Scipw own himfelf much more vigilant and vigorous in the race of virtue, from fuppofmg heaven the prize.* And he introduceth Cato declaring, he would never have undergone thofe virtuous toils for the fervice of the public, if he had thought his being was to end with this life.f * Somn. Scipionis. f De Sene&ute.
Alc— — I acknowledge Cato, Scipio, and Cicero, were very well for their times: But you mult pardon me, if I do not think they arrived at the high confummate virtue of our modern free-thinkers.
Euph. — It mould feem then, that virtue flourifheth more than ever among us.
Alc. — It mould.
Euph. — And this abundant virtue is owing to the method taken by your profound writers to recommend it.
Alc — This I grant.
Euph. — But you have acknowledged, that the enthufiaflic lovers of virtue are not the many of your feet, but only a few fele£t fpirits. To which Alclphrcn making no anfwer, Crito addrefled himfelf to Euphranor: To make, faid he, a true eftimate of the worth and growth of modern virtue, you are not to count the virtuous men, but rather to confider the quality of their virtue. Now you rauft know, the virtue of thefe refined theorifts is fomething fo pure and genuine, that a very little goes far, and, is in truth, invaluable. To which that reafonable, interested virtue, of the old EngUJh, or Spartan kind, can bear no proportion.
Euph. — Tell me, Alciphron, are there not difeafes of the foul, as well as of the body?
Alc — Without doubt.
Euph. — And are not thofe difeafes, vicious habits?
Alc — They are.
Euph. — And, as bodily diflempers are cured by phyfic, thofe of the mind are cured by philofophy: are they not?
Alc— -I acknowledge it.
Euph. — It feems, therefore, that philofophy is a medicine for the foul of man.
Alc — It is.
Euph. — How fhall we be able to judge of medicines, or know which to prefer? Is it not from the effects wrought by them?
Alc — Doubtlefs.
MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. III.]
Euph.— - Where an epidemical diftemper rages, fuppofe a new phyfician mould condemn the known eftablifhed practice, and recommend another method of cure: would you not, in proportion as the bills of mortality increafed* be tempted to fufpecT this new method, notwithstanding all the plaufible difcourfe of its abettors?
Alc. — This ferves only to amufe and lead us from the 'on.
Cm.— It puts me in mind of my friend, Lnmprccles^ who needed but one argument againft infidels. I obferved, faid he, that, as infidelity grew, there grew corruption of every kind, and new vices. This fimple obfervation, on matter of fa£t, v/as fufficient to make him, notwithstanding the remonftrance of feveral ingenious men, imbue and feafon the minds of his children betimes with the principles of religion. The new theories, which our acute moderns have endeavored to fubftitute in place of religion, have had their fullcourfe in theprefent age, and produced their e£Fec?c on the minds and manners of men. That men are men, is a fure maxim: But it is as fure, that Engujlmien are not the fame men they were: whether better or worfe, more or lefs virtuous, I need not fay. Every one may fee and judge. Though, indeed, after Arijlides had been banifned, and Socrates put to death at Athens^ a man, without being a conjurer, migltt guefs what the beauty of. virtue could do in England. But there is now neither room nor occafion for gueffing. We have our own experience to open our eyes 5 which yet if we continue to keep fhut, till the remains of religious education are quite worn off from the minds of men; it is to ared we fhall then open them wide, not to avoid, but to behold and lament our ruin.
Alc. — Be the confequences what they will, I can never bring myfelf to be of a mind with thole, who meafure truth by convenience. Truth is the only that I adore.
Wherever truth leads- I fhall follow.
[Dial, in.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 149 Euph. — You have then a paffion for truth?
Alc. — Undoubtedly.
Euph.— For all truths?
Alc. — For all.
Euph. — To know, or to publifh them?
Alc— Both.
Eupk. — What! would you undeceive a child that was taking plryfic? would you officioufly fet an enemy right, that was making a wrong attack? would you help an enraged man to his fword?
Alc. — In fiich cafes, common fenfe directs one how to behave.
Euph. — Common fenfe, it feems then, muft be confuted, whether a truth be falutary, or hurtful, fit to be declared, or concealed.
Alc. — How! you would have me conceal, and ftifie the truth, and keep it to myfeif? Is this what you aim at?
Euph. — I only make a plain inference from what you grant. As for myfeif, I do not believe your opinions true. And, although you dot you mould not, therefore, if you would appear confident with yourfelf, think it neceflary, or wife, to publifn hurtful truths. "What fervice can it do mankind, to 'leflen the motives to virtue, or what damage to increafe them?
Alc. — None in the world. But I muft needs fay, I cannot reconcile the received notions of a God, and Providence, to my underftanding, and my nature abhors the bafcnefs of conniving at a falfhood.
Euph. — Shall we,- therefore, appeal to truth, and examine the reafons, by which you are withheld from believing thefe points?
Alc. — With all my heart, but enough for the prefent. We will make this the fubjecl: of our next, conference.
THE FOURTH DIALOGUE.
I. Prejudices concerning a Deity. II. Rules laid down by Alciphron, to be obferved in proving a God. III. What fort of Proof he expetls. IV. Whence we collecl the Being of other Thinking Individuals. V. The fame Method a fortiori proves the being of a God. VI. AlciphronV fecond Thoughts on this Point. VII. God /peaks to Men. VIII. How Diflance is perceived by Sight. IX. The proper Objetls of Sight at no diflance. X. Lights, Shades, and Colours, varioufy combined, form a Language. XI. The Signification of this Language learned by Experience. XII. God explaineth himfelf to the eyes of Men by the arbitrary Ufe of fenfble Signs. XIII. The Prejudice and Hue fold AfpeEl of a Minute Philofopher. XIV. Godprefent to Mankind, informs, admoni/hes, and direcls them in a fenfble manner. XV. Admirable Nature and Ufe of this vifual Language. XVI. Minute Philofopher s content to admit a God in certain Senfes. XVII. Opinion offome, who hold that Knowledge and Wifdom are not properly in God. XVIII. Dangerous Tendency of this Notion. XIX. Its Original. XX. The Senfe of Schoolmen upon it. XXI. Scholafic Ufe of the Terms, Analogy and. Analogical, explained: Analogical Perfections of God mifunderfood. XXII. God intelligent, wife and good, in the proper Senfe of the Words. XXIII. ObjeBion from moral Evil confidered. XXIV. Men argue from their own Defects againfl a Deity. XXV. Religious Wafhip reafonable and expedient.
LE LE ARLY the next morning, as I looked out of my window, I faw Alciphron walking in the garden, with all the figns of a man in deep thought. Upon which I went down to him. Alciphron, faid I, this early and profound meditation puts me in no fmall fright. How fo! Becaufe I mould be forry to be convinced there was no God. The thought of anarchy in nature is to me more (hocking than in civil life: inafmuch as natural concerns are more important than civil, and the bafis of all others. I grant, replied Alciphron, that fome inconvenience may poflibly follow from difproving a God: but, as to what you fay of fright and mocking, all that is nothing but prejudice, mere prejudice. Men frame an idea, or chimera, in their own minds, and then fall down and worfhip it. Notions govern mankind: but, of all notions, that of God's governing the world, hath taken the deepeft root, and fpread the farthefl: It is therefore, in philofophy, an heroical atchievment to difpoflefs this imaginary monarch of his government, and banifh all thofe fears and fpe&res, which the light ©f reafon alone can difpel; Non radii foils, non lucida tela diet Difcutiunt, fed nature f pedes raticque. * My part, faid I, {hall be to ftandby, as I have hitherto done, and takes notes of all that pafleth during this memorable event: while a Minute Philofopher, not fix foot high, attempts to dethrone the Monarch of the univerfe. Alas! replied Alciphron, arguments are not to be meafured by feet and inches. One man may fee more than a million: and a fhort argument, managed by a freethinker, may be fufficient to overthrow the moil gigantic chimera. As we were engaged in this difcourfe, Crito * Lucretius.
i$z MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IV] and Euphranor joined us. I find you have been beforehand with us to-day, faid Crito to Alciphron, and taken the advantage of folitude and early hours, while Euphranor and I v/ere afleep in our beds. We may, therefore, expe£t to fee atheifm placed in its beft light, and fupported by the ftrongeft arguments.
II. Alc — The being of a God is a fubjecT: upon which there has been a world of common-place, which it is needlefs to repeat. Give me leave, therefore, to lay down certain rules and limitations, in order to fhorten our prefent conference. For, as the end of debating is to perfuade, all thofe things which are foreign to this end, fhould be left out of our debate. Firft then, let me tell you, I am not to be perfuaded by metaphyseal arguments •, fuch, for inftance, as are drawn from the idea of an all-perfecl; Being, or the abfurdity of an infinite progreflion of caufes. This fort of arguments I have always found dry and jejune: and, as they are not fuited to my way of thinking, they may, perhaps, puzzle, but never will convince me. Secondly, I am not to be perfuaded by the authority either of paft or prefent ages, of mankind in general, or of particular wife men: all which paffeth for little or nothing with a man of found argument and free thought.
Thirdly, all proofs drawn from utility, or convenience, are foreign to the purpofe. They may prove, indeed, the ufefulnefs of the notion, but not the exiftenee of' the thing. Whatever legiflators or ftatefmen may think, truth and convenience are very different things to the rigorous eyes of a philofophcr. And now, that I may not feem partial, I will limit myfelf, alfo, not to object, in the firft place, from any thing that may feem irregular, or unaccountable in the works' of nature, againft a caufe of infinite power and wifdom: becaufe I already, know the anfwer vou would make, to wit, that no one can. judge of the fymmetry and ufe of the parts of an infinite machine, which are all relative to each other, and to the whole, without being able to comprehend the entire machine, or the whole univerfe. And, in the fecond place, I (hall engage myfelf not to obje£t againft the justice, and providence of a Supreme Being, from the evil that befalls good men, and the profperity which is often the portion of wicked men in this life: becaufe I know that, inftead of admitting this to be an objection againft a Deity, you would make it an argument for a future ftate; in which there fhall be fuch a retribution of rewards and punifhments, as may vindicate the divine attributes, and fet all things right in the end. Now thefe anfwers, though they mould be admitted for good ones, are, in truth, no proofs of the being of a God, but only folutions of certain difficulties which might be objected, fuppofing it already proved by proper arguments. Thus much I thought fit to premife, in order to fave time and trouble both to you, and myfelf.
Cri. — I think that, as the proper end of our conference ought to be fuppofed the difcovery and defence of truth, fo truth may be juftified, not only by perfuading its adverfaries, but, where that cannot be done, by mewing them to be unreafonable. Arguments, therefore, which carry light, have their effec~t, even againft an opponent who fhuts his eyes, becaufe they (hew him to be obftinate and prejudiced. Befides, this diftin£tion between arguments that puzzle, and that convince, is leaft of all, obferved by Minute Philofophers, and need not, therefore^ be obferved by others, in their favor. But, perhaps, Euphranor may be willing to encounter you on your own terms, in which cafe I have nothing farther to fay.
III. Euph. — Alciphron a&s like a fkilful general, who is bent upon gaining the advantage of the ground, and alluring the enemy out of their trenches. We, who believe a God, are intrenched within tradition, cuftom, au- U thority and law. And neverthelefs, inftead of attempting to force us, he propofes that we fhould voluntarily, abandon thefe intrenchments, and make the attack: when we may ae~l on the defenfive with much fecurity and eafe, leaving him the trouble to difpoflefs us, of what we need not refign. Thofe reafons (continued he, addreffing himfelf to Alciphron) which you have muttered up in this morning's meditation, if they do not weaken, muft eftablifh our belief of a God: For the utmoft is to be expected from fo great a matter in his profeffion, when he fets his ftrength to a point.
Alc. — I hold the confufed notion of a Deity, or fome invifible power, to be, of all prejudices, the molt unconquerable. When half a dozen ingenious men are got together over a glafs of wine, by a chearful fire, in a room well-lighted; we banilh with eafe all the fpe&res of fancy, or education, and are very clear in our decifions. But as I was taking a folitary walk before it was broad day-light, in yonder grove, methought the point was not quite fo clear: nor could I readily recollect the force of thofe arguments, which ufed to appear fo conclufive at other times. I had, I know not, what awe upon my mind, and feemed haunted by a fort of panic, which I cannot otherwife account for, than by fuppofing it the effe£t of prejudice: For you muft know, that I, like the reft of the world, was once upon a time, catechifed, and tutored into the belief of a God, or Spirit. There is no furer mark of prejudice, than the believing a thing without reafon. What neceffity then can there be that I mould fet myfelf the difficult talk of proving a negative, when it is fufficient to obferve, that there is no proof of the affirmative, and that the admitting it without proof is unreafonable? prove, therefore, your opinion, or, if you cannot, you may indeed remain in porTeffion of it, but you will only be poffefled of a prejudice.
Euph.— O Alciphron I to content you, we muft prove, [Dial. IV.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. i55 it feems, and we muft prove upon your own terms. But, in the firft place, let us fee what fort of proof you expect.
Alc. — Perhaps I may not expect it, but I will tell you what fort of proof I would have: And that is, in fhort, fuch proof, as every man of fenfe requires of a matter of fa£t, or the exiftence of aciy other particular thing. For inftance, fhould a man afk^why I believe there is a king of Great Britain P I might anfwer, becaufe I had feen him: Or a king of Spain P becaufe I had feen thofe who faw him. But as for this king of kings, I neither faw him myfelf, nor any one elfe, that ever did fee him. Surely if there be fuch a thing as God, it is very ftrange that he fhould leave himfelf without a witnefs; that men fhould ftill difpute his being; and that there fhould be no one evident, fenfible, plain proof of it, without recourfe to philofophy or metaphyfics. A matter of fact is not to be proved by notions, but by fa£ts. This is clear and full to the point. You fee what I would be at. Upon thefe principles I defy fuperftition.
Euph.— You believe then, as far as you can fee.
Alc. — That is my rule of faith.
Euph. — How! will you not believe the exiftence of things which you hear, unlefs you alfo fee them?
Alc — I will not fay fo neither. When I infilled on feeing, I would be underftood to mean perceiving in general. Outward objects make very different impreflions upon the animal fpirits, all which are comprifed under the common name of fenfe. And whatever we can perceive by any fenfe we may be fure of.
IV. Euph. — What! do you believe then there are fuch things as animal fpirits?
Alc- — Doubtlefs.
Euph. — By what fenfe, do you perceive them?
Alc. — I do not perceive immediately by any of my fenfes. I am neverthelefs perfuaded of their exiftence, bei$6 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IV.]
caufe I can collect it from their effects and operations. They are the meffengers, which, running to and fro in the nerves, preferve a communication between the foul and outward objects.
Euph.— You admit then, the being of a foul.
Alc. — Provided I do not admit an immaterial fubftance, I fee no inconvenience in admitting there may be fuch a thing as a foul. And this may be no more than a thin fine texture of fubtile parts, or fpirits, refiding in the brain.
Euph. — I do not afk about its nature. I only aik whether you admit that there is a principle of thought and action, and whether it be perceivable by fenfe.
Alc. — I grant that there is fuch a principle, and that it is not the object of fenfe itfelf, but inferred from appearances which are perceived by fenfe..
Euph. — If I underftand you rightly, from animal functions and motions, you infer the exiftence of animal fpirits; and from reafonable acts you infer the exiftence of a reasonable foul. Is it not fo?
Alc — It is.
Euph. — It fhould feem therefore, that the being of things, imperceptible to fenfe, may be collected from effects and figns, or fenfible tokens.
Alc. — It may.
Euph. — Tell me, Alciphron, is not the foul that which makes the principal diftinctio.n between a real perfon and a fhadow, a living man and a carcafs?
Alc. — -I grant it is.
Euph. — I cannot, therefore, know that you, for inftance, are a diftinct thinking individual, or a living real man, by furer, or other figns, than thofe from which it can be inferred that you have a foul.
Alc — You cannot.
Euph. — Pray tell me, are not all acts, immediately and properly perceived by fer.fe, reducible to motion?
Alc — Thev are.
[Dial. IV.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. i57 Euph. — Prom motions therefore, you infer a mover, or caufe: And from reafonable motions (or fuch as appear calculated for a reafonable end) a rational caufe, foul, or fpirit.
Alc. — Even fo.
V. Euph. The foul of man actuates but a fmall body, an infignificant particle, in refpe£r. of the great mafies of nature, the elements, and heavenly bodies, and the fyftem of the world. And the wifdom that appears in thofe motions, which are the effetl: of human reafon, is incomparably lefs than that which difcovers itfelf, in the ftructure and ufe of organized natural bodies, animal or vegetable. A man, with his hand, can make no machine fo admirable as the hand itfelf: Nor can any of thofe motions, by which we trace out human reafon, approach the fkill and contrivance of thofe wonderful motions of the heart, and brain, and other vital parts, which do not depend on the will of man.
Alc. — AIL this is true.
Euph. — Doth it not follow then, that from natural motions, independent of man's will, may be inferred both power and wifdom, incomparably greater than that of the human foul?
Alc. — It fhould feem fo.
Euph. — Further, is there not, in natural productions and effects, a vifible unity of council and defign? Are not the rules affixed and immoveable? Do not the fame laws of motion obtain throughout? The fame in China and here, the fame two thouftind years ago, and at this day?
Alc — All this I do not deny.
Euph. — Is there not alfo a connexion, or relation, between animals and vegetables; between both and the elements; between the elements and heavenly bodies; fo that, from their mutual refpe&s, influences, fubordina- 158 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IV.]
tions, and ufes, they may be colle&ed to be parts of one whole, confpiring to one and the fame end, and fulfilling the fame defign?
Alc. — Suppofing all this to be true.
Euph. — Will it not then follow, that this vaftly great or infinite power and wifdom, muft be fuppofed in one and the fame agent, fpirit or mind; and that we have, at leaft, as clear, full, and immediate certainty of the being of this infinitely wife and powerful, Spirit, as of any one human foul whatfoever, befides our own?
Alc. — Let me confider: I fufpect we proceed too haftily. What! Do you pretend you can have the fame affurance of the being of God, that you can have of mine, whom you actually fee (land before you, and talk to you?
Euph. — The very fame, if not greater.
Alc — How do you make this appear?
Euph. — By the perfon Alciphrony is meant an individual thinking thing, and not the hair, fkin, or vifible furface, or any part of the outward form, colour, or ihape of Alciphron.
Alc — This I grant.
Euph. — And in granting this, you grant that, irua ftric~t. fenfe, I do not fee Alciphron> i. e. that individual thinking thing, but only fuch vifible figns and tokens, as fuggeft and infer the being of that invifible thinking principle, or foul. Even fo, in the felf fame manner, it feems tome, that though I cannot, with eyes of flefh, behold the invifible God; yet I do, in the ftri&eft fenfe, behold and perceive, by all my fenfes, fuch figns and tokens, fuch effe&s and operations, as fuggeft, indicate, and demon* ftrate an invifible God, as certainly, and with the fame evidence, at leaft, as any other figns, perceived by fenfe, do fugged to me the exiftence of your foul, fpirit, or thinking principle j which I am convinced of only by a few figns or effects, and the motions of one fmali organized body: Whereas I do, at all times, and in all places, [Dial. IV.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. iS9 perceive fenfible figns, which evince the being of God. The point, therefore, doubted or denied by you at the beginning, now feems manifeftly to follow from the premifes. Throughout this whole enquiry, have we not confidered every ftep with care, and made not the leaft advance without clear evidence? You and I examined and affented fingly to each foregoing propofition: What {hall we do then with the conclufion? For my part, if you do not help me out, I find myfelf under an abfolute necefiity of admitting it for true. You muft, therefore, be content, henceforward to bear the blame, if I live and die in the belief of a God.
VI. Alc. — It muft be confeft, I do not readily find an anfwer. There feems to be fome foundation for what you fay. But, on the other hand, if the point was fo clear as you pretend, I cannot conceive how fo many fagacious men, of our fe£l, mould be fo much in the dark, as not to know or believe one fyllable of it.
Euph. — Ozilciphron> it is not our prefent bufinefs to account for the overfights, or vindicate the honor of thofe great men, the free-thinkers, when their very exiftencc is in danger of being called in queftion.
Alc. — How fo?
Euph. — Be pleafed to recollect the conceflions you have made, and then fhe\tf me, if the arguments for a Deity be not conclufive, by what better arguments you can prove the exiftence of that thinking thing, which in ftri&nefs conflitutes the free-thinker.